


UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO



3 1761 01320938 2

HANDBOUND
AT THE



UNIVERSITY OF
TORONTO PRESS

8872

I
76

THE GORGIAS OF PLATO.

БАНДУРОВ

ОПЕРА

ОТДЫХАЮЩИЕ ДЕНЬ

ПРЕДСТАВЛЕНИЕ

Plato. Gorgias

THE

G O R G I A S

OF

P L A T O ,

CHIEFLY ACCORDING TO STALLBAUM'S TEXT;

WITH

N O T E S ,

BY

THEODORE D. WOOLSEY.

Athenis diligentius legi Gorgiam: quo in libro in hoc maxime admirabar Platonem,
quod mihi in oratoribus irridendis ipse esse orator summus videbatur.

CIC. DE ORATORE, I. 11.

NEW EDITION, WITH ADDITIONS.

BOSTON AND CAMBRIDGE:

JAMES MUNROE AND COMPANY.

1848.

Entered according to Act of Congress, in the year 1848, by
JAMES MUNROE AND COMPANY,
in the Clerk's Office of the District Court of the District of Massachusetts.

2792
3/5/1890
6

C A M B R I D G E :
STEREOTYPED AND PRINTED BY
M E T C A L F A N D C O M P A N Y ,
PRINTERS TO THE UNIVERSITY.

TO

PROFESSOR FELTON

OF HARVARD UNIVERSITY

THIS EDITION OF GORGIAS

IS INSCRIBED,

AS A MEMORIAL OF LONG FRIENDSHIP,

BY

THE EDITOR

b

P R E F A C E .

1. THE text of this edition principally follows Stallbaum's, published at Gotha in 1840. After examining the various readings, as Ast has given them, the editor was led to make about forty changes in the text of Stallbaum's first Gotha edition of 1828. On receiving, not very long since, the same critic's second edition of 1840, mentioned above, the editor was pleased to find a large part of these alterations, and nearly all the more important ones, made by Stallbaum himself. A number of others have since been made, in reliance upon Stallbaum's long study of Plato and ability; and the text now differs from his last revision chiefly in the following places.

450, D, my ed. inserts ἡ before ἀριθμητική. — 451, A, I have given οὖν for γενν. — 459, A, τοι γενν δὴ for τοίνυν δὴ. — 460, C, Stallb. has no brackets. — ibid. D, omits the words in brackets. — 461, B, vid. not. — 462, E, Stallb. has ἄρ' for δ'. — 465, B, gives ἐσθῆσιν. — 466, A, omits the words in brackets. — 472, A, has ταῦτα for ταῦτα. — ibid. B, has Πυθοῖ. Vid. not. — ibid. ἔρθαδε. Vid. not. — 480, D, has τοῦτο for τούτῳ. — 481, A, omits αὐτὸν before θαράτον. — 483, E, puts a colon after πλάττοντες. — 491, D, vid. not. — 492, B, omits

the words in brackets. — 494, E, omits *το*. — 496, A, reads ἀνθρωπος. — 497, A, gives καὶ . . . νουθετεῖς to Callicles. Vid. not. — 500, B, brackets κατὰ τὸ σῶμα after μυγεισικήν, which I have omitted. — 505, E, joins οὗτως to the next sentence. — 508, B, inserts *ἀθλοι*. — 514, C, I have bracketed ὥφ'. — 522, C, have given οὗτως. Vid. not. — 525, D, have omitted τοὺς before τούτων. — 527, C, Stallb. gives δὲ λόγος. Vid. not.

In the text, like other editors of Plato, I have allowed οὐκοῦν, *nonne igitur*, to be thus accented, and, as I think, for good reasons. In the notes, I have followed what is, I believe, Hermann's practice, in treating a single Greek oxytoned word in an English sentence just as it would be treated in a Greek one. If, for example, ἄν occurs in the middle of a clause, it is not written ἄν.

2. I have had access to the following editions of Gorgias, which include all the modern ones of much value. 1. Routh's, Oxford, 1784. 2. Findeisen's,— an edition of indifferent judgment. Gotha and Amsterdam, 1796. 3. Heindorf's second, edited by Buttmann, Berlin, 1829,— excellent, especially for the Commentary. 4. Bekker's. 5. Stallbaum's Leipzig ed. These are concerned only with the text. Bekker's has some Scholia. 6. Coray's, Paris, 1825, together with Xenophon's Memorab. 7. Ast's, in his Plato. The bulky Commentary on Gorgias is in Vol. XI., Leipzig, 1832; valuable, but ill-arranged and tedious, and not always judicious. 8. Stallbaum's, in his Gotha ed. of Plato, 1828 and 1840. Both text and interpretation owe much to him, and he has collected most of what is useful in other editions.

From these editions, above all from the last, I have derived great assistance, which is often acknowledged and often not. In a work like this, it would be plainly impossible to trace every thing up to its source, but nothing has been adopted without examination ; much, also, is original ; but I fear that if any one should pass the severe judgment upon the edition, that much of what is faulty is original, he would not be very far out of the way.

Besides these editions, I have consulted several of those works relating to Plato, to which an editor of his dialogues would naturally think of turning for aid. Of this description are Ast's *Lexicon Platonicum* (the first three vols.), which is of no great use after all, Ast's, Socher's, and the first vol. of C. F. Hermann's *Introduction to Plato*, Schleiermacher's and Cousin's translations, and Dobson's translation of Schleiermacher's *Prefaces*.

3. An introduction is prefixed to the text of the dialogue, with a view to give an explanation and critique of the argument. To this are added, in notes, rather literal translations of a few illustrative passages out of very many from Plato's other writings, most of which I have read with reference to the present edition during its preparation. I had intended to add an index, in which some things omitted in the notes were to find their place, and had made some progress in it, but was tempted by the overpowering tediousness of the task to lay it aside until too late.

4. I have said nothing, thus far, as to the propriety of laying the *Gorgias* before American students of Greek, rather than some other dialogue of the same great author. To persons familiar with the Platonic

dialogues, perhaps nothing need be said on this point. Let me say, however, that while many of the dialogues would not have suited my design, on account of their abstruseness or their length, the Gorgias deserved to be preferred to others equally finished in style, on account of its positive inculcation of truth and its high moral tone. Something better is to be found in it than the miserable doctrine of instruction, and the duty of the politician to obey the popular will.

Yale College, New Haven,
July, 1842.

A SECOND edition of the Gorgias being called for, the editor has done what he could, amid the pressing cares of a new office, to render it, by the necessary changes and additions, less imperfect than the former. In doing this, he has received kind aid from several friends, and takes this opportunity of making his acknowledgments to Professor Crosby of Dartmouth College, Mr. Sophocles of Harvard University, Mr. Hadley of Yale College, and C. A. Bristed, Esq., of New York.

Yale College, June 1, 1848.

INTRODUCTION.

THE times in Greece which just preceded the age of Socrates gave birth to a class of men denominated the Sophists. This title, which before was honorably applied to such as excelled in wisdom or ingenuity, was then chiefly confined to those who, with mercenary views, professed a vain and shallow kind of wisdom. Such is in substance Aristotle's definition of a Sophist. In the successive sketches of Plato's Sophistes, he is hit off as a mercenary hunter after rich young men; a dealer and huckster in intellectual wares, especially of his own production; a logomachist; one who, by his power of taking the opposite on all subjects, gets a reputation for wisdom; one who is employed about that which is false, or merely appearing, instead of the invariable objects of true science, and who conceals his ignorance of true science by artificial and crafty turns of words. This last characteristic is one which gives the relation of the Sophist to philosophy. He denied all objective truth, and stood only on the fluctuating, uncertain ground of subjective opinion. Hence, as to truth, he was an unbeliever. He could accommodate himself to one side or its opposite, contending for or against any point, as interest might dictate. Finding nothing in philosophy to employ himself with, he withdrew from the study of it to the arts of practical life, and aimed, by attract-

ing admiration and educating the young, to gain wealth and honor. Gratification or pleasure was the immediate object in his view, and he could have no higher; for to instruct in virtue would imply the existence of unalterable moral differences, which he denied. Or, if he professed to teach virtue and justice, it was only in accommodation to a vague opinion of those who employed him; and it was necessary for him to pervert these notions, in order to make his instructions consistent with the rule of gratification by which he was governed.

It would carry us far beyond our bounds, were we to attempt to exhibit at any length the causes to which this class of men owed their origin and their prominence. These causes lay partly in the unsatisfactory results to which the prevailing systems of Greek philosophy had arrived, and partly in the circumstances of the times. On the one hand, many of the philosophers either wholly denied the existence of truth within the reach of man, or so contracted its dimensions as to make it not worth pursuing. Hence arose skepticism, despair, and the fading away of a serious regard for truth, which were succeeded by frivolity and by the purpose to gain immediate selfish ends through pretensions to superior knowledge. On the other hand, the decay of religious belief which attends upon increasing civilization in heathen countries, and the disregard of political morality so prevalent in Greece, threw uncertainty into the opinions of men upon the most important subjects. Thus the same disease attacked the roots of philosophy, religion, and morals.

In the schools of the philosophers, the art of reasoning and its instrument had received by degrees some attention. Thus logic had been cultivated by the Eleatic sect, but was turned, in the hands of the Sophists, into an art of disputing, applied to puzzle the unpractised and display their

own dexterity. The right and elegant use of words was employed by other Sophists to procure for themselves admiration and pupils. Many of this class of men exhibited their knowledge in public by answering any question that might be proposed to them, or gave lectures prepared with great care ; while in private they imparted such instructions to young men as would give them polish and ability in civil and political life. All of them took money for their instructions,— a practice not regarded as entirely honorable at that time in Greece.

The sophistical principles of the time were brought into closer connection with public affairs by means of the art of rhetoric, which arose at about the same era. Rhetoric began to be taught as a means of gaining a cause in the courts at Syracuse after the year 466, when a popular government, succeeding to the sway of Hiero's family, greatly multiplied judicial proceedings. An art like this was calculated to be popular in free states, and especially in Athens, where the judicial function of the people was the most important one ; where the crowds of ignorant judges were easily deceived by sophistry ; and where there was an uncommon fondness for displays of skill in the use of words.

The sophistical tendency, which we have represented as one in its origin, affected all branches of truth and every art which can be referred to scientific principles. In metaphysics it may be exemplified by the tenets of Protagoras, that all knowledge consists in sensation, and that whatever appears true to any man is true to him ; and by the doctrine of Gorgias, that there is no truth which men can ascertain or communicate to one another. In morals and politics, it appeared in the opinions, that there is no natural justice, or that justice is the interest of the stronger ; and that pleasure is the chief good. In the use of rhetoric, it showed its nature when Protagoras offered to teach how to prevail

by the worse argument (*τὸν ἔπι τῷ λόγῳ υρεῖττω ποιεῖν*), and when Tisias and Gorgias said that the probable must be held in higher esteem than the true.

The Sophists could not fail to disgust a man like Socrates, who hated show and pretension, and who had a deep veneration for truth. Hence he was sometimes brought into collision with them, and in a degree his doctrines, as well as those of Plato, were shaped by opposition to theirs. And in accordance with this, Plato, especially in his first works, represents Socrates arguing against some false opinion or other maintained by a person imbued with this spirit.

One of the more prominent Sophists, with whom Socrates was contemporary, was Gorgias, after whom this dialogue is named. Gorgias was a Sicilian Greek of Leontini, a Chalcidian town, which lay some twenty miles to the north of Syracuse, and suffered much from its nearness to that powerful Doric state. The birth of Gorgias is assigned by Foss* to the first year of the 71st Olympiad, or 496 B. C. But there is good reason, I think, for putting it several years later. For the art of rhetoric began to flourish at Syracuse after 466 B. C., and Gorgias learned this art from Tisias, a scholar of Corax, the first preceptor.† And with this it accords, that Gorgias heard Empedocles in philosophy, whose birth even Foss places no earlier than the 71st Olympiad, while the ancients say that he flourished from forty to sixty years afterward.

From this time we know nothing of Gorgias until he was

* *De Gorgia Leontino Commentatio.* Halle. 1828.

† This is asserted by the author of the Prolegomena to the Rhetoric of Hermogenes (in Walz's Collection, Vol. IV. p. 14). The passage is inserted by Spengel into his valuable book entitled *Artium Scriptores.* Stuttgart. 1828. Foss denies it without authority, "tum propter alias testimoniis inopiam, tum propter Tisiæ ætatem."

sixty years old or upwards. In the interval he may have taught rhetoric in Sicily, for Polus of Agrigentum appears at Athens as his disciple, and he probably stood high in his native state. In the second year of the 88th Olympiad, he came to Athens on the following occasion. “The Leontines (Diodor. 12. 53), who were emigrants from Chalcis, and of the same stock with the Athenians, were invaded by the people of Syracuse. As they were pressed by the war, and in danger of being reduced by the superior might of Syracuse, they sent ambassadors to Athens, begging the people to help them as speedily as possible, and rescue their state from its dangers. The principal ambassador among those who were sent was Gorgias, the orator, a man who excelled all of his time in eloquence, and first invented the artifices of rhetoric* (*τέχνας φητορικάς*). — On his arrival at Athens he was introduced into the Assembly, and discoursed before the people concerning the alliance. The Athenians, who were fond of displays of genius and skill in the use of words, were struck with wonder by the novelty of his style, by his various antitheses, his clauses of equal length, his words of similar forms and endings, and the like artifices; which then, being new, met with favor, but now seem to be a waste of labor, and are ridiculous if repeated so often as to produce satiety. At last, having persuaded the Athenians to form an alliance with the Leontines, and gained admiration at Athens for his rhetorical art, he returned to his native town.” The sensation which his rhetoric produced at Athens is spoken of by others also. The days on which he made his exhibitions were called festivals, and his discourses themselves torches.† “He won great praise,” says

* See Spengel, u. s., p. 81.

† This is said by the commentator on Hermog. u. s., p. 15, by Olym-
piod. apud Routh, p. 562, and other late writers.

Socrates in Plato's Hippias Maj. (282, B), "by his speeches in the Assembly, and by his private displays of his eloquence. By the instructions he imparted to the young (*συντίθει τοῖς νέοις*) he gained a large amount of money, and carried it with him from Athens." If Plato, who is sometimes careless about precise facts and dates, may here be relied upon, he must have stayed long enough at Athens to act the part of a teacher before he went elsewhere. It is probable that, after discharging his mission, he soon returned to Greece, where the rest of his life seems to have been spent. Thessaly was his principal residence, and that he passed no very long time in Athens may be argued from the fact, that Isocrates, an Athenian, received his instructions in that country. There, also, he taught Meno, and Aristippus, one of the nobles of Larissa, and there, or in Bœotia, Proxenus, the comrade of Xenophon. The wealthy families of Thessaly had that rude taste which would make them fond of the glitter and ostentation of Gorgias, and were able to pay him well. He lived in splendor, affecting in his dress the same show and parade which marked his eloquence. (Ælian, Var. Hist. 12. 32.) Owing to his habits of temperance, he attained to a very great age, to six or eight years over a century, and acted the rhetorician to the last, by saying, according to Ælian (u. s. 2. 35), when invaded by a lethargic sleep, premonitory of his end,— "Sleep is now beginning to lay me in the hands of his brother." His works, in his capacity as a rhetorician, were,— 1. One on the art, or on one branch of it, the art of speaking suitably to the occasion. 2. A number of orations, declamatory and laudatory. One of these was delivered at the Olympic festival, in which, like Isocrates afterwards, he tried to unite the Greeks against the Persians. Another was a funeral discourse in honor of Athenians slain in battle, a fragment of which, preserved by a Scholiast on Hermogenes,

supplies us with the longest extant specimen of his style. These works exhibited a stately, uncommon, and poetical diction, together with frequent rhetorical figures, which must have been tedious and frigid in the extreme.* Two declamations still extant, bearing his name, are unlike his fragments in style, and ought probably to be regarded as spurious.

Gorgias was, as we have said, at bottom a Sophist,† but he avoided the title, which was not very popular, “and laughed at the Sophists, who professed to know how to make men better, confining himself to instructions concerning the art of speaking.” (Plat. Meno, 95, C.) His literary labors in the more appropriate sphere of the Sophist were confined, so far as we know, to a work entitled *περὶ φύσεως ἡ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος*, which may have been unknown to Plato, but is analyzed in a little treatise among the works of Aristotle. In this work, with such an ominous title, he attempted to prove, first, that nothing exists, then, if any thing exists, that it cannot be known, and, finally, that if known, it cannot be made known to others. Olympiodorus (in Routh’s ed. of Gorgias, p. 567) says, that this work was written in the 84th Olympiad, that is, sixteen years or thereabouts before his embassy to Athens. For the sophis-

* The fragments, which are few, are collected by Foss, but not completely. Thus, Clem. Alex. Strom. 1. 11, § 51, cites some words of Gorgias, apparently from his Olympian oration. The following words are a good sample of the style of Gorgias, and show some just thought. They are cited by Foss from Plutarch. Γοργίας τὸν τραγῳδίαν εἶχεν εἴναι ἀτάπην ἢ
ἢ τε ἀταπήσας δικαιότερος τοῦ μὴ ἀταπήσαντος καὶ οἱ ἀταπηθεῖσις σοφάτερος;
τοῦ μὴ ἀταπηθίσσετος.

† And so the men of that time regarded those who displayed their talents after the manner of Gorgias. Thucyd. 3. 38, ἀκοῆς ἡδονῆς ἵσσαμενοι καὶ σοφιστῶν θιαταῖς ιοικότες καθημένοις. For the estimation in which the Sophists were held, comp. Protag. 316, seq.

tries out of which, with the help of the principles of the Eleatic Sect, he built up this triple wall against truth, I must refer to the treatise of Aristotle,* and to Ritter's history of philosophy.

Such was Gorgias. Of Polus, another speaker in the dialogue, little is known. He was a Sicilian of Agrigentum, a scholar of Gorgias in rhetoric, and perhaps of Empedocles in philosophy. He wrote, together with other works, a treatise, probably on rhetoric, to which Plato refers in the *Gorgias*. As we learn from the *Phædrus* and other sources, he gave great prominence to the figures of that artificial rhetoric of which his master was so fond ; such as equality of periods and correspondence of adjoining words in sound ; and taught the mode of using maxims and similes under separate heads, to which he gave pedantic names.

Callicles is an unknown Athenian, not a Sophist, as some have regarded him, but rather a contemner of the Sophists ; although he carried out in practical life those principles which they laid down. He is a specimen of a considerable number of Athenians of his time, who, while they courted the people, despised it ; who would have grasped at tyrannical power, without scruple as to the means ; who looked down upon the pursuits of philosophy, when compared with the honors of political life ; who had no faith in the distinction between right and wrong, and held pleasure to be the supreme good.

Besides these and Socrates, Chærephon bears a small part at the opening of the dialogue. He was an early friend and a follower of the philosopher, ardent in whatever he undertook, whose variance with his brother is mentioned in Xen. *Memorab.* 2. 3, and who obtained a response from

* It is edited by Foss, in his *Commentatio* before mentioned, and by Mullach (Berlin, 1845).

the Pythia commendatory of Socrates, according to the Apologies of Plato and Xenophon. He went into exile in the time of the thirty tyrants, and died soon afterwards, before his friend's condemnation. He injured his health and complexion through his studies, and received the nicknames of *υντερίς*, *υντός παῖς* (Aristoph. Birds, 1564, and Horarum frag.), for never coming abroad during the day, and of *πιέζως θάψιος*, for his sallow hue (Eupolis *Πόλεων* frag., Aristoph. Wasps, 1413), as well as other ridicule from the comic poets.* When, according to the Scholiast on Plato's *Apology*, these reckless jesters proceeded further to call him a sycophant, a parasite, and a thief, we may put by the side of these aspersions the testimony of Xenophon, who classes him among those friends of Socrates who sought his company to improve themselves in household and civil relations, and who, at no time of their lives, either did, or were charged with doing, any wrong.

The persons of this dialogue are represented as having met in the year after the sea-fight at Arginusæ. Gorgias, being then on a visit at Athens, was lodging at the house of Callicles, and there, it is generally supposed, the dialogue was spoken. There is, however, good reason, I think, to accede to the opinion of Schleiermacher, who lays the scene in some public place, like the Lyceum, where the parties in several other dialogues convened.† At the opening of the

* In the proemium to Philostrat. Vitæ Sophist., another Chærephon, as we are there expressly told, is brought into connection with Gorgias. He asked the Sophist a foolish question, *Διὰ τί οἱ κύριοι τὴν μὲν γαστήρα φυγῶσι τὸ δὲ πῦρ οὐ φυγῶσι;* To which the other replied, *Τοῦτο σὺ καταλιπὼν σκοπεῖν· ἐγὼ δὲ ἔχειν πάλαι οἶδα ὅτι ἡ γῆ τοὺς νάρθηκας ἔστι τοὺς τοιούτους φύει.* I have seen the opinion somewhere expressed, that the story was first told of this Chærephon, the declaration of Philostrat. notwithstanding.

† For some observations on the time and place of the dialogue, see Appendix, No. I.

work, Socrates and his friend find that they have reached the place where Gorgias and others were assembled, too late to witness his exhibitions of rhetorical skill. In the hope, however, of drawing from him his views concerning his art, they approach and begin the conversation. Gorgias being fatigued, the younger rhetorician, Polus, volunteers to take his place, and answer to the inquiries concerning the nature of rhetoric ; but as it is soon apparent that he is unwilling or unable to observe a logical method, Socrates transfers the discourse to Gorgias, from whom he professes to think that more brevity and accuracy of definition may be expected. (447–449.) By a series of questions in his peculiar manner, he gathers from Gorgias that he is a rhetorician, and able to make others such ; and that his art is employed about words as instruments of thought. Socrates asks whether the definition is not too general, since several arts called by other names are also employed about words. To this Gorgias replies, that other arts ask principally, “What is to be done ?” and use words as a secondary thing ; but that rhetoric inquires, “What is to be said ?” (- 450, B.) Socrates objects that there are other arts, such as those of calculation and astronomy, which mainly depend on words, and demands to what the words relate which rhetoric employs. The most important of human affairs, says Gorgias. (- 451, B.) But what are the most important ? asks Socrates ; for other arts might make a similar claim. The good, replies Gorgias, to which rhetoric opens the way, is freedom for the orator and the power of controlling other men, and this it effects by the power of persuading public assemblies. By this power it brings every other art under its control. (- 453.) Socrates still is not satisfied. For although Gorgias has defined rhetoric to be the art of persuasion, he inquires whether other arts, which have to do with words, do not aim at persuasion also. What, then, is

the province and the nature of rhetorical persuasion? Gorgias is brought to admit that its province is to persuade judicial and other popular assemblies concerning things right and wrong; and that it attains its end rather by plausible arguments than by proofs drawn from absolute truth. (-455.) But Socrates still finds it hard to comprehend what is the peculiar sphere of rhetoric. In all public deliberations, the artificer, the general, or other person acquainted with the point in question, can give the best counsel. Where, then, is the orator's place? In reply, Gorgias refers to matters of fact. It was the advice of the political leaders which led to the building of the Athenian walls and docks, and not that of the artificers. He himself had often persuaded sick persons to comply with the directions of physicians, who had exhausted their arguments in vain. There was no occasion when an orator was opposed to an artificer, without gaining an easy victory. Such was the power of rhetoric, but, like other arts, it might be abused by those who learned it. Yet that abuse was no good cause of complaint against the teacher. (-457, C.) Socrates, after offering an apology for his seemingly contentious spirit, now forces Gorgias to allow that the orator may be ignorant of the subject-matter of other arts; all his study being concerned with finding the means of appearing to "those who do not know to know more than those who do." This Gorgias regards as an advantage, since it furnishes the orator with power acquired by small pains.* Socrates, without stopping to examine into the extent of this advantage, inquires whether the case is the same with justice and injustice, good and evil, and the like; whether, without know-

* Philebus. 58, A. "I heard Gorgias say, on a variety of occasions, that the art of persuasion far surpassed all the other arts, since it brought all things under its sway, not by force, but by their own will."

ing what these are in themselves, the orator can gain a reputation for such knowledge; and whether, as a master in rhetoric, Gorgias would teach a scholar justice, who should come to him unacquainted with its nature. Gorgias has here to reply, either that there is no need of knowing any thing about right and wrong in order to be an orator, and that, too, when he is perpetually employed upon questions involving right and wrong; or that he will teach his students their nature. He chooses the latter alternative, although the previous conversation shows that, to be consistent, he should have taken the former. Socrates now forces him to admit that he who knows justice is just. The rhetorician, then, under his training, must be a just man. But he had before said, that the art might be used for a good or a bad purpose,—to favor justice or injustice. Socrates brings forward this inconsistency as needing explanation, when this, the first part of the dialogue, is broken off by the impatience of Polus. (-461, B.)

There are two remarks which this portion of the discussion seems to demand. The first is, that, while it ends with an *argumentum ad hominem*, and with fastening upon Gorgias an inconsistency of no importance in itself to philosophical truth, it is not without its use. It shows how little the Sophists had reflected upon the nature of their arts, and how little they cared for truth or justice.* The

* Several passages of Phædrus, a work which treats of the worthlessness of rhetoric when not dependent on philosophy, may be adduced in illustration of what is here said. On 260, A, Phædrus tells Socrates that he hears the remark made, "that one who wishes to be an orator has no need to learn true justice, but only what may seem to be such to the multitude, who will exercise the office of jurymen; nor the truly good or beautiful, but only the seeming; for from these sources, and not from the truth, persuasion is derived." And, again, 272, D,—"They say that there is no need of making so much of this, or of taking such a long, round-about

art itself, having in its own nature no reference to truth, but merely to the force of arguments upon the minds of others, and, at the same time, being employed in discussions concerning what is good and just, could in its best estate be as easily used against truth as in its behalf. But, as it then was, it was based on sophistical principles and opposed to sound philosophy, its aim being something else than the greatest good. It was an art of acting on the ignorant, and of acting on them by pretending to knowledge. It must use such arguments as were suited to persuade the masses, who are not capable of taking the true philosophical view of things. What arguments could a person ignorant of justice use before an audience also ignorant, when the question related to justice, but such as almost necessarily mislead ?

course to reach it. For the orator, who would be well versed in his art, (they maintain,) has no occasion to possess true views in regard to just or true actions, or in regard to men that are such either by nature or education. In fact, they assert that no one in the courts cares for the truth about these things, but only for that which is adapted to persuade. And this is the probable," etc. Plato goes on to illustrate this by an example drawn from Tisias, one of the rhetoricians. If a brave man of weak body should have beaten and stripped of his garment a strong but cowardly man, and the case be brought before a court, neither ought to tell the truth ; the coward ought to deny that the weak but courageous man was alone in beating him ; while the other should ask, " how he, being so deficient in bodily strength, could have attempted it." He then shows how weak, at its very foundation, that unphilosophical rhetoric is which is built on merely empiric rules ; since he who knows what is true must know, also, what is like truth, and he who studies the classes of human minds with philosophy for his guide will know by what arguments each class of minds is most influenced. " But," he adds, very nobly, " the virtuous man will not study this art of rhetoric for the sake of speaking and acting before men, but that he may be able to speak in a manner acceptable to the divinities, and to act so as to please them to the extent of his power."

Plato's opinion of advocates, which was none of the highest, may be found in Book XI. of the *Laws*, at the end.

But in the second place, if the art taught or presupposed the teaching of justice, its scholars would be a very different sort of persons from what even Gorgias allows that they were. For he who has learned justice is just. This looks to us like sophistry on the part of Socrates himself, as if the knowledge and practice of virtue could not exist apart. But whatever of untruth there is in the proposition, it was not meant for sophistry ; it is a part of the system of Socrates and Plato. In the view of Socrates, and in that of Plato at first, all virtue could be resolved into science ; all vice into ignorance.* Nor was the reason voluntarily ignorant, but merely deceived by the conceit of knowledge, and false opinion. When this was removed, and knowledge took possession of the mind, there was no cause why he who knew should not act in conformity with his knowledge.

In the second part of the dialogue, Polus takes his master's place. He begins by complaining that Socrates had unfairly involved Gorgias in inconsistency. Gorgias had said that he would teach justice to a scholar ignorant of it, only in accommodation to the prejudices of mankind, who regarded instruction upon that point as of high importance. A discussion now arises, in which Socrates explains in part his views of rhetoric. It is not an art, but a knack, or practical observation of rules aiming to produce pleasure. It belongs to a nature which is adroit, courageous, and skilled in mingling with mankind. It is reducible to flattery ; like the arts of cookery, cosmetics, and sophistry, being mere routine or practice, not guided by the laws of absolute truth, and

* Comp. Aristot. Ethic. Eudem. 1. 5, ἵπιστήμας (*Σωκράτης*) φέτ' εἶναι πάσας τὰς ἀγεράς, ὡσδ' ἄμα συμβαίνειν εἰδέναι τε τὴν δικαιοσύνην καὶ εἶναι δίκαιον. See, also, Xen. Memorab. 3. 9. 5. Plato appears at first to have entertained the same opinion, but afterwards made virtue to consist in this : that the faculties of the soul respectively perform their parts, and are all obedient to the reason.

aiming at gratification. The real arts relating to the soul and body are two, with a twofold division each ; of which the one,—the political art, or that which conserves the public good,—when it seeks to *secure* that good, is called the *legislative* art, when to *restore* it, is called *justice*. To these two arts, two touching the body correspond : gymnastics, aiming to *preserve* bodily good or health, and medicine, to *bring it back*. To these four arts four arts of flattery answer, and, acting adroitly without settled principles, slip into their places. These are sophistry, answering to legislation, rhetoric to justice, cosmetics to gymnastics, and cookery to medicine. Aiming at pleasure, and not at the highest good, these false arts attract and deceive the ignorant and thoughtless. And, being incapable of exact limits from their want of a scientific basis, they run into one another. (- 466.) Polus is displeased at this brand of flattery put upon rhetoric, and asks if good orators are so regarded in the states where they live. *Socr.* "They are not regarded at all." *Pol.* "How not regarded ? Have they not the greatest power in their countries ?" To this Socrates replies by admitting that they do what seems good to them, but denies that they do what they wish. In explaining this, he shows that what men wish is not what they do, but that for the sake of which they do it. It is a good in prospect which moves to action. Unless, then, the great power which enables orators to dispose, as Polus says, of the lives and fortunes of others is a good, it is not what they wish. And if to have great power is a good, orators cannot have it, seeing they use that which they call such as an evil. They may do, then, what seems good to them, without either really having great power, or doing what they wish. (- 469.) Polus sneers at these views expressed by Socrates. "Just as though you would not choose the liberty of doing what seemed good to you in the state, and would feel no envy if you saw one killing

whom he liked, or stripping him of his goods, or binding him." Socrates earnestly declares that he regards such a one, if doing this unjustly, as most wretched, and to do wrong as the greatest of evils. Polus is surprised that he should think so, and affirms, that to be wronged is a greater evil than to wrong; and that the possession of supreme power in the state — which is won by the orator — is to be desired as enabling him to do what he thinks fit, — to wrong, if he pleases, and to keep others from wronging him. Upon this, Socrates makes his opponent own that uncontrolled power in the state, if it is a good, may also be an evil. It cannot, therefore, be a good in itself, and something beyond it must determine when it is good and when the contrary. This criterion is, that it shall be justly or unjustly exercised. (- 470, C.) Polus responds in a superior tone to this, as going against the common sense of men, and appeals rhetorically to the prosperity of Archelaus, king of Macedon, which was begun by atrocious crimes. If you wish, says Socrates, to support yourself by examples and by testimony, you will have no want of them. But I shall not consider the matter settled until I force you, with whom I hold the argument, to acknowledge that the unjust man is unhappy, or you compel me to the contrary admission. (- 472, D.)

The discussion during the rest of this part of the dialogue embraces two points, arising out of the proposition, that it is better to wrong than to be wronged: — 1. That the unjust man is, in every event, miserable; and, 2. That if he escapes punishment for his crimes, he is more miserable than if he suffers. And hence no man can prefer doing wrong to being wronged, which Polus says is the choice of all men.

1. Polus acknowledges that it is baser (*αἰσχιον*, more ugly) to wrong, but denies that it is more evil (*κάκιον*). This leads to an analysis of the ideas of the beautiful and the base (*τὸ καλόν*, *τὸ αἰσχυλόν*), in which Socrates shows that

a thing is beautiful owing to its utility or pleasure, or both ; and base, owing to its evil or pain. But to wrong — which has been owned to be baser than to be wronged — is not more painful ; therefore it must be more evil. Neither Polus, then, nor any other man, as desirous of the highest good, can prefer the more evil and base to the less. (- 476.)

2. Polus admits, that to be the object of justice (*διδόναι δίκην*) and to be justly punished for wrong-doing are the same ; that a just punisher supposes one who suffers what is just, and that every thing just is *καλὸν* as far as it is just. If, then, what is suffered is just, it is *καλόν*, and if so, either useful or pleasant. But suffering for doing wrong is not pleasant ; therefore, it is useful or good. This goodness consists in removing pravity of soul, which, of all kinds of badness, is the greatest. Justice, the medicine of the soul, effects this removal : hence, to escape from punishment is more miserable than to be punished. It is better to go unhealed of a disease, than not cured of this inward severer malady. And not to seek this cure from justice is like fearing the pain necessary for attaining to health. (- 480.)

If these things are so, of what use is rhetoric ? For if it place a man in a situation where he can wrong more easily than be wronged, it does him so much the more harm ; and if he be enabled by it to escape the punishment of his misdeeds, again it does him so much the more harm. If it help him to punish an enemy, it benefits that enemy, — an object at which he is far from aiming. He cannot even defend himself against an enemy without doing the enemy this good.* (- 481, C.)

The end reached in this second division of the Gorgias is to set forth in a clear light that a pretended art, like the rhetoric of Gorgias and Polus, which has the gratification

* See Buttmann's view, in the note on 480, E.

of others, as well as one's own, in view, fails, by running against the law of right, to attain to any thing good or useful, defeats its own objects, and falls into inconsistency with itself. It will not be doubted by the reader, that the moral tone of this discussion is worthy of the highest praise, and the conclusion most gratifying, considering it is formed by a heathen. But there are several places in the stream of the argument, where we may fancy that we see shallows, or touch upon the ground. In the first place, we may question the accuracy of the comparison of the legislative art and justice with the self-styled arts of sophistry and rhetoric. What is the truth of the distinction, and what sphere must we suppose that Plato assigns to rhetoric ? In reply, it must be owned, I think, that Plato fluctuates a little,* owing to his analogy between rhetoric and medicine, on the one hand, and between rhetoric and justice, on the other. If we press the resemblance to medicine, rhetoric must be confined to the reparation of injustice, and restoration of the public health. If we follow the parallel with justice, rhetoric must embrace within its limits every case where the question of conformity to the rule of right is involved ; the rule of true right being laid down at the outset by the legislative art, and that of seeming right or gratification, in the place of justice, by sophistry. In this part of the dialogue, the narrower notion of rhetoric, determined by comparing it with medicine, seems to prevail in Plato's mind : the art has to do with the courts. And in this Plato was fully justified by the practice of writers on this art, who all, as Aristotle affirms (*Rhet. 1. 1. 10*), said nothing about the popular assembly, and confined their rules of art to the judicial

* Comp. Aristides (2. 377, Dindorf.), τοτὶ μίν γέ, φησι, ταυτόν εστιν, ὡ μακάριον, ἥπτωρ καὶ σοφιστής, τοτὶ δ' αὖ τὴν σοφιστικὴν κριτικὸν οἶναι τῆς ἥπτοσικῆς καὶ διαφέρειν. See 517, A, note.

(περὶ τοῦ δικάζεσθαι πάντες πειρῶνται τεχνολογεῖν). But in the latter division of this work, Plato treats the rhetorician and the political man as the same, which accords with the analogy between rhetoric and justice. This is the truer view of the subject, for otherwise the assembly of the people, where there lay open a wide field for false art, must be unoccupied.* We must recollect that Plato himself speaks of the boundaries of rhetoric as uncertain; and, also, that he is not opposing the bare “art of inventing and arranging arguments,” but a sophistical art opposed to truth.†

In the second place, we may doubt whether the analysis of the beautiful into the pleasant and the good, that is, the useful, and of the opposite to the beautiful into the painful and the harmful, is correctly made out, and, consequently, whether the principles of the latter part of the discourse be-

* With more justice still, Socrates, in Phædr. 261, A, regards it “as the art of bending men’s minds by words without respect to the occasion, not only in courts and other public assemblies, but also in private meetings; being the same in nature, whether small or great affairs are in question.” To which, in reply, Phædrus says, that the rules of art are used in speaking and writing when suits at law are brought, and in speaking when addresses are made to the Assembly; but that he has not heard of a wider application of rhetorical precepts.

† Whately’s definition. Aristotle’s is, δύναμις περὶ ἵκαστον τοῦ θεωρῆσαι τὸ ἴνδεχόμενον πιθανόν. It is worthy of remark how Aristotle alludes to this dialogue without naming it. He begins with saying, that rhetoric is ἀντίστροφος τῇ διαλεκτικῇ. In speaking of its abuse, he says, “It tries to put on the garb (ὑποδύεται) of the political art”; and, soon afterwards, ἵστη γὰρ μόριον τι τῆς διαλεκτικῆς. Comp. 464, B, C.—This conduct of rhetoricians is ascribed to ignorance, or vanity, or other human reasons (1. 2. 7); and doubtless he joined with Plato in condemning the sophistical rhetoric of the preceding age. (Comp. 1. 1. 3.) But when he says that the judge himself ought to know whether a thing is *just* or not, and not learn it from the parties, whose only duty is to discuss the *fact*, he must be regarded not only as opposing Plato’s views (454, B), but as condemning the Athenian and every other system where the judges were ignorant.

tween Socrates and Polus, true as we feel them to be, are not built upon the sand. If I am not deceived, Plato does not here intend to enter into a close dialectical exposition of what is meant by *τὸ οὐακόν*, the beautiful. But, still, his definition is exact enough for the argument and the purposes of the dialogue. The attempts of others to analyze this idea prove this. Whether the term *beautiful* is or is not applied on account of pleasure derived from contemplating the object so called, or on account of the perception of a certain fitness, implying a relation of the parts to the whole, and of the whole to some good or pleasant end ; — whatever we may decide to be the primary and essential characteristic of beautiful objects, it is sufficient, I think, for the argument to say, that pleasure or utility, or both, invariably attend on objects so called, and the author was not required to stop and subject this idea to a closer examination. It is also to be remarked, that the good and the useful are treated here as identical.* Upon this point we need only say, that it is assumed that whatever is good tends to promote the perfection or well-being of the person ; in other words, is useful in reaching a good end.

Again, it may be thought that the last argument, concerning the good or utility of punishment, renders it necessary that punishment should reform the offender, whereas Plato, in this work and elsewhere, speaks of incorrigible criminals.†

* Comp. Repub. 2. 379, B. "Is not God truly good, and ought he not to be spoken of as such? Certainly. But nothing good is harmful. Is it? I think not. Can what is not harmful, then, do harm? By no means. Does that which does no harm do any evil (*κακόν τι*)? No, no more this than the other. But whatever does no evil can be the cause of no evil. Is it so? Assuredly. But what? is the good useful (*ωφιλμον*)? Yes. Is it, then, the cause of well-being (*ἰσηγαγίας*)? Yes." Etc.

† On the design and efficacy of punishments in society, a number of

If to suffer *δικαια* — to suffer *κακά* — to suffer *ωφέλιμα* or *ἀγαθά*, can the criminal help being profited? and does not

passages from the Laws give us Plato's views. One is found in Book XI. 934, A. "Not suffering for the sake of his crime, — for what he has done can never be undone, — but in order that for the future he and they who see him suffering justice (*δικαιούμενον*) may either altogether hate wrong-doing, or, at least, that a considerable part of so great an evil may cease." Another occurs in Book IX. 854, D. "For, perhaps, if he suffer this penalty, he may become better, by being rendered more sober-minded (*σωφρόνεστις*). For no penalty which is inflicted by law is inflicted for evil (*γίγνεται ίντι κακός*), but has, for the most part, one of two effects: it improves him who is punished, or, at least, checks the growth of his depravity." He then goes on to speak of incurable offenders doing good as examples. On page 862, E, after remarking on the excellence of legal expedients by which transgressors shall be made "to hate wrong, and to love or not hate the nature of right," he continues thus: — "When a lawgiver finds men incurable, he will provide some law and penalty for them, being assured that, for such persons themselves, it is not the better part to live, and that, by withdrawing from life, they will confer a twofold benefit on others: they will serve as an example to others to deter from evil, and will rid the state of bad inhabitants. Thus [that is, on these principles], in the case of such persons must the lawgiver establish death as the penalty for crimes, and in no other way."

In Book V. 728, C, he speaks of becoming like the wicked, and being separated from the good, as the greatest penalties for wrong-doing. "Though this is not penalty (*δίκη*), — since justice and penalty are always beautiful, — but vengeance, which is suffering attendant on iniquity. And as well he who has suffered this vengeance is miserable, as he who avoids suffering it; the one, because there is no cure for him; the other, because he is lost, that many may be saved." In these passages, the end of punishment is to cure and deter, or, at least, such is its result. And with these may be compared such places as Repub. I. 335, where it is said, that a just man cannot harm even an enemy and a bad man. It is true that the notion of *harm* is confined there to making such a man worse, but the reasoning appears to include pain if unproductive of good. Cousin, in his Preface to Gorgias, contends very brilliantly, and in some degree justly, that the right to punish in society is derived, not from the good effects of

the argument look like a dead algebraic formula, more than like living moral truth ? This difficulty must attend the argument at the first view of it. Nor can it be removed, unless we allow *dixia* and *xalà* to be what they are, not only in themselves, but also in the apprehension of the sufferer, while *ωφελίμα* is simply objective. The argument now becomes tenable. Punishment can be a good to none who do not receive it as just ; nor can it, in the arrangements of this world, fail of being more or less of a good to him who feelingly owns that it is rightly inflicted. But there may be some who do not own this, and they are the incorrigible.

Polus being reduced to silence, Callicles steps forth as the third champion of the arts of show. He begins with doubting whether Socrates is in earnest in maintaining these principles, which would throw human life and conduct off from their old foundations. To this Socrates answers, that he follows wherever philosophy shows the way, just as implicitly as Callicles obeys the popular will, and that, before he can change his tone, he must hear her strike a different key. In reply, Callicles says that it was not philosophical reasoning, but trick, by which Polus was beaten. He had made the incautious admission, that to do wrong is baser (*αισχιον*) than to be wronged. It is so, indeed, by law, but not by nature. This ambiguity it is between the naturally

punishment upon the criminal or others, but from the duty of punishing, which is based on the instinctive feeling of desert of evil for doing wrong. He adds, "This theory is, without doubt, only indicated in Plato, but it occurs in a number of places, briefly but positively expressed." I could wish that the learned translator had proved this assertion, which his familiar acquaintance with Plato must have rendered easy. Doubtless Plato could not get rid of the conviction written on the heart, that the sinner *ought* to suffer, or of the tendency to view suffering as a debt owed to justice. But did not Plato try to go farther back than this conviction, and search into the reason of the right which it admits ?

and the legally beautiful or right which enables crafty reasoners to gain their points. When Polus spoke of that which is legally base, Socrates shuffled the natural into its room. But by nature nothing is baser which is not more harmful. The natural feelings of men, which, when injured, instantly rise against the aggressor, show, that to be wronged is no property of a *man*. The legal definitions of base and wrong deeds are introduced by the many and the weak, in order to keep the strong in check. But herein law is opposed to nature, which teaches that the better ought to have more* than the worse, and the more powerful

* *πλεονεξία*. *πλεονεξία* is substantially selfishness, to which cause in a very striking passage Plato ascribes all the wrong actions of men. Leges, V. 731, D: *πάντων δὲ πλεονεξίας*, etc. "The greatest of all evils is inherent in the souls of the mass of men, for which they excuse themselves and seek no deliverance from it. This is what the vulgar saying implies, that every man by nature loves himself, and that it is right so to do. But in truth the cause of all errors in every case is to be ascribed to too great self-love. For the lover becomes blind in regard to the object beloved, so that he judges wrongly of the beautiful, the good, and the just, thinking that he ought to honor what pertains to himself before the truth. The man who will be truly great ought not to love himself or his own things, but what is just and right, whether pertaining to his own actions or another man's. From this fault it comes, that all think their own ignorance wisdom. Whence, though we know next to nothing, we think we know every thing; and, being unwilling to intrust to others that which we are not well skilled to do, we are forced to make mistakes in doing it. Therefore ought every man to avoid undue self-love, and to seek out some one better than himself, allowing no shame to prevent his taking such a course."

In another fine passage of the same work (IX. 875, B), the necessity of law is partly ascribed to the selfishness of man. *διύπλωσις*, etc. "In the second place, should any one in theory properly comprehend that this is so [that is, that the political art ought to care for the community more than for the individual, and that it is for the interests of both to have the community, rather than the individual, well arranged], and then rule a state with irresponsible and autocratical power, yet can he not adhere to this persuasion,

than the less powerful. The “good old plan, that they should get who have the power,” is the law of nature — ay, and of right — in animals and man, as they show whenever they can seize the occasion. All this is very evident to the man of the world. But philosophy makes a man blind to these truths of common sense, and, if pursued beyond the requirements of education, is the ruin of a man. It unfits him for civil and political life; it is unbecoming for a full-grown man, who should be practical and mix with his fellows; it makes one slink away to a corner with two or three disciples; and, if attacked by foes in the courts, he cannot help himself, but falls into their hands, as defenceless prey, to be slain at their pleasure. (- 486, D.)

In this brilliant passage we see described the contempt felt by the vulgar politician for the true philosopher, and the sympathy of such a man with false and sophistical principles. He aims at pleasure rather than good, and the Sophists give their maxims for the prudential attainment of the same end. There is a plain allusion, also, to the behaviour of Socrates at his trial, and to the charges against Socrates and Plato, — especially the latter, — of neglecting the service of the state. The ground which Calicles takes is evidently the only one which can be taken against Socrates,*

and through life keep the interests of the community foremost in the state, and his private interests subordinate; but his mortal nature will ever drive him into selfishness and the pursuit of his own ends (*πλεονεξίαν καὶ ἴδιωτραγίαν*), since it blindly shuns pain and seeks pleasure. Thus it will give a higher place to pleasure and pain than to the more just and good; and, by producing darkness in itself, will at length plunge the man himself and the state into all sorts of evils.”

* The philosopher Archelaus, who was, perhaps, an Athenian and a scholar of Anaxagoras, taught (although he may not have meant by his words what the Sophists taught) *τὸ δίκαιον εἶναι καὶ τὸ αἰσχύλον οὐ φύει ἀλλὰ τόπος*. This principle is admirably ridiculed in the *Clouds*, 1421, seq. Pla-

but it is equally the foundation of an attack against all morality. If the idea of right is admitted, it must be supreme ; and pleasure, if opposed to it, must bow before it. The only escape is to show that pleasure is never inconsistent with the right and the good. But right, as fixed by law, restrains the individual, and is therefore inconsistent with self-gratification. Hence the advocate for pleasure must yield, unless he can show that natural right — which is really such — is another thing from what the opinions of men, expressed in their laws, call such, and that it authorizes selfish indulgence. But if this be natural right, it contains no moral element, implies no relation of one man to others, and sanctions obedience to every desire which looks towards pleasure.

Socrates first answers with exquisite irony to the maxim of Callicles, that the better ought, by natural right, to have more than the worse. If his opponent means, as he admits that he does, by the better (*βελτίονς*), the superior and stronger, then, since the many are stronger than the one, as is shown by their enforcing their laws, they have a natural right to make laws for the one. Now they say, in their laws, that to wrong is baser than to be wronged ; and hence, according to Callicles, it must naturally be so. (-489, B.)

2. Callicles now shifts his ground, and makes the better the more intelligent. If so, replies Socrates, and if the more intelligent ought to have more than another of that to which his intelligence relates, then, in a mixed collection of men, a physician ought to have more food and drink than others, while yet the greater portion thus assigned to

to refers to it in a striking passage, *Leges*, X. 890. The discussion with Thrasymachus, in the first part of the *Republic*, attacks a kindred principle, and may be read here to advantage. Hobbes went to the length of any of the ancient Sophists on this point. See Mr. Hallam's *Critique, Hist. of Lit.*, Vol. III. 365–382, especially the close of the chapter.

him may do him extreme harm. In short, there is no end to the absurdities which will follow from the principle, that intelligence should move in an orbit around desire and not around good. (-491, B.) 3. Calicles forsakes this definition, and the better now become the more intelligent and courageous in politics, — such as are capable of governing.* Socrates here changes his point of attack, and takes a position nearer to the enemy's inner works. For whatever definition Calicles gives, to have more than others (*πλεονεκτεῖν*), or self-gratification, is the centre of the system, and must be laid bare in all its deformity. Do you mean, says he, by governing, governing one's self? At this the man of the world sneers, and pronounces a man's well-being to consist in having as large desires as possible, with the courage and intelligence to fulfil them. These qualities the many do not possess, whence, to hide their weakness, they praise self-restraint and blame incontinence. But it was not so from the beginning; the great and mighty of old acted by another rule; they regarded justice and self-restraint as base and evil, and got all they could from their enemies for themselves and their friends. Good and pleasure are the same. (-492, C.)

Socrates answers this in two ways. He first tries, by selecting some examples of low bodily pleasures, to awaken Calicles to the consciousness of the amazing baseness and evil which may attend a life of enjoyment.† The illustrations which form the long prologue of this part show that a most important topic is begun. (-495, B.) In the second place, he searches for some tests of the nature of pleasure,

* This may be regarded as the notion of the *ἀγαθοί*, the *optimates*, which was somewhat in vogue at the time, only a little altered.

† Comp. Philebus (an important dialogue, in which the nature of the good and the pleasant is closely examined), 46, A, B.

which shall show that it differs from good. To do this, he makes Callicles allow that courage, science, and pleasure are not the same; and that *εὐ ποάττειν* and *κακῶς ποάττειν* are opposites, so that one cannot be in both states at once, any more than he can be well and ill at once. The same may be said of weakness and strength, of swiftness and slowness, of good and bad, of happiness and misery. But pleasure and pain can coexist in the same person at the same time; as, for instance, thirst, a pain, exists, until drinking, which is pleasant, slakes it.* Thus pleasure wants an essential characteristic of good, and pain of evil. (-497, E.) Another test follows, grounded on the admission of Callicles, that the manly and intelligent are good. A foolish boy or man may be glad, and so may a wise one.† In war a coward is as glad, if not more so, when the enemy goes away, than the man of courage. Then the coward is as good as the courageous man, or even better, and yet bad by the concession of Callicles. (-499, B.) In other words, if good is relative to desire, as such, then its absolute nature ceases, it is in a perpetual flux, and alters with every change of desire or character.‡

Callicles now admits that some pleasures are evil and some good. He thus overthrows his argument, for if pleas-

* Comp. Cic. de Fin. 2. 3. 9.

† Comp. Philebus, 55, B, "And, besides, to be compelled to say that a man who feels grief is bad when he feels it, though he be the best of all men, and that one who is glad, the more he is so, at the time when he is so, is the more virtuous."

‡ In a fine passage, Leges, II. 663, Plato teaches that the good and bad judge of pleasure subjectively, or relatively to their own character. He then inquires whose judgment is to be received, as accordant with the truth, and answers, that of the good. Neither the lawgiver, then, should ever separate the pleasant from the right, the good, and the beautiful, nor any one else engaged in educating the young.

ure is in itself a good, evil cannot be affirmed of it. Socrates seizes upon the acknowledgment, and carries him back to a point debated in the first part of the dialogue,—that the good being the end of all actions, the pleasant must be sought for its sake, and not *vice versa*. (—500, A.) Now to know what pleasures are good and what evil needs an artist,—a man who has studied the invariable absolute principles of true good and right;—whilst the knowledge how to gratify, acquired by observation, and resting on no unchanging truth, has nothing of the nature of true art, and to apply that knowledge calls simply for an exercise of memory.

If this be so, we have a standard by which we may try the pursuits of men; and, according to this standard, must condemn the music which is in vogue at the public contests, dithyrambic poetry, and even tragedy itself, with all its lofty pretensions. But how is it with rhetoric and the orators or statesmen? Do they neglect their own or the public interests? Do they seek to benefit or gratify the community? To this Callicles responds, that the question admits of a double answer; the orators of the present day seek to please the people, and follow their will, but he thinks that Miltiades, Themistocles, Cimon, and Pericles were good men, and aimed at the highest public good. (—503, D.) This Socrates denies, and, to make the matter clearer, goes at some length into the motives which should influence the good orator,—the true political artist. As the physician has health in view, so has he the health of the community, which consists in justice and temperance* (*σωφροσύνη*, self-

* For *σωφροσύνη*, comp. Repub. 4. 430, D. It is there compared to a concord and harmony, and called *κόσμος τις καὶ ἡδονῶν τινῶν καὶ ἵπιθυμιῶν ἐγκράτεια*. This *κόσμος* consists in the subjugation of the worse part of the soul to the better. Ritter observes (2. 474) that the expression *σωφροσύνη*

restraint, soundness of mind in regard to all pleasures and excess). Instead of flattering them and following popular desires, such a politician will restrain and chastise the people. (-505, C.) This is further enforced in a most important and admirable passage, by pointing out that the ideas of true good, of virtue, of order, of self-restraint or orderliness, of justice and piety (or the observance of the laws of moral order), of courage, of the well-being of the individual and his happiness, are closely and necessarily connected; while the opposites of these are linked together with the pursuit of pleasure. Neither a man, then, nor a state, which would be happy, can have any end in view inconsistent with justice and temperance. If this be admitted, every thing will follow which Socrates had maintained, and his three adversaries had controverted. The orator ought to be just, and to know justice; otherwise he cannot practise or promote it. To be wronged is better than to wrong, for it involves no violation of justice; and to be punished for wrong-doing, than to go unpunished, for it reconciles the soul to justice. The wonder of Callicles, when Socrates defended these latter points, was misplaced. Furthermore, by acting on such principles, he should help himself and his friends, to do which Callicles pronounced him unable. For by living according to these principles, he would avoid the basest and the greatest evil. (-509, C.) But cannot a man, it may be asked, gain the advantage arising from not being wronged, as well as that arising from not wronging others? For the latter, an art is needed. As no one does wrong because he prefers it, but because he thinks to gain some good by it, that art must inculcate

is vaguely used by Plato, especially in his early dialogues; and that the definition in the passages of the Repub. which he cites (4. 490. u. s., and 3. 389, D) almost reduces its notion to that of *δικαιοσύνη*.

the nature of true good ; for example, must distinguish it from self-gratification. Is there, also, an art to avoid being wronged ? The only way of preventing injuries in all cases is, to have supreme power yourself, or to be a friend of the supreme power ; — for instance, if the people is that power, to gain its friendship by catering for its desires and following all its whims. But if this is done, the other and greater good must slip out of your hands. Nor is it of any use to say, that if you do not thus conciliate the sovereign power in the state, you may lose your life. For it is not a man's business in this world to seek to save his life, nor ought the art of rhetoric to make higher pretensions because it saves life than the art of the pilot or the engineer, by each of which the life of those intrusted to its care is preserved, no matter whether it be better for such persons to live or to die. A man's part is to leave it to God how long he shall live, and to find out on what principles he shall pass the term of life given to him ; whether on those of the flattering politician, which will involve the loss of the greatest good, or on those of the man who sacrifices pleasure to the really good and useful. (- 514, A.) And the same will apply to the management of a state. Hence the apprenticeship of political life must be in philosophy, which reveals the good and just to those who search for them ; and the true politician, contrary to what Callicles had maintained, must be a philosopher. A man who seeks to play the important part of a leader in the state must first ask himself whether, in his private capacity, he has cultivated justice and temperance, and made men better ; for the aim in the public and in the private sphere is one and the same. With this in mind, we may return to the four great Athenians, and bring their characters to the touchstone. Did Pericles make the Athenians better ? or did they not rather become idle, cowardly, talkative, and covetous through the measures of his admin-

istration? And did not those very Athenians, near the close of his long political life, show their degeneracy, by ungratefully bringing against him a charge of peculation?* The other three met with even worse treatment at the hands of those whom, if skilful politicians, they must have wished and known how to make better. Their ill-success is a proof that they understood not the true art of rhetoric, — that of persuading men to aim at the good, rather than the pleasant; and, indeed, that they were ignorant of the false art, also, if that enables its possessors, as is alleged, to sail in safety amid the storms of politics. (-517, A.)

In this remarkable attack on four of the greatest men of Athens, — men certainly not inferior, in any point, to hundreds of public characters who have been extolled by Christian historians, — we discover an exasperation of feeling in Plato, produced by the unjust fate of his master, and by the wide difference between his own political views and those of his native land. Nor can his character in general be freed from the charge of fault-finding. To this he was led by that uncommonly high standard which the nature of his mind compelled him to form; and, dwelling aloof, as he did, from the turmoil of politics, in contemplative retirement, he could not estimate all the practical difficulties which even a perfect statesman must encounter from a spoiled and self-willed people. But if we strike out what is due to these prejudices, we must find something of justice left in his blame of “the four.” The very fact that he draws a broad line between them and Aristides (526, B) is presumptive proof of a real difference. They were high-minded leaders of parties, who humored the people in many of its wishes for the sake of keeping power, and sought the

* See Appendix, No. II.

greatness, but not the real well-being, of their country.
Had they

“to divinity aspired,
Not on the breath of popular applause,
But through dependence on the sacred laws,
Framed in the schools where wisdom dwelt retired,
Intent to trace the ideal path of right,”

had they been philosophical statesmen, aiming at justice and the highest good, the allies of Athens would have been less oppressed ; the people would not have grown worse so fast ; they themselves would have impressed something of their own virtue upon the state, and been less likely to suffer unjustly from those to whom they had done good.

But is it not strange that Plato should reproach these politicians with their ill-success, as a proof of their want of virtuous statesmanship ? This is the point which Aristides, the Sophist, presses most effectively in his long and wearisome defence of “the four.” If ill-success is to be the test, what is to be argued from the two reprobate companions of Socrates, Critias and Alcibiades (Aristid. de Quatuorviris, 2. 322, Dindorf., de Rhet. 2. 111) ? What from Plato’s abortive attempts to make a man out of Dionysius of Syracuse (302–304, 324) ? Nor is Plato, the Sophist goes on to allege, consistent with himself, since he praises Pericles, in the Phædrus, for his rhetorical skill.* In the Apology (31, E), he makes Socrates affirm that no one can be safe who opposes any populace, or strives to prevent injustice in a state, unless he avoid public life and live as a private citizen. (343, 353, 366.) And, in our dialogue itself, he pronounces safety to arise from being like the sovereign power, or from having supreme power in one’s own hands. Again, he says, — “I should be a fool not to know

* Comp. Appendix, No. II.

that at Athens any man may suffer any thing." And yet the fact, that these statesmen were not safe from the effects of popular ingratitude, is his proof that they did not oppose the people, or strive to prevent injustice.

How the reasonableness or consistency of Plato, as to this point, can be defended, I do not see. Ill-success could have the force which he gives it only in case the influence of the four men outweighed the opposing influences of all other causes acting at their time upon the opposite side. In general, however, it may be said that politicians who complain of ingratitude are only reaping what they have sown. They have tickled the nice palate of the people until their cookery pleases no longer ; and now, by a rotation in office, which was right in their eyes until they came into power, and wrong afterwards, they are driven from the kitchen by new hands, who pay a price for the situation, and have learned some newer arts of falsehood. It was, perhaps, the sight of such flatterers of the Athenian *demus* fallen into disgrace, that led Plato beyond the bounds of truth, in imputing all the ill-success of politicians to their want of correct principles,— to their aiming at pleasure rather than good. Being preoccupied by this partial view, and having also in his mind the pretensions of the Sophists,— the teachers of such politicians,— that they could make men good, he loses sight of the great truth, that, in a corrupt age, a good man must suffer ill from those whom he tries to benefit.

But to return to the dialogue : — When Socrates had expressed such an opinion of these four great statesmen, Callicles replied, that no one of his own contemporaries could compare with them in the works they had done for the state. In answer, Socrates admits that they had shown uncommon ability in gratifying the desires of the people. They had created the ships, walls, and docks of Athens, but they dif-

ferred in no respect from the politicians of the day in the motives of their administration. If the highest good of the state should be the statesman's aim, they could no more claim this title, than a cook or a writer on cookery could claim to rank with the master of gymnastics in preserving the bodily health. And as such persons, if intrusted with the care of the body, would be blamed when the maladies arising from luxury should come on, so will the politician, who seeks to please rather than to profit, be punished for political evils which he or his predecessors have occasioned. The head of a state may not complain of ingratitude; for it is by his management that the character of those who compose it has grown worse. And the same holds good of the Sophists. They pretend that they can make their disciples better; and yet find fault with these very scholars for keeping back the price of tuition from them, and for other acts of unthankfulness. But what good, demands Callicles, can you say of such worthless men as the Sophists? They are the same with rhetoricians, answers Socrates, or nearly so; only somewhat above them, because they deal with principles which rhetoricians merely apply. If, now, their pretensions are well founded, they, as well as politicians, ought to fear no ingratitude; they should stipulate for no fees of instruction beforehand, trusting to the generosity of those pupils whom they had purged from vice.* (-521, A.)

Having thus compared the arts which aim at pleasure with those which aim at good, Socrates makes a personal

* Schleiermacher thinks that this is aimed at Aristippus, who, by taking pay for his instructions, brought reproach upon the Socratic philosophers. The best account of the remunerations given to the Sophists which I have met with is contained in Welcker's *Essay on Prodicus, his Life and Writings*, in Welcker and Näke's *Rheinisches Museum*, 1. 22, seq., and since reprinted in his "*Kleine Schriften*," Part 2, p. 393, seq.

appeal to Callicles. " Which mode of serving the state do you now exhort me to follow ; that of seeking its best interests, or that of catering for its desires ? " Callicles persists in telling over the same story, that fidelity in doing good will make him suffer the loss of all things. Socrates acknowledges, with evident allusion to his trial and condemnation, that he is exposed to such dangers from bad men, and that he could say nothing in the court which would win him the favor of his judges. If he should urge, on his defence, that he had opposed the public will when it was basely clamorous for present gratification, that he had striven to make men good, and had their well-being in view, he would fare as a physician might fare before a jury of children with a cook for his accuser. What he called good, they called evil ; what he called hurtful, they called pleasant. It was painful to be perplexed ; and yet he must lead them through perplexity to truth. Would he not, then, before such judges, be himself perplexed, and at a loss for a defence ? " And do you think, then," says Callicles again, " that it is well with a man who cannot help himself ? " " Assuredly," replies Socrates, " it would be very ill with me, if I could not give myself that help which has been shown to be truly such, — if I could not observe the rule of right in all my relations. Let a man show me that I am not seeking to help myself thus, and I shall be ashamed of my character, and be grieved if I need punishment. But if I die for want of the flattering art of rhetoric, I shall not be sorry. For no one who is a man, and has reason, fears death in itself, but rather to do wrong. For to go into the other world with a soul full of all manner of iniquity is the worst of evils." (-523, A.)

Having thus brought the two principles of action to the confines of the two states of being, he closes very nobly, by presenting them in contrast beyond the grave. His views

are introduced as an explanation of the common *mythus* concerning a judgment after death ; which, however, Plato scruples not to alter for his own purposes. The views are these :—The character formed by disregarding the good and right, and pursuing pleasure, must be lasting, while all the advantages it offers are temporary, being connected with the world and the wrong judgments of men. But, at death, men will come before a judge who will look at the bare soul, and give sentence according to its qualities. Among transgressors, there are some who are not gone too far in evil to be curable. For these, punishment, bitter as it must be, will prove a good. Others, having passed beyond the reach of a cure, will suffer eternally, as an example to all who shall behold them. Of this description, a large part will be tyrants and other men in power, who had on earth the greatest license to do evil. But if one of these, like Aristides, rises above the temptations of his station on earth, his reward will be so much the greater. The larger number, however, of those who receive rewards will be private persons ; and, more especially, philosophers who had not mingled in public affairs. With this trial in view, Socrates asserts that he strives to bring his soul, in its most healthy condition, before the judge, and that he seeks to lead his fellow-men to do the same. And to this he now urges Callicles, warning him that the trial then will be more serious than all earthly ones, and that, without such a preparation, he will be unable to help himself, but, speechless and perplexed, must submit to worse than earthly indignities. Callicles, he continues, might despise such fables, and the truth they contain, if he could show any thing better. But this, neither he, Polus, nor Gorgias had been able to do. They should, therefore, agree with Socrates that to be, and not to seem to be, a good man is a good thing ; that the next best thing is to become good by submitting to punishment ;

that all flattery of one's self or others, of a few or a multitude, must be shunned; and that rhetoric, like every thing else, must be used to promote the right, and that only. "Let us, then," he says in closing, "join together to live virtuously on such principles; then can we best apply ourselves to politics, when we are no longer afloat on the most momentous subjects. This is the only way to live well and to die well."

With respect to the close of the *Gorgias*, which must be counted among the finest passages in Greek, it may be observed that Plato shows elsewhere the same inclination to clothe in a mythical dress those truths which lie beyond the bounds of reason. It seems as if he felt the need of the venerable authority and positive assurances of a revelation upon such points, and resorted to the old traditions of his country as the best substitute which he could find, as having for their foundation real, though distorted, truth.* The *mythus* is something more than mere drapery, something more than a poetical fiction, which, with a beautifully plastic hand, he shapes into a form and meaning corresponding to his awakened moral sense. And yet the freedom with which he treats the *mythus*, and the readiness with which he alters its form on several occasions, prove that he accepted it only in its leading outlines as true; it was to him a *μῦθος*, and yet a *μάλα καλὸς λόγος*. It is found, also, at the close of the *Phædo* and of the *Republic*. He who compares the three passages will perceive that they agree in affirming the rewards and punishments of another life,

* This remark does not include those *mythi* which are of Plato's own invention. He was led to use them by his poetical temperament, and felt, perhaps, that the view suggested by a beautiful fable was as true as any which could be given; more true, because more beautiful, than if put into abstract propositions.

which are used, with all seriousness, as motives for living well here below; and also in teaching that some criminals are healed by punishment, while others must suffer for ever without hope of a cure.* This Platonic view of the reme-

* Phædo, 113, E. "Those who are judged to be incurable on account of the enormity of their crimes, who have committed many and heinous sacrileges, or numerous unjust and lawless murders, or the like, these their appropriate destiny hurls into Tartarus, whence they never come forth." He then speaks of the punishment of those who have committed curable sins, in a passage too long to be inserted here, and then adds,—"With respect to the *mythus*, to affirm positively that these things are as I have narrated them is not the part of a reasonable man"; and then uses the truth taught in the *mythus* as a motive for virtuous action. In the Republic, the narrator of the *mythus* is represented as near a chasm (see Gorg. 526, B, note) in the ground, by the side of a person who asked another where Ardiæus was. "Now this Ardiæus was a tyrant in a Pamphylian city a thousand years before, and had slain his aged father and his elder brother, besides doing, as was said, many other unhallowed deeds. The person so asked replied, said the informant, 'He is not come, nor can he hereafter come hither.' Among the frightful spectacles that we saw, this was one, continued he:—When we were near the mouth of the chasm, and were expecting to go upwards, after enduring all the other things appointed, on a sudden we saw this Ardiæus and others, nearly all of them tyrants; although some enormous transgressors among private persons were there also. When they thought that they should now go upwards (out of the chasm), the mouth would not let them pass, but uttered a bellowing sound whenever any such incurably wicked person, or any one who had not paid a sufficient penalty, endeavoured to ascend. Thereupon, wild men, said he, all fiery to look upon, who stood by, when they heard the bellow, picked out and carried off a part of the transgressors; but Ardiæus and others they bound hand and foot, and threw them down, and beat them hard, and dragged them along on one side of the road, scraping them upon thorns, while to the by-standers they told the reasons why these sinners suffered these things, and that they were drawn along to be plunged into Tartarus. There, said he, of all the fears many and various which fell upon us, this was the greatest,—lest, when each one was going upwards, the mouth should utter that bellow, and most gladly did each one hear no sound as he ascended." A conception worthy of the highest flights of Dante!

dial nature of punishment, in certain cases, even in another life, seems to have recommended the doctrine of purgatory to some of the Christian fathers.*

Having thus exhibited the argument of the *Gorgias* at some length, it will be in order for us to ask, What is the main subject of the dialogue? A question which it is almost as difficult to answer, in regard to some of the Platonic dialogues, as it would be to express the sum total of an evening's conversation among refined and intelligent persons: the delight you have felt, the instruction you have received, you are conscious of, and you carry away much in your memory; but it is hard to say what was the leading topic of the discourse, or whether there was any. The subject of the *Gorgias* is more easy to be perceived, and yet all have not been agreed concerning it. Olympiodorus (apud Routh) mentions three opinions besides his own: — Some say that it treats of rhetoric; others, of justice and injustice, considered especially in their relations to happiness; others still, absurdly enough, make it relate to the *demiurgus* or divine builder of the world, on account of the *mythus* at the close. “But we say,” continues the Platonic commentator, “that the scope is, to treat of the principles which lead men to political happiness.” With the first of these opinions, Cousin and Stallbaum agree. The latter says, however, that “though the principal point of the discussion is to blame the civil and rhetorical art at that day in vogue, and to show that it could not attain to excellence without the knowledge and practice of philosophy,” yet several other topics are closely united with this, as the difference of the just and the pleasant, the end of human actions, and the constancy of a good man in bearing evils and injuries. Nearly the same is the view taken by Ast. The *Gorgias*,

* Comp. Muenscher, *Dogmengeschichte*, Vol. II. § 298.

says he, "has a decidedly political tendency ; and all the philosophical inquiries which it contains are intended to show, not only the unmeaning nature, but also the perniciousness, and, in fact, the profligacy, of the political art, when built on sophistry, that is, of the rhetoric there opposed." Another writer on the higher criticism of Plato, Socher, gives this dialogue a wider range. "The whole presents an arena, rising in three gradations. The prize of the contest is the better, happier mode of life ; the parties are philosophy and rhetoric ; that contends for righteousness and virtue; this for the possession of political power ; the champion of the former is Socrates ; on behalf of the latter, three step forward, Gorgias, a rhetorician, Polus, a Sophist, and Callicles, an Athenian politician." Finally, Schleiermacher and C. F. Hermann, in the words of the latter, regard "the kernel of the dialogue to be, that the good alone is truly useful, and that men harm themselves by wrong-doing ; that, accordingly, the rule of pleasure must give way to the higher rule of the good." *

* All these opinions may be found in the works of their respective advocates, viz. Cousin's in his transl. S. 130, seq., Stallbaum's in Vol. 2, sec. 1, p. 38, of his second ed., Ast's in his work on Plato's life and writings, p. 133, Socher's in his similar work, (Munich, 1820,) p. 237, in which he is polemical towards Ast. C. F. Hermann's is contained in his Introd. to Plato, (Heidelberg, 1838 - 39, the second vol. has not appeared,) p. 476, and Schleiermacher's — the critic to whom the thorough understanding of Plato owes most — in Dobson's translation of his prefaces. While I am upon this subject, let me say, that Schleiermacher hardly receives justice from the hands of this translator. His style, indeed, offers serious difficulties, for his mind was not, "though deep, yet clear." It may be forgiven, therefore, to a translator, that sometimes he constructs, out of Schleiermacher's formidable German sentences, something not exactly English, as though he were only half conscious of the meaning. But when such things as the turning of André Dacier, the French translator of parts of

Most of these opinions have something of justice in them, but, with the exception of the last, appear to me to look at a part of the dialogue, rather than at the whole. If rhetoric is the subject, why have the researches into the nature of pleasure, the comparison between suffering injustice and committing it, and the discussion of the efficacy of punishment, so great prominence? Much is said about rhetoric, but it is the vehicle for conveying thought rather than the subject, the starting-point of the dialogue rather than its goal. I should entertain just the opposite opinion to that of Ast above quoted: that the scientific part of the dialogue is the main thing, and rhetoric only an example. Schleiermacher's view, so far as I understand it, or one very similar to it, appears to me to deserve the preference. The main subject is the worthless nature of pleasure, and of the pursuits founded on pleasure, as opposed to the right and the good. Rhetoric, including politics in its corrupt condition at that time, is selected as the most prominent and most esteemed of the arts which minister to pleasure. This exhibition of the subject being admitted, we see a propriety in the introduction of every topic. The right and the good are inseparably linked to each other, and, in fact, united with all that pertains to man's excellence and well-being. But to these, pleasure, pursued for its own sake, is opposed. It is opposed to true good, for it blindly seeks present gratification, however pernicious or debasing. It is opposed to right or justice, for it tries to avoid suffering wrong by inflicting wrong on others. It is opposed to both, because its impulse is to escape from de-

Plato, into Madame Dacier occur, notwithstanding Schleiermacher's "dem Dacier," and "Seiner einleitung," it may be suspected that the translation was made before sufficient knowledge of German was acquired, — a suspicion from which only the plea of gross carelessness can free the translator.

served punishment, without regard to the good effects of punishment on virtue and happiness. The arts which minister to pleasure — one of which, and the chief in its pretensions, is false rhetoric — fall under the same condemnation. As truth is on the side of good, they have no communion with truth ; they are arts of imposition or flattery, calculated to persuade the ignorant, and reared upon no basis of unchanging truth or scientific principles. In the end, as they sacrifice the highest good of those whom they please to their present gratification, they involve in ruin him who practises them, and those who are practised upon. Politics, especially, which, when genuine, aims at the public good, is, when based on these principles, a mischievous trade. And this supreme pursuit of pleasure affects the condition of man, not only in this life, but in the life to come.

Such appears to me to be the subject of the *Gorgias*. But it should be added, that Plato has so handled the subject that the dialogue answers, also, for a defence of himself and his master. The allusions to the trial of Socrates have been noticed already. He stands before us as the philosopher who suffers reproach and death for seeking men's good rather than their pleasure. But Plato defends himself, also, apparently against friends, who blamed him for not publicly serving the state, as well as against public men, who thought philosophy a useless pursuit. Politics, he asserts, must be founded on the theory and practice of philosophy. No man is a true politician until he becomes *τεχνικός*, — an artist, a philosopher able to distinguish useful from harmful pleasures, — and reduces his science to practice by making men better. That this is a fair defence I do not assert ; for, with true good in view at the outset, the practice perfects a man in the science. He might have said, what he must have felt, that the corruption of the

times, the necessity of using flattering arts, to which he could not resort, would have altogether prevented his success. In such an age,—and such an age is a very long one,—the philosophical statesman,—let me add, the truly enlightened Christian statesman,—the sound pilot of the state, is thrust from the helm, and ignorant apprentices usurp his place. Plato's part, therefore, was to act on a few, and on future times.

I would gladly now draw the attention of my younger readers to the *Gorgias*, as a display of the mind and style of Plato; but the limits of an Introduction forbid me to enlarge upon this topic. I must, therefore, omit to speak of the exquisite style of Plato, and the dramatic form in which he clothes his works. I must only glance at the Platonic Socrates, the centre of Plato's writings; at his admirable irony, now playful and now severe, his unruffled good-nature, his hatred of show and pretence, his attitude as an inquirer rather than as already wise, his unaffected modesty, his propensity to illustrate the great by the small, philosophical truth by common life, his high estimate of moral truth above physical. There are, however, one or two points to be noticed, in which *Gorgias* differs from many of Plato's works. One is, the earnestness, almost amounting to bitterness, with which the argument is carried on. There is less here of playful irony than elsewhere. Another is, that Socrates expresses his opinion, and lays down his principles, more than in most of the dialogues of an earlier date. Another still is, that, compared with the Platonic works of the first period, it has less of the dramatic about it; we have no embellished preface, like that of *Protagoras*, but at the beginning, Socrates, without any delay on the part of the writer, enters into the discussion. All these characteristics may be explained by a predominance of moral feeling, which rises even into indignation, and deprives Plato of part

of his usual tranquillity. With all this, the form is admirable.* The argument grows in interest and importance, until it ends in a strain of highest mood. To mention but a single characteristic, nothing can be finer than the way in which Socrates deals with Callicles in the third part, where he retorts his language upon him, and shows that the indignities which he had described as the rewards of the just man on earth will be heaped upon the unjust in a higher degree hereafter.

The opinion of the greater number of critics assigns the composition of the *Gorgias* to one of the years not long after the death of Socrates, while that event was still fresh in Plato's mind. *Athenæus* has a story (11. 505, D), that *Gorgias* read the work, and said, "How well Plato knows how to lampoon!" and another, that *Gorgias* declared that "he never heard or said such things as Plato reported." If *Gorgias* died soon after Socrates, as Foss maintains, these anecdotes, which may not be wholly unworthy of credence, would supply us with the latter term for the composition of the dialogue. But there is no certainty in regard to the dates of the birth of *Gorgias*, and of his age when he came to Athens as ambassador, on which the date of his death depends. A comparison of this dialogue with Plato's other works enables us to come somewhere near the time of its composition in another manner. It occupies a

* Stallbaum, in his *Introd.* to the *Repub.*, says: — "Hoc monere juvat disserendi quoque elegantiam in *Politia* tantam regnare ut paucissimi sermones præter *Gorgiam*, *Protagoram*, *Phædonem*, *Phædrum*, et *Symposium*, hoc in genere ad eam comparandi sint." Ritter, 2. 192. "In regard to Plato's imitative art in dialogue (*dialogisch-mimische kunst*), we consider as his most finished works *Protagoras*, *Gorgias*, and *Symposium*, next to which, though at some distance, come *Phædrus* and *Phædo*." Here, however, style, rather than form, is spoken of. As a work of art, I should place *Phædrus* first among all the Platonic dialogues.

middle place, as Schleiermacher teaches us, between the elementary writings of Plato's first years, and the constructive ones of his maturer life. This critic conceives that it was written after Plato's first visit to Sicily, in 389, B. C., when he was forty years of age. Stallbaum brings it much nearer to the death of Socrates, in 399. To this conclusion he is led by a strong resemblance he discovers between the *Gorgias* and *Meno*, which latter dialogue he carries back even to a time before the death of Socrates, on account of Plato's mildness there in attacking Anytus, the accuser of his master. But neither of these considerations has much weight; Plato might and does resemble himself in works written at considerable intervals from one another; and the more gentle tone of *Meno* may be owing to a frame of its author's mind which is not to be accounted for. It is safer to say, that the date cannot be ascertained precisely.

ΤΑ ΤΟΥ ΔΙΑΛΟΓΟΥ ΠΡΟΣΩΠΑ
ΚΑΛΛΙΚΛΗΣ, ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ, ΧΑΙΡΕΦΩΝ,
ΓΟΡΓΙΑΣ, ΠΩΛΟΣ.

447 ΣΑΡ. I. ΚΑΛ. Πολέμου καὶ μάχης φασὶ^A χρῆναι, ὃ Σώκρατες, οὗτοι μεταλαγχάνειν. ΣΩ.
Ἄλλ' ἦ, τὸ λεγόμενον, κατόπιν ἑορτῆς ἥκομεν καὶ υστεροῦμεν; ΚΑΛ. Καὶ μάλα γε ἀστείας ἑορτῆς· πολλὰ γὰρ καὶ καλὰ Γοργίας ἡμῖν ὅλιγον πρότερον ἐπεδείξατο. ΣΩ. Τούτων μέντοι, B ὃ Καλλίκλεις, αὕτιος Χαιρεφῶν ὅδε, ἐν ἀγορᾷ ἀναγκάσας ἡμᾶς διατρῆψαι. ΧΑΙ. Οὐδὲν πρᾶγμα, ὃ Σώκρατες· ἐγὼ γὰρ καὶ ίάσομαι. φίλος γάρ μοι Γοργίας, ὃστ' ἐπιδείξεται ἡμῖν, εἰ μὲν δοκεῖ, νῦν, ἐὰν δὲ βούλη, ἐσαῦθις. ΚΑΛ. Τί δαί, ὃ Χαιρεφῶν; ἐπιθυμεῖ Σωκράτης ἀκοῦσαι Γοργίου; ΧΑΙ. Ἐπ' αὐτό γέ τοι τοῦτο πάρεσμεν. ΚΑΛ. Οὐκοῦν ὅταν βούλησθε παρ' ἐμὲ ἥκειν οἴκαδε, παρ' ἐμοὶ γὰρ Γοργίας καταλύει καὶ ἐπιδείξεται ὑμῖν. ΣΩ. Εὖ λέγεις, C ὃ Καλλίκλεις. ἄλλ' ἀρα ἐθελήσειεν ἀν ἡμῖν διαλεχθῆναι; βούλομαι γὰρ πυθέσθαι παρ' αὐτοῦ, τίς ἡ δύναμις τῆς τέχνης τοῦ ἀνδρός, καὶ τί ἔστιν ὃ ἐπαγγέλλεται τε καὶ διδάσκει. τὴν δὲ

ἀλλην ἐπίδειξιν ἐσαῦθις, ὥσπερ σὺ λέγεις, ποιησάσθω. *ΚΑΛ.* Οὐδὲν οἶον τὸ αὐτὸν ἐρωτᾶν, ὃ Σώκρατες. καὶ γὰρ αὐτῷ ἐν τοῦτῳ τῇς ἐπιδείξεως ἐκέλευε γοῦν νῦν δὴ ἐρωτᾶν ὅ τι τις βούλοιτο τῶν ἔνδον ὄντων, καὶ πρὸς ἀπαντα ἔφη ἀποκρινεῖσθαι. *ΣΩ.* Ἡ καλῶς λέγεις. *Ω* Χαιρεφῶν, ἐροῦ αὐτόν. *ΧΑΙ.* Τί ἐρωμαι; *ΣΩ.* Δῆτις ἐστί. *ΧΑΙ.* Πῶς λέγεις; *ΣΩ.* Ὡσπερ ἂν εἰ ἐτύγχανεν ὃν ὑποδημάτων δημιουργός, ἀπεκρίνατο ἂν δήπου σοι, ὅτι σκυτοτόμος. ἢ οὐ μανθάνεις ὡς λέγω;

ΣΑΡ. II. *ΧΑΙ.* Μανθάνω καὶ ἐρήσομαι. — Εἰπέ μοι, ὃ Γοργία, ἀληθῆ λέγει Καλλικλῆς ὅδε, ὅτι ἐπαγγέλλει ἀποκρίνεσθαι ὅ τι ἂν τίς σε ἐρωτᾷ; *ΓΟΡ.* Ἀλληθῆ, ὃ Χαιρεφῶν· καὶ γὰρ 448 νῦν δὴ αὐτὰ ταῦτα ἐπηγγελλόμην, καὶ λέγω, ὅτι οὐδείς μέ πω ἡρώτηκε καινὸν οὐδὲν πολλῶν ἐτῶν. *ΧΑΙ.* Ἡ που ἄρα διδίως ἀποκρίνει, ὃ Γοργία. *ΓΟΡ.* Πάρεστι τούτου πεῖραν, ὃ Χαιρεφῶν, λαμβάνειν. *ΠΩΛ.* Νὴ Δία· ἂν δέ γε βούλῃ, ὃ Χαιρεφῶν, ἔμοῦ. Γοργίας μὲν γὰρ καὶ ἀπειρηκέναι μοι δοκεῖ· πολλὰ γὰρ ἄρτι διελήλυθε. *ΧΑΙ.* Τί δαί, ὃ Πῶλε; οἵτι σὺ κάλλιον ἂν Γοργίου ἀποκρίνασθαι; *ΠΩΛ.* Τί δὲ τοῦτο, ἐὰν σοί γε ἴκανῶς; *ΧΑΙ.* Οὐδέν· ἀλλ' ἐπειδὴ *Β* σὺ βούλει, ἀποκρίνουν. *ΠΩΛ.* Ἐρώτα. *ΧΑΙ.* Ἐρωτῶ δή. εἰ ἐτύγχανε Γοργίας ἐπιστήμων ὃν τῇς τέχνης ἡσπερ ὁ ἀδελφὸς αὐτοῦ Ἡρόδικος, τίνα ἂν αὐτὸν ὀνομάζομεν δικαίως; οὐχ ὅπερ ἐκεῖνον; *ΠΩΛ.* Πάντα γε. *ΧΑΙ.* Ἰατρὸν

ἄρα φάσκοντες αὐτὸν εἶναι καλῶς ἀν ἐλέγομεν.

ΠΩΛ. Ναί. **XAI.** Εἰ δέ γε ἥσπερ Ἀριστοφῶν ὁ Ἀγλαοφῶντος ἢ ὁ ἀδελφὸς αὐτοῦ ἔμπειρος ἦν τέχνης, τίνα ἀν αὐτὸν ὄρθως ἐκαλοῦμεν;

ΠΩΛ. Δῆλον, ὅτι ζωγράφον. **XAI.** Νῦν δὲ ἐπειδὴ τίνος τέχνης ἐπιστήμων ἐστί, τίνα ἀν κα-

λοῦντες αὐτὸν ὄρθως καλοῦμεν; **ΠΩΛ.** Ὡ **Χαιρεφῶν,** πολλαὶ τέχναι ἐν ἀνθρώποις εἰσὶν ἐκ τῶν ἔμπειριῶν ἔμπειρος εύδοημέναι· ἔμπειρία μὲν γὰρ ποιεῖ τὸν αἰῶνα ἡμᾶν πορεύεσθαι κατὰ τέχνην, ἀπειρία δὲ κατὰ τύχην. ἐκάστων δὲ τούτων μεταλαμβάνουσιν ἄλλοι ἄλλων ἄλλως, τῶν δὲ ἀφίστων οἱ ἄριστοι· ἂν καὶ Γοργίας ἐστὶν ὅδε, καὶ μετέχει τῆς καλλίστης τῶν τεχνῶν.

D CAP. III. ΣΩ. Καλῶς γε, ὡ **Γοργία,** φαί-
νεται **Πῶλος** παρεσκευάσθαι εἰς λόγους· ἄλλα
γὰρ ὁ ὑπέσχετο **Χαιρεφῶντι** οὐ ποιεῖ. **GOR.**

Tí μάλιστα, ὡ **Σώκρατες;** **ΣΩ.** Τὸ ἐρωτώμε-
νον οὐ πάνυ μοι φαίνεται ἀποκρίνεσθαι. **GOR.**

Ἄλλα σύ, εἰ βούλει, ἐροῦ αὐτόν. **ΣΩ.** Οὐκ,
εἰ αὐτῷ γε σοὶ βουλομένῳ ἐστὶν ἀποκρίνεσθαι,

ἄλλα πολὺ ἀν ἥδιον σέ. δῆλος γάρ μοι **Πῶλος**
καὶ ἐξ ἀν εἴρηκεν, ὅτι τὴν καλουμένην δητορικὴν

E μᾶλλον μεμελέτηκεν ἢ διαλέγεσθαι. **ΠΩΛ.** Τί
δή, ὡ **Σώκρατες;** **ΣΩ.** Ὁτι, ὡ **Πῶλε,** ἐρομέ-
νον **Χαιρεφῶντος** τίνος **Γοργίας** ἐπιστήμων τέ-

χνῆς, ἐγκωμιάζεις μὲν αὐτοῦ τὴν τέχνην, ὥσπερ
τινὸς ψέγοντος, ἥτις δέ ἐστιν, οὐκ ἀπεκρίνω.

ΠΩΛ. Οὐ γάρ ἀπεκρινάμην, ὅτι εἴη ἡ καλ-
λίστη; **ΣΩ.** Καὶ μάλα γε. ἄλλ' οὐδεὶς ἐρωτᾷ

ποία τις εἶη ἡ Γοργίου τέχνη, ἀλλὰ τίς, καὶ ὅντινα δέοι καλεῖν τὸν Γοργίαν. ὥσπερ τὰ ἔμπροσθέν σοι ὑπετείνατο Χαιρεφῶν καὶ αὐτῷ⁴⁴⁹ καλῶς καὶ διὰ βραχέων ἀπεκρίνω, καὶ ιῦν οὕτως εἰπὲ τίς ἡ τέχνη καὶ τίνα Γοργίαν καλεῖν χρὴ ἥμᾶς. μᾶλλον δέ, ὡς Γοργία, αὐτὸς ἥμιν εἰπὲ τίνα σε χρὴ καλεῖν ὡς τίνος ἐπιστήμονα τέχνης. ΓΟΡ. Τῆς ἑητορικῆς, ὡς Σώκρατες. ΣΩ. Ῥήτορα ἄρα χρὴ σε καλεῖν; ΓΟΡ. Ἀγαθόν γε, ὡς Σώκρατες, εἰ δὴ ὁ γε εὑχομαι εἶναι, ὡς ἔφη Ὁμηρος, βούλει με καλεῖν. ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ βούλομαι. ΓΟΡ. Κάλει δὴ. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἄλλους σε φῶμεν δυνατὸν εἶναι Β ποιεῖν; ΓΟΡ. Ἐπαγγέλλομαι γε δὴ ταῦτα οὐ μόνον ἐνθάδε, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἄλλοθι. ΣΩ. Ἄρ, οὖν ἐθελήσαις ἂν, ὡς Γοργία, ὥσπερ νῦν διαλεγόμεθα, διατελέσαι τὸ μὲν ἐρωτῶν, τὸ δ' ἀποκρινόμενος, τὸ δὲ μῆκος τῶν λόγων τοῦτο, οἶνον καὶ Πᾶλος ἦρξατο, ἐσαῦθις ἀποθέσθαι; ἀλλ' ὅπερ ὑπισχνεῖ, μὴ ψεύσῃ, ἀλλὰ ἐθέλησον κατὰ βραχὺ τὸ ἐρωτώμενον ἀποκρίνεσθαι. ΓΟΡ. Εἰσὶ μέν, ὡς Σώκρατες, ἔνιαι τῶν ἀποκρίσεων ἀναγκαῖαι διὰ Σ μακρῶν τοὺς λόγους ποιεῖσθαι· οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ πειράσομαι γε ὡς διὰ βραχυτάτων. καὶ γὰρ αὖ καὶ τοῦτο ἐν ἐστιν ὡν φημι, μηδένα ἂν ἐν βραχυτέροις ἐμοῦ τὰ αὐτὰ εἰπεῖν. ΣΩ. Τούτου μὴν δεῖ, ὡς Γοργία· καί μοι ἐπίδειξιν αὐτοῦ τούτου ποίησαι, τῆς βραχυλογίας, μακρολογίας δὲ ἐσαῦθις. ΓΟΡ. Ἀλλὰ ποιήσω, καὶ οὐδενὸς φήσεις βραχυλογωτέρου ἀκοῦσαι.

CAP. IV. ΣΩ. Φέρε δή.—ὅητορικῆς γὰρ
 Δ φῆς ἐπιστήμων τέχνης εἶναι καὶ ποιῆσαι ἀν καὶ
 ἄλλον ὅητορα.—ἡ ὅητορικὴ περὶ τί τῶν ὄντων
 τυγχάνει οὖσα ; ὡσπερ ἡ ὑφαντικὴ περὶ τὴν
 τῶν ἴματίων ἐργασίαν . ἢ γάρ ; **GOR.** Ναί.
ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἡ μουσικὴ περὶ τὴν τῶν
 μελῶν ποίησιν ; **GOR.** Ναί. **ΣΩ.** Νη τὴν
 Ἡραν, ὡς Γοργία, ἄγαμαί γε τὰς ἀποκρίσεις,
 διι ἀποκρίνει ως οἰόν τε διὰ βραχυτάτων.
GOR. Πάνυ γὰρ οἴμαι, ὡς Σώκρατες, ἐπιεικῶς
 τοῦτο ποιεῖν. **ΣΩ.** Εὗ λέγεις. ἵθι δή μοι ἀπό-
 Ε κριναι οὔτω καὶ περὶ τῆς ὅητορικῆς, περὶ τί τῶν
 ὄντων ἔστιν ἐπιστήμη ; **GOR.** Περὶ λόγους.
ΣΩ. Ποίους τούτους, ὡς Γοργία ; ἀρα οἱ δηλοῦ-
 σι τοὺς κάμνοντας, ως ἀν διαιτώμενοι ὑγιαίνοιεν ;
GOR. Οὐ. **ΣΩ.** Οὐκ ἄρα περὶ πάντας γε
 τοὺς λόγους ἡ ὅητορικὴ ἔστιν. **GOR.** Οὐ δῆ-
 τα. **ΣΩ.** Ἀλλὰ μὴν λέγειν γε ποιεῖ δυνατούς.
GOR. Ναί. **ΣΩ.** Οὐκοῦν περὶ ὕνπερ λέγειν,
 καὶ φρονεῖν ; **GOR.** Πῶς γὰρ οὐ ; **ΣΩ.** Ἄρ,
 450 οὖν καὶ ἦν νῦν δὴ ἐλέγομεν, ἡ ἰατρικὴ περὶ τῶν
 καμνόντων ποιεῖ δυνατοὺς εἶναι φρονεῖν καὶ
 λέγειν ; **GOR.** Ἀνάγκη. **ΣΩ.** Καὶ ἡ ἰατρικὴ
 ἀρα, ως ἔοικε, περὶ λόγους ἔστι. **GOR.** Ναί.
ΣΩ. Τούς γε περὶ τὰ νοσήματα ; **GOR.** Μά-
 λιστα. **ΣΩ.** Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἡ γυμναστικὴ περὶ
 λόγους ἔστι τοὺς περὶ εὐεξίαν τε τῶν σωμάτων
 καὶ καχεξίαν ; **GOR.** Πάνυ γε. **ΣΩ.** Καὶ
 Β μὴν καὶ αἱ ἄλλαι τέχναι, ὡς Γοργία, οὔτες ἔχου-
 σιν· ἐκάστη αὐτῶν περὶ λόγους ἔστι τούτους, οἱ

τυγχάνουσιν ὅντες περὶ τὸ πρᾶγμα οὗ ἐκάστη ἔστιν ἡ τέχνη. ΓΟΡ. Φαίνεται. ΣΩ. Τί οὖν δὴ ποτε τὰς ἄλλας τέχνας οὐ φητορικὰς καλεῖς, οὕσας περὶ λόγους, εἴπερ ταύτην φητορικὴν καλεῖς, ἢ ἀν ἥ περὶ λόγους; ΓΟΡ. Ὅτι, ὡς Σώκρατες, τῶν μὲν ἄλλων τεχνῶν περὶ χειρουργίας τε καὶ τοιαύτας πράξεις, ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν, πᾶσα ἔστιν ἡ ἐπιστήμη, τῆς δὲ φητορικῆς οὐδέν ἔστι τοιοῦτον χειρουργημα, ἄλλὰ πᾶσα ἡ πρᾶξις καὶ ἡ κύρωσις διὰ λόγων ἔστι. διὰ ταῦτ' ἐγὼ τὴν C φητορικὴν τέχνην ἀξιῶ εἶναι περὶ λόγους, δρθῶς λέγων, ὡς ἐγώ φημι.

CAP. V. ΣΩ. Ἄρ, οὖν μανθάνω οἷαν αὐτὴν βούλει καλεῖν; τάχα δὲ εἴσομαι σαφέστερον. ἄλλ, ἀπόκριναι. εἰσὶν ἡμῖν τέχναι. ἥ γάρ; ΓΟΡ. Ναί. ΣΩ. Πασῶν δέ, οἶμαι, τῶν τεχνῶν τῶν μὲν ἐργασία τὸ πολύ ἔστι καὶ λόγου βραχέος δέονται, ἔνιαι δὲ οὐδενός, ἄλλὰ τὸ τῆς τέχνης περαίνοιτο ἀν καὶ διὰ σιγῆς, οἶον γραφικὴ καὶ ἀνδριαντοποιία καὶ ἄλλαι πολλαί. τὰς τοιαύτας μοι δοκεῖς λέγειν, περὶ ἃς οὐ φῆς τὴν φητορικὴν εἶναι. ἥ οὐ; ΓΟΡ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν καλῶς ὑπολαμβάνεις, ὡς Σώκρατες. ΣΩ. Ἐτεροι δέ γέ εἰσι τῶν τεχνῶν, αἱ διὰ λόγου πᾶν περαίνουσι, καὶ ἐργον, ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν, ἥ οὐδενός προσδέονται ἥ βραχέος πάνυ, οἶον ἡ ἀριθμητικὴ καὶ λογιστικὴ καὶ γεωμετρικὴ καὶ πεττεντικὴ γε καὶ ἄλλαι πολλαὶ τέχναι, ὃν ἔνιαι σχεδόν τι ἴσους τοὺς λόγους ἔχουσι ταῖς πράξειν, αἱ δὲ πολλαὶ πλείους καὶ τὸ παράπαν πᾶσα ἡ πρᾶξις E

καὶ τὸ κῦρος αὐταῖς διὰ λόγων ἐστί. τῶν τοι-
ούτων τινά μοι δοκεῖς λέγειν τὴν δητορικήν.

ΓΟΡ. Ἀληθῆ λέγεις. **ΣΩ.** Άλλ' οὔτοι τού-
των γε οὐδεμίαν οἶμαί σε βούλεσθαι δητορικὴν
καλεῖν; οὐχ ὅτι τῷ δῆματι οὕτως εἶπες, ὅτι ή
διὰ λόγου τὸ κῦρος ἔχουσα δητορική ἐστι, καὶ
ὑπολάβοι ἀν τις, εἰ βούλοιτο δυσχεραίνειν ἐν
τοῖς λόγοις, Τὴν ἀριθμητικὴν ἄρα δητορικήν, ὡ
Γοργία, λέγεις; ἀλλ' οὐκ οἶμαί σε οὕτε τὴν
451 ἀριθμητικὴν οὕτε τὴν γεωμετρίαν δητορικὴν λέ-
γειν. **ΓΟΡ.** Οφθῶς γὰρ οἴει, ὡ **Σώκρατες**, καὶ
δικαίως ὑπολαμβάνεις.

ΣΑΡ. VI. **ΣΩ.** Ιθι οὖν καὶ σὺ τὴν ἀπόκρι-
σιν ἦν ἡρόμην διαπέρανον. ἐπεὶ γὰρ η δητορικὴ
τυγχάνει μὲν οὖσα τούτων τις τῶν τεχνῶν τῶν
τὸ πολὺ λόγῳ χρωμένων, τυγχάνουσι δὲ καὶ ἄλ-
λαι τοιαῦται οὖσαι, πειρῶ εἰπεῖν, η περὶ τί ἐν
λόγοις τὸ κῦρος ἔχουσα δητορική ἐστιν. ὥσπερ
ἀν εἴ τις με ἔροιτο ὃν νῦν δὴ ἔλεγον περὶ ἡσ-
τινοσοῦν τῶν τεχνῶν, **Ω Σώκρατες**, τίς ἐστιν η
B ἀριθμητικὴ τέχνη; εἴποιμ' ἀν αὐτῷ, ὥσπερ σὺ
ἄρτι, ὅτι τῶν διὰ λόγου τις τὸ κῦρος ἔχουσῶν.
καὶ εἰ με ἐπανέρθοιτο· Τῶν περὶ τί; εἴποιμ' ἀν,
ὅτι τῶν περὶ τὸ ἄρτιόν τε καὶ περιττὸν [γνῶσις],
ὅσα ἀν ἐκάτερα τυγχάνοι ὄντα. εἰ δ' αὖ ἔροιτο·
Τὴν δὲ λογιστικὴν τίνα καλεῖς τέχνην; εἴποιμ'
ἀν, ὅτι καὶ αὗτη ἐστὶ τῶν λόγῳ τὸ πᾶν κυρουμέ-
νων. καὶ εἰ ἐπανέρθοιτο, **Η περὶ τί;** εἴποιμ' ἀν
ώσπερ οἱ ἐν τῷ δῆμῳ συγγραφόμενοι, ὅτι τὰ μὲν
C ἄλλα καθάπερ η ἀριθμητικὴ η λογιστικὴ ἔχει.

περὶ τὸ αὐτὸν γάρ ἐστι, τό τε ἄρτιον καὶ τὸ περιττόν· διαφέρει δὲ τοσοῦτον, ὅτι καὶ πρὸς αὐτὰ καὶ πρὸς ἄλληλα πῶς ἔχει πλήθους ἐπισκοπεῖ τὸ περιττὸν καὶ τὸ ἄρτιον ἡ λογιστική. καὶ εἴ τις τὴν ἀστρονομίαν ἀνέροιτο, ἐμοῦ λέγοντος, ὅτι καὶ αὗτη λόγῳ κυριοῦται τὰ πάντα, Οἱ δὲ λόγοι οἱ τῆς ἀστρονομίας, εἰ φαίη, περὶ τί εἰσιν, ὃ Σώκρατες; εἴποιμ' ἄν, ὅτι περὶ τὴν τῶν ἀστρων φορὰν καὶ ἡλίου καὶ σελήνης, πῶς πρὸς ἄλληλα D τάχους ἔχει. ΓΟΡ. Ὁρθῶς γε λέγων σύ, ὃ Σώκρατες. ΣΩ. Ἰθι δὴ καὶ σύ, ὃ Γοργία. τυγχάνει μὲν γάρ δὴ ἡ ὁητορικὴ οὖσα τῶν λόγων τὰ πάντα διαπραττομένων τε καὶ κυρουμένων τις. ἢ γάρ; ΓΟΡ. Ἐστι ταῦτα. ΣΩ. Λέγε δὴ τῶν περὶ τί; * τί * ἐστι τοῦτο τῶν ὅντων, περὶ οὗ οὗτοι οἱ λόγοι εἰσίν, οἷς ἡ ὁητορικὴ χρῆται; ΓΟΡ. Τὰ μέγιστα τῶν ἀνθρωπείων πραγμάτων, ὃ Σώκρατες, καὶ ἄριστα.

CAP. VII. ΣΩ. Ἀλλ', ὃ Γοργία, ἀμφισβητήσιμον καὶ τοῦτο λέγεις καὶ οὐδέν πω σαφές. Εἰ οἴομαι γάρ σε ἀκηκοέναι ἐν τοῖς συμποσίοις ἀδόντων ἀνθρώπων τοῦτο τὸ σκολιόν, ἐν ὃ καταριθμοῦνται ἀδοντες, ὅτι ὑγιαίνειν μὲν ἀριστόν ἐστι, τὸ δὲ δεύτερον καλὸν γενέσθαι, τρίτον δέ, ὃς φησιν ὁ ποιητὴς τοῦ σκολιοῦ, τὸ πλούτεν ἀδόλως. ΓΟΡ. Ἀκήκοα γάρ· ἀλλὰ πρὸς τί τοῦτο λέγεις; ΣΩ. Ὄτι σοι αὐτίκα ἄν παρα-452 σταῖεν οἱ δημιουργοὶ τούτων ἢν ἐπήνεσεν ὁ τὸ σκολιὸν ποιήσας, ἵατρός τε καὶ παιδοτρίβης καὶ χοηματιστής, καὶ εἴποι πρῶτον μὲν ὁ ἵατρός, ὅτι,

Ὡ Σώκρατες, ἐξαπατᾶ σε Γοργίας· οὐ γάρ
 ἔστιν ἡ τούτου τέχνη περὶ τὸ μέγιστον ἀγαθὸν
 τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, ἀλλ' ἡ ἐμῆ. εἰ οὖν αὐτὸν ἐγὼ
 ἐροίμην· Σὺ δὲ τίς ἂν ταῦτα λέγεις; εἴποι ἂν
 ἵσως, ὅτι Ἰατρός. Τί οὖν λέγεις; ἡ τὸ τῆς σῆς
 τέχνης ἔργον μέγιστόν ἔστιν ἀγαθόν; Πῶς γὰρ
 B οὖν, φαίη ἂν ἵσως, ὡς Σώκρατες, ὑγίεια; τί δ'
 ἔστι μεῖζον ἀγαθὸν ἀνθρώπους ὑγιείας; Εἰ δ'
 αὖ μετὰ τοῦτον ὁ παιδοτρίβης εἴποι, ὅτι Θαυ-
 μάζοιμί γ' ἄν, ὡς Σώκρατες, καὶ αὐτός, εἴ σοι
 ἔχει Γοργίας μεῖζον ἀγαθὸν ἐπιδεῖξαι τῆς αὐ-
 τοῦ τέχνης ἡ ἐγὼ τῆς ἐμῆς· εἴποιμ' ἂν αὖ καὶ
 πρὸς τοῦτον· Σὺ δὲ δὴ τίς εἶ, ὡς ἀνθρωπε; καὶ
 τί τὸ σὸν ἔργον; Παιδοτρίβης, φαίη ἄν, τὸ δ'
 ἔργον μού ἔστι καλούς τε καὶ ἴσχυρούς ποιεῖν
 τοὺς ἀνθρώπους τὰ σώματα. Μετὰ δὲ τὸν παι-
 δοτρίβην εἴποι ἂν ὁ χρηματιστής, ὡς ἐγῶμαι,
 C πάνυ καταφρονῶν ἀπάντων, Σκόπει δῆτα, ὡς
 Σώκρατες, ἐάν σοι πλούτου φανῆ τι μεῖζον ἀγα-
 θὸν ὃν ἡ παρὰ Γοργίᾳ ἡ παρ', ἀλλῷ διτροῦν.
 φαῖμεν ἂν οὖν πρὸς αὐτόν· Τί δὲ δὴ; ἡ σὺ
 τοῦτον δημιουργός; Φαίη ἄν. Τίς ὡν; Χρη-
 ματιστής. Τί οὖν; κρίνεις σὺ μέγιστον ἀνθρώ-
 πους ἀγαθὸν εἶναι πλοῦτον; φήσομεν. Πῶς
 γὰρ οὐκ; ἐρεῖ. Καὶ μὴν ἀμφισβητεῖ γε Γορ-
 γίας ὅδε τὴν παρ', αὐτῷ τέχνην μεῖζονος ἀγαθοῦ
 αἰτίαν εἶναι ἡ τὴν σήν, φαῖμεν ἂν ἡμεῖς. δῆλον
 D οὖν, ὅτι τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο ἐροιτ' ἄν· Καὶ τί ἔστι
 τοῦτο τὸ ἀγαθόν; ἀποκρινάσθω Γοργίας. "Ιθι
 οὖν νομίσας, ὡς Γοργία, ἐρωτᾶσθαι καὶ ὑπ' ἐκεί-

νων καὶ ὑπ' ἐμοῦ, ἀπόκριναι τί ἔστι τοῦτο, ὁ φῆς σὺ μέγιστον ἀγαθὸν εἶναι τοῖς ἀνθρώποις καὶ σὲ δημιουργὸν εἶναι αὐτοῦ. ΓΟΡ. Ὁπερ ἔστιν, ὃ Σώκρατες, τῇ ἀληθείᾳ μέγιστον ἀγαθὸν καὶ αἴτιον ἄμα μὲν ἐλευθερίας αὐτοῖς τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, ἄμα δὲ τοῦ ἄλλων ἀρχειν ἐν τῇ αὐτοῦ πόλει ἐκάστῳ. ΣΩ. Τί οὖν δὴ τοῦτο λέγεις; Ε ΓΟΡ. Τὸ πείθειν ἔγωγ' οἶόν τ' εἶναι τοῖς λόγοις καὶ ἐν δικαστηρίῳ δικαστὰς καὶ ἐν βουλευτηρίῳ βουλευτὰς καὶ ἐν ἐκκλησίᾳ ἐκκλησιαστὰς καὶ ἐν ἄλλῳ ἔνδικῳ παντί, ὅστις ἀν πολιτικὸς ἔνδικος γίγνηται. καίτοι ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ δυνάμει δοῦλον μὲν ἔξεις τὸν ἴατρόν, δοῦλον δὲ τὸν παιδοτρίβην· ὁ δὲ χρηματιστὴς οὗτος ἄλλῳ ἀναφανήσεται χρηματιζόμενος καὶ οὐχ αὐτῷ, ἀλλὰ σοὶ τῷ δυναμένῳ λέγειν καὶ πείθειν τὰ πλήθη.

CAP. VIII. ΣΩ. Νῦν μοι δοκεῖς δηλῶσαι, ὃ Γοργία, ἐγγύτατα τὴν ἡγητορικὴν ἥντινα τέ-453 χνην ἥγεῖ εἶναι, καί, εἴ τι ἔγὼ συνίημι, λέγεις, ὅτι πειθοῦς δημιουργός ἔστιν ἡ ἡγητορική, καὶ ἡ πραγματεία αὐτῆς ἀπασα καὶ τὸ κεφάλαιον εἰς τοῦτο τελευτᾷ. ἡ ἔχεις τι λέγειν ἐπὶ πλέον τὴν ἡγητορικὴν δύνασθαι ἡ πειθὼ τοῖς ἀκούονσιν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ποιεῖν; ΓΟΡ. Οὐδαμῶς, ὃ Σώκρατες, ἀλλά μοι δοκεῖς ἰκανῶς δρίζεσθαι· ἔστι γὰρ τοῦτο τὸ κεφάλαιον αὐτῆς. ΣΩ. Ἡ Ακουσον δῆ, ὃ Γοργία. ἔγὼ γὰρ εῦ ἵσθ' ὅτι, ὡς ἐμαυτὸν B πείθω, εἴπερ τις ἄλλος ἄλλῳ διαλέγεται βουλόμενος εἰδέναι αὐτὸ τοῦτο, περὶ ὅτου ὁ λόγος ἔστι, καὶ ἐμὲ εἶναι τούτων ἔνα· ἀξιῶ δὲ καὶ σέ.

GORP. Τί οὖν δή, ὃ Σώκρατες; *ΣΩ.* Ἐγὼ
ἔρω νῦν. ἐγὼ τὴν ἀπὸ τῆς ὁητορικῆς πειθώ, ὅτις
ποτ' ἔστιν ἦν σὺ λέγεις καὶ περὶ ἀντινων πρα-
γμάτων ἔστι πειθώ, σαφῶς μὲν εῦ ἴσθ' ὅτι οὐκ
οἶδα, οὐ μὴν ἀλλ' ὑποπτεύω γε ἦν οἷμαί σε
λέγειν καὶ περὶ ᾧ· οὐδὲν μέντοι ἥπτον ἔρησο-
C μαί σε τίνα ποτὲ λέγεις τὴν πειθώ τὴν ἀπὸ τῆς
ὁητορικῆς καὶ περὶ τίνων αὐτὴν εἶναι. τοῦ οὖν
ἔνεκα δὴ αὐτὸς ὑποπτεύων σὲ ἔρησομαι, ἀλλ',
οὐκ αὐτὸς λέγω; οὐ σοῦ ἔνεκα, ἀλλὰ τοῦ λόγου,
ίνα οὗτο προῖη, ὡς μάλιστ' ἀν ἡμῖν καταφανὲς
ποιοῖ περὶ ὅτου λέγεται. σκόπει γὰρ, εἰ σοι δοκῶ
δικαίως ἀνερωτᾶν σε. ὥσπερ ἀν εἰ ἐτύγχανόν σε
ἔρωτῶν τίς ἔστι τῶν ζωγράφων Ζεῦξις, εἴ μοι
εἶπες, ὅτι ὁ τὰ ζῶα γράφων, ἀρ' οὐκ ἀν δικαίως
D σε ἡρόμην ὁ τὰ ποῖα τῶν ζώων γράφων καὶ ποῦ;
GORP. Πάνυ γε. *ΣΩ.* Ἄρα διὰ τοῦτο, ὅτι
καὶ ἄλλοι εἰσὶ ζωγράφοι γράφοντες ἄλλα πολλὰ
ζῶα; *GORP.* Ναί. *ΣΩ.* Εἰ δέ γε μηδεὶς ἄλ-
λος ἢ Ζεῦξις ἔγραφε, καλῶς ἀν σοι ἀπεκέκριτο;
GORP. Πῶς γὰρ οῦ; *ΣΩ.* Ἰθι δὴ καὶ περὶ
τῆς ὁητορικῆς εἰπέ, πότερον σοι δοκεῖ πειθώ ποι-
εῖν ἢ ὁητορικὴ μόνη, ἢ καὶ ἄλλαι τέχναι; λέγω
δὲ τὸ τοιόνδε· ὅστις διδάσκει ὅτιοῦν πρᾶγμα,
πότερον ὁ διδάσκει πείθει, ἢ οὐ; *GORP.* Οὐ
δῆτα, ὃ Σώκρατες, ἀλλὰ πάντων μάλιστα πείθει.
E *ΣΩ.* Πάλιν δ' εἰ ἐπὶ τῶν αὐτῶν τεχνῶν λέγομεν
ἄνπερ νῦν δή, ἢ ἀριθμητικὴ οὐ διδάσκει ἡμᾶς
ὅσα ἔστι τὰ τοῦ ἀριθμοῦ καὶ ὁ ἀριθμητικὸς ἀν-
θρωπος; *GORP.* Πάνυ γε. *ΣΩ.* Οὐκοῦν καὶ

πείθει; *ΓΟΡ.* Ναί. *ΣΩ.* Πειθοῦς ἄρα δημιουργός ἐστι καὶ ἡ ἀριθμητική. *ΓΟΡ.* Φαίνεται. *ΣΩ.* Οὐκοῦν ἐάν τις ἐρωτᾷ ήμᾶς ποίας πειθοῦς καὶ περὶ τί, ἀποκρινούμεθά που αὐτῷ, διτι τῆς διδασκαλικῆς τῆς περὶ τὸ ἀρτιόν τε καὶ⁴⁵⁴ τὸ περιττὸν ὅσον ἐστί. καὶ τὰς ἄλλας ἃς νῦν δὴ ἐλέγομεν τέχνας ἀπόστας ἔξομεν ἀποδεῖξαι πειθοῦς δημιουργοὺς οὓςσας καὶ ἡστίνος καὶ περὶ ὃ τι. ἢ οὐ; *ΓΟΡ.* Ναί. *ΣΩ.* Οὐκ ἄρα ἡγητορικὴ μόνη πειθοῦς ἐστι δημιουργός. *ΓΟΡ.* Ἀληθῆ λέγεις.

CAP. IX. *ΣΩ.* Ἐπειδὴ τοίνυν οὐ μόνη ἀπεργάζεται τοῦτο τὸ ἔργον, ἄλλὰ καὶ ἄλλαι, δικαίως, ὥσπερ περὶ τοῦ ζωγράφου, μετὰ τοῦτο ἐπανερούμεθ' ἂν τὸν λέγοντα, ποίας δὴ πειθοῦς καὶ τῆς περὶ τί πειθοῦς ἡ ἡγητορικὴ ἐστι B τέχνη; ἢ οὐ δοκεῖ σοι δίκαιον εἶναι ἐπανερέσθαι; *ΓΟΡ.* Ἐμοιγε. *ΣΩ.* Ἀπόκριναι δή, ὡς Γοργία, ἐπειδή γε καὶ σοὶ δοκεῖ οὗτο. *ΓΟΡ.* Ταύτης τοίνυν τῆς πειθοῦς λέγω, ὡς Σώκρατες, τῆς ἐν δικαστηρίοις καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ὄχλοις, ὥσπερ καὶ ἄρτι ἔλεγον, καὶ περὶ τούτων, ἃ ἐστι δίκαια τε καὶ ἄδικα. *ΣΩ.* Καὶ ἐγώ τοι ὑπώπτευον ταύτην σε λέγειν τὴν πειθώ καὶ περὶ τούτων, ὡς Γοργία· ἀλλ' ἵνα μὴ θαυμάζῃς, ἐὰν C ὀλίγον ὕστερον τοιοῦτόν τί σε ἀνέρωμαι, ὃ δοκεῖ μὲν δῆλον εἶναι, ἐγὼ δ' ἐπανερωτῶ· ὅπερ γὰρ λέγω, τοῦ εὗῆς ἔνεκα περαιώνεσθαι τὸν λόγον ἐρωτῶ, οὐ σοῦ ἔνεκα, ἀλλ' ἵνα μὴ ἐθιζώμεθα ὑπονοοῦντες προαρπάζειν ἄλλήλων τὰ λεγόμενα,

ἀλλὰ σὺ τὰ σαντοῦ κατὰ τὴν ὑπόθεσιν ὅπως ἂν
βούλῃ περαιάνῃς. **ΓΟΡ.** Καὶ ὁρθῶς γέ μοι
δοκεῖς ποιεῖν, ὃ Σώκρατες. **ΣΩ.** "Ιθι δὴ καὶ
τόδε ἐπισκεψώμεθα. καλεῖς τι μεμαθηκέναι ;
D ΓΟΡ. Καλῶ. **ΣΩ.** Τί δέ ; πεπιστευκέναι ;
ΓΟΡ. "Εγωγε. **ΣΩ.** Πότερον οὖν ταῦτὸν δο-
κεῖ σοι εἶναι μεμαθηκέναι καὶ πεπιστευκέναι, καὶ
μάθησις καὶ πίστις, ἢ ἄλλο τι ; **ΓΟΡ.** Οὕμαι
μὲν ἔγωγε, ὃ Σώκρατες, ἄλλο. **ΣΩ.** Καλῶς
γάρ οἴει· γνώσει δὲ ἐνθένδε. εἰ γάρ τίς σε
ἔροιτο Ἄρος ἐστι τις, ὃ Γοργία, πίστις ψευδῆς
καὶ ἀληθῆς ; φαίης ἀν, ὡς ἔγὼ οἶμαι. **ΓΟΡ.**
Ναί. **ΣΩ.** Τί δέ ; ἐπιστήμη ἐστὶ ψευδῆς καὶ
ἀληθῆς ; **ΓΟΡ.** Οὐδαμῶς. **ΣΩ.** Δῆλον γάρ
Ε αῦ, ὅτι οὐ ταῦτόν ἐστιν. **ΓΟΡ.** Ἀληθῆ λέγεις.
ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ μὴν οὖ τέ γε μεμαθηκότες πεπει-
σμένοι εἰσὶ καὶ οἱ πεπιστευκότες. **ΓΟΡ.** "Ἐστι
ταῦτα. **ΣΩ.** Βούλει οὖν δύο εἰδῆ θῶμεν πει-
θοῦντος, τὸ μὲν πίστιν παρεχόμενον ἀνευ τοῦ εἰδέ-
ναι, τὸ δ' ἐπιστήμην ; **ΓΟΡ.** Πάνυ γε. **ΣΩ.**
Ποτέραν οὖν ἡ ὁρτορικὴ πειθῶ ποιεῖ ἐν δικα-
στηρίοις τε καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ὅχλοις περὶ τῶν δι-
καίων τε καὶ ἀδίκων ; ἐξ ἣς τὸ πιστεύειν γίγνε-
ται ἀνευ τοῦ εἰδέναι, ἢ ἐξ ἣς τὸ εἰδέναι ; **ΓΟΡ.**
Δῆλον δήπου, ὃ Σώκρατες, ὅτι ἐξ ἣς τὸ πιστεύ-
455ειν. **ΣΩ.** Ἡ ὁρτορικὴ ἄρα, ὡς ἔοικε, πειθοῦς
δημιουργός ἐστι πιστευτικῆς, ἀλλ' οὐ διδασκαλι-
κῆς περὶ τὸ δίκαιον τε καὶ ἀδίκον. **ΓΟΡ.** Ναί.
ΣΩ. Οὐδ', ἄρα διδασκαλικὸς ὁ ὁρτωρ ἐστὶ δικα-
στηρίων τε καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὅχλων δικαίων τε

πέρι καὶ ἀδίκων, ἀλλὰ πιστικὸς μόνον. οὐ γὰρ δήπου ὅχλον γ' ἀν δύνατο τοσοῦτον ἐν ὀλίγῳ χρόνῳ διδάξαι οὕτω μεγάλα πράγματα. ΓΟΡ.
Οὐ δῆτα.

CAP. X. ΣΩ. Φέρε δὴ, ἵδωμεν τί ποτε καὶ B λέγομεν περὶ τῆς ὁγητορικῆς· ἐγὼ μὲν γάρ τοι οὐδ' αὐτός πω δύναμαι κατανοῆσαι ὃ τι λέγω. ὅταν περὶ ἴατρῶν αἰρέσεως ἢ τῇ πόλει σύλλογος, ἢ περὶ ναυπηγῶν, ἢ περὶ ἄλλου τινὸς δημιουργικοῦ ἔθνους, ἄλλο τι ἢ τότε ὁ ὁγητορικὸς οὐ συμβουλεύσει; δῆλον γάρ, ὅτι ἐν ἑκάστῃ αἰρέσει τὸν τεχνικώτατον δεῖ αἰρεῖσθαι. οὐδ' ὅταν τειχῶν περὶ οἰκοδομήσεως, ἢ λιμένων κατασκευῆς, ἢ νεωρίων, ἀλλ' οἵ ἀρχιτέκτονες· οὐδ' αὖ ὅταν στρατηγῶν αἰρέσεως πέρι, ἢ τάξεώς τινος πρὸς πολεμίους, ἢ χωρίων καταλήψεως συμβουλὴ ἢ, C ἄλλ' οἱ στρατηγικοὶ τότε συμβουλεύσουσιν, οἱ ὁγητορικοὶ δὲ οὐ. ἢ πῶς λέγεις, ὡς Γοργία, τὰ τοιαῦτα; ἐπειδὴ γάρ αὐτός τε φῆς ὁγήτωρ εἶναι καὶ ἄλλους ποιεῦν ὁγητορικούς, εῦ ἔχει τὰ τῆς σῆς τέχνης παρὰ σοῦ πυνθάνεσθαι. καὶ ἐμὲ νῦν νόμισον καὶ τὸ σὸν σπεύδειν. ἵσως γάρ καὶ τυγχάνει τις τῶν ἐνδον ὅντων μαθητής σου βουλόμενος γενέσθαι, ὡς ἐγώ τινας σχεδὸν καὶ συχνῷς αἰσθάνομαι, οἱ ἵσως αἰσχύνοιντ' ἀν σε ἀνερέσθαι. ὑπ' ἐμοῦ οὖν ἀνερωτώμενος νόμισον D καὶ ὑπ' ἔκείνων ἀνερωτᾶσθαι, Τί ἡμῖν, ὡς Γοργία, ἔσται, ἐάν σοι συνῶμεν; περὶ τίνων τῇ πόλει συμβουλεύειν οἷοί τε ἐσόμεθα; πότερον περὶ δικαίου μόνον καὶ ἀδίκου, ἢ καὶ περὶ ὃν νῦν δὴ

Σώκρατης ἔλεγε; πειρῶ οὖν αὐτοῖς ἀποκρίνεσθαι. *GORP.* Ἀλλ' ἐγώ σοι πειράσομαι, ὃ Σώκρατες, σαφῶς ἀποκαλύψαι τὴν τῆς ἡγητορικῆς δύναμιν ἀπασαν· αὐτὸς γὰρ καλῶς ὑφηγήσω. Εἰσθα γὰρ δήπου, ὅτι τὰ νεώρια ταῦτα καὶ τὰ τείχη τὰ Ἀθηναίων καὶ ἡ τῶν λιμένων κατασκευὴ ἐκ τῆς Θεμιστοκλέους συμβουλῆς γέγονε, τὰ δ' ἐκ τῆς Περικλέους, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐκ τῶν δημιουργῶν. *SΩ.* Λέγεται ταῦτα, ὃ Γοργία, περὶ Θεμιστοκλέους· Περικλέους δὲ καὶ αὐτὸς ἥκουνον, ὅτε συνεβούλευεν ἡμῖν περὶ τοῦ διὰ μέ-
456 σου τείχους. *GORP.* Καὶ ὅταν γέ τις αἴρεσις ἢ ὁν δὴ σὺ ἔλεγες, ὃ Σώκρατες, ὅρᾶς, ὅτι οἱ ἡγήτορές εἰσιν οἱ συμβουλεύοντες καὶ οἱ νικῶντες τὰς γνώμας περὶ τούτων. *SΩ.* Ταῦτα καὶ θαυμάζων, ὃ Γοργία, πάλαι ἐρωτῶ τίς ποτε ἡ δύναμις ἐστι τῆς ἡγητορικῆς. δαιμονία γάρ τις ἔμοιγε καταφαίνεται τὸ μέγεθος οὗτοι σκοποῦντι.

CAP. XI. GORP. Εἰ πάντα γε εἰδείης, ὃ Σώκρατες, ὅτι, ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν, ἀπάσας τὰς δυνάμεις συλλαβοῦσα ὑφ' αὐτῇ ἔχει· μέγα δέ σοι τεκμήριον ἐρῶ· πολλάκις γὰρ ἥδη ἔγωγε μετὰ τοῦ ἀδελφοῦ καὶ μετὰ τῶν ἄλλων ἱατρῶν εἰσελθὼν παρά τινα τῶν καμνόντων οὐχὶ ἐθέλοντα ἢ φάρμακον πιεῖν ἢ τεμεῖν ἢ καῦσαι παρασχεῖν τῷ ἱατρῷ, οὐ δυναμένου τοῦ ἱατροῦ πεῖσαι, ἐγὼ ἔπεισα, οὐκ ἄλλῃ τέχνῃ ἢ τῇ ἡγητορικῇ. φημὶ δὲ καὶ εἰς πόλιν ὅποι βούλει ἐλθόντα ἡγητορικὸν ἄνδρα καὶ ἱατρόν, εἰ δέοι λόγῳ διαγωνίζεσθαι ἐν ἐκκλησίᾳ ἢ ἐν ἄλλῳ

τινὶ συλλόγῳ, ὅπότερον δεῖ αἰρεθῆναι, φήτορα C
 ἡ ἰατρόν, οὐδαμοῦ ἀν φανῆναι τὸν ἰατρόν, ἀλλ'
 αἰρεθῆναι ἀν τὸν εἰπεῖν δυνατόν, εἰ βούλοιτο.
 καὶ εἰ πρὸς ἄλλον γε δημιουργὸν ὄντιναοῦν
 ἀγωνίζοιτο, πείσειεν ἀν αὐτὸν ἐλέσθαι ὁ φήτορι-
 κὸς μᾶλλον ἢ ἄλλος ὁστισοῦν· οὐ γὰρ ἔστι περὶ
 ὅτου οὐκ ἀν πιθανώτερον εἴποι ὁ φήτορικὸς ἢ
 ἄλλος ὁστισοῦν τῶν δημιουργῶν ἐν πλήθει. H
 μὲν οὖν δύναμις τοσαύτη ἔστι καὶ τοιαύτη τῆς
 τέχνης. δεῖ μέντοι, ὡς Σώκρατες, τῇ φήτορικῇ
 χρῆσθαι ὥσπερ καὶ τῇ ἄλλῃ πάσῃ ἀγωνίᾳ. καὶ D
 γὰρ τῇ ἄλλῃ ἀγωνίᾳ οὐ τούτου ἔνεκα δεῖ πρὸς
 ἀπαντας χρῆσθαι ἀνθρώπους, ὅτι ἔμαθε πυκτεύ-
 ειν τε καὶ παγκρατιάζειν καὶ ἐν ὅπλοις μάχε-
 σθαι, ὥστε κρείττων εἶναι καὶ φίλων καὶ ἔχθρῶν·
 οὐ τούτου ἔνεκα τοὺς φίλους δεῖ τύπτειν οὐδὲ
 κεντεῖν τε καὶ ἀποκτιννύναι. οὐδέ γε μὰ Δία
 ἐάν τις εἰς παλαίστραν φοιτήσας, εὖ ἔχων τὸ
 σῶμα καὶ πυκτικὸς γενόμενος, ἐπειτα τὸν πατέρα
 τύπτῃ καὶ τὴν μητέρα ἢ ἄλλον τινὰ τῶν οἰκείων
 ἢ τῶν φίλων, οὐ τούτου ἔνεκα δεῖ τοὺς παιδο- E
 τρίβας καὶ τοὺς ἐν τοῖς ὅπλοις διδάσκοντας μά-
 χεσθαι μισεῖν τε καὶ ἐκβάλλειν ἐκ τῶν πόλεων.
 • ἐκεῖνοι μὲν γὰρ παρέδοσαν ἐπὶ τῷ δικαίως χρῆ-
 σθαι τούτοις πρὸς τοὺς πολεμίους καὶ τοὺς ἀδι-
 κοῦντας, ἀμυνομένους, μὴ ὑπάρχοντας· οἱ δὲ 457
 μεταστρέψαντες χρῶνται τῇ ἴσχυΐ καὶ τῇ τέχνῃ
 οὐκ ὁρθῶς. οὕκουν οἱ διδάξαντες πονηροί, οὐδὲ
 ἡ τέχνη οὕτε αἰτία οὕτε πονηρὰ τούτου ἔνεκά
 ἔστιν, ἀλλ' οἱ μὴ χρώμενοι, οἷμαι, ὁρθῶς. ὁ

αὐτὸς δὴ λόγος καὶ περὶ τῆς ὁγητορικῆς. δυνατὸς μὲν γὰρ πρὸς ἄπαντάς ἐστιν ὁ ὁγήτωρ καὶ περὶ παντὸς λέγειν, ὥστε πιθανώτερος εἶναι ἐν τοῖς πλήθεσιν ἐμβραχὺ περὶ ὅτου ἀν βούληται· Β ἀλλ' οὐδέν τι μᾶλλον τούτου ἔνεκα δεῖ οὔτε τοὺς ἰατροὺς τὴν δόξαν ἀφαιρεῖσθαι, ὅτι δύναιτο ἀν τοῦτο ποιῆσαι, οὔτε τοὺς ἄλλους δημιουργούς, ἀλλὰ δικαίως καὶ τῇ ὁγητορικῇ χρῆσθαι, ὥσπερ καὶ τῇ ἀγωνίᾳ. ἐὰν δέ, οἷμαι, ὁγητορικὸς γενόμενός τις κἀτα ταύτῃ τῇ δυνάμει καὶ τῇ τέχνῃ ἀδικῆ, οὐ τὸν διδάξαντα δεῖ μισεῖν τε καὶ ἐκβάλλειν ἐκ τῶν πόλεων. ἐκεῖνος μὲν γὰρ ἐπὶ δικαίᾳ χρείᾳ παρέδωκεν, ὁ δ' ἐναντίως χρῆται. τὸν οὖν οὐκ ὄρθως χρώμενον μισεῖν δίκαιον καὶ ἐκβάλλειν καὶ ἀποκτιννύναι, ἀλλ' οὐ τὸν διδάξαντα.

CAP. XII. ΣΩ. Οἷμαι, ὡς Γοργία, καὶ σὲ ἔμπειρον εἶναι πολλῶν λόγων καὶ καθεωρακέναι ἐν αὐτοῖς τὸ τοιόνδε, ὅτι οὐ δραδίως δύνανται περὶ ὃν ἀν ἐπιχειρήσωσι διαλέγεσθαι διορισάμενοι πρὸς ἄλληλους καὶ μαθόντες καὶ διδάξαντες Δ ἑαυτοὺς οὕτω διαλύεσθαι τὰς συνουσίας, ἀλλ' ἐὰν περὶ του ἀμφισβητήσωσι καὶ μὴ φῆ ὁ ἔτερος τὸν ἔτερον ὄρθως λέγειν ἢ μὴ σαφῶς, χαλεπαίνουσί τε καὶ κατὰ φθόνον οἴονται τὸν ἑαυτῶν λέγειν, φιλονεικοῦντας, ἀλλ' οὐ ζητοῦντας τὸ προκείμενον ἐν τῷ λόγῳ. καὶ ἔνιοί γε τελευτῶντες αἰσχιστα ἀπαλλάττονται, λοιδορηθέντες τε καὶ εἰπόντες καὶ ἀκούσαντες περὶ σφῶν αὐτῶν τοιαῦτα, οἷα καὶ τοὺς παρόντας ἄχθεσθαι ὑπὲρ σφῶν αὐτῶν, ὅτι τοιούτων ἀνθρώπων ἡξίωσαν

ἀκροαται γενέσθαι. Τοῦ δὴ ἔνεκα λέγω ταῦτα; Εἴ τι νῦν ἐμοὶ δοκεῖς σὺ οὐ πάνυ ἀκόλουθα λέγειν οὐδὲ σύμφωνα οἷς τὸ πρῶτον ἔλεγες περὶ τῆς δητορικῆς. φοβοῦμαι οὖν διελέγχειν σε, μή με ὑπολάβῃς οὐ πρὸς τὸ πρᾶγμα φιλονεικοῦντα λέγειν τοῦ καταφανὲς γενέσθαι, ἀλλὰ πρὸς σέ. ἔγὼ οὖν, εἰ μὲν καὶ σὺ εἶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ὅνπερ⁴⁵⁸ καὶ ἔγώ, ἡδέως ἂν σε διερωτῷην· εἰ δὲ μή, ἔφην ἂν. ἔγὼ δὲ τίνων εἰμί; τῶν ἡδέως μὲν ἂν ἐλεγχθέντων, εἴ τι μὴ ἀληθὲς λέγω, ἡδέως δ' ἂν ἐλεγξάντων, εἴ τις τι μὴ ἀληθὲς λέγοι, οὐκ ἀηδέστερον μέντ' ἂν ἐλεγχθέντων ἢ ἐλεγξάντων· μεῖζον γάρ αὐτὸν ἀγαθὸν ἥγοῦμαι, ὅσῳ περ μεῖζον ἀγαθόν ἐστιν αὐτὸν ἀπαλλαγῆναι κακοῦ τοῦ μεγίστου ἢ ἄλλον ἀπαλλάξαι. οὐδὲν γάρ οἶμαι τοσοῦτον κακὸν εἶναι ἀνθρώπῳ, ὃσον δόξα ψευδὴς Β περὶ ὃν τυγχάνει νῦν ἡμῖν ὁ λόγος ὃν. εἰ μὲν οὖν καὶ σὺ φῆς τοιοῦτος εἶναι, διαλεγώμεθα· εἰ δὲ καὶ δοκεῖ χρῆναι ἐᾶν, ἐῶμεν ἡδη χαίρειν καὶ διαλύωμεν τὸν λόγον. ΓΟΡ. Ἄλλὰ φημὶ μὲν ἔγωγε, ὃ Σώκρατες, καὶ αὐτὸς τοιοῦτος εἶναι, οἶον σὺ ὑφηγεῖ· ἵσως μέντοι χρῆν ἐννοεῖν καὶ τὸ τῶν παρόντων. πάλαι γάρ τοι, πρὶν καὶ ὑμᾶς ἐλθεῖν, ἔγὼ τοῖς παροῦσι πολλὰ ἐπεδειξά- C μην, καὶ νῦν ἵσως πόρρω ἀποτενοῦμεν, ἦν διαλεγώμεθα. σκοπεῖν οὖν χρὴ καὶ τὸ τούτων, μή τινας αὐτῶν κατέχωμεν βουλομένους τι καὶ ἄλλο πράττειν.

CAP. XIII. XAI. Τοῦ μὲν θορύβου, ὃ Γοργία τε καὶ Σώκρατες, αὐτοὶ ἀκούετε τούτων τῶν

ἀνδρῶν, βουλομένων ἀκούειν, ἐάν τι λέγητε· ἔμοὶ δ' οὖν καὶ αὐτῷ μὴ γένοιτο τοσαύτη ἀσχολία, ὥστε τοιούτων λόγων καὶ οὗτω λεγομένων
 Δ ἀφεμένῳ προνογιαίτερόν τι γενέσθαι ἄλλο πρότειν. **ΚΑΛ.** Νὴ τοὺς θεούς, ὃ Χαιρεφῶν.
 καὶ μὲν δὴ καὶ αὐτὸς πολλοῖς ἥδη λόγοις παραγενόμενος οὐκ οἶδ' εἰ πώποτε ἥσθην οὔτως, ὥσπερ νυνί, ὥστ' ἔμοιγε, κἄν τὴν ἡμέραν ὅλην ἐθέλητε διαλέγεσθαι, χαριεῖσθε. **ΣΩ.** Ἀλλὰ μήν,
 ὃ Καλλίκλεις, τό γ' ἔμὸν οὐδὲν κωλύει, εἴπερ ἐθέλει Γοργίας. **ΓΟΡ.** Αἰσχρὸν δὴ τὸ λοιπόν,
 ὃ Σώκρατες, γίγνεται ἐμέ γε μὴ ἐθέλειν, καὶ
 Ε ταῦτα αὐτὸν ἐπαγγειλάμενον ἐρωτᾶν ὅ τι τις
 βούλεται. ἀλλ' εἰ δοκεῖ τουτοισί, διαλέγου τε
 καὶ ἐρώτα ὅ τι βούλει. **ΣΩ.** Ἀκούε δή, ὃ
 Γοργία, ἃ θαυμάζω ἐν τοῖς λεγομένοις ὑπὸ σοῦ·
 ἵσως γάρ τοι σοῦ ὁρθῶς λέγοντος ἐγὼ οὐκ ὁρθῶς
 ὑπολαμβάνω. ἥητορικὸν φῆς ποιεῖν οἶστος τ' εἶναι,
 ἐάν τις βούληται παρὰ σοῦ μανθάνειν;
ΓΟΡ. Ναί. **ΣΩ.** Οὐκοῦν περὶ πάντων ὥστ'
 459 ἐν ὅχλῳ πιθανὸν εἶναι, οὐ διδάσκοντα, ἀλλὰ πείθοντα; **ΓΟΡ.** Πάνυ μὲν οὖν. **ΣΩ.** Ἐλεγες τοι νῦν δὴ ὅτι καὶ περὶ τοῦ ὑγιεινοῦ τοῦ ἱατροῦ
 πιθανώτερος ἔσται ὁ ὁρτώρ. **ΓΟΡ.** Καὶ γὰρ ἔλεγον, ἐν γε ὅχλῳ. **ΣΩ.** Οὐκοῦν τὸ ἐν ὅχλῳ τοῦτο ἔστιν ἐν τοῖς μὴ εἰδόσιν; οὐ γὰρ δήπου ἐν γε τοῖς εἰδόσι τοῦ ἱατροῦ πιθανώτερος ἔσται.
ΓΟΡ. Ἀληθῆ λέγεις. **ΣΩ.** Οὐκοῦν εἴπερ τοῦ ἱατροῦ πιθανώτερος ἔσται, τοῦ εἰδότος πιθανώτερος γίγνεται; **ΓΟΡ.** Πάνυ γε. **ΣΩ.** Οὐκ

ἰατρός γε ὡν· η γάρ; ΓΟΡ. Ναί. ΣΩ. Ὁ δὲ μὴ ἰατρός γε δῆπου ἀνεπιστήμων ὡν ὁ ἰατρὸς ἐπιστήμων. ΓΟΡ. Αῆλον δτι. ΣΩ. Ὁ οὐκ εἰδὼς ἄρα τοῦ εἰδότος ἐν οὐκ εἰδόσι πιθανώτερος ἔσται, δταν ὁ φήτωρ τοῦ ἰατροῦ πιθανώτερος η. τοῦτο συμβαίνει, η ἄλλο τι; ΓΟΡ. Τοῦτο ἐνταῦθα γε συμβαίνει. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ περὶ τὰς ἄλλας ἀπάσας τέχνας ὠσαύτως ἔχει ὁ φήτωρ καὶ η φητορική· αὐτὰ μὲν τὰ πράγματα οὐδὲν δεῖ αὐτὴν εἰδέναι ὅπως ἔχει, μηχανὴν δέ τινα πειθοῦς εὑρηκέναι, ὥστε φαίνεσθαι τοῖς οὐκ εἰδόσι μᾶλλον εἰδέναι τῶν εἰδότων.

CAP. XIV. ΓΟΡ. Οὐκοῦν πολλὴ φαστώνη, ὡ Σώκρατες, γίγνεται, μὴ μαθόντα τὰς ἄλλας τέχνας, ἀλλὰ μίαν ταύτην, μηδὲν ἐλαττοῦσθαι τῶν δημιουργῶν; ΣΩ. Εἰ μὲν ἐλαττοῦται η μὴ ἐλαττοῦται ὁ φήτωρ τῶν ἄλλων διὰ τὸ οὔτως ἔχειν, αὐτίκα ἐπισκεψόμεθα, εάν τι ήμιν πρὸς λόγουν η· νῦν δὲ τόδε πρότερον σκεψώμεθα, ἄρα τυγχάνει περὶ τὸ δίκαιον καὶ τὸ ἄδικον καὶ τὸ αἰσχρόν καὶ τὸ καλὸν καὶ ἀγαθὸν καὶ κακὸν οὔτως ἔχων ὁ φητορικὸς ὡς περὶ τὸ ὑγιεινὸν καὶ περὶ τὰ ἄλλα ὃν αἱ ἄλλαι τέχναι, αὐτὰ μὲν οὐκ εἰδώς, τι ἀγαθὸν η τί κακόν ἔστιν, η τί καλὸν η τί αἰσχρόν, η δίκαιον η ἄδικον, πειθὼ δὲ περὶ αὐτῶν μεμηχανημένος, ὥστε δοκεῖν εἰδέναι οὐκ εἰδὼς ἐν οὐκ εἰδόσι μᾶλλον τοῦ εἰδότος; η ἀνάγκη εἰδέναι, καὶ δεῖ προεπιστάμενον ταῦτα ἀφικέσθαι παρὰ σὲ τὸν μέλλοντα μαθήσεσθαι τὴν φητορικὴν; εἰ δὲ μή, σὺ ὁ τῆς

ἡγητορικῆς διδάσκαλος τούτων μὲν οὐδὲν διδάξεις τὸν ἀφικνούμενον·—οὐ γὰρ σὸν ἔργον·—ποιήσεις δ' ἐν τοῖς πολλοῖς δοκεῖν εἰδέναι αὐτὸν τὰ τοιαῦτα οὐκ εἰδότα καὶ δοκεῖν ἀγαθὸν εἶναι οὐκ ὄντα; ἢ τὸ παράπαν οὐχ οἶστε τε ἔσει αὐτὸν διδάξαι τὴν ἡγητορικήν, ἐὰν μὴ προειδῆ περὶ τούτων τὴν ἀλήθειαν; ἢ πῶς τὰ τοιαῦτα ἔχει, ὁ
 460 Γοργία; καὶ πρὸς Διός, ὥσπερ ἄρτι εἶπες, ἀποκαλύψας τῆς ἡγητορικῆς εἰπὲ τίς ποθ' ἡ δύναμις ἐστιν. **ΓΟΡ.** Ἀλλ' ἐγὼ μὲν οἶμαι, ὃ Σώκρατες, ἐὰν τύχῃ μὴ εἰδώς, καὶ ταῦτα παρ' ἐμοῦ μαθήσεται. **ΣΩ.** Ἐχε δή· καλῶς γὰρ λέγεις. ἐάνπερ ἡγητορικὸν σύ τινα ποιήσῃς, ἀνάγκη αὐτὸν εἰδέναι τὰ δίκαια καὶ τὰ ἀδίκα ἵτοι πρότερον γε ἢ ὕστερον μαθόντα παρὰ σοῦ. **ΓΟΡ.**
 Β Πάννυ γε. **ΣΩ.** Τί οὖν; ὁ τὰ τεκτονικὰ μεμαθηκὼς τεκτονικός, ἢ οὐ; **ΓΟΡ.** Ναί. **ΣΩ.** Οὐκοῦν καὶ ὁ τὰ μουσικὰ μουσικός; **ΓΟΡ.** Ναί. **ΣΩ.** Καὶ ὁ τὰ ἰατρικὰ ἰατρικός; καὶ τὰλλα οὗτα κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον, ὁ μεμαθηκὼς ἔκαστα τοιοῦτός ἐστιν, οἷον ἡ ἐπιστήμη ἔκαστον ἀπεργάζεται; **ΓΟΡ.** Πάννυ γε. **ΣΩ.** Οὐκοῦν κατὰ τοῦτον τὸν λόγον καὶ ὁ τὰ δίκαια μεμαθηκὼς δίκαιος; **ΓΟΡ.** Πάντως δήπον. **ΣΩ.** Ὁ
 Σ δὲ δίκαιος δίκαια που πράττει. **ΓΟΡ.** Ναί. **ΣΩ.** Οὐκοῦν ἀνάγκη [τὸν ἡγητορικὸν δίκαιον εἶναι], τὸν [δὲ] δίκαιον δίκαια βούλεσθαι πράττειν; **ΓΟΡ.** Φαίνεται γε. **ΣΩ.** Οὐδέποτε ἄρα βουλήσεται ὁ γε δίκαιος ἀδικεῖν. **ΓΟΡ.** Ἀνάγκη. **ΣΩ.** Τὸν δὲ ἡγητορικὸν ἀνάγκη ἐκ

τοῦ λόγου δίκαιον εἶναι. ΓΟΡ. Ναί. ΣΩ.
Οὐδέποτε ἄρα βουλήσεται ὁ ὁρητορικὸς ἀδικεῖν.
ΓΟΡ. Οὐ φαίνεται γε.

CAP. XV. ΣΩ. Μέμνησαι οὖν λέγων ὀλίγῳ ^Δ πρότερον, ὅτι οὐ δεῖ τοῖς παιδοτρίβαις ἐγκαλεῖν οὐδ' ἐκβάλλειν ἐκ τῶν πόλεων, ἐὰν ὁ πύκτης τῇ πυκτικῇ [μὴ καλῶς] χρῆται τε καὶ ἀδικῇ; ὡσαύτως δὲ οὕτω καὶ ἐὰν ὁ ὁρητώρ τῇ ὁρητορικῇ ἀδίκως χρῆται, μὴ τῷ διδάξαντι ἐγκαλεῖν μηδὲ ἔξελαύνειν ἐκ τῆς πόλεως, ἀλλὰ τῷ ἀδικοῦντι καὶ οὐκ ὁρθῶς χρωμένῳ τῇ ὁρητορικῇ; ἐφόρθη ταῦτα, ἦ οὖ; ΓΟΡ. Ἐφόρθη. ΣΩ. Νῦν δέ γε ὁ αὐτὸς οὗτος φαίνεται, ὁ ὁρητορικός, οὐκ ἀν ποτε ^Ε ἀδικήσας. ἦ οὖ; ΓΟΡ. Φαίνεται. ΣΩ. Καὶ ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις γε, ὃ Γοργία, λόγοις ἐλέγετο, ὅτι ἡ ὁρητορικὴ περὶ λόγους εἴη οὐ τοὺς τοῦ ἀρτίου καὶ περιττοῦ, ἀλλὰ τοὺς τοῦ δικαίου καὶ ἀδίκου. ἦ γάρ; ΓΟΡ. Ναί. ΣΩ. Ἐγὼ τοίνυν σου τότε ταῦτα λέγοντος ὑπέλαβον, ὡς οὐδέποτ’ ἀν εἴη ἡ ὁρητορικὴ ἀδικον πρᾶγμα, ὃ γ’ ἀεὶ περὶ δικαιοσύνης τοὺς λόγους ποιεῖται. ἐπειδὴ δὲ ὀλίγον ὕστερον ἐλεγεῖς, ὅτι ὁ ὁρητώρ τῇ ὁρητορικῇ καν ἀδίκως χρῶτο, οὕτω θαυμάσας καὶ ἡγησάμενος ⁴⁶¹ οὐ συνάδειν τὰ λεγόμενα ἐκείνους εἶπον τοὺς λόγους, ὅτι, εἰ μὲν κέρδος ἡγοῦσι εἶναι τὸ ἐλέγχεσθαι, ὃσπερ ἐγώ, ἀξιον εἴη διαλέγεσθαι, εἰ δὲ μή, ἐᾶν χαιρεῖν. ὕστερον δὲ ἡμῶν ἐπισκοπουμένων, ὁρᾶς δὴ καὶ αὐτός, ὅτι αὖ ὁμολογεῖται τὸν ὁρητορικὸν ἀδύνατον εἶναι ἀδίκως χρῆσθαι τῇ ὁρητορικῇ καὶ ἐθέλειν ἀδικεῖν. ταῦτα οὖν ὅπῃ ποτὲ

Βέβηλος, μὰ τὸν κύνα, ὃ Γοργία, οὐκ ὀλίγης συνουσίας ἔστιν, ὥστε ἴκανῶς διασκέψασθαι.

CAP. XVI. ΠΩΛ. Τί δαί, ὃ Σώκρατες; οὗτος καὶ σὺ περὶ τῆς ὁγητορικῆς δοξάζεις, ὡσπερ νῦν λέγεις; ή οἶει, δτι Γοργίας ἥσχύνθη σοι μὴ προσομοιογῆσαι τὸν ὁγητορικὸν ἄνδρα μὴ οὐχὶ καὶ τὰ δίκαια εἰδέναι καὶ τὰ καλὰ καὶ τὰ ἀγαθά, καὶ ἐὰν μὴ ἔλθῃ ταῦτα εἰδὼς παρ' αὐτόν, **Σ**αύτὸς διδάξειν — ἐπειτα ἐκ ταύτης ἵσως τῆς ὁμοιογίας ἐναντίον τι συνέβη ἐν τοῖς λόγοις, τοῦθ' ὁ δὴ ἀγαπᾶς, αὐτὸς ἀγαγὼν ἐπὶ τοιαῦτα ἐρωτήματα. ἐπεὶ τίνα οἶει ἀπαρνήσεσθαι μὴ οὐχὶ καὶ αὐτὸν ἐπίστασθαι τὰ δίκαια καὶ ἄλλους διδάξειν; ἀλλ' εἰς τὰ τοιαῦτα ἀγενί πολλὴ ἀγροικία ἔστι τοὺς λόγους. **ΣΩ.** γ^τ Ω κάλλιστε Πῶλε, ἀλλά τοι ἔξεπίτηδες κτώμεθα ἔταιρους καὶ νίεῖς, ἵνα, ἐπειδὰν αὐτοὶ πρεσβύτεροι γιγνόμενοι σφαλλώμεθα, παρόντες ὑμεῖς οἱ νεώτεροι ἐπανορθοῖτε ἡμῶν τὸν βίον καὶ ἐν ἔργοις καὶ ἐν λόγοις. καὶ νῦν εἴ τι ἐγὼ καὶ Γοργίας ἐν τοῖς λόγοις σφαλλόμεθα, σὺ παρὼν ἐπανόρθου· δίκαιος δ' εἴ. καὶ ἐγὼ ἐθέλω τῶν ὡμοιογημένων εἴ τί σοι δοκεῖ μὴ καλῶς ὡμοιογῆσθαι, ἀναθέσθαι ὁ τι ἀν σὺ βούλῃ, ἐάν μοι ἐν μόνον φυλάττης. **ΠΩΛ.** Τί τοῦτο λέγεις; **ΣΩ.** Τὴν μακρολογίαν, ὃ Πῶλε, ἣν καθείρξῃς, η τὸ πρῶτον ἐπεχείρησας χρῆσθαι. **ΠΩΛ.** Τί δαί; οὐκ ἔξεσται μοι λέγειν ὅπόσα ἀν βούλωμαι; **ΣΩ.** Δεινὰ μέντ' ἀν πάθοις, ὃ βέλτιστε, εἰ Ἀθήναζε ἀφικόμενος, οὗ τῆς Ἑλλάδος πλείστη ἔστιν ἔξου-

σία τοῦ λέγειν, ἐπειτα σὺ ἐνταῦθα τούτου μόνος ἀτυχήσαις. ἢ ἀλλὰ ἀντίθετοι· “Σοῦ μακρὰ λέγοντος καὶ μὴ ἐθέλοντος τὸ ἐρωτώμενον ἀποκρίνεσθαι, οὐδὲ δεινὰ ἂν αὖ ἐγὼ πάθοιμι, εἰ μὴ ἔξεσται μοι ἀπίεναι καὶ μὴ ἀκούειν σου;” ἀλλ’ εἰ⁴⁶² τι κήδει τοῦ λόγου τοῦ εἰρημένου καὶ ἐπανορθώσασθαι αὐτὸν βούλει, ὥσπερ νῦν δὴ ἔλεγον, ἀναθέμενος ὃ τι σοι δοκεῖ, ἐν τῷ μέρει ἐρωτῶν τε καὶ ἐρωτώμενος, ὥσπερ ἐγὼ τε καὶ Γοργίας, ἔλεγχέ τε καὶ ἔλέγχου. φῆς γὰρ δήπου καὶ σὺ ἐπίστασθαι ἀπερ Γοργίας. η̄ οὐ; **ΠΩΛ.** Ἔγωγε. **ΣΩ.** Οὐκοῦν καὶ σὺ κελεύεις σαυτὸν ἐρωτᾶν ἐκάστοτε ὃ τι ἂν τις βούληται, ὡς ἐπιστάμενος ἀποκρίνεσθαι; **ΠΩΛ.** Πάνυ μὲν οὖν. **ΣΩ.** Καὶ νῦν δὴ τούτων ὁπότερον βούλει ποίει· ἐρώτα, η̄ ἀποκρίνουν.

Cap. XVII. **ΠΩΛ.** Ἀλλὰ ποιήσω ταῦτα. καὶ μοι ἀπόκριναι, ὃ **Σώκρατες.** ἐπειδὴ Γοργίας ἀπορεῖν σοι δοκεῖ περὶ τῆς ὁγητορικῆς, σὺ αὐτὴν τίνα φῆς εἶναι; **ΣΩ.** Ἄρα ἐρωτᾶς ἦντινα τέχνην φημὶ εἶναι; **ΠΩΛ.** Ἔγωγε. **ΣΩ.** Οὐδεμία ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, ὃ **Πῶλε,** ὡς γε πρὸς σὲ τἀληθῆ εἰρησθαι. **ΠΩΛ.** Ἀλλὰ τί σοι δοκεῖ η̄ ὁγητορικὴ εἶναι; **ΣΩ.** Πρᾶγμα, ὃ φῆς σὺ ποιῆσαι τέχνην ἐν τῷ συγγράμματι, ὃ ἐγὼ ἔναγχος ἀνέγνων. **ΠΩΛ.** Τί τοῦτο λέγεις; **ΣΩ.** Ἐμπειρίαν ἔγωγέ τινα. **ΠΩΛ.** Ἐμπειρία ἄρα σοι δοκεῖ η̄ ὁγητορικὴ εἶναι; **ΣΩ.** Ἔμοιγε, εἰ μή τι σὺ ἄλλο λέγεις. **ΠΩΛ.** Τίνος ἔμπειρία; **ΣΩ.** Χάριτός τινος καὶ ηδονῆς ἀπεργασίας.

ΠΩΛ. Οὐκοῦν καλόν σοι δοκεῖ ἡ ὁγητορικὴ εἶναι, χαρίζεσθαι οἴόν τ' εἶναι ἀνθρώποις; **ΣΩ.** Τί δέ, ὃ Πῶλε; ἥδη πέπυσαι παρ' ἐμοῦ ὃ τι Δ φημὶ αὐτὴν εἶναι, ὥστε τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο ἔρωτᾶς, εἰ οὐ καλή μοι δοκεῖ εἶναι; **ΠΩΛ.** Οὐ γάρ πέπυσμαι, ὅτι ἐμπειρίαν τινὰ αὐτὴν φῆσ εἶναι; **ΣΩ.** Βούλει οὖν, ἐπειδὴ τιμᾶς τὸ χαρίζεσθαι, σμικρόν τί μοι χαρίσασθαι; **ΠΩΛ.** Ἔγωγε. **ΣΩ.** Ἐροῦ νῦν με, ὀψοποιά ἡτις μοι δοκεῖ τέχνη εἶναι. **ΠΩΛ.** Ἐρωτῶ δή, τίς τέχνη ὀψοποιά; **ΣΩ.** Οὐδεμία, ὃ Πῶλε. **ΠΩΛ.** Ἀλλὰ τί; φάθι. **ΣΩ.** Φημὶ δή, ἐμπειρία τις. Ε **ΠΩΛ.** Τίνος; φάθι. **ΣΩ.** Φημὶ δή, χάριτος καὶ ἡδονῆς ἀπεργασίας, ὃ Πῶλε. **ΠΩΛ.** Ταῦτὸν δ' ἔστιν ὀψοποιά καὶ ὁγητορική; **ΣΩ.** Οὐδαμῶς γε, ἀλλὰ τῆς αὐτῆς ἐπιτηδεύσεως μόριον. **ΠΩΛ.** Τίνος λέγεις ταύτης; **ΣΩ.** Μὴ ἀγροικότερον ἢ τὸ ἀληθὲς εἰπεῖν· ὀκνῶ γάρ *Γοργίου* ἔνεκα λέγειν, μὴ οἴηται με διακωμῷδεῖν 463 τὸ ξαντοῦ ἐπιτήδευμα. ἐγὼ δέ εἰ μὲν τοῦτο ἔστιν ἡ ὁγητορικὴ ἣν *Γοργίας* ἐπιτηδεύει οὐκ οἶδα· καὶ γάρ ἄρτι ἐκ τοῦ λόγου οὐδὲν ἡμῖν καταφανὲς ἐγένετο τί ποτε οὗτος ἡγεῖται· ὃ δ' ἐγὼ καλῶ τὴν ὁγητορικήν, πράγματός τινός ἔστι μόριον οὐδενὸς τῶν καλῶν. **ΓΟΡ.** Τίνος, ὃ *Σώκρατες*; εἰπέ, μηδὲν ἐμὲ αἰσχυνθείσ.

CAP. XVIII. **ΣΩ.** Δοκεῖ τοίνυν μοι, ὃ *Γοργία*, εἶναι τι ἐπιτήδευμα τεχνικὸν μὲν οὖ, ψυχῆς δὲ στοχαστικῆς καὶ ἀνδρείας καὶ φύσει δεινῆς Β προσομιλεῖν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις· καλῶ δὲ αὐτοῦ ἐγὼ

τὸ κεφάλαιον κολακείαν. ταύτης μοι δοκεῖ τῆς ἐπιτηδεύσεως πολλὰ μὲν καὶ ἄλλα μόρια εἶναι, ἐν δὲ καὶ ἡ ὄψοπουκή· ὃ δοκεῖ μὲν εἶναι τέχνη, ὡς δὲ ὁ ἐμὸς λόγος, οὐκ ἔστι τέχνη, ἀλλ' ἐμπειρία καὶ τριβή. ταύτης μόριον καὶ τὴν ὁγητορικὴν ἔγὼ καλῶ καὶ τὴν γε κομμωτικὴν καὶ τὴν σοφιστικὴν, τέτταρα ταῦτα μόρια ἐπὶ τέτταρσι πρόσ-^{τη} γμασιν. εἰ οὖν βούλεται Πῶλος πυνθάνεσθαι, πυνθανέσθω· οὐ γάρ πω πέπυσται ὅποιον φημι ἔγὼ τῆς κολακείας μόριον εἶναι τὴν ὁγητορικὴν ἀλλ' αὐτὸν λέληθα οὕπω ἀποκεκριμένος, ὃ δὲ ἐπανερωτᾷ, εἰ οὐ καλὸν ἥγοῦμαι εἶναι. ἔγὼ δὲ αὐτῷ οὐκ ἀποκρινοῦμαι πρότερον εἴτε καλὸν εἴτε αἰσχρὸν ἥγοῦμαι εἶναι τὴν ὁγητορικὴν, πρὶν ἂν πρῶτον ἀποκρίνωμαι ὃ τι ἔστιν. οὐ γὰρ δίκαιον, ω̄ Πῶλε· ἀλλ' εἴπερ βούλει πυθέσθαι, ἐφάτα ὅποιον μόριον τῆς κολακείας φημὶ εἶναι τὴν ὁγητορικὴν. **ΠΩΛ.** Ἐρωτῶ δή, καὶ ἀπόκριναι, ^{τη} δόποιον μόριον. **ΣΩ.** ^{τη} Αρ, οὖν ἂν μάθοις ἀποκριναμένου; ἔστι γάρ ἡ ὁγητορικὴ κατὰ τὸν ἐμὸν λόγον πολιτικῆς μορίου εἴδωλον. **ΠΩΛ.** Τί οὖν; καλὸν ἡ αἰσχρὸν λέγεις αὐτὴν εἶναι; **ΣΩ.** Αἰσχρὸν ἔγωγε· τὰ γὰρ κακὰ αἰσχρὰ καλῶ· ἐπειδὴ δεῖ σοι ἀποκρίνασθαι, ὡς ἥδη εἰδότι ἄ ἔγὼ λέγω. **ΓΟΡ.** Μὰ τὸν Δία, ω̄ Σώκρατες, ἀλλ' ἔγὼ οὐδὲ αὐτὸς συνίημι ὃ τι λέγεις. **ΣΩ.** Εἰκό-^{τη} τως γε, ω̄ Γοργία· οὐδὲν γάρ πω σαφὲς λέγω, Πῶλος δὲ δόδε νέος ἔστι καὶ ὀξύς. **ΓΟΡ.** Ἀλλὰ τοῦτον μὲν ἔα, ἐμοὶ δ' εἰπὲ πῶς λέγεις πολιτικῆς μορίου εἴδωλον εἶναι τὴν ὁγητορικὴν. **ΣΩ.**

Αλλ' ἐγὼ πειράσομαι φράσαι ὃ γέ μοι φαίνεται εἶναι ἡ φητορική· εἰ δὲ μὴ τυγχάνει ὃν τοῦτο,
461 Πῶλος ὅδε ἐλέγξει. σῶμά που καλεῖς τι καὶ ψυχὴν; ΓΟΡ. Πῶς γὰρ οὐ; ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ τούτων οἵτινα εἶναι ἔκατέρον εὐεξίαν;
ΓΟΡ. Ἔγωγε. ΣΩ. Τί δέ; δοκοῦσαν μὲν εὐεξίαν, οὔσαν δ' οὐ; οἷον τοιόνδε λέγω· πολλοὶ δοκοῦσιν εὗ ἔχειν τὰ σώματα, οὓς οὐκ ἀνδραῖοι αἰσθοῖτό τις, ὅτι οὐκ εὗ ἔχουσιν, ἄλλος ἢ ἰατρός τε καὶ τῶν γυμναστικῶν τις. ΓΟΡ.
Ἀληθῆ λέγεις. ΣΩ. Τὸ τοιοῦτον λέγω καὶ ἐν σώματι εἶναι καὶ ἐν ψυχῇ, ὃ τι ποιεῖ δοκεῖν μὲν Β εὗ ἔχειν τὸ σῶμα καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν, ἔχει δὲ οὐδὲν μᾶλλον. ΓΟΡ. Ἐστι ταῦτα.

CAP. XIX. ΣΩ. Φέρε δὴ σοι, ἐὰν δύνωμαι, σαφέστερον ἐπιδείξω ὃ λέγω. Άνοιν ὄντοιν τοῖν πραγμάτοιν δύο λέγω τέχνας· τὴν μὲν ἐπὶ τῇ ψυχῇ πολιτικὴν καλῶ, τὴν δὲ ἐπὶ σώματι μίαν μὲν οὐτως ὀνομάσαι οὐκ ἔχω σοι, μιᾶς δὲ οὔσης τῆς τοῦ σώματος θεραπείας δύο μόρια λέγω, τὴν μὲν γυμναστικήν, τὴν δὲ ἰατρικήν. τῆς δὲ πολιτικῆς ἀντίστροφον μὲν τῇ γυμναστικῇ τὴν νομοθετικήν, ἀντίστροφον δὲ τῇ ἰατρικῇ τὴν δικαιοσύνην. ἐπικοινωνοῦσι μὲν δὴ ἀλλήλαις, ἀτε περὶ τὸ αὐτὸ οὖσαι, ἐκάτεραι τούτων, ἡ τε ἰατρικὴ τῇ γυμναστικῇ καὶ ἡ δικαιοσύνη τῇ νομοθετικῇ· δῆμος δὲ διαφέροντι τι ἀλλήλων. τεττάρων δὴ τούτων οὐσῶν, καὶ ἀεὶ πρὸς τὸ βέλτιστον θεραπευοντικόν, τῶν μὲν τὸ σῶμα, τῶν δὲ τὴν ψυχήν, ἡ κολακευτικὴ αἰσθομένη, οὐ γνοῦσα λέγω ἀλλὰ

στοχασμένη, τέτραχα ἔαυτὴν διανείμασα, ὑποδῦσα ὑπὸ ἔκαστον τῶν μορίων, προσποιεῖται εἰ-^D ναι τοῦτο, ὅπερ ὑπέδυ, καὶ τοῦ μὲν βελτίστου οὐδὲν φροντίζει, τῷ δὲ ἀεὶ ἡδίστῳ θηρεύεται τὴν ἄνοιαν καὶ ἔξαπατᾶ, ὥστε δοκεῖ πλείστου ἀξία εἶναι. ὑπὸ μὲν οὖν τὴν ἰατρικὴν ἡ ὁψοποικὴ ὑποδέδυκε, καὶ προσποιεῖται τὰ βέλτιστα σιτία τῷ σώματι εἰδέναι, ὥστ', εἰ δέοι ἐν παισὶ διαγωνίζεσθαι ὁψοποιόν τε καὶ ἰατρὸν ἢ ἐν ἀνδράσιν οὗτος ἀνοήτοις ὥσπερ οἱ παιδες, πότερος ἐπαῖει περὶ τῶν χρηστῶν σιτίων καὶ πονηρῶν, ὁ ἰατρὸς ἢ ὁ ὁψοποιός, λιμῷ ἀν ἀποθανεῖν τὸν ἰατρόν. Εκολακείαν μὲν οὖν αὐτὸν καλῶ, καὶ αἰσχρόν φημι εἶναι τὸ τοιοῦτον, ὃ Πᾶλε, — τοῦτο γὰρ πρὸς σὲ⁴⁶⁵ λέγω, — ὅτι τοῦ ἡδέος στοχάζεται ἄνευ τοῦ βελτίστου· τέχνην δὲ αὐτὴν οὐ φημι εἶναι, ἀλλ' ἐμπειρίαν, ὅτι οὐκ ἔχει λόγον οὐδένα ἂ προσφέρει ὅποι' ἀττα τὴν φύσιν ἐστίν, ὥστε τὴν αἰτίαν ἑκάστου μὴ ἔχειν εἰπεῖν. Ἐγὼ δὲ τέχνην οὐ καλῶ ὃ ἀν ἢ ἀλογον πρᾶγμα. τούτων δὲ πέρι εἰ ἀμφισβητεῖς, ἐθέλω ὑποσχεῖν λόγον.

CAP. XX. Τῇ μὲν οὖν ἰατρικῇ, ὥσπερ λέγω, ἡ ὁψοποικὴ κολακεία ὑπόκειται· τῇ δὲ γυμνα-^B στικῇ κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον τοῦτον ἡ κομμωτική, κακοῦργός τε οὖσα καὶ ἀπατηλὴ καὶ ἀγεννῆς καὶ ἀνελεύθερος, σχήμασι καὶ χρώμασι καὶ λειότησι καὶ ἐσθήσει ἀπατῶσα, ὥστε ποιεῖν ἀλλότριον κάλλος ἐφελκομένους τοῦ οἰκείου τοῦ διὰ τῆς γυμναστικῆς ἀμελεῖν. οὐν μὴ μακρολογῶ, ἐθέλω σοι εἰπεῖν ὥσπερ οἱ γεωμέτραι — ἦδη

γάρ ἀν ἵσως ἀκολουθήσαις — ὅτι ὁ κομμωτικὴ
 Σ πρὸς γυμναστικήν, τοῦτο ὄψοπουκὴ πρὸς ἰατρι-
 κήν. μᾶλλον δὲ ὡδε, ὅτι ὁ κομμωτικὴ πρὸς γυ-
 μναστικήν, τοῦτο σοφιστικὴ πρὸς νομοθετικήν,
 καὶ ὅτι ὁ ὄψοπουκὴ πρὸς ἰατρικήν, τοῦτο ἡτο-
 ρικὴ πρὸς δικαιοσύνην. ὅπερ μέντοι λέγω, διέ-
 σιηκε μὲν οὗτο φύσει· ἀτε δ' ἐγγὺς ὅντων φύ-
 ρονται ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ καὶ περὶ ταῦτα σοφισταὶ καὶ
 ἡτορεῖς, καὶ οὐκ ἔχουσιν ὃ τι χρήσονται οὕτε
 αὐτοὶ ἔαυτοῖς οὕτε οἵ ἄλλοι ἀνθρώποι τούτοις.
 Δ καὶ γάρ ἄν, εἰ μὴ ἡ ψυχὴ τῷ σώματι ἐπεστάτει,
 ἄλλ' αὐτὸ αὐτῷ, καὶ μὴ ὑπὸ ταύτης κατεθεωρεῖ-
 το καὶ διεκρίνετο ἡ τε ὄψοπουκὴ καὶ ἡ ἰατρική,
 ἄλλ' αὐτὸ τὸ σῶμα ἔκρινε σταθμώμενον ταῖς
 χάρισι ταῖς πρὸς αὐτό, τὸ τοῦ Ἀναξαγόρου ἄν
 πολὺ ἦν, ὃ φίλε Πᾶλε· — σὺ γάρ τούτων ἔμπει-
 ρος· — ὅμοι ἀν πάντα χρήματα ἐφύρετο ἐν τῷ
 αὐτῷ, ἀκρίτων ὅντων τῶν τε ἰατρικῶν καὶ ὑγει-
 νῶν καὶ ὄψοπουκῶν. ὁ μὲν οὖν ἐγώ φημι τὴν
 ἡτορικήν εἶναι, ἀκήκοας· ἀντίστροφον ὄψοποι-
 Ε ἴας ἐν ψυχῇ, ὡς ἔκεινο ἐν σώματι. ⁷ Ἰσως μὲν
 οὖν ἄτοπον πεποίηκα, ὅτι σε οὐκ ἐῶν μακροὺς
 λόγους λέγειν αὐτὸς συχνὸν λόγον ἀποτέτακα.
 ἄξιον μὲν οὖν ἔμοὶ συγγνώμην ἔχειν ἐστί· λέ-
 γοντος γάρ μου βραχέα οὐκ ἔμάνθανες, οὐδὲ
 χρῆσθαι τῇ ἀποκρίσει ἦν σοι ἀπεκρινάμην οὐδὲν
 466 οἶστος τ' ἥσθα, ἄλλ' ἐδέον διηγήσεως. ἐὰν μὲν
 οὖν καὶ ἐγὼ, σοῦ ἀποκρινομένου, μὴ ἔχω ὃ τι
 χρήσωμαι, ἀπότεινε καὶ σὺ λόγον, ἐὰν δὲ ἔχω,

ἔα με χρῆσθαι· δίκαιον γάρ. καὶ νῦν ταύτη
τῇ ἀποκρίσει εἴ τι ἔχεις χρῆσθαι, χρῶ.

ΠΑΡ. ΧΙ. **ΠΩΛ.** Τί οὖν φήσ; κολακεία
δοκεῖ σοι εἶναι ἡ φήτορική; **ΣΩ.** Κολακείας
μὲν οὖν ἔγωγε εἰπον μόριον. ἀλλ' οὐ μημο-
νεύεις τηλικοῦτος ὅν, ὃ Πᾶλε; τί τάχα δράσεις
[πρεσβύτης γενόμενος]; **ΠΩΛ.** Ἄρ' οὖν δοκοῦ-
σί σοι ὡς κόλακες ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι φαῦλοι νομίζε-
σθαι οἱ ἀγαθοὶ φήτορες; **ΣΩ.** Ἐρώτημα τοῦτο
ἐρωτᾶς, ἢ λόγου τινὸς ἀρχὴν λέγεις; **ΠΩΛ.**
Ἐρωτῶ ἔγωγε. **ΣΩ.** Οὐδὲ νομίζεσθαι ἔμοιγε
δοκοῦσι. **ΠΩΛ.** Πῶς οὐ νομίζεσθαι; οὐ μέγι-
στον δύνανται ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν; **ΣΩ.** Οὐκ, εἰ
τὸ δύνασθαι γε λέγεις ἀγαθόν τι εἶναι τῷ δυνα-
μένῳ. **ΠΩΛ.** Ἀλλὰ μὲν δὴ λέγω γε. **ΣΩ.**
Ἐλάχιστον τοίνυν μοι δοκοῦσι τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει σ
δύνασθαι οἱ φήτορες. **ΠΩΛ.** Τί δέ; οὐχ, ὥσ-
περ οἱ τύραννοι, ἀποκτιννύσι τε ὃν ἂν βούλων-
ται, καὶ ἀφαιροῦνται χρήματα καὶ ἐκβάλλουσιν
ἐκ τῶν πόλεων δν ἂν δοκῇ αὐτοῖς; **ΣΩ.** Νὴ
τὸν κύνα, ἀμφιγνοῶ μέντοι, ὃ Πᾶλε, ἐφ' ἐκά-
στου ὃν λέγεις, πότερον αὐτὸς ταῦτα λέγεις καὶ
γνώμην σαντοῦ ἀποφαίνει, ἢ ἐμὲ ἐρωτᾶς. **ΠΩΛ.**
Ἀλλ' ἔγωγε σὲ ἐρωτῶ. **ΣΩ.** Εἶν, ὃ φίλε·
ἔπειτα δύο ἄμα με ἐρωτᾶς; **ΠΩΛ.** Πῶς δύο;
ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἀρτι οὐτω πως ἔλεγες, δτι ἀποκτιν-
νύασιν οἱ φήτορες οὓς ἂν βούλωνται, ὥσπερ οἱ
τύραννοι, καὶ χρήματα ἀφαιροῦνται καὶ ἐξε-
λαύνουσιν ἐκ τῶν πόλεων δν ἂν δοκῇ αὐτοῖς;
ΠΩΛ. Ἔγωγε.

CAP. XXII. **ΣΩ.** Λέγω τοίνυν σοι, ὅτι δύο ταῦτ' ἔστι τὰ ἐρωτήματα, καὶ ἀποκρινοῦμαι γέ σοι πρὸς ἀμφότερα. φημὶ γάρ, ὃ Πᾶλε, ἐγὼ καὶ τοὺς ὄχιτορας καὶ τοὺς τυράννους δύνασθαι Ε μὲν ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι σμικρότατον, ὥσπερ νῦν δὴ ἔλεγον· οὐδὲν γάρ ποιεῖν ὅν βούλονται, ὡς ἐπος εἰπεῖν· ποιεῖν μέντοι ὅ τι ἀν αὐτοῖς δόξῃ βέλτιστον εἶναι. **ΠΩΛ.** Οὐκοῦν τοῦτο ἔστι τὸ μέγα δύνασθαι; **ΣΩ.** Οὐχ, ὡς γέ φησι Πᾶλος. **ΠΩΛ.** Ἐγὼ οὖ φημι; φημὶ μὲν οὖν ἔγωγε. **ΣΩ.** Μὰ τὸν—οὐ σύ γε, ἐπεὶ τὸ μέγα δύνασθαι ἔφης ἀγαθὸν εἶναι τῷ δυναμένῳ. **ΠΩΛ.** Φημὶ γάρ οὖν. **ΣΩ.** Ἀγαθὸν οὖν οἵτινες εἶναι, ἐάν τις ποιῇ ταῦτα, ἢ ἀν δοκῆ αὐτῷ βέλτιστα εἶναι, νοῦν μὴ ἔχων; καὶ τοῦτο καλεῖς μέγα δύνασθαι; **ΠΩΛ.** Οὐκ ἔγωγε. **ΣΩ.** Οὐκοῦν ἀποδεῖξεις τοὺς ὄχιτορας νοῦν ἔχοντας καὶ τέχνην
467τὴν ὄχιτορικήν, ἀλλὰ μὴ κολακείαν, ἐμὲ ἔξελέγξας; εἰ δέ με ἔάσεις ἀνέλεγκτον, οἵ ὄχιτορες οἱ ποιοῦντες ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν ἢ δοκεῖ αὐτοῖς καὶ οἱ τύραννοι οὐδὲν ἀγαθὸν τοῦτο πεκτήσονται, εἰ δὴ δύναμίς ἔστιν, ὡς σὺ φήσις, ἀγαθόν, τὸ δὲ ποιεῖν ἀνευ νοῦ ἢ δοκεῖ καὶ σὺ δύολογεῖς κακὸν εἶναι. ἢ οὖ; **ΠΩΛ.** Ἐγωγε. **ΣΩ.** Πῶς ἀν οὖν οἱ ὄχιτορες μέγα δύναντο ἢ οἱ τύραννοι ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν, ἐὰν μὴ Σωκράτης ἔξελεγχθῇ ὑπὸ Πώλου, ὅτι ποιοῦσιν ἢ βούλονται; **ΠΩΛ.** Οὗτος ἀνήρ— **ΣΩ.** Οὐ φημι ποιεῖν αὐτοὺς ἢ βούλονται· ἀλλά μ' ἔλεγχε. **ΠΩΛ.** Οὐκ ἄρτι δύολόγεις ποιεῖν ἢ δοκεῖ αὐτοῖς βέλτιστα εἶναι,

τούτου πρόσθεν; ΣΩ. Καὶ γὰρ νῦν διμολογῶ.
 ΠΩΛ. Οὐκοῦν ποιοῦσιν ἀ βούλονται. ΣΩ.
 Οὐ φῆμι. ΠΩΛ. Ποιοῦντες δὲ ἀ δοκεῖ αὐτοῖς;
 ΣΩ. Φῆμι. ΠΩΛ. Σχέτλια λέγεις καὶ ὑπερφυῆ, ὡς Σώκρατες. ΣΩ. Μὴ κατηγόρει, ὡς λῶστε
 Πῶλε, ἵνα προσείπω σε κατὰ σέ· ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν C
 ἔχεις ἐμὲ ἐρωτᾶν, ἐπίδειξον, ὅτι ψεύδομαι, εἰ δὲ
 μή, αὐτὸς ἀποκρίνου. ΠΩΛ. Ἄλλ' ἐθέλω ἀποκρίνεσθαι, ἵνα καὶ εἰδῶ ὁ τι λέγεις.

CAP. XXIII. ΣΩ. Πότερον οὖν σοι δοκοῦσιν οἱ ἀνθρώποι τοῦτο βούλεσθαι, ὃ ἂν πράττωσιν ἐκάστοτε, ἢ ἐκεῖνο, οὗ ἔνεκα πράττουσι τοῦθ', ὃ πράττουσιν; οἶνον οἱ τὰ φάρμακα πίνοντες παρὰ τῶν ἴατρῶν πότερόν σοι δοκοῦσι τοῦτο βούλεσθαι, ὅπερ ποιοῦσι, πίνειν τὸ φάρμακον D καὶ ἄλγεῖν, ἢ ἐκεῖνο, τὸ ὑγιαίνειν, οὗ ἔνεκα πίνουσι; ΠΩΛ. Δῆλον, ὅτι τὸ ὑγιαίνειν, οὗ ἔνεκα πίνουσιν. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ οἱ πλέοντές τε καὶ τὸν ἄλλον χρηματισμὸν χρηματιζόμενοι οὐ τοῦτό ἐστιν ὃ βούλονται, ὃ ποιοῦσιν ἐκάστοτε· τίς γὰρ βούλεται πλεῖν τε καὶ κινδυνεύειν καὶ πράγματ' ἔχειν; ἀλλ' ἐκεῖνο, οἷμαι, οὗ ἔνεκα πλέουσι, πλουτεῖν· πλούτου γὰρ ἔνεκα πλέουσι. ΠΩΛ. Πάνυ γε. ΣΩ. Ἄλλο τι οὖν οὔτω καὶ περὶ πάντων; ἐάν τίς τι πράττῃ ἔνεκά του, οὐ τοῦτο βούλεται, ὃ πράττει, ἀλλ' ἐκεῖνο, οὗ ἔνεκα πράττει. ΠΩΛ. Ναί. ΣΩ. Ἄρ' οὖν E ἔστι τι τῶν ὅντων, ὃ οὐχὶ ἥτοι ἀγαθόν γ' ἐστὶν ἢ κακὸν ἢ μεταξὺ τούτων, οὐτε ἀγαθὸν οὔτε κακόν; ΠΩΛ. Πολλὴ ἀνάγκη, ὡς Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν λέγεις εἶναι ἀγαθὸν μὲν σοφίαν τε καὶ ὑγίειαν καὶ πλοῦτον καὶ τὰλλα τὰ τοι-
αῦτα, κακὰ δὲ τάναντία τούτων; **ΠΩΛ.** Ἔγω-
γε. **ΣΩ.** Τὰ δὲ μήτε ἀγαθὰ μήτε κακὰ ἄρα
468 τοιάδε λέγεις, ἢ ἐνίστιε μὲν μετέχει τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ,
ἐνίστιε δὲ τοῦ κακοῦ, ἐνίστιε δὲ οὐδετέρου, οἷον
καθῆσθαι καὶ βαδίζειν καὶ τρέχειν καὶ πλεῖν,
καὶ οἷον αὖ λίθους καὶ ξύλα καὶ τὰλλα τὰ τοι-
αῦτα; οὐ ταῦτα λέγεις; ἢ ἄλλ' ἄττα καλεῖς τὰ
μήτε ἀγαθὰ μήτε κακά; **ΠΩΛ.** Οὐκ, ἄλλὰ
ταῦτα. **ΣΩ.** Πότερον οὖν τὰ μεταξὺ ταῦτα
ἔνεκεν τῶν ἀγαθῶν πράττουσιν, ὅταν πράττωσιν,
ἢ τάγαθὰ τῶν μεταξύ; **ΠΩΛ.** Τὰ μεταξὺ δῆ-
βπου τῶν ἀγαθῶν. **ΣΩ.** Τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἄρα διώ-
κοντες καὶ βαδίζομεν, ὅταν βαδίζωμεν, οἰόμενοι
βέλτιον εἶναι, καὶ τὸ ἐναντίον ἔσταμεν, ὅταν
ἔστωμεν, τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἔνεκα, τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ. ἢ οὐ;
ΠΩΛ. Ναί. **ΣΩ.** Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἀποκτίννυμεν,
εἴ τιν' ἀποκτίννυμεν, καὶ ἐκβάλλομεν καὶ ἀφαι-
ρούμεθα χρήματα, οἰόμενοι ἀμεινον εἶναι ἡμῖν
ταῦτα ποιεῖν ἢ μή; **ΠΩΛ.** Πάνυ γε. **ΣΩ.**
“Ἐνεκ’ ἄρα τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἀπαντα ταῦτα ποιοῦσιν
οἱ ποιοῦντες. **ΠΩΛ.** Φημί.

ΣΑΡ. XXIV. **ΣΩ.** Οὐκοῦν ὡμολογήσαμεν, ἃ
C ἔνεκά του ποιοῦμεν, μὴ ἐκεῖνα βούλεσθαι, ἄλλ'
ἐκεῖνο, οὐ ἔνεκα ταῦτα ποιοῦμεν; **ΠΩΛ.** Μά-
λιστα. **ΣΩ.** Οὐκ ἄρα σφάττειν βουλόμεθα οὐδ'
ἐκβάλλειν ἐκ τῶν πόλεων οὐδὲ χρήματα ἀφαι-
ρεῖσθαι ἀπλῶς οὗτως, ἄλλ' ἐὰν μὲν ὠφέλιμα ἢ
ταῦτα, βουλόμεθα πράττειν αὐτά, βλαβερά δὲ

όντα οὐ βουλόμεθα. τὰ γὰρ ἀγαθὰ βουλόμεθα, ὡς φῆσ σύ, τὰ δὲ μήτε ἀγαθὰ μήτε κακά οὐ βουλόμεθα, οὐδὲ τὰ κακά. η̄ γάρ; ἀληθῆ σοι δοκῶ λέγειν, ὃ Πῶλε, η̄ οὐ; Τί οὐκ ἀποκρίνει; **ΠΩΛ.** Ἀληθῆ. **ΣΩ.** Οὐκοῦν εἴπερ ταῦτα ὁμολογοῦμεν, εἴ τις ἀποκτείνει τινὰ η̄ ἐκβάλλει ἐκ πόλεως η̄ ἀφαιρεῖται χρήματα, εἴτε τύραννος ἢν εἴτε ὅγητωρ, οἰόμενος ἀμεινον εἶναι αὐτῷ, τυγχάνει δὲ ὃν κάκιον, οὗτος δήπου ποιεῖ ἀ δοκεῖ αὐτῷ. η̄ γάρ; **ΠΩΛ.** Ναί. **ΣΩ.** Ἄρ; οὖν καὶ ἀ βούλεται, εἴπερ τυγχάνει ταῦτα κακά οὐντα; Τί οὐκ ἀποκρίνει; **ΠΩΛ.** Ἀλλ' οὐ μοι δοκεῖ ποιεῖν ἀ βούλεται. **ΣΩ.** Ἐστιν οὖν ὅπως ὁ τοιοῦτος μέγα δύναται ἐν τῇ πόλει ταύτῃ, εἴπερ ἔστι τὸ μέγα δύνασθαι ἀγαθόν τι κατὰ τὴν σὴν ὁμολογίαν; **ΠΩΛ.** Οὐκ ἔστιν. **ΣΩ.** Ἀληθῆ ἀρα ἐγὼ ἔλεγον, λέγων, ὅτι ἔστιν ἀνθρώποιν ποιοῦντα ἐν πόλει ἀ δοκεῖ αὐτῷ μὴ μέγα δύνασθαι μηδὲ ποιεῖν ἀ βούλεται. **ΠΩΛ.** Ως δὴ σύ, ὃ **Σώκρατες**, οὐκ ἀν δέξαιο ἔξειναι σοι ποιεῖν ὃ τι δοκεῖ σοι ἐν τῇ πόλει μᾶλλον η̄ μή, οὐδὲ ζηλοῖς, ὅταν ἵδης τινὰ η̄ ἀποκτείναντα ὃν ἔδοξεν αὐτῷ η̄ ἀφελόμενον χρήματα η̄ δήσαντα. **ΣΩ.** Δικαίως, λέγεις, η̄ ἀδίκως; **ΠΩΛ.** Ὁπότερ; ἀν ποιῆ, οὐκ ἀμφοτέρως ζηλωτόν ἔστιν; ⁴⁶⁹ **ΣΩ.** Εὐφήμει, ὃ **Πῶλε.** **ΠΩΛ.** Τί δή; **ΣΩ.** "Οτι οὐ χρή οὐτε τοὺς ἀζηλώτους ζηλοῦν οὐτε τοὺς ἀθλίους, ἀλλ' ἔλεεῖν. **ΠΩΛ.** Τί δαί; οὕτω σοι δοκεῖ ἔχειν περὶ δν ἐγὼ λέγω τῶν ἀνθρώπων; **ΣΩ.** Πῶς γὰρ οὐ; **ΠΩΛ.** Ὁστις

οῦν ἀποκτίννυσιν δν ἄν δόξη αὐτῷ, δικαίως ἀποκτιννύς, ἄθλιος δοκεῖ σοι εἶναι καὶ ἐλεεινός ; ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἔμοιγε, οὐδὲ μέντοι ζηλωτός. ΠΩΛ. Β Οὐκ ἄρτι ἄθλιον ἔφησθα εἶναι ; ΣΩ. Τὸν ἀδίκως γε, ὃ ἔταιρε, ἀποκτείναντα, καὶ ἐλεεινόν γε πρός τὸν δὲ δικαίως ἀξήλωτον. ΠΩΛ. Ὡς που ὁ γε ἀποθνήσκων ἀδίκως ἐλεεινός τε καὶ ἄθλιός ἐστιν. ΣΩ. Ὡς ή ὁ ἀποκτιννύς, ὃ Πῶλε, καὶ ἡττον ἡ ὁ δικαίως ἀποθνήσκων. ΠΩΛ. Πῶς δῆτα, ὃ Σώκρατες ; ΣΩ. Οὕτως, ὃς μέγιστον τῶν κακῶν τυγχάνει δν τὸ ἀδικεῖν. ΠΩΛ. Ὡς γὰρ τοῦτο μέγιστον ; οὐ τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι μεῖζον ; ΣΩ. Ὡκιστά γε. ΠΩΛ. Σὺ ἄρα βούλοιο ἄν ἀδικεῖσθαι μᾶλλον ἡ ἀδικεῖν ; ΣΩ. Βουλοίμην μὲν ἄν ἔγωγε οὐδέτερα εἰ δ' ἀναγκαῖον εἴη ἀδικεῖν ἡ ἀδικεῖσθαι, ἐλοίμην ἄν μᾶλλον ἀδικεῖσθαι ἡ ἀδικεῖν. ΠΩΛ. Σὺ ἄρα τυραννεῖν οὐκ ἄν δέξαιο ; ΣΩ. Οὐκ, εἰ τὸ τυραννεῖν γε λέγεις ὅπερ ἔγώ. ΠΩΛ. Ἀλλ' ἔγωγε τοῦτο λέγω, ὅπερ ἄρτι, ἔξεῖναι ἐν τῇ πόλει, δ ἄν δοκῇ αὐτῷ, ποιεῖν τοῦτο, καὶ ἀποκτιννόντι καὶ ἐκβάλλοντι καὶ πάντα πράττοντι κατὰ τὴν αὐτοῦ δόξαν.

CAP. XXV. ΣΩ. Ὡ μακάριε, ἔμοῦ δὴ λέ-
D γοντος τῷ λόγῳ ἐπιλαβοῦ. εἰ γὰρ ἔγὼ ἐν ἀγορᾷ πληθούσῃ λαβὼν ὑπὸ μάλης ἐγχειρίδιον λέγοιμι πρὸς σὲ, δτι Ὡ Πῶλε, ἔμοὶ δύναμίς τις καὶ τυραννὸς θαυμασία ἄρτι προσγέγονεν· ἐὰν γὰρ ἄρα ἔμοὶ δόξῃ τινὰ τουτωνὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ὃν σὺ ὄρᾶς αὐτίκα μάλα δεῖν τεθνάναι, τεθνήξει

οῦτος, ὃν ἀν δόξῃ· καὶ τινα δόξη μοι τῆς κεφαλῆς αὐτῶν κατεαγέναι δεῖν, κατεαγὼς ἔσται αὐτίκα μάλα, καὶ θοιμάτιον διεσχίσθαι, διεσχισμένον ἔσται· οὗτο μέγα ἐγὼ δύναμαι ἐν τῇδε τῇ Επόλει· εἰ οὖν ἀπιστοῦντί σοι δείξαιμι τὸ ἐγχειρίδιον, ἵσως ἀν εἴποις ἴδων, ὅτι ^ὭΣώκρατες, οὗτο μὲν πάντες ἀν μέγα δύναντο, ἐπεὶ καὶ ἐμπρησθείη οἰκία τούτῳ τῷ τρόπῳ ἥντιν' ἀν σοι δοκῇ, καὶ τά γε Ἀθηναίων νεώρια καὶ τριήρεις καὶ τὰ πλοῖα πάντα καὶ τὰ δημόσια καὶ τὰ ἴδια. ἄλλ' οὐκ ἄρα τοῦτο ἔστι τὸ μέγα δύνασθαι, τὸ ποιεῖν ἀ δοκεῖ αὐτῷ. ἢ δοκεῖ σοι; **ΠΩΛ.** Οὐ⁴⁷⁰ δῆτα οὗτο γε. **ΣΩ.** Ἐχεις οὖν εἰπεῖν, διότι μέμφει τὴν τοιαύτην δύναμιν; **ΠΩΛ.** Ἔγωγε. **ΣΩ.** Τί δή; λέγε. **ΠΩΛ.** Οὐ αναγκαῖον τὸν οὗτο πράττοντα ζημιοῦσθαι ἔστι. **ΣΩ.** Τὸ δὲ ζημιοῦσθαι οὐ κακόν; **ΠΩΛ.** Πάνυ γε. **ΣΩ.** Οὐκοῦν, ὡς θαυμάσιε, τὸ μέγα δύνασθαι πάλιν αὐτὸι φαίνεται, ἐὰν μὲν πράττοντι ἀ δοκεῖ ἐπηταῖ τὸ ὡφελίμως πράττειν, ἀγαθόν τε εἶναι, καὶ τοῦτο, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἔστι τὸ μέγα δύνασθαι· εἰ δὲ Β μή, κακὸν καὶ σμικρὸν δύνασθαι. **Σκεψώμεθα** δὲ καὶ τόδε. ἄλλο τι διμολογοῦμεν ἐνίστε μὲν ἀμεινον εἶναι ταῦτα ποιεῖν, ἀ νῦν δὴ ἐλέγομεν, ἀποκτιννύναι τε καὶ ἐξελαύνειν ἀνθρώπους καὶ ἀφαιρεῖσθαι χρήματα, ἐνίστε δὲ οὐ; **ΠΩΛ.** Πάνυ γε. **ΣΩ.** Τοῦτο μὲν δή, ὡς ἔοικε, καὶ παρὰ σοῦ καὶ παρ' ἐμοῦ διμολογεῖται. **ΠΩΛ.** Ναί. **ΣΩ.** Πότε οὖν σὺ φῆς ἀμεινον εἶναι ταῦτα ποιεῖν; εἰπὲ τίνα ὁρον ὁρίζει. **ΠΩΛ.** Σὺ

μὲν οὖν, ὃ Σώκρατες, ἀπόκριναι ταῦτὸ τοῦτο.
c ΣΩ. Ἐγὼ μὲν τοίνυν φημί, ὃ Πῶλε, εἴ σοι
παρ' ἐμοῦ· ἥδιόν ἐστιν ἀκούειν, ὅταν μὲν δικαίως
τις ταῦτα ποιῇ, ἄμεινον εἶναι, ὅταν δὲ ἀδίκως,
κάκιον.

CAP. XXVI. ΠΩΛ. Χαλεπόν γέ σε ἐλέγξαι,
ὅτι Σώκρατες· ἀλλ' οὐχὶ καν παῖς σε ἐλέγξειεν,
ὅτι οὐκ ἀληθῆ λέγεις; ΣΩ. Πολλὴν ὅφα ἐγὼ
τῷ παιδὶ χάριν ἔξω, ἵσην δὲ καὶ σοί, ἐάν με ἐλέγ-
ξῃς καὶ ἀπαλλάξῃς φλυαρίας. ἀλλὰ μὴ κάμῃς
φίλον ἄνδρα εὐεργετῶν, ἀλλ' ἐλεγχε. ΠΩΛ.
Δ' Άλλὰ μήν, ὃ Σώκρατες, οὐδέν γέ σε δεῖ πα-
λαιοῖς πράγμασιν ἐλέγχειν· τὰ γὰρ ἔχθες καὶ
πρώην γεγονότα ταῦτα ἴκανά σε ἔξελέγξαι ἐστὶ
καὶ ἀποδεῖξαι, ὡς πολλοὶ ἀδικοῦντες ἄνθρωποι
εὐδαιμονές εἰσι. ΣΩ. Τὰ ποῖα ταῦτα; ΠΩΛ.
Ἄρχέλαιον δήπου τοῦτον τὸν Περδίκκου ὁρᾶς
ἀρχοντα Μακεδονίας; ΣΩ. Εἰ δὲ μή, ἀλλ'
ἀκούω γε. ΠΩΛ. Εὐδαιμων οὖν σοι δοκεῖ εῖ-
ναι ἡ ἄθλιος; ΣΩ. Οὐκ οἶδα, ὃ Πῶλε· οὐ
γάρ πω συγγέγονα τῷ ἀνδρί. ΠΩΛ. Τί δαί;
Εσυγγενόμενος ἀν γνοίης, ἄλλως δὲ αὐτόθεν οὐ
γιγνώσκεις ὅτι εὐδαιμονεῖ; ΣΩ. Μὰ Δί' οὐ
δῆτα. ΠΩΛ. Λῆλον δή, ὃ Σώκρατες, δητι οὐδὲ
τὸν μέγαν βασιλέα γιγνώσκειν φήσεις εὐδαιμονα
ὄντα. ΣΩ. Καὶ ἀληθῆ γε ἐρῶ· οὐ γὰρ οἶδα
παιδείας ὅπως ἔχει καὶ δικαιοσύνης. ΠΩΛ. Τί
δέ; ἐν τούτῳ ἡ πᾶσα εὐδαιμονία ἐστίν; ΣΩ.
Ὦς γε ἐγὼ λέγω, ὃ Πῶλε· τὸν μὲν γὰρ καλὸν
κάγαθὸν ἄνδρα καὶ γυναικα εὐδαιμονα εἶναι

φημι, τὸν δὲ ἄδικον καὶ πονηρὸν ἀθλιον. ΠΩΛ. 4π
 "Αθλιος ἄρα οὗτος ἐστιν ὁ Ἀρχέλαος κατὰ τὸν
 σὸν λόγον; ΣΩ. Εἴπερ γε, ω̄ φίλε, ἄδικος.
 ΠΩΛ. Ἄλλα μὲν δὴ πῶς οὐκ ἄδικος; ω̄ γε
 προσῆκε μὲν τῆς ἀρχῆς οὐδέν, ἦν νῦν ἔχει, δοῦτι
 ἐκ γυναικός, ἦν δούλη Ἀλκέτου, τοῦ Περδίκ-
 κου ἀδελφοῦ, καὶ κατὰ μὲν τὸ δίκαιον δοῦλος
 ἦν Ἀλκέτου, καὶ εἰ ἐβούλετο τὰ δίκαια ποιεῖν,
 ἐδούλευεν ἄν Ἀλκέτῃ καὶ ἦν εὐδαιμων κατὰ τὸν
 σὸν λόγον· νῦν δὲ θαυμασίως ὡς ἀθλιος γέγονεν, Β
 ἐπεὶ τὰ μέγιστα ἡδίκηκεν· ὃς γε πρῶτον μὲν
 τοῦτον αὐτὸν τὸν δεσπότην καὶ θεῖον μεταπεμ-
 ψάμενος ὡς ἀποδώσων τὴν ἀρχήν, ἦν Περδίκκας
 αὐτὸν ἀφεύλετο, ξενίσας καὶ καταμεθύσας αὐτόν
 τε καὶ τὸν νίδην αὐτοῦ Ἀλέξανδρον, ἀνεψιὸν
 αὐτοῦ, σχεδὸν ἡλικιώτην, ἐμβαλὼν εἰς ἀμαξαν,
 νύκτωρ ἔξαγαγὼν ἀπέσφαξέ τε καὶ ἥφαντισεν
 ἀμφοτέρους, καὶ ταῦτα ἄδικήσας ἔλαθεν ἑαυτὸν
 ἀθλιώτατος γενόμενος καὶ οὐ μετεμέλησεν αὐτῷ,
 ἀλλ' ὀλίγον ὑστερον τὸν ἀδελφὸν τὸν γνήσιον, Σ
 τὸν Περδίκκου νίδην, παῖδα ὡς ἐπταετῆ, οὗ ἡ
 ἀρχὴ ἐγίγνετο κατὰ τὸ δίκαιον, οὐκ ἐβούληθη
 εὐδαιμων γενέσθαι δικαίως ἐκθρέψας καὶ ἀπο-
 δους τὴν ἀρχὴν ἐκείνῳ, ἀλλ' εἰς φρέαρ ἐμβαλὼν
 ἀποπνίξας πρὸς τὴν μητέρα αὐτοῦ Κλεοπάτραν
 χῆνα ἔφη διώκοντα ἐμπεσεῖν καὶ ἀποθανεῖν.
 τοιγάρτοι νῦν, ἀτε μέγιστα ἡδικηώς τῶν ἐν Μα-
 κεδονίᾳ, ἀθλιώτατός ἐστι πάντων Μακεδόνων,
 ἀλλ' οὐκ εὐδαιμονέστατος, καὶ ἵσως ἐστιν ὅστις
 Ἀθηναίων ἀπὸ σοῦ ἀρξάμενος δέξαιτ' ἄν ἄλλος

Δόστισοῦν Μακεδόνων γενέσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ Ἀρχέλαος.

CAP. XXVII. ΣΩ. Καὶ κατ' ἀρχὰς τῶν λόγων, ὃ Πῶλε, ἔγωγέ σε ἐπήνεσα, ὅτι μοι δοκεῖς εὖ πρὸς τὴν ὁητορικὴν πεπαιδεῦσθαι, τοῦ δὲ διαλέγεσθαι ἡμεληκέναι· καὶ νῦν ἄλλο τι οὗτός ἔστιν ὁ λόγος, φῆ με καὶ ἂν παῖς ἔξελέγξειε, καὶ ἔγὼ ὑπὸ σοῦ νῦν, ὡς σὺ οἴει, ἔξελήλεγμαι τούτῳ τῷ λόγῳ, φάσκων τὸν ἀδικοῦντα οὐκ εὔδαιμονα εἶναι; πόθεν, ὃ γαθέ; καὶ μὴν οὐδέν γέ σοι τούτων ὄμολογῷ ὃν σὺ φήσ. ΠΩΛ. Οὐ γὰρ ἐθέλεις, ἐπεὶ δοκεῖ γέ σοι ὡς ἔγὼ λέγω. ΣΩ. Ω μακάριε, ὁητορικῶς γάρ με ἐπιχειρεῖς ἐλέγχειν, ὥσπερ οἱ ἐν τοῖς δικαστηρίοις ἡγούμενοι ἐλέγχειν. καὶ γὰρ ἐκεῖ οἱ ἔτεροι τοὺς ἐτέρους δοκοῦσιν ἐλέγχειν, ἐπειδὴν τῶν λόγων ὃν ἂν λέγωσι μάρτυρας πολλοὺς παρέχωνται καὶ εὔδοκίμους, ὁ δὲ τάναντία λέγων ἔνα τινὰ παρέχηται, ἢ μηδένα. οὗτος δὲ ὁ ἐλεγχός οὐδενὸς ἄξιός ἔστι πρὸς τὴν ⁴⁷² ἀλήθειαν· ἐνίστε γὰρ ἂν καὶ καταψευδομαρτυρηθείη τις ὑπὸ πολλῶν καὶ δοκούντων εἶναι τι. καὶ νῦν περὶ ὃν σὺ λέγεις ὀλίγου σοι πάντες συμφήσουσι ταῦτα Ἀθηναῖοι καὶ ξένοι· ἐὰν βούλῃ κατ' ἔμοῦ μάρτυρας παρασχέσθαι ὡς οὐκ ἀληθῆ λέγω, μαρτυρήσουσί σοι, ἐὰν μὲν βούλῃ, Νικίας ὁ Νικηφάτου καὶ οἱ ἀδελφοὶ μετ' αὐτοῦ, ὃν οἱ τρίποδες οἱ ἐφεξῆς ἔστωτές εἰσιν ἐν τῷ Διονυσίῳ, ἐὰν δὲ βούλῃ, Ἀριστοκράτης ὁ Β Σκελλίου, οὗν αὐτὸν ἔστιν ἐν Πυθίου τοῦτο τὸ καλὸν ἀνάθημα, ἐὰν δὲ βούλῃ, η Περικλέους ὅλη

οἰκία, ἢ ἄλλη συγγένεια, ἥντινα ἀν βούλη τῶν ἐνθένδε ἐκλέξασθαι. ἀλλ' ἐγώ σοι εἰς ὃν οὐχ ὁμολογῶ· οὐ γάρ με σὺ ἀναγκάζεις, ἀλλὰ ψευδομάρτυρας κατ' ἔμοῦ πολλοὺς παρασχόμενος ἐπιχειρεῖς ἐκβάλλειν με ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας καὶ τοῦ ἀληθοῦς. ἐγὼ δὲ ἀν μὴ σὲ αὐτὸν ἔνα ὅντα μάρτυρα παράσχωμαι ὁμολογοῦντα περὶ ὃν λέγω, οὐδὲν οἶμαι ἄξιον λόγου μοι πεπεράνθαι περὶ ὃν ἀν ἡμῖν ὁ λόγος ἦ· οἶμαι δὲ οὐδὲ σοί, ἐὰν μὴ C ἐγώ σοι μαρτυρῶ εἰς ὃν μόνος, τοὺς δ' ἄλλους πάντας τούτους χαίρειν ἔστι. ἔστι μὲν οὖν οὐτός τις τρόπος ἐλέγχου, ὡς σύ τε οἴει καὶ ἄλλοι πολλοί· ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἄλλος, ὃν ἐγὼ αὖ οἶμαι. παραβαλόντες οὖν παρ' ἄλλήλους σκεψώμεθα εἴ τι διοίσουσιν ἄλλήλων. καὶ γάρ τυγχάνει περὶ ὃν ἀμφισβητοῦμεν οὐ πάντα σμικρὰ ὅντα, ἄλλὰ σχεδόν τι ταῦτα, περὶ ὃν εἰδέναι τε κάλλιστον, μὴ εἰδέναι τε αἰσχιστον· τὸ γάρ κεφάλαιον αὐτῶν ἔστιν ἡ γιγνώσκειν ἡ ἀγνοεῖν ὅστις τε εὐδαιμων ἔστι καὶ ὅστις μή· αὐτίκα πρῶτον, περὶ D οὗ νῦν ὁ λόγος ἔστι, σὺ ἡγεῖ οἶόν τε εἶναι μακάριον ἀνδρα ἀδικοῦντά τε καὶ ἀδικον ὅντα, εἴπερ Ἄρχέλαον ἀδικον μὲν ἡγεῖ εἶναι, εὐδαιμονα δέ. ἄλλο τι ὡς οὕτω σου νομίζοντος διανοώμεθα; **ΠΩΛ.** Πάνυ γε.

CAP. XXVIII. ΣΩ. Ἐγὼ δέ φημι ἀδύνατον. ἐν μὲν τοιτὶ ἀμφισβητοῦμεν. εἶεν· ἀδικῶν δὲ δὴ εὐδαιμων ἔσται ἄρ;, ἀν τυγχάνῃ δίκης τε καὶ τιμωρίας; **ΠΩΛ.** Ἡκιστά γε, ἐπεὶ οὕτω γ' ἀν ἀθλιώτατος εἴη. **ΣΩ.** Ἀλλ' ἐὰν ἄφα μὴ τυγ-

χάνη δίκης ὁ ἀδικῶν, κατὰ τὸν σὸν λόγον εὐδαίμων ἔσται. **ΠΩΛ.** Φημί. **ΣΩ.** Κατὰ δέ γε τὴν ἐμὴν δόξαν, ὃ Πῶλε, ὁ ἀδικῶν τε καὶ ἕπειτα πάντως μὲν ἀθλιος, ἀθλιώτερος μέντοι, ἐὰν μὴ διδῷ δίκην μηδὲ τυγχάνη τιμωρίας ἀδικῶν, ἥττον δὲ ἀθλιος, ἐὰν διδῷ δίκην καὶ τυγχάνη δίκης ὑπὸ θεῶν τε καὶ ἀνθρώπων. **ΠΩΛ.**

⁴⁷³ Ἀτοπά γε, ὃ Σώκρατες, ἐπιχειρεῖς λέγειν. **ΣΩ.** Πειράσομαι δέ γε καὶ σὲ ποιῆσαι, ὃ ἔταῦρε, ταῦτα ἐμοὶ λέγειν· φίλον γάρ σε ἡγοῦμαι. νῦν μὲν οὖν ἀδιαφερόμεθα ταῦτ' ἔστι· σκόπει δὲ καὶ σύ. εἶπον ἐγώ που ἐν τοῖς ἐμπροσθεν τὸ ἀδικεῖν τοῦ ἀδικεῖσθαι κάκιον εἶναι. **ΠΩΛ.**

Πάνυ γε. **ΣΩ.** Σὺ δὲ τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι. **ΠΩΛ.** Ναί. **ΣΩ.** Καὶ τοὺς ἀδικοῦντας ἀθλίους ἐφηνεῖναι ἐγώ, καὶ ἐξηλέγχθην ὑπὸ σοῦ. **ΠΩΛ.**

^B Ναὶ μὰ Δία. **ΣΩ.** Ως σύ γε οἴει, ὃ Πῶλε. **ΠΩΛ.** Ἀληθῆ γε οἰόμενος ἵσως. **ΣΩ.** Σὺ δέ γε εὐδαιμόνας αὖ τοὺς ἀδικοῦντας, ἐὰν μὴ διδῶσι δίκην. **ΠΩΛ.** Πάνυ μὲν οὖν. **ΣΩ.** Ἐγὼ δὲ αὐτοὺς ἀθλιωτάτους φημί, τοὺς δὲ διδόντας δίκην ἥττον. βούλει καὶ τοῦτο ἐλέγχειν; **ΠΩΛ.**

^C **Άλλ'** ἔτι τοῦτ' ἐκείνου χαλεπώτερόν ἔστιν, ὃ Σώκρατες, ἐξελέγξαι. **ΣΩ.** Οὐ δῆτα, ὃ Πῶλε, ἄλλ' ἀδύνατον· τὸ γάρ ἀληθὲς οὐδέποτε ἐλέγχεται. **ΠΩΛ.** Πῶς λέγεις; ἐὰν ἀδικῶν ἀνθρώπος ληφθῇ τυραννίδι ἐπιβουλεύων, καὶ ληφθεὶς στρεβλῶται καὶ ἐκτέμνηται καὶ τοὺς ὄφθαλμους ἐκκάηται, καὶ ἄλλας πολλὰς καὶ μεγάλας καὶ παντοδαπὰς λώθας αὐτός τε λωβηθεὶς καὶ τοὺς

αύτοῦ ἐπιδὼν παιδας τε καὶ γυναικα τὸ ἔσχατον ἀνασταυρωθῆ ἢ καταπιττωθῆ, οὗτος εὐδαιμονέστερος ἔσται ἢ ἐὰν διαφυγὴν τύραννος καταστῇ καὶ ἄρχων ἐν τῇ πόλει διαβιῷ ποιῶν ὃ τι ἂν βουληται, ζηλωτὸς ὥν καὶ εὐδαιμονιζόμενος ὑπὸ τῶν πολιτῶν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἔνειν; ταῦτα λέγεις ἀδύνατον εἶναι ἐξελέγχειν;

ΣΑΡ. ΧΙΧ. ΣΩ. Μορμολύττει αὖ, ὃ γενναῖς Πᾶλε, καὶ οὐκ ἐλέγχεις· ἄρτι δὲ ἐμαρτύρουν. ὅμως δὲ ὑπόμνησόν με σμικρόν· ἐὰν ἀδίκως ἐπιβουλεύων τυραννίδι, εἴπεις; ΠΩΛ. Ἐγωγε. ΣΩ. Εὐδαιμονέστερος μὲν τοίνυν οὐδέποτε ἔσται οὐδέτερος αὐτῶν, οὔτε ὁ κατειργασμένος τὴν τυραννίδα ἀδίκως οὔτε ὁ δίκην διδούς· δυοῖν γὰρ ἀθλίοιν εὐδαιμονέστερος μὲν οὐκ ἀν εἴη· ἀθλιώτερος μέντοι ὁ διαφυγὴν καὶ τυραννεύσας. Τί Ετοῦτο, ὃ Πᾶλε; γελᾶς; ἄλλο αὖ τοῦτο εἶδος ἐλέγχου ἔστιν, ἐπειδάν τίς τι εἴπῃ, καταγελᾶν, ἐλέγχειν δὲ μή; ΠΩΛ. Οὐκ οἵει ἐξεληλέγχθαι, ὃ Σώκρατες, ὅταν τοιαῦτα λέγῃς ἀ οὐδεὶς ἀν φήσειεν ἀνθρώπων; ἐπεὶ ἐροῦ τινα τουτωνί. ΣΩ. Ω Πᾶλε, οὐκ εἰμὶ τῶν πολιτικῶν, καὶ πέροισι βουλεύειν λαχών, ἐπειδὴ ἡ φυλὴ ἐπρυτάνευε καὶ ἔδει με ἐπιψηφίζειν, γέλωτα παρεῖχον καὶ οὐκ ἡπιστάμην ἐπιψηφίζειν. μὴ οὖν μηδὲ νῦν 474 με κέλευε ἐπιψηφίζειν τοὺς παρόντας, ἀλλ' εἰ μὴ ἔχεις τούτων βελτίω ἐλεγχον, δπερ νῦν δὴ ἐγὼ ἐλεγον, ἐμοὶ ἐν τῷ μέρει παράδοσ, καὶ πείρασαι τοῦ ἐλέγχου οἷον ἐγὼ οἶμαι δεῖν εἶναι. ἐγὼ γὰρ ὅν ἀν λέγω ἔνα μὲν παρασχέσθαι μάρτυρα ἐπί-

σταμαι, αὐτὸν πρὸς ὃν ἀν μοι ὁ λόγος ἦ, τοὺς δὲ πολλοὺς ἐῶ χαίρειν, καὶ ἔνα ἐπιψηφίζειν ἐπί-
Β σταμαι, τοῖς δὲ πολλοῖς οὐδὲ διαλέγομαι. ὅρα οῦν, εἰ ἐθελήσεις ἐν τῷ μέρει διδόναι ἔλεγχον ἀποκρινόμενος τὰ ἐρωτώμενα. ἐγὼ γὰρ δὴ οἴ-
μαι καὶ ἐμὲ καὶ σὲ καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ἀνθρώπους τὸ ἀδικεῖν τοῦ ἀδικεῖσθαι κάκιον ἡγεῖσθαι καὶ τὸ μὴ διδόναι δίκην τοῦ διδόναι. **ΠΩΛ.** Ἐγὼ δέ γε οὗτ' ἐμὲ οὗτ' ἄλλον ἀνθρώπων οὐδένα. ἐπεὶ σὺ δέξαι' ἄν μᾶλλον ἀδικεῖσθαι ἢ ἀδικεῖν; **ΣΩ.** Καὶ σύ γ' ἀν καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι πάντες. **ΠΩΛ.** Πολλοῦ γε δεῖ, ἀλλ' οὗτ' ἐγὼ οὔτε σὺ οὔτε ἄλλος οὐδείς.
C **ΣΩ.** Οὐκοῦν ἀποκρινεῖ; **ΠΩΛ.** Πάνυ μὲν οῦν· καὶ γὰρ ἐπιθυμῶ εἰδέναι ὃ τι ποτ' ἐρεῖς. **ΣΩ.** Λέγε δὴ μοι, ἵν' εἰδῆς, ὥσπερ ἀν εἰ ἐξ ἀρχῆς σε ἡρώτων· πότερον δοκεῖ σοι, ὡς Πῶλε, κάκιον εἶναι τὸ ἀδικεῖν ἢ τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι; **ΠΩΛ.** Τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι ἔμοιγε. **ΣΩ.** Τί δὲ δὴ αἰσχιον; πότερον τὸ ἀδικεῖν ἢ τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι; **Ἀποκρίνον.**
ΠΩΛ. Τὸ ἀδικεῖν.

CAP. XXX. **ΣΩ.** Οὐκοῦν καὶ κάκιον, εἴπερ αἰσχιον. **ΠΩΛ.** Ἡκιστά γε. **ΣΩ.** Μανθάνω·
D οὐ ταῦτὸν ἡγεῖ σύ, ὡς ἔοικας, καλόν τε καὶ ἀγα-
θὸν καὶ κακὸν καὶ αἰσχρόν. **ΠΩΛ.** Οὐ δῆτα. **ΣΩ.** Τί δὲ τόδε; τὰ καλὰ πάντα, οἷον καὶ σώματα καὶ χρώματα καὶ σχῆματα καὶ φωνὰς καὶ ἐπιτηδεύματα, εἰς οὐδὲν ἀποβλέπων καλεῖς ἔκαστοτε καλά; οἷον πρῶτον τὰ σώματα τὰ κα-
λὰ οὐχὶ ἥτοι κατὰ τὴν χρείαν λέγεις καλὰ εἶναι, πρὸς ὃ ἀν ἔκαστον χρήσιμον ἢ, πρὸς τοῦτο, ἢ

κατὰ ἡδονὴν τινα, ἐὰν ἐν τῷ θεωρεῖσθαι χαίρειν ποιῆ τοὺς θεωροῦντας ; ἔχεις τι ἐκτὸς τούτων λέγειν περὶ σώματος κάλλους ; **ΠΩΛ.** Οὐκ εἶχω. **ΣΩ.** Οὐκοῦν καὶ τἄλλα πάντα οὗτα καὶ σχήματα καὶ χρώματα ἢ διὰ ἡδονὴν τινα, ἢ διὰ ὥφελειαν, ἢ δι' ἀμφότερα καλὰ προσαγορεύεις ; **ΠΩΛ.** ["]Εγωγε. **ΣΩ.** Οὐ καὶ τὰς φωνὰς καὶ τὰ κατὰ τὴν μουσικὴν πάντα ὄσαντις ; **ΠΩΛ.** Ναί. **ΣΩ.** Καὶ μὴν τά γε κατὰ τοὺς νόμους καὶ τὰ ἐπιτηδεύματα οὐ δήπου ἐκτὸς τούτων ἔστι τὰ καλά, τοῦ ἢ ὥφελιμα εἶναι, ἢ ἡδεῖα, ἢ ἀμφότερα. **ΠΩΛ.** Οὐκ ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ. **ΣΩ.**⁴⁷⁵ Οὐκοῦν καὶ τὸ τῶν μαθημάτων κάλλος ὄσαντις ; **ΠΩΛ.** Πάννυ γε καὶ καλῶς γε νῦν ὁρίζει, ὃ Σώκρατες, ἡδονῇ τε καὶ ἀγαθῷ ὁριζόμενος τὸ καλόν. **ΣΩ.** Οὐκοῦν τὸ αἰσχρὸν τῷ ἐνάντιῳ, λύπῃ τε καὶ κακῷ ; **ΠΩΛ.** [']Ανάγκη. **ΣΩ.** ["]Οταν ἀρα δυοῖν καλοῖν θάτερον κάλλιον ἢ, ἢ τῷ ἑτέρῳ τούτοιν ἢ ἀμφοτέροις ὑπερβάλλον κάλλιον ἔστιν, ἵτοι ἡδονῇ ἢ ὥφελείᾳ ἢ ἀμφοτέροις. **ΠΩΛ.** Πάννυ γε. **ΣΩ.** Καὶ δταν δὲ δὴ δυοῖν αἰσχροῖν τὸ ἔτερον αἰσχιον ἢ, ἵτοι λύπῃ ἢ κα-
κῷ ὑπερβάλλον αἰσχιον ἔσται. ἢ οὐκ ἀνάγκη ; **ΠΩΛ.** Ναί. **ΣΩ.** Φέρε δή, πῶς ἐλέγετο νῦν δὴ περὶ τοῦ ἀδικεῖν καὶ ἀδικεῖσθαι ; οὐκ ἔλεγες τὸ μὲν ἀδικεῖσθαι κάκιον εἶναι, τὸ δὲ ἀδικεῖν αἰσχιον ; **ΠΩΛ.** ["]Ελεγον. **ΣΩ.** Οὐκοῦν εἴπερ αἰσχιον τὸ ἀδικεῖν τοῦ ἀδικεῖσθαι, ἵτοι λυπηρότερόν ἔστι καὶ λύπῃ ὑπερβάλλον αἰσχιον ἄν εἴη, ἢ κακῷ, ἢ ἀμφοτέροις ; οὐ καὶ τοῦτο ἀνάγκη ; **ΠΩΛ.** Πῶς γὰρ οὐ ;

С САР. XXXI. ΣΩ. Πρῶτον μὲν δὴ σκεψάμεθα· ἄρα λύπη ὑπερβάλλει τὸ ἀδικεῖν τοῦ ἀδικεῖσθαι, καὶ ἀλγοῦσι μᾶλλον οἱ ἀδικοῦντες ἢ οἱ ἀδικούμενοι; ΠΩΛ. Οὐδαμῶς, ὃ Σώκρατες, τοῦτο γε. ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἄρα λύπη γε ὑπερέχει. ΠΩΛ. Οὐ δῆτα. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν εἰ μὴ λύπη, ἀμφοτέροις μὲν οὐκ ἀν ἔτι ὑπερβάλλοι. ΠΩΛ. Οὐ φαίνεται. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τῷ ἐτέρῳ λείπεται. ΠΩΛ. Ναί. ΣΩ. Τῷ κακῷ. ΠΩΛ. Ἔοικεν. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν κακῷ ὑπερβάλλον τὸ ἀδικεῖν κάκιον ἀν εἴη τοῦ ἀδικεῖσθαι. ΠΩΛ. Δῆλον δὴ δτι. ΣΩ. Ἀλλο τι οὖν ὑπὸ μὲν τῶν πολλῶν ἀνθρώπων καὶ ὑπὸ σοῦ ὡμολογεῖτο ἡμῖν ἐν τῷ ἔμπροσθεν χρόνῳ αἰσχιον εἶναι τὸ ἀδικεῖν τοῦ ἀδικεῖσθαι; ΠΩΛ. Ναί. ΣΩ. Νῦν δέ γε κάκιον ἐφάνη. ΠΩΛ. Ἔοικε. ΣΩ. Δέξαιο ἀν οὖν σὺ μᾶλλον τὸ κάκιον καὶ τὸ αἰσχιον ἀντὶ τοῦ ἥττον; Μὴ ὄκνει ἀποκρίνασθαι, ὃ Πῶλε—οὐδὲν γὰρ βλαβήσει—, ἀλλὰ γενναίως τῷ λόγῳ, Εἰσπερὶ ἰατρῷ, παρέχων ἀποκρίνουν, καὶ ἢ φάθι ἢ μὴ ἀ ἐρωτῶ. ΠΩΛ. Ἀλλ' οὐκ ἀν δεξαίμην, ὃ Σώκρατες. ΣΩ. Ἀλλος δέ τις ἀνθρώπων; ΠΩΛ. Οὐ μοι δοκεῖ κατά γε τοῦτον τὸν λόγον. ΣΩ. Ἀληθῆ ἄρα ἐγὼ ἔλεγον, δτι οὔτ' ἀν ἐγὼ οὔτ' ἀν σὺ οὔτ' ἄλλος οὐδεὶς ἀνθρώπων δέξαιτ' ἀν μᾶλλον ἀδικεῖν ἢ ἀδικεῖσθαι· κάκιον γὰρ τυγχάνει ὅν. ΠΩΛ. Φαίνεται. ΣΩ. Ορᾶς οὖν, ὃ Πῶλε, ὁ ἔλεγχος παρὰ τὸν ἔλεγχον παραβαλλόμενος δτι οὐδὲν ἔοικεν, ἀλλὰ σοὶ μὲν οἱ ἄλλοι πάντες ὁμολογοῦσι πλὴν ἐμοῦ, ἐμοὶ δὲ σὺ

ἔξαρκεῖς εῖς ὃν μόνος καὶ ὁμολογῶν καὶ μαρτυ-⁴⁷⁶
 ρῶν, καὶ ἐγὼ σὲ μόνον ἐπιψηφίζων τοὺς ἄλλους
 ἐῶ χαίρειν. Καὶ τοῦτο μὲν ἡμῖν οὕτως ἔχέτω·
 μετὰ τοῦτο δὲ περὶ οὗ τὸ δεύτερον ἡμφεσθητήσα-
 μεν, σκεψώμεθα, τὸ ἀδικοῦντα διδόναι δίκην ἄρα
 μέγιστον τῶν κακῶν ἐστιν, ὡς σὺ φάσῃ, η̄ μεῖζον τὸ
 μὴ διδόναι, ὡς αὖ ἐγὼ φύμην. σκοπώμεθα δὲ τῇδε·
 τὸ διδόναι δίκην καὶ τὸ κολάζεσθαι δικαίως ἀδι-
 κοῦντα ἄρα τὸ αὐτὸν καλεῖς; **ΠΩΛ.** Ἔγωγε.
ΣΩ. Ἐχεις οὖν λέγειν, ὡς οὐχὶ τά γε δίκαια ^β
 πάντα καλά ἐστι, καθ' ὅσον δίκαια; καὶ δια-
 σκεψώμενος εἰπέ. **ΠΩΛ.** Άλλα μοι δοκεῖ, ὡς
Σώκρατες.

CAP. XXXII. **ΣΩ.** Σκόπει δὴ καὶ τόδε· ἄρα
 εἴ τις τι ποιεῖ, ἀνάγκη τι εἶναι καὶ πάσχον ὑπὸ^γ
 τούτου τοῦ ποιοῦντος; **ΠΩΛ.** Ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.
ΣΩ. Άρα τοῦτο πάσχον ὁ τὸ ποιοῦν ποιεῖ, καὶ
 τοιοῦτον οἶνον ποιεῖ τὸ ποιοῦν; λέγω δὲ τὸ τοι-
 όνδε· εἴ τις τύπτει, ἀνάγκη τι τύπτεσθαι;
ΠΩΛ. Ἀνάγκη. **ΣΩ.** Καὶ εἰ σφόδρα τύπτει η̄^δ
 ταχὺ ὁ τύπτων, οὕτω καὶ τὸ τυπτόμενον τύπτε-
 σθαι; **ΠΩΛ.** Ναί. **ΣΩ.** Τοιοῦτον ἄρα πά-
 θος τῷ τυπτομένῳ ἐστίν οἶνον ἀν τὸ τύπτον ποιῆ;
ΠΩΛ. Πάνυ γε. **ΣΩ.** Οὐκοῦν καὶ εἰ κάει τις,
 ἀνάγκη τι κάεσθαι; **ΠΩΛ.** Πῶς γάρ οὐ; **ΣΩ.**
 Καὶ εἰ σφόδρα γε κάει η̄ ἀλγεινῶς, οὕτω κάεσθαι
 τὸ καόμενον ὡς ἀν τὸ κᾶον κάῃ; **ΠΩΛ.** Πάνυ
 γε. **ΣΩ.** Οὐκοῦν καὶ εἰ τέμνει τις, ὁ αὐτὸς
 λόγος; τέμνεται γάρ τι. **ΠΩΛ.** Ναί. **ΣΩ.**
 Καὶ εἰ μέγα γε η̄ βαθὺ τὸ τμῆμα η̄ ἀλγεινόν,

Ω τοιοῦτον τμῆμα τέμνεται τὸ τεμνόμενον οὗν τὸ τέμνον τέμνει; **ΠΩΛ.** Φαίνεται. **ΣΩ.** Συλλήβδην δὴ ὅρα, εἰ ὁμολογεῖς ὃ ἀφτι ἔλεγον περὶ πάντων· οὗν ἀν ποιῇ τὸ ποιοῦν, τοιοῦτον τὸ πάσχον πάσχειν. **ΠΩΛ.** Ἀλλ' ὁμολογῶ. **ΣΩ.** Τούτων δὴ ὁμολογουμένων, τὸ δίκην διδόναι πότερον πάσχειν τί ἐστιν ἢ ποιεῖν; **ΠΩΛ.** Ἀνάγκη, ὡς Σώκρατες, πάσχειν. **ΣΩ.** Οὐκοῦν ὑπό τινος ποιοῦντος; **ΠΩΛ.** Πῶς γὰρ οὖ; ὑπό γε τοῦ Εκολάζοντος. **ΣΩ.** Ο δὲ ὄρθως κολάζων δικαίως κολάζει; **ΠΩΛ.** Ναί. **ΣΩ.** Δίκαια ποιῶν, ἢ οὖ; **ΠΩΛ.** Δίκαια. **ΣΩ.** Οὐκοῦν ὁ κολαζόμενος δίκην διδοὺς δίκαια πάσχει; **ΠΩΛ.** Φαίνεται. **ΣΩ.** Τὰ δὲ δίκαια πον καλὰ ὡμολόγηται; **ΠΩΛ.** Πάντα γε. **ΣΩ.** Τούτων ὅρα ὃ μὲν ποιεῖ καλά, ὃ δὲ πάσχει, ὁ κολαζόμενος. **ΠΩΛ.** Ναί.

CAP. XXXIII. **ΣΩ.** Οὐκοῦν εἴπερ καλά, ἀπάγαθά; ἢ γὰρ ἥδεα ἢ ὡφέλιμα. **ΠΩΛ.** Ἀνάγκη. **ΣΩ.** Ἀγαθὰ ὅρα πάσχει ὃ δίκην διδούς; **ΠΩΛ.** Εοικεν. **ΣΩ.** Ωφελεῖται ὅρα; **ΠΩΛ.** Ναί. **ΣΩ.** Ὅρα ἥνπερ ἐγὼ ὑπολαμβάνω τὴν ὡφέλειαν; βελτίων τὴν ψυχὴν γίγνεται, εἴπερ δικαίως κολάζεται; **ΠΩΛ.** Είκος γε. **ΣΩ.** Κακίας ὅρα ψυχῆς ἀπαλλάττεται ὃ δίκην διδούς; **ΠΩΛ.** Ναί. **ΣΩ.** Ἄρ' οὖν τοῦ μεγίστου β ἀπαλλάττεται κακοῦ; **ΠΩΛ.** Ωδε δὲ σκόπει. ἐν χρημάτων κατασκευῆ ἀνθρώπου κακίαν ἄλλην τινὰ ἐνορᾶς ἢ πενίαν; **ΠΩΛ.** Οὐκ, ἀλλὰ πενίαν. **ΣΩ.** Τί δ' ἐν σώματος κατασκευῆ; κακίαν ἀν

φήσαις ἀσθένειαν εἶναι καὶ νόσον καὶ αἰσχος καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα ; ΠΩΛ. Ἔγωγε. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἐν ψυχῇ πονηρίαν ἥγεῖ τινα εἶναι ; ΠΩΛ. Πῶς γὰρ οὐ ; ΣΩ. Ταύτην οὖν οὐκ ἀδικίαν καλεῖς καὶ ἀμαθίαν καὶ δειλίαν καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα ; ΠΩΛ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν χρημάτων καὶ σώματος καὶ ψυχῆς, τριῶν ὅντων, τριττὰς εἴρηκας πονηρίας, πενίαν, νόσον, ἀδικίαν ; ΠΩΛ. Ναί. ΣΩ. Τίς οὖν τούτων τῶν πονηριῶν αἰσχίστη ; οὐχ ἡ ἀδικία καὶ συλλήβδην ἡ τῆς ψυχῆς πονηρία ; ΠΩΛ. Πολύ γε. ΣΩ. Εἰ δὴ αἰσχίστη, καὶ κακίστη ; ΠΩΛ. Πῶς, ὁ Σώκρατες, λέγεις ; ΣΩ. Ὡδί· ἀεὶ τὸ αἰσχυστον, ἦτοι λύπην μεγίστην παρέχον ἢ βλάβην ἡ ἀμφότερα, αἰσχιστόν ἐστιν ἐκ τῶν ὀμολογημένων ἐν τῷ ἔμπροσθεν. ΠΩΛ. Μάλιστα. ΣΩ. Αἰσχιστον δὲ ἀδικία καὶ σύμπασα ψυχῆς πονηρία νῦν δὴ ὀμολόγηται ἡμῖν ; ΠΩΛ. Ὡμολόγηται γάρ. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἡ ἀνιαρότατόν ἐστιν καὶ ἀνίᾳ ὑπερβάλλον αἰσχιστον τούτων ἐστίν, ἡ βλάβη, ἡ ἀμφότερα ; ΠΩΛ. Ἀνάγκη. ΣΩ. Ἄρ, οὖν ἀλγεινότερόν ἐστι τοῦ πένεσθαι καὶ κάμνειν τὸ ἀδικον εἶναι καὶ ἀκόλαστον καὶ δειλὸν καὶ ἀμαθῆ ; ΠΩΛ. Οὐκ ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, ὁ Σώκρατες, ἀπὸ τούτων γε. ΣΩ. Ὅπερφυεῖ τινι ἄρα ὡς μεγάλη βλάβη καὶ κακῷ θαυμασίῳ ὑπερβάλλουσα τάλλα ἡ τῆς ψυχῆς πονηρία αἰσχιστόν Ε ἐστι πάντων, ἐπειδὴ οὐκ ἀλγηδόνι γε, ὡς ὁ σὸς λόγος. ΠΩΛ. Φαίνεται. ΣΩ. Άλλὰ μήν που τό γε μεγίστη βλάβη ὑπερβάλλον μέγιστον ἀν

κακὸν εἴη τῶν ὄντων. ΠΩΛ. Ναί. ΣΩ. Ἡ ἀδικία ἄρα καὶ ἡ ἀκολασία καὶ ἡ ἄλλη ψυχῆς πονηρία μέγιστον τῶν ὄντων κακόν ἐστι; ΠΩΛ. Φαίνεται.

ΣΑΡ. XXXIV. ΣΩ. Τίς οὖν τέχνη πενίας ἀπαλλάττει; οὐ χρηματιστική; ΠΩΛ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Τίς δὲ νόσου; οὐκ ἰατρική; ΠΩΛ.

⁴⁷⁸ Ανάγκη. ΣΩ. Τίς δὲ πονηρίας καὶ ἀδικίας;

Εἰ μὴ οὗτος εὐπορεῖς, ὃδε σκόπει· ποῖ ἄγομεν καὶ παρὰ τίνας τοὺς κάμνοντας τὰ σώματα;

ΠΩΛ. Παρὰ τοὺς ἰατρούς, ὃ Σώκρατες. ΣΩ.

Ποῖ δὲ τοὺς ἀδικοῦντας καὶ τοὺς ἀκολασταίνοντας; ΠΩΛ. Παρὰ τοὺς δικαστὰς λέγεις;

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν δίκην δώσοντας; ΠΩΛ. Φημί.

ΣΩ. Ἄρ' οὖν οὐ δικαιοσύνη τινὶ χρώμενοι κολάζοντιν οἱ ὁρθῶς κολάζοντες; ΠΩΛ. Λῆλον

β δῆ. ΣΩ. Χρηματιστική μὲν ἄρα πενίας ἀπαλλάττει, ἰατρικὴ δὲ νόσου, δίκη δὲ ἀκολασίας καὶ ἀδικίας. ΠΩΛ. Φαίνεται. ΣΩ. Τί οὖν τούτων κάλλιστόν ἐστιν [ἄν λέγεις]; ΠΩΛ.

Τίνων λέγεις; ΣΩ. Χρηματιστικῆς, ἰατρικῆς, δίκης. ΠΩΛ. Πολὺ διαφέρει, ὃ Σώκρατες, ἡ δίκη. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν αὖ ἥτοι ἥδονὴν πλείστην ποιεῖ, ἡ ὡφέλειαν, ἡ ἀμφότερα, εἴπερ κάλλιστόν ἐστι; ΠΩΛ. Ναί. ΣΩ. Ἄρ' οὖν τὸ ἰατρεύεσθαι ἥδυ ἐστι, καὶ χαίρουσιν οἱ ἰατρευόμενοι;

ΠΩΛ. Οὐκ ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ. ΣΩ. Ἄλλ' ὡφέλι-

μόν γε. ἡ γάρ; ΠΩΛ. Ναί. ΣΩ. Μεγάλου

γάρ κακοῦ ἀπαλλάττεται, ὥστε λυσιτελεῖ ὑπο-

μεῖναι τὴν ἀλγηδόνα καὶ ὑγιεῖ εἶναι. ΠΩΛ.

Πῶς γὰρ οὐ ; ΣΩ. Ἄρον οὗτος ἀν περὶ σῶμα εὔδαιμονέστατος ἀνθρωπος εἴη, ἵατρευόμενος, η μηδὲ κάμνων ἀρχήν ; *ΠΩΛ.* Λῆλον, δι μηδὲ κάμνων. *ΣΩ.* Οὐ γὰρ τοῦτ' ἦν εὔδαιμονία, ὡς ἔοικε, κακοῦ ἀπαλλαγή, ἀλλὰ τὴν ἀρχὴν μηδὲ κτῆσις. *ΠΩΛ.* Ἐστι ταῦτα. *ΣΩ.* Τί δέ ; ἀθλιώτερος πότερος δυοῖν ἔχόντοιν κακὸν εἴτ' ἐν σώματι εἴτ' ἐν ψυχῇ ; ὁ ἵατρευόμενος καὶ ἀπαλλαττόμενος τοῦ κακοῦ, η ὁ μὴ ἵατρευόμενος, ἔχων δέ ; *ΠΩΛ.* Φαίνεται μοι ὁ μὴ ἵατρευόμενος. *ΣΩ.* Οὐκοῦν τὸ δίκην διδόναι μεγίστου κακοῦ ἀπαλλαγὴ ην, πονηρίας ; *ΠΩΛ.* Ἡν γάρ. *ΣΩ.* Σωφρονίζει γάρ που καὶ δικαιοτέρους ποιεῖ καὶ ἵατρικὴ γίγνεται πονηρίας η δίκη. *ΠΩΛ.* Ναί. *ΣΩ.* Εὐδαιμονέστατος μὲν ἄρα ὁ μὴ ἔχων εκακίαν ἐν ψυχῇ, ἐπειδὴ τοῦτο μέγιστον τῶν κακῶν ἐφάνη. *ΠΩΛ.* Λῆλον δή. *ΣΩ.* Λεύτερος δήπου ὁ ἀπαλλαττόμενος. *ΠΩΛ.* Ἐοικεν. *ΣΩ.* Οὗτος δ' ην ὁ νουθετούμενός τε καὶ ἐπιπληττόμενος καὶ δίκην διδούς. *ΠΩΛ.* Ναί. *ΣΩ.* Κάκιστα ἄρα ζῆ ὁ ἔχων ἀδικίαν καὶ μὴ ἀπαλλαττόμενος. *ΠΩΛ.* Φαίνεται. *ΣΩ.* Οὐκοῦν οὗτος τυγχάνει ἄν, ὃς ἀν τὰ μέγιστα ἀδικῶν καὶ χρώμενος μεγίστη ἀδικίᾳ διαπράξηται ὥστε 479 μήτε νουθετεῖσθαι μήτε κολάζεσθαι μήτε δίκην διδόναι, ὥσπερ σὺ φης Ἀρχέλαον παρεσκευάσθαι καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους τυράννους καὶ δήτορας καὶ δυνάστας ; *ΠΩΛ.* Ἐοικε.

CAP. XXXV. *ΣΩ.* Σχεδὸν γάρ που οὗτοι, ὃ ἄριστε, τὸ αὐτὸ διαπεπραγμένοι εἰσί, ὥσπερ ἀν-

εῖ τις τοῖς μεγίστοις νοσήμασι συνισχόμενος δια-
πράξαιτο μὴ διδόναι δίκην τῶν περὶ τὸ σῶμα
ἀμαρτημάτων τοῖς ἰατροῖς μηδὲ ἰατρεύεσθαι, φο-
βούμενος, ὡσπερανεὶ πᾶς, τὸ κάεσθαι καὶ τὸ
τέμνεσθαι, δτι ἀλγεινόν. ἦ οὐ δοκεῖ καὶ σοὶ
οὕτως; **ΠΩΛ.** Ἐμοιγε. **ΣΩ.** Ἀγνοῶν γε, ὡς
ἔοικεν, οἶόν ἐστιν ἡ ὑγίεια καὶ ἀρετὴ σώματος.
κινδυνεύουσι γὰρ ἐκ τῶν νῦν ἡμῖν ὁμολογημένων
τοιοῦτόν τι ποιεῖν καὶ οἱ τὴν δίκην φεύγοντες,
ὦ Πῶλε, τὸ ἀλγεινὸν αὐτοῦ καθορᾶν, πρὸς δὲ τὸ
ῳφέλιμον τυφλῶς ἔχειν καὶ ἀγνοεῖν ὅσῳ ἀθλιώ-
τερόν ἐστι μὴ ὑγιοῦς σώματος μὴ ὑγιεῖ ψυχῆ
συννοικεῖν, ἀλλὰ σαθρῷ καὶ ἀδίκῳ καὶ ἀνοσίῳ.
ὅθεν καὶ πᾶν ποιοῦσιν, ὥστε δίκην μὴ διδόναι
μηδ' ἀπαλλάττεσθαι τοῦ μεγίστου κακοῦ, καὶ
χρήματα παρασκευαζόμενοι καὶ φίλους καὶ ὅπως
ἄν ὅσιν ὡς πιθανώτατοι λέγειν. εἰ δὲ ἡμεῖς ἀλη-
θῆ ὁμολογήκαμεν, ὦ Πῶλε, ἀρ, αἰσθάνει τὰ
συμβαίνοντα ἐκ τοῦ λόγου; ἦ βούλει συλλογι-
σώμεθα αὐτά; **ΠΩΛ.** Εἰ μὴ σοί γε ἄλλως
δοκεῖ. **ΣΩ.** Άρ, οὖν συμβαίνει μέγιστον κα-
κὸν ἡ ἀδικία καὶ τὸ ἀδικεῖν; **ΠΩΛ.** Φαίνεται
γε. **ΣΩ.** Καὶ μὴν ἀπαλλαγή γε ἐφάνη τού-
του τοῦ κακοῦ τὸ δίκην διδόναι; **ΠΩΛ.** Κιν-
δυνεύει. **ΣΩ.** Τὸ δέ γε μὴ διδόναι ἐμμονὴ τοῦ
κακοῦ; **ΠΩΛ.** Ναί. **ΣΩ.** Λεύτερον ἀρα ἐστὶ
τῶν κακῶν μεγέθει τὸ ἀδικεῖν· τὸ δὲ ἀδικοῦντα
μὴ διδόναι δίκην πάντων μέγιστόν τε καὶ πρῶτον
κακῶν πέφυκεν. **ΠΩΛ.** Ἐοικεν. **ΣΩ.** Άρ,
οὖν οὐ περὶ τούτου, ὦ φίλε, ἡμφεσθητήσαμεν, σὺ

μὲν τὸν Ἀρχέλαον εὐδαιμονίζων τὸν τὰ μέγιστα ἀδικοῦντα δίκην οὐδεμίαν διδόντα, ἐγὼ δὲ τούτου ναυτίον οἰόμενος, εἴτε Ἀρχέλαος εἴτε ἄλλος ἀνθρώπων ὅστισοῦν μὴ δίδωσι δίκην ἀδικῶν, τούτῳ προσήκειν ἀθλίῳ εἶναι διαφερόντως τῶν ἄλλων ἀνθρώπων, καὶ ἀεὶ τὸν ἀδικοῦντα τοῦ ἀδικουμένου ἀθλιώτερον εἶναι καὶ τὸν μὴ διδόντα δίκην τοῦ διδόντος; οὐ ταῦτα ἡνὶ τὰ ὑπέρ ἐμοῦ λεγόμενα; *ΠΩΛ.* Ναί. *ΣΩ.* Οὐκοῦν ἀποδέδεικται, δτὶ ἀληθῆ ἐλέγετο; *ΠΩΛ.* Φαίνεται.

CAP. XXXVI. *ΣΩ.* Εἶνεν. εἰ οὖν δὴ ταῦτα ἀληθῆ, ὃ *Πῶλε*, τίς ἡ μεγάλη χρεία ἔστι τῆς ὁγητορικῆς; δεῖ μὲν γὰρ δὴ ἐκ τῶν νῦν ὁμολογημένων αὐτὸν ἔαντὸν μάλιστα φυλάττειν, ὅπως μὴ ἀδικήσῃ, ὡς ἵκανὸν κακὸν ἔξοντα. οὐ γάρ; *ΠΩΛ.* Πάνυ γε. *ΣΩ.* Ἐὰν δέ γε ἀδικήσῃ ἡ αὐτός, ἡ ἄλλος τις ἀν κήδηται, αὐτὸν ἔκόντα ἔναι τέκεῖσε ὅπου ὡς τάχιστα δώσει δίκην, παρὰ τὸν δικαστήν ὥσπερ παρὰ τὸν ἰατρόν, σπεύδοντα ὅπως μὴ ἐγχρονισθὲν τὸ νόσημα τῆς ἀδικίας ὑπουρλον τὴν ψυχὴν ποιήσῃ καὶ ἀνίατον· ἡ πῶς λέγομεν, ὃ *Πῶλε*, εἴπερ τὰ πρότερον μένει ἡμῖν ὁμολογήματα; οὐκ ἀνάγκη ταῦτα ἔκείνοις οὕτω μὲν συμφωνεῖν, ἄλλως δὲ μή; *ΠΩΛ.* Τί γὰρ δὴ φῶμεν, ὃ *Σώκρατες*; *ΣΩ.* Ἐπὶ μὲν ἄρα τὸ ἀπολογεῖσθαι ὑπὲρ τῆς ἀδικίας τῆς αὐτοῦ, ἡ γονέων, ἡ ἔταιρων, ἡ παίδων, ἡ πατρίδος ἀδικούσης οὐ χρήσιμος οὐδὲν ἡ ὁγητορικὴ ἡμῖν, ὃ *Πῶλε*, εἰ μὴ εἴ τις ὑπολάβοι ἐπὶ τούτων τίοντίον, *κατηγορεῖν* δεῖν μάλιστα μὲν ἔαντοῦ, ἐπειτα δὲ

καὶ τῶν οἰκείων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὃς ἂν ἀεὶ τῶν φίλων τυγχάνῃ ἀδικῶν, καὶ μὴ ἀποκρύπτεσθαι, ἀλλ' εἰς τὸ φανερὸν ἄγειν τὸ ἀδίκημα, ἵνα δῷ δίκην καὶ ὑγιῆς γένηται, ἀναγκάζειν τε καὶ αὐτὸν καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους μὴ ἀποδειλιᾶν, ἀλλὰ παρέχειν μύσαντα καὶ ἀνδρείως, ὥσπερ τέμνειν καὶ κάειν ἰατρῷ, τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ καλὸν διώκοντα, μὴ Δ ὑπολογιζόμενον τὸ ἀλγεινόν· ἐὰν μέν γε πληγῶν ἄξια ἡδικηκῶς ἦ, τύπτειν παρέχοντα, ἐὰν δὲ δεσμοῦ, δεῖν, ἐὰν δὲ ζημίας, ἀποτίνοντα, ἐὰν δὲ φυγῆς, φεύγοντα, ἐὰν δὲ θανάτου, ἀποθνήσκοντα, αὐτὸν πρῶτον ὅντα κατήγορον καὶ αὐτοῦ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων οἰκείων καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦτο χρώμενον τῇ ἁγητορικῇ, ὅπως ἂν καταδήλων τῶν ἀδικημάτων γιγνομένων ἀπαλλάττωνται τοῦ μεγίστου κακοῦ, ἀδικίας. Εφῶμεν οὖτως, ἢ μὴ φῶμεν, ὁ Πῶλε; ΠΩΛ. Ἀτοπα μέν, ὁ Σώκρατες, ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, τοῖς μέντοι ἔμπροσθεν ἵσως σοι δύολογεῖται. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἢ κάκεῖνα λυτέον, ἢ τάδε ἀνάγκη συμβαίνειν; ΠΩΛ. Ναί, τοῦτό γε οὖτως ἔχει. ΣΩ. Τούναντίον δέ γε αὐτὸν μεταβαλόντα εἰ ἄρα δεῖ τινα κακῶς ποιεῖν, εἴτ' ἐχθρὸν εἴτε ὄντινοῦν, ἐὰν μόνον μὴ αὐτὸς ἀδικῆται ὑπὸ τοῦ ἐχθροῦ,—τοῦτο μὲν γάρ εὐλαβητέον·—ἐὰν δὲ ἄλλον ἀδικῇ ὁ 481 ἐχθρός, παντὶ τρόπῳ παρασκευαστέον καὶ πράττοντα καὶ λέγοντα, ὅπως μὴ δῷ δίκην μηδὲ ἔλθῃ παρὰ τὸν δικαστήν· ἐὰν δὲ ἔλθῃ, μηχανητέον ὅπως ἀν διαφύγῃ καὶ μὴ δῷ δίκην ὁ ἐχθρός, ἀλλ' ἐάν τε χρυσίον ἡρπακῶς ἥ πολύ, μὴ ἀποδιδῷ τοῦτο, ἀλλ' ἔχων ἀναλίσκηται καὶ εἰς ἑαυτὸν

καὶ εἰς τοὺς ἔαυτοῦ ἀδίκως καὶ ἀθέως, ἐάν τε αὐθανάτου ἄξια ἡδικηώς η̄, ὅπως μὴ ἀποθανεῖται, μάλιστα μὲν μηδέποτε, ἀλλ' ἀθάνατος ἔσται πονηρὸς ὥν, εἰ δὲ μή, ὅπως ὡς πλεῖστον χρόνον βιώσεται τοιοῦτος ὥν. ἐπὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, ὃ Πῶλε, ἡ ὁγηρικὴ χρήσιμος εἶναι, ἐπεὶ τῷ γε μὴ μέλλοντι ἀδικεῖν οὐ μεγάλη τίς μοι δοκεῖ ἡ χρεία αὐτῆς εἶναι, εἰ δὴ καὶ ἔστι τις χρεία· ὡς ἐν γε τοῖς πρόσθεν οὐδαμῇ ἐφάνη οὖσα.

CAP. XXXVII. *ΚΑΛ.* Εἰπέ μοι, ὃ Χαιρεφῶν, σπουδάζει ταῦτα Σωκράτης, ἢ παίζει; *ΧΑΙ.* Ἐμοὶ μὲν δοκεῖ, ὃ Καλλίκλεις, ὑπερφυῶς σπουδάζειν· οὐδὲν μέντοι οἶον τὸ αὐτὸν ἐρωτᾶν. *ΚΑΛ.* Νὴ τοὺς θεοὺς ἀλλ' ἐπιθυμῶ. Εἰπέ μοι, ὃ Σώκρατες, πότερόν σε φῶμεν νῦν σπουδάζοντα, ἢ παίζοντα; εἰ μὲν γὰρ σπουδάζεις τε καὶ τυγχάνει ταῦτα ἀληθῆ ὄντα, ἀ λέγεις, ἄλλο τι ἢ ἡμῶν ὁ βίος ἀνατετραμμένος ἀν εἴη τῶν ἀνθρώπων καὶ πάντα τὰ ἐναντία πράττομεν, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἢ ἀ δεῖ; *ΣΩ.* Ὡ Καλλίκλεις, εἰ μή τι ἦν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις πάθος, τοῖς μὲν ἄλλο τι, τοῖς δὲ ἄλλο τι, τὸ αὐτό, ἄλλα τις ἡμῶν ἵδιόν τι ἔπασχε πάθος ἢ οἱ ἄλλοι, οὐκ ἀν ἦν ἡφάδιον ἐνδείξασθαι τῷ ἐτέρῳ τὸ ἔαυτοῦ πάθημα. λέγω δ' ἐννοήσας, ὅτι ἐγώ τε καὶ σὺ νῦν τυγχάνομεν ταῦτόν τι πεπονθότες, ἐρῶντε δύο ὄντε δυεῖν ἔκάτερος, ἐγὼ μὲν Ἀλκιβιάδου τε τοῦ Κλεινίου καὶ φιλοσοφίας, σὺ δὲ τοῦ τε Ἀθηναίων δήμου καὶ τοῦ Πυριλάμπους. αἰσθάνομαι οὖν σου ἔκαστοτε, καίπερ ὄντος δεινοῦ, ὅτι δόπος' ἀν φῆ σου

τὰ παιδικὰ καὶ ὅπερ ἀν φῆ ἔχειν, οὐ δυναμένου
 Ε ἀντιλέγειν, ἀλλ' ἄνω καὶ κάτω μεταβαλλομένου·
 Τὸν τε τῇ ἐκκλησίᾳ, ἐάν τι σοῦ λέγοντος ὁ δῆμος
 ὁ Ἀθηναίων μὴ φῆ οὔτως ἔχειν, μεταβαλλόμενος
 λέγεις ἂν ἐκεῖνος βούλεται, καὶ πρὸς τὸν Πυρι-
 λάμπους νεανίαν τὸν καλὸν τοῦτον τοιαῦτα ἔτε-
 ρα πέπονθας. τοῖς γὰρ τῶν παιδικῶν βούλεύ-
 μασί τε καὶ λόγοις οὐχ οἶός τ' εἰ ἐναντιοῦσθαι,
 ὥστε, εἴ τίς σον λέγοντος ἐκάστοτε ἂν διὰ τούτους
 λέγεις θαυμάζοι ὡς ἄτοπά ἐστιν, ἵσως εἴποις ἄν
 482 αὐτῷ, εἰ βούλοιο τάληθῆ λέγειν, ὅτι, εἰ μὴ τις
 παύσει τὰ σὰ παιδικὰ τούτων τῶν λόγων, οὐδὲ
 σὺ παύσει ποτὲ ταῦτα λέγων. νόμιζε τοίνυν καὶ
 παρ' ἐμοῦ χρῆναι ἔτερα τοιαῦτα ἀκούειν, καὶ
 μὴ θαύμαζε, ὅτι ἔγω ταῦτα λέγω, ἀλλὰ τὴν φι-
 λοσοφίαν, τὰ ἐμὰ παιδικά, παῦσον ταῦτα λέγου-
 σαν. λέγει γάρ, ὃ φίλε ἔταῖρε, ἀεὶ ἂν νῦν ἐμοῦ
 ἀκούεις, καί μοί ἐστι τῶν ἔτέρων παιδικῶν πολὺ^{τῶν}
 ἔμπληκτος· ὁ μὲν γὰρ Κλεινίειος οὗτος
 ἄλλοτε ἄλλων ἐστὶ λόγων, ἡ δὲ φιλοσοφία ἀεὶ^{τῶν}
 λέγει δὲ ἂν σὺ νῦν θαυμάζεις· πα-
 φῆσθα δὲ καὶ αὐτὸς λεγομένοις. ἡ οὖν ἐκείνην
 ἔξέλεγξον, ὅπερ ἀρτι ἔλεγον, ὡς οὐ τὸ ἀδικεῖν
 ἐστι καὶ ἀδικοῦντα δίκην μὴ διδόναι ἀπάντων
 ἔσχατον κακῶν· ἡ εἰ τοῦτο ἔάσεις ἀνέλεγκτον,
 μὰ τὸν κύνα, τὸν Αἴγυπτίων Θεόν, οὐ σοι ὅμο-
 λογήσει Καλλικλῆς, ὃ Καλλίκλεις, ἀλλὰ διαφω-
 νήσει ἐν ἅπαντι τῷ βίῳ. καίτοι ἔγωγε οἷμαι, ὃ
 βέλτιστε, καὶ τὴν λύραν μοι κρεῖττον εἶναι ἀναρ-
 C μοστεῖν τε καὶ διαφωνεῖν, καὶ χορὸν φέρειν,

καὶ πλείστους ἀνθρώπους μὴ διολογεῖν μοι ἀλλ' ἐναντία λέγειν, μᾶλλον ἢ ἔνα ὅντα ἐμὲ ἐμαντῶ ἀσύμφωνον εἶναι καὶ ἐναντία λέγειν.

CAP. XXXVIII. ΚΑΛ. ὩΣώκρατες, δοκεῖς νεανιεύεσθαι ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ὡς ἀληθῶς δημηγόρος ὁν· καὶ νῦν ταῦτα δημηγορεῖς ταῦτὸν παθόντος Πάλου πάθος, ὅπερ Γοργίου κατηγόρει πρὸς σὲ παθεῖν. ἔφη γάρ που Γοργίαν ἐρωτώμενον ὑπὸ σοῦ, ἐὰν ἀφίκηται παρ' αὐτὸν μὴ ἐπιστάμενος τὰ δίκαια ὁ τὴν φητορικὴν βουλό-^D μενος μαθεῖν, εἰ διδάξει αὐτὸν ὁ Γοργίας, αἰσχυνθῆναι αὐτὸν καὶ φάναι διδάξειν διὰ τὸ ἔθος τῶν ἀνθρώπων, ὅτι ἀγανακτοῦεν ἄν, εἴ τις μὴ φαίη· διὰ δὴ ταύτην τὴν διολογίαν ἀναγκάσθηναι ἐναντία αὐτὸν αὐτῷ εἰπεῖν, σὲ δὲ αὐτὸ τοῦτο ἀγαπᾶν. καί σου κατεγέλα, ὡς γέ μοι δοκεῖν, ὁρθῶς τότε. νῦν δὲ πάλιν αὐτὸς ταῦτὸν τοῦτο ἐπαθε, καὶ ἔγωγε κατ' αὐτὸ τοῦτο οὐκ ἀγαμαι Πᾶλον, ὅτι σοι συνεχώρησε τὸ ἀδικεῖν αἰσχιον ^E εἶναι τοῦ ἀδικεῖσθαι· ἐκ ταύτης γὰρ αὖ τῆς διολογίας αὐτὸς ὑπὸ σοῦ συμποδισθεὶς ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ἐπεστομίσθη, αἰσχυνθεὶς ἂν ἐνόει εἰπεῖν. σὺ γὰρ τῷ ὅντι, ὡς Σώκρατες, εἰς τοιαῦτα ἄγεις φορτικὰ καὶ δημηγορικά, φάσκων τὴν ἀλήθειαν διώκειν, ἂν φύσει μὲν οὐκ ἔστι καλά, νόμῳ δέ. ὡς τὰ πολλὰ δὲ ταῦτα ἐναντία ἀλλήλοις ἔστιν, ἥ τε φύσις καὶ ὁ νόμος. ἐὰν οὖν τις αἰσχύνηται καὶ μὴ τολμᾷ λέγειν ἅπερ νοεῖ, ἀναγκάζεται⁴⁸³ ἐναντία λέγειν. ὃ δὴ καὶ σὺ τοῦτο τὸ σοφὸν κατανενοηκὼς κακουργεῖς ἐν τοῖς λόγοις, ἐὰν μέν

τις κατὰ νόμου λέγη, κατὰ φύσιν ὑπερωτῶν, ἐὰν δὲ τὰ τῆς φύσεως, τὰ τοῦ νόμου. ὥσπερ αὐτίκα ἐν τούτοις, τῷ ἀδικεῖν τε καὶ τῷ ἀδικεῖσθαι, Πώλου τὸ κατὰ νόμου αἰσχιον λέγοντος, σὺ τὸν νόμου ἐδιώκαθες κατὰ φύσιν. φύσει μὲν γάρ πᾶν αἰσχιόν ἐστιν ὅπερ καὶ κάκιον, *οἶον* τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι, νόμῳ δὲ τὸ ἀδικεῖν. οὐδὲ γάρ ἀνδρὸς τοῦτο γ' ἐστὶ τὸ πάθημα, τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι, ἀλλ' ἀνδραπόδου τινός, φρεεπτόν ἐστι τεθνάναι ή ζῆν, ὅστις ἀδικούμενος καὶ προπηλακιζόμενος μὴ οἴόστε ἐστὶν αὐτὸς αὐτῷ βοηθεῖν μηδὲ ἄλλῳ οὐ ἀν κήδηται. ἀλλ', οἶμαι, οἱ τιθέμενοι τοὺς νόμους οἵ ἀσθενεῖς ἀνθρωποί εἰσι καὶ οἱ πολλοί. πρὸς αὐτοὺς οὖν καὶ τὸ αὐτοῖς συμφέρον τούς τε νόμους τίθενται καὶ τοὺς ἐπαίνους ἐπαινοῦσι καὶ τοὺς ψόγους ψέγουσιν· — ἐκφοβοῦντές τοὺς ἐφράμενεστέρους τῶν ἀνθρώπων καὶ δυνατοὺς ὄντας πλέον ἔχειν, ἵνα μὴ αὐτῶν πλέον ἔχωσι, λέγοντος, ὡς αἰσχρὸν καὶ ἀδικον τὸ πλεονεκτεῖν, καὶ τοῦτο ἐστὶ τὸ ἀδικεῖν, τὸ πλέον τῶν ἄλλων ζητεῖν ἔχειν· ἀγαπῶσι γάρ, οἶμαι, αὐτοὶ ἀν τὸ ἵσον ἔχωσι φαυλότεροι ὄντες.

CAP. XXXIX.

διὰ ταῦτα δὴ νόμῳ μὲν τοῦτο ἀδικον καὶ αἰσχρὸν λέγεται, τὸ πλέον ζητεῖν ἔχειν τῶν πολλῶν, καὶ ἀδικεῖν αὐτὸ καλοῦσιν· ἡ δέ γε, οἶμαι, φύσις D αὐτῇ ἀποφαίνει αὐτὸ, ὅτι δίκαιον ἐστι τὸν ἀμείνων τοῦ χείρονος πλέον ἔχειν καὶ τὸν δυνατώτερον τοῦ ἀδυνατωτέρου. δηλοῦ δὲ ταῦτα πολλαχοῦ ὅτι οὕτως ἔχει, καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ζώοις καὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἐν ὅλαις ταῖς πόλεσι καὶ τοῖς γέ-

νεσιν, ὅτι οὗτο τὸ δίκαιον κέκριται, τὸν κρείττων
 τοῦ ἥττονος ἀρχεῖν καὶ πλέον ἔχειν. ἐπεὶ ποίῳ
 δίκαιῷ χρώμενος Ξέρξης ἐπὶ τὴν Ἑλλάδα ἐστρά-^E
 τευσεν, ἦ ὁ πατὴρ αὐτοῦ ἐπὶ Σκύθας; ἢ ἄλλα
 μυρία ἀν τις ἔχοι τοιαῦτα λέγειν. ἀλλ' οἶμαι,
 οὗτοι κατὰ φύσιν [τὴν τοῦ δίκαιον] ταῦτα πράτ-
 τουσι, καὶ ναὶ μὰ Δία κατὰ νόμον γε τὸν τῆς
 φύσεως, οὐ μέντοι ἵσως κατὰ τοῦτον, δην ἡμεῖς
 τιθέμεθα πλάττοντες τοὺς βελτίστους καὶ ἐρῶ-
 μενεστάτους ἡμῶν αὐτῶν· ἐκ νέων λαμβάνοντες,
 ἂσπερ λέοντας κατεπάδοντές τε καὶ γοητεύοντες⁴⁸¹
 καταδονλούμεθα, λέγοντες, ὡς τὸ ἵσον χρὴ ἔχειν
 καὶ τοῦτό ἔστι τὸ καλὸν καὶ τὸ δίκαιον. ἐὰν
 δέ γε, οἶμαι, φύσιν ἴκανην γένηται ἔχων ἀνήρ,
 πάντα ταῦτα ἀποσεισάμενος καὶ διαρρήξας καὶ
 διαφυγών, καταπατήσας τὰ ἡμέτερα γράμματα
 καὶ μαγγανεύματα καὶ ἐπωδὰς καὶ νόμους τοὺς
 παρὰ φύσιν ἀπαντας, ἐπαναστὰς ἀνεφάνη δεσπό-
 της ἡμέτερος ὁ δοῦλος, καὶ ἐνταῦθα ἐξέλαμψε τὸ^B
 τῆς φύσεως δίκαιον. δοκεῖ δέ μοι καὶ Πίνδαρος
 ἀπερ ἐγὼ λέγω ἐνδείκνυσθαι ἐν τῷ ἄσματι, ἐν τῷ
 λέγει, ὅτι Νόμος ὁ πάντων βασιλεὺς θνα-
 τῶν τε καὶ ἀθανάτων· οὗτος δὲ δῆ, φησίν,
 ἄγει δικαιῶν τὸ βιαιότατον ὑπερτάτῃ
 χερί· τεκμαίρομαι ἐργοισιν Ἡρακλέος,
 ἐπεὶ ἀπριάτας — λέγει οὗτος πως· τὸ γὰρ
 ἄσμα οὐκ ἐπίσταμαι. λέγει δ', ὅτι οὕτε πρι-
 μενος οὕτε δόντος τοῦ Γηρυόνου ἤλασατο τὰς
 βοῦς, ὡς τούτον ὅντος τοῦ δίκαιον φύσει, καὶ
 βοῦς καὶ τᾶλλα κτήματα εἶναι πάντα τοῦ βελ-

τίονός τε καὶ κρείττονος τὰ τῶν χειρόνων τε καὶ
ἡπτόνων. ΣΑΡ. XL. τὸ μὲν οὖν ἀληθὲς οὐ-
τῶς ἔχει, γνώσει δέ, ἀν ἐπὶ τὰ μεῖζα ἔλθῃς ἐάσας
ἡδη φιλοσοφίāν. φιλοσοφία γάρ τοι ἐστιν, ὡ
Σώκρατες, χαρίεν, ἃν τις αὐτοῦ μετρίως ἀψήται
ἐν τῇ ἡλικίᾳ· ἐὰν δὲ περαιτέρῳ τοῦ δέοντος
ἐνδιατρίψῃ, διαφθορὰ τῶν ἀνθρώπων. ἐὰν γάρ
καὶ πάνυ εὐφυῆς ἦ καὶ πόρφω τῆς ἡλικίας φιλο-
σοφῆ, ἀνάγκη πάντων ἀπειρον γεγονέναι ἐστίν,
ῶν χρὴ ἔμπειρον εἶναι τὸν μέλλοντα καλὸν κά-
γαθὸν καὶ εὐδόκιμον ἔσεσθαι ἄνδρα. καὶ γάρ
τῶν νόμων ἀπειροι γίγνονται τῶν κατὰ τὴν πό-
λιν, καὶ τῶν λόγων, οἷς δεῖ χρώμενον ὅμιλεῖν ἐν
τοῖς συμβολαίοις τοῖς ἀνθρώποις καὶ ἴδιᾳ καὶ
δημοσίᾳ, καὶ τῶν ἡδονῶν τε καὶ ἐπιθυμιῶν τῶν
ἀνθρωπείων, καὶ συλλήβδην τῶν ἥθῶν παντάπασιν
ἀπειροι γίγνονται. ἐπειδὰν οὖν ἔλθωσιν εἰς τινὰ
Ἐιδίαν ἦ πολιτικὴν πρᾶξιν, καταγέλαστοι γίγνον-
ται, ὥσπερ γε, οἵμαι, οἱ πολιτικοί, ἐπειδὰν αὐ-
εῖς τὰς ὑμετέρας διατριβὰς ἔλθωσι καὶ τοὺς λό-
γους, καταγέλαστοί εἰσι. συμβαίνει γάρ τὸ
τοῦ Εὐφρίπιδον· λαμπρός τ' ἐστὶν ἔκαστος ἐν
τούτῳ,

κάπὶ τοῦτ' ἐπείγεται,
νέμων τὸ πλεῖστον ἡμέρας τούτῳ μέρος,
ἴν' αὐτὸς αὐτοῦ τυγχάνῃ βέλτιστος ὡν.

455 δόπον δ' ἀν φαῦλος ἦ, ἐντεῦθεν φεύγει καὶ λοι-
δορεῖ τοῦτο, τὸ δ' ἔτερον ἐπαινεῖ, εὔνοίᾳ τῇ ἔαν-
τοῦ, ἥγονύμενος οὖτως αὐτὸς ἔαυτὸν ἐπαινεῖν.
ἄλλ', οἵμαι, τὸ δρθότατόν ἐστιν ἀμφοτέρων μετα-

σχεῖν. φιλοσοφίας μέν, ὅσον παιδείας χάριν,
καλὸν μετέχειν, καὶ οὐκ αἰσχρὸν μειρακίῳ ὅντι
φιλοσοφεῖν· ἐπειδὰν δὲ ἡδη πρεσβύτερος ὁν ἀν-
θρωπος ἔτι φιλοσοφῆ, καταγέλαστον, ὃ Σώκρα-
τες, τὸ χρῆμα γίγνεται, καὶ ἔγωγε ὄμοιότατον
πάσχω πρὸς τοὺς φιλοσοφοῦντας ὥσπερ πρὸς τοὺς B
ψελλιζομένους καὶ παίζοντας. ὅταν μὲν γὰρ
παιδίον ἵδω, φό ἔτι προσήκει διαλέγεσθαι οὗτο,
ψελλιζόμενον καὶ παῖζον, χαίρω τε καὶ χαρίεν
μοι φαίνεται καὶ ἐλευθέριον καὶ πρέπον τῇ τοῦ
παιδίου ἡλικίᾳ· ὅταν δὲ σαφῶς διαλεγομένου
παιδαρίου ἀκούσω, πικρόν τί μοι δοκεῖ χρῆμα
εἶναι καὶ ἀνιᾶ μον τὰ ὅτα καί μοι δοκεῖ δουλο- C
πρεπές τι εἶναι· ὅταν δὲ ἀνδρὸς ἀκούσῃ τις
ψελλιζομένου ἢ παίζοντα ὅρᾳ, καταγέλαστον
φαίνεται καὶ ἀνανδρον καὶ πληγῶν ἀξιον. ταῦ-
τὸν οὖν ἔγωγε τοῦτο πάσχω καὶ πρὸς τοὺς φι-
λοσοφοῦντας. παρὰ νέῳ μὲν γὰρ μειρακίῳ ὅρῶν
φιλοσοφίαν ἄγαμαι, καὶ πρέπειν μοι δοκεῖ, καὶ
ἡγοῦμαι ἐλεύθερόν τινα εἶναι τοῦτον τὸν ἀνθρω-
πον, τὸν δὲ μὴ φιλοσοφοῦντα ἀνελεύθερον καὶ
οὐδέποτε οὐδενὸς ἀξιώσοντα ἔαυτὸν οὔτε καλοῦ D
οὔτε γενναίου πράγματος· ὅταν δὲ δὴ πρεσβύτε-
ρον ἵδω ἔτι φιλοσοφοῦντα καὶ μὴ ἀπαλλαττόμε-
νον, πληγῶν μοι δοκεῖ ἡδη δεῖσθαι, ὃ Σώκρατες,
οὗτος ὁ ἀνήρ. ὁ γὰρ νῦν δὴ ἐλεγον, ὑπάρχει
τούτῳ τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ, καν πάνυ εὐφυης ἢ, ἀνάνδρῳ
γενέσθαι φεύγοντι τὰ μέσα τῆς πόλεως καὶ τὰς
ἀγοράς, ἐν αἷς ἔφη ὁ ποιητὴς τοὺς ἀνδρας ἀρι-
πρεπεῖς γίγνεσθαι, καταδεδυκότι δὲ τὸν λοιπὸν

βίον βιῶναι μετὰ μειρακίων ἐν γωνίᾳ τριῶν ἥ
 Ετεττάρων ψιθυρίζοντα, ἐλεύθερον δὲ καὶ μέγα καὶ
 ἴκανὸν μηδέποτε φθέγξασθαι. CAP. XLI. ἐγὼ
 δέ, ὡς Σώκρατες, πρὸς σὲ ἐπιεικῶς ἔχω φιλικῶς.
 κινδυνεύω οὖν πεπονθέναι νῦν ὅπερ ὁ Ζῆθος
 πρὸς τὸν Ἀμφίονα ὁ Εὐριπίδου, οὗπερ ἐμνή-
 σθην. καὶ γὰρ ἐμοὶ τοιαῦτ' ἄττα ἐπέρχεται
 πρὸς σὲ λέγειν, οἵαπερ ἐκεῖνος πρὸς τὸν ἀδελφόν,
 ὅτι ἀμελεῖς, ὡς Σώκρατες, ὃν δεῖ σε ἐπιμελεῖσθαι,
 καὶ φύσιν ψυχῆς ὡδε γενναίαν μειρα-
 κιώδει τινὶ διαπρέπεις μορφώματι, καὶ
 οὕτ' ἂν δίκης βουλαῖσι προθεῖ· ἂν δρθῶς
 λόγον, οὕτ' εἰκὸς ἂν καὶ πιθανὸν λάβοις,
 οὕθ' ὑπὲρ ἄλλου νεανικὸν βούλευμα
 βουλεύσαιο. καίτοι, ὡς φίλε Σώκρατες — καί
 μοι μηδὲν ἀχθεσθῆς· εὐνοίᾳ γὰρ ἐρῶ τῇ σῇ —
 οὐκ αἰσχρὸν δοκεῖ σοι εἶναι οὗτος ἔχειν, ὡς ἐγὼ
 σὲ οἶμαι ἔχειν καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους τοὺς πόρῳ ἀεὶ¹
 φιλοσοφίας ἐλαύνοντας; νῦν γὰρ εἴ τις σοῦ λα-
 βόμενος ἥ ἄλλου ὅτουοῦν τῶν τοιούτων εἰς τὸ
 δεσμωτήριον ἀπαγάγοι, φάσκων ἀδικεῖν μηδὲν
 Β ἀδικοῦντα, οἷσθ' ὅτι οὐκ ἂν ἔχοις ὁ τι χρήσαιο
 σαντῷ, ἀλλ' ἵλιγγιώης ἂν καὶ χασμῷ οὐκ ἔχων ὃ
 τι εἴποις, καὶ εἰς τὸ δικαστήριον ἀναβάς, κατη-
 γόρου τυχὸν πάνυ φαύλου καὶ μοχθηροῦ, ἀπο-
 θάνοις ἄν, εἰ βούλοιτο θανάτον σοι τιμᾶσθαι.
 καίτοι πῶς σοφὸν τοῦτό ἐστιν, ὡς Σώκρατες, εἴ τις
 εὐφυῖα λαβοῦσα τέχνη φῶτα ἔθηκε χεί-
 ρονα, μήτε αὐτὸν αὐτῷ δυνάμενον βοηθεῖν μηδ'
 ἐκσῶσαι ἐκ τῶν μεγίστων κινδύνων μήτε ἔαυτὸν

μήτε ἄλλον μηδένα, ὑπὸ δὲ τῶν ἐχθρῶν περισυλᾶ· σθαι πᾶσαν τὴν οὐσίαν, ἀτεχνῶς δὲ ἀτιμον ζῆν ἐν τῇ πόλει; τὸν δὲ τοιοῦτον, εἴ τι καὶ ἀγροικότερον εἰρῆσθαι, ἔξεστιν ἐπὶ κόρδης τύπτοντα μὴ διδόναι δίκην. ἀλλ’ ὁ γαθέ, ἐμοὶ πείθου, παῦσαι δ’ ἐλέγχων, πραγμάτων δ’ εὑμουσίαν ἀσκεῖ, καὶ ἀσκει ὅπόθεν δόξεις φρονεῖν, ἄλλοις τὰ κομψὰ ταῦτ’ ἀφείς, εἴτε ληρήματα χρὴ φάναι εἶναι εἴτε φλυαρίας, ἐξ ὧν κενοῖσιν ἐγκατοικήσεις δόμοις· ζηλῶν οὐκ ἐλέγχοντας ἄνδρας τὰ μικρὰ ταῦτα, ἀλλ’ οἷς ἐστι καὶ βίος καὶ δόξα καὶ ἄλλα πολλὰ ἀγαθά.

CAP. XLII. ΣΩ. Εἰ χρυσῆν ἔχων ἐτύγχανον τὴν ψυχήν, ὁ Καλλίκλεις, οὐκ ἄν οἵει με ἀσμενον εὑρεῖν τούτων τινὰ τῶν λίθων, ἢ βασανίζουσι τὸν χρυσόν, τὴν ἀρίστην, πρὸς ἥντινα ἔμελλον προσαγαγὼν αὐτήν, εἴ μοι ὅμολογήσειεν ἔκείνη καλῶς τεθεραπεῦσθαι τὴν ψυχήν, εὖ εἰσεσθαι, ὅτι ἴκανῶς ἔχω καὶ οὐδέν μοι δεῖ ἄλλης Εβασάνου; **ΚΑΛ.** Πρὸς τί δὴ τοῦτ’ ἐρωτᾶς, ὁ Σώκρατες; **ΣΩ.** Ἐγώ σοι ἐρῶ νῦν. οἷμαι ἔγὼ σοὶ ἐντετυχηκὼς τοιούτῳ ἐρμαίφ ἐντετυχηκέναι. **ΚΑΛ.** Τί δή; **ΣΩ.** Εὖ οἶδ’, ὅτι, ἀν μοι σὺ ὅμολογῆσῃς περὶ ὃν ἡ ἐμὴ ψυχὴ δοξάζει, ταῦτ’ ἡδη ἐστὶν αὐτὰ τάληθῆ. ἐννοῶ γὰρ, ὅτι⁴⁸⁷ τὸν μέλλοντα βασανεῖν ἴκανῶς ψυχῆς πέρι ὁρθῶς τε ζώσης καὶ μὴ τρία ἄρα δεῖ ἔχειν, ἀ σὺ πάντα ἔχεις, ἐπιστήμην τε καὶ εὔνοιαν καὶ παρόησίαν. ἔγὼ γὰρ πολλοῖς ἐντυγχάνω, οἱ

ἔμει οὐχ οἶοί τε εἰσὶ βασανίζειν διὰ τὸ μὴ σοφοὶ
εἶναι ὥσπερ σύ· ἔτεροι δὲ σοφοὶ μέν εἰσιν, οὐκ
ἔθέλουσι δέ μοι λέγειν τὴν ἀλήθειαν διὰ τὸ μὴ
κῆδεσθαι μονῶσπερ σύ· τὰ δὲ ξένω τώδε, Γορ-
γίας τε καὶ Πῶλος, σοφῷ μὲν καὶ φίλῳ ἐστὸν
ἔμω, ἐνδεεστέρῳ δὲ παρόησίας καὶ αἰσχυντηρο-
τέρῳ μᾶλλον τοῦ δέοντος· πῶς γάρ οὖ; ὡς γε εἰς
τοσοῦτον αἰσχύνης ἐληλύθατον, ὥστε διὰ τὸ αἰ-
σχύνεσθαι τολμᾶ ἐκάτερος αὐτῶν αὐτὸς αὐτῷ
ἐναντία λέγειν ἐναντίον πολλῶν ἀνθρώπων, καὶ
ταῦτα περὶ τῶν μεγίστων. σὺ δὲ ταῦτα πάντα
ἔχεις, ἢ οἱ ἄλλοι οὐκ ᔁχουσι· πεπαίδευσάι τε γάρ
ἴκανῶς, ὡς πολλοὶ ἀν φήσαιεν Ἀθηναίων, καὶ
ἔμοι γ' εἶ εὔνους. τίνι τεκμηρίῳ χρῶμαι; ἐγώ
σοι ἐρῶ. οἶδα ὑμᾶς ἐγώ, ὃ Καλλίκλεις, τέτταρας
ὅντας, κοινωνοὺς γεγονότας σοφίας, σέ τε καὶ
Τίσανδρον, τὸν Ἀφιδναῖον, καὶ Ἀνδρωνα, τὸν
Ἀνδροτίωνος, καὶ Ναυσικύδην, τὸν Χολαργέα.
καί ποτε ὑμῶν ἐγὼ ἐπήκουσα βούλευομένων μέ-
χρι ὅποι τὴν σοφίαν ἀσκητέον εἴη, καὶ οἶδα, ὅτι
ἐνίκα ἐν ὑμῖν τοιάδε τις δόξα, μὴ προθυμεῖσθαι
εἰς τὴν ἀκρίβειαν φιλοσοφεῖν, ἀλλὰ εὐλαβεῖσθαι
παρεκελεύεσθε ἀλλήλοις, ὅπως μὴ πέρα τοῦ δέ-
οντος σοφώτεροι γενόμενοι λήσετε διαφθαρέντες.
ἐπειδὴ οὖν σου ἀκούω ταῦτα ἔμοὶ συμβουλεύ-
οντος, ἀπερ τοῖς σεαυτοῦ ἐταιροτάτοις, ίκανόν
μοι τεκμήριόν ἔστιν, ὅτι ὡς ἀληθῶς μοι εὔνους εἶ.
καὶ μὴν, ὅτι γε οἷος παρόησιάζεσθαι καὶ μὴ αἰ-
σχύνεσθαι, αὐτός τε φῆς καὶ ὁ λόγος, δην ὀλίγον
πρότερον ἔλεγες, ὁμολογεῖ σοι. ᔁχει δὴ οἵτωσὶ

δῆλον ὅτι τούτων πέρι νυνί· ἐάν τι σὺ ἐν τοῖς Ελόγοις ὁμολογήσῃς μοι, βεβασανισμένον τοῦτον ἥδη ἔσται ἵκανῶς ὑπ' ἐμοῦ τε καὶ σοῦ, καὶ οὐκέτι αὐτὸν δεήσει ἐπ' ἄλλην βάσανον ἀναφέρειν. οὐ γάρ ἂν ποτε αὐτὸν συνεχώρησας σὺ οὔτε σοφίας ἐνδείᾳ οὔτε αἰσχύνῃς περιουσίᾳ· οὐδὲν' αὖτῶν ἐμὲ συγχωρήσαις ἂν· φίλος γάρ μοι εἶ, ὡς καὶ αὐτὸς φῆς. τῷ δὲ οὗν ή ἐμὴ καὶ σὴ ὁμολογία τέλος ἥδη ἔξει τῆς ἀληθείας. πάντων δὲ καλλίστη ἔστιν ἡ σκέψις, ὡς Καλλίκλεις, περὶ τούτων ἂν σὺ δή μοι ἐπειμησας, ποιὸν τίνα χρὴ εἶναι τὸν ἄνδρα καὶ τί ἐπιτηδεύειν καὶ μέχρι τοῦ, 488 καὶ πρεσβύτερον καὶ νεώτερον ὄντα. ἐγὼ γάρ εἴ τι μὴ ὁρθῶς πράττω κατὰ τὸν βίον τὸν ἐμαυτοῦ, εὐδίσθι τοῦτο ὅτι οὐχ ἵκανων ἔξαμαρτάνω, ἀλλ' ἀμαθίᾳ τῇ ἐμῇ. σὺ οὖν, ὥσπερ ἥρξω νουθετεῖν με, μὴ ἀποστῆς, ἀλλ' ἵκανῶς μοι ἐνδειχαι τί ἔστι τοῦτο, ὃ ἐπιτηδευτέον μοι, καὶ τίνα τρόπον κτησαίμην ἂν αὐτό. καὶ ἐάν με λάβῃς νῦν μέν σοι ὁμολογήσαντα, ἐν δὲ τῷ ὑστέρῳ χρόνῳ μὴ ταῦτα πράττοντα, ἀπεριώμολόγησα, πάνυ με ἥγοῦ βλάπτα εἶναι καὶ μηκέτι ποτέ με νουθετήσῃς ὑστερον, ^B ὡς μηδενὸς ἄξιον ὄντα. ἔξ αρχῆς δέ μοι ἐπανάλαβε, πῶς φῆς τὸ δίκαιον ἔχειν καὶ σὺ καὶ Πίνδαρος τὸ κατὰ φύσιν; ἀγειν βίᾳ τὸν κρείττω τὰ τῶν ἡττόνων καὶ ἀρχειν τὸν βελτίω τῶν χειρόνων καὶ πλέον ἔχειν τὸν ἀμείνω τοῦ φαυλοτέρου; μή τι ἄλλο λέγεις τὸ δίκαιον εἶναι, ἢ ὁρθῶς μεμνημαι;

CAP. XLIII. ΚΑΛ. Ἀλλὰ ταῦτα ἔλεγον

καὶ τότε, καὶ νῦν λέγω. ΣΩ. Πότερον δὲ τὸν
 αὐτὸν βελτίω καλεῖς σὺ καὶ κρείττῳ; οὐδὲ γάρ
 τοι τότε οἶστος τ' ἢ μαθεῖν σου τί ποτε λέγεις.
 πότερον τοὺς ἴσχυροτέρους κρείττους καλεῖς καὶ
 δεῖ ἀκροᾶσθαι τοῦ ἴσχυροτέρου τοὺς ἀσθενεστέ-
 ρους, οἷόν μοι δοκεῖς καὶ τότε ἐνδείκνυσθαι, ὡς αἱ
 μεγάλαι πόλεις ἐπὶ τὰς σμικρὰς κατὰ τὸ φύσει
 δίκαιον ἔρχονται, ὅτι κρείττους εἰσὶ καὶ ἴσχυρό-
 τεραι, ὡς τὸ κρείττον καὶ ἴσχυρότερον καὶ βέλτιον
 ταῦτὸν ὅν, ἢ ἔστι βελτίω μὲν εἶναι, ἥττῳ δὲ καὶ
 ἀσθενέστερον, καὶ κρείττῳ μὲν εἶναι, μοχθηρότε-
 ρον δέ. ἢ ὁ αὐτὸς ὄφος ἔστι τοῦ βελτίονος καὶ
 τοῦ κρείττονος; τοῦτο μοι αὐτὸν σαφῶς διόρισον,
 ταῦτὸν, ἢ ἔτερόν ἔστι τὸ κρείττον καὶ τὸ βέλτιον
 καὶ τὸ ἴσχυρότερον; ΚΑΛ. Ἀλλ' ἐγώ σοι σα-
 φῶς λέγω, ὅτι ταῦτόν ἔστιν. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν οἱ
 πολλοὶ τοῦ ἐνὸς κρείττους εἰσὶ κατὰ φύσιν; οἱ
 δὴ καὶ τοὺς νόμους τίθενται ἐπὶ τῷ ἐνί, ὥσπερ καὶ
 σὺ ἀρτι ἔλεγες. ΚΑΛ. Πῶς γὰρ οὖ; ΣΩ.
 Τὰ τῶν πολλῶν ἀρα νόμιμα τὰ τῶν κρείττονων
 Εἶστι. ΚΑΛ. Πάνυ γε. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τὰ τῶν
 βελτιόνων; οἱ γὰρ κρείττους βελτίους πολὺ⁴⁸⁹
 κατὰ τὸν σὸν λόγον. ΚΑΛ. Ναί. ΣΩ. Οὐ-
 κοῦν τὰ τούτων νόμιμα κατὰ φύσιν καλά, κρείττο-
 νων γε ὄντων; ΚΑΛ. Φημί. ΣΩ. Ἄρος οὖν
 οἱ πολλοὶ νομίζουσιν οὗτως, ὡς ἀρτι αὖ σὺ ἔλεγες,
 δίκαιον εἶναι τὸ ἵσον ἔχειν καὶ αἰσχιον τὸ ἀδικεῖν
 τοῦ ἀδικεῖσθαι; ἔστι ταῦτα, ἢ οὖ; καὶ ὅπως μὴ
 ἀλώσει ἐνταῦθα σὺ αἰσχυνόμενος. νομίζουσιν, ἢ
 οὖ, οἱ πολλοὶ τὸ ἵσον ἔχειν ἀλλ' οὐ τὸ πλέον

δίκαιον εἶναι, καὶ αἰσχιον τὸ ἀδικεῖν τοῦ ἀδικεῖσθαι; Μὴ φθόνει μοι ἀποκρίνασθαι τοῦτο, Καλλίκλεις, ἦν, ἐάν μοι διμολογήσῃς, βεβαιώσω μαὶ ἡδη παρὰ σου, ἀτε ἴκανοῦ ἀνδρὸς διαγνῶναι ὁμολογηκότος. ΚΑΛ. Ἀλλ' οἱ γε πολλοὶ νομίζουσιν οὕτως. ΣΩ. Οὐ νόμῳ ἄρα μόνον ἐστὶν αἰσχιον τὸ ἀδικεῖν τοῦ ἀδικεῖσθαι, οὐδὲ δίκαιον τὸ ἵσον ἔχειν, ἀλλὰ καὶ φύσει· ὥστε κυνδυνεύεις Β οὐκ ἀληθῆ λέγειν ἐν τοῖς πρόσοθεν οὐδὲ ὄρθως ἐμοῦ κατηγορεῖν λέγων ὅτι ἐναντίον ἐστὶν ὁ νόμος καὶ ἡ φύσις, ἢ δὴ καὶ ἐγὼ γνοὺς κακονοργῶ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις, ἐάν μέν τις κατὰ φύσιν λέγῃ, ἐπὶ τὸν νόμον ἄγων, ἐάν δέ τις κατὰ τὸν νόμον, ἐπὶ τὴν φύσιν.

CAP. XLIV. ΚΑΛ. Οὗτοσὶ ἀνὴρ οὐ παύσεται φλυαρῶν. Εἰπέ μοι, ὃ Σώκρατες, οὐκ αἰσχύνει, τηλικοῦτος ὁν, ὀνόματα θηρεύων, καὶ ἐάν τις φήματι ἀμάρτη, ἔρμαιον τοῦτο ποιούμενος; Σ ἐμὲ γάρ οἴει ἄλλο τι λέγειν τὸ κρείττον εἶναι ἢ τὸ βελτίους; οὐ πάλαι σοι λέγω, ὅτι ταῦτα φημι εἶναι τὸ βέλτιον καὶ τὸ κρείττον; ἢ οἴει με λέγειν, ἐάν συρφετὸς συλλεγῇ δούλων καὶ παντοδαπῶν ἀνθρώπων μηδενὸς ὀξίων πλὴν ἵσως τῷ σώματι ἰσχυρίσασθαι, καὶ οὗτοι φῶσιν, αὐτὰ ταῦτα εἶναι νόμιμα; ΣΩ. Εἰεν, ὃ σοφώτατε Καλλίκλεις· οὕτω λέγεις; ΚΑΛ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν. ΣΩ. Ἀλλ' ἐγὼ μέν, ὃ δαιμόνιε, καὶ αὐτὸς πάλαι τοπάξω τοιοῦτόν τι σε λέγειν τὸ κρείττον, καὶ ἀνερωτῶ γλιχόμενος σαφῶς εἰδέναι ὃ τι λέγεις. οὐ γάρ δήπου σύ γε τοὺς δύο βελτίους ἡγεῖ τοῦ

ένός, οὐδὲ τοὺς σοὺς δούλους βελτίους σοῦ, ὅτι
ἰσχυρότεροί εἰσιν ἢ σύ. ἀλλὰ πάλιν ἐξ ἀρχῆς
εἰπέ, τί ποτε λέγεις τοὺς βελτίους, ἐπειδὴ οὐ τοὺς
ἰσχυροτέρους; καὶ, ὡς θαυμάσιε, πραότερον με
Ἐπροδίδασκε, ἵνα μὴ ἀποφοιτήσω παρὰ σοῦ.

ΚΑΛ. Εἰρωνεύει, ὡς Σώκρατες. **ΣΩ.** Οὐ μὰ
τὸν Ζῆθον, ὡς Καλλίκλεις, φῶ σὺ χρώμενος πολλὰ
νῦν δὴ εἰρωνεύοντος πρός με. ἀλλ’ ἵθι εἰπέ, τίνας
λέγεις τοὺς βελτίους εἶναι; **ΚΑΛ.** Τοὺς ἀμεί-
νους ἔγωγε. **ΣΩ.** Ὁρᾶς ἄρα, ὅτι σὺ αὐτὸς ὀνό-
ματα λέγεις, δηλοῖς δὲ οὐδέν. οὐκ ἔρεις τοὺς
βελτίους καὶ κρείττους πότερον τοὺς φρονιμωτέ-
ρους λέγεις, ἢ ἄλλους τινάς; **ΚΑΛ.** Ἀλλὰ ναὶ
μὰ Δία τούτους λέγω, καὶ σφόδρα γε. **ΣΩ.**

Πολλάκις ἄρα εἴς φρονῶν μυρίων μὴ φρονούν-
των κρείττων ἔστι κατὰ τὸν σὸν λόγον, καὶ τοῦ-
τον ἀρχειν δεῖ, τοὺς δ’ ἀρχεσθαι, καὶ πλέον ἔχειν
τὸν ἀρχοντα τῶν ἀρχομένων. τοῦτο γάρ μοι
δοκεῖς βούλεσθαι λέγειν — καὶ οὐ δῆματα θη-
ρεύω —, εἰ ὁ εἴς τῶν μυρίων κρείττων. **ΚΑΛ.**
Ἀλλὰ ταῦτ’ ἔστιν ἀλέγω. τοῦτο γὰρ οἴμαι
ἔγὼ τὸ δίκαιον εἶναι φύσει, τὸ βελτίω ὄντα καὶ
φρονιμώτερον καὶ ἀρχειν καὶ πλέον ἔχειν τῶν
φαυλοτέρων.

B CAP. XLV. **ΣΩ.** Ἐχε δὴ αὐτοῦ. τί ποτε
αὖ νῦν λέγεις; ἐὰν ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ὅμεν, ὥσπερ νῦν,
πολλοὶ ἀθρόοι ἀνθρώποι, καὶ ἡμῖν ἢ ἐν κοινῷ
πολλὰ σιτία καὶ ποτά, ὅμεν δὲ παντοδαποί, οἱ
μὲν ἰσχυροί, οἱ δὲ ἀσθενεῖς, εἴς δὲ ἡμῶν ἢ φρονι-
μώτερος περὶ ταῦτα ἴατρὸς ὃν, ἢ δέ, οἶον εἶκός,

τῶν μὲν ἴσχυρότερος, τῶν δὲ ἀσθενέστερος, ἄλλο τι
ἢ οὗτος φρονιμώτερος ἡμῶν ὥν βελτίων καὶ κρεί-
των ἔσται εἰς ταῦτα; *ΚΑΛ.* Πάνυ γε. *ΣΩ.*
"Η οὖν τούτων τῶν σιτίων πλέον ἡμῶν ἔκτεον C
αὐτῷ, ὅτι βελτίων ἔστιν, ἢ τῷ μὲν ἄρχειν πάντα
ἔκεινον δεῖ νέμειν, ἐν δὲ τῷ ἀναλίσκειν τε αὐτὰ
καὶ καταχρῆσθαι εἰς τὸ ἔαυτοῦ σῶμα οὐ πλεο-
νεκτητέον, εἰ μὴ μέλλει ζημιοῦσθαι, ἀλλὰ τῶν μὲν
πλέον, τῶν δ' ἔλαττον ἔκτεον. ἐὰν δὲ τύχῃ πάν-
των ἀσθενέστατος ὥν, πάντων ἐλάχιστον τῷ βελτί-
στῳ, ὃ *Καλλίκλεις*; οὐχ οὕτως, ὃ *'γαθέ*; *ΚΑΛ.*
Περὶ σιτία λέγεις καὶ ποτὰ καὶ ιατροὺς καὶ φλυ-
αρίας. ἐγὼ δὲ οὐ ταῦτα λέγω. *ΣΩ.* Πότερον D
οὖν τὸν φρονιμώτερον βελτίω λέγεις; *Φάθι* ἢ
μή. *ΚΑΛ.* *'Εγωγε.* *ΣΩ.* Ἀλλ' οὐ τὸν βελτίω
πλέον δεῖν ἔχειν; *ΚΑΛ.* Οὐ σιτίων γε οὐδὲ
ποτῶν. *ΣΩ.* Μανθάνω, ἀλλ' ἵσως ἴματίων, καὶ
δεῖ τὸν ὑφαντικώτατον μέγιστον ἴμάτιον ἔχειν
καὶ πλεῖστα καὶ κάλλιστα ἀμπεχόμενον περιέ-
ναι. *ΚΑΛ.* Ποίων ἴματίων; *ΣΩ.* Ἀλλ' εἰς
ὑποδήματα δῆλον ὅτι δεῖ πλεονεκτεῖν τὸν φρονι-
μώτερον εἰς ταῦτα καὶ βέλτιστον. τὸν σκυτοτό-E
μον *ἵσως* μέγιστα δεῖ ὑποδήματα καὶ πλεῖστα
ὑποδεδεμένον περιπατεῖν. *ΚΑΛ.* Ποῖα ὑποδή-
ματα φλυαρεῖς ἔχων; *ΣΩ.* Ἀλλ' εἰ μὴ τὰ
τοιαῦτα λέγεις, *ἵσως* τὰ τοιάδε. οἷον γεωργικὸν
ἄνδρα περὶ γῆν φρόνιμόν τε καὶ καλὸν καὶ ἀγα-
θόν, τοῦτον δὴ *ἵσως* δεῖ πλεονεκτεῖν τῶν σπερ-
μάτων καὶ ὡς πλείστῳ σπέρματι χρῆσθαι εἰς τὴν
αὐτοῦ γῆν. *ΚΑΛ.* Ως ἀεὶ ταῦτα λέγεις, ὃ

Σώκρατες. ΣΩ. Οὐ μόνον γε, ὡς Καλλίκλεις,
αὐτὸς ἀλλὰ καὶ περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν. ΚΑΛ. Νὴ τοὺς
θεούς, ἀτεχνῶς γε ἀεὶ σκυτέας τε καὶ κναφέας
καὶ μαγείρους λέγων καὶ ἴατροὺς οὐδὲν παύει,
ὡς περὶ τούτων ἡμῖν ὅντα τὸν λόγον. ΣΩ.
Οὐκοῦν σὺ ἐρεῖς περὶ τίνων ὁ κρείττων τε καὶ
φρονιμώτερος πλέον ἔχων δικαίως πλεονεκτεῖ;
ἢ οὕτε ἐμοῦ ὑποβάλλοντος ἀνέξει οὗτ' αὐτὸς
ἐρεῖς; ΚΑΛ. Ἄλλ' ἔγωγε καὶ πάλαι λέγω.
πρῶτον μὲν τοὺς κρείττους οἶ εἰσιν, οὐ σκυτοτό-
B μους λέγω οὐδὲ μαγείρους, ἀλλ' οἴ ἂν εἰς τὰ
τῆς πόλεως πράγματα φρόνιμοι ὢσιν, ὅντινα ἂν
τρόπον εὖ οἰκοῦτο, καὶ μὴ μόνον φρόνιμοι, ἀλ-
λὰ καὶ ἀνδρεῖοι, ἵκανοὶ ὅντες ἀ ἂν νοήσωσιν
ἐπιτελεῖν, καὶ μὴ ἀποκάμνωσι διὰ μαλακίαν
ψυχῆς.

CAP. XLVI. ΣΩ. Ορᾶς, ὡς βέλτιστε Καλ-
λίκλεις, ὡς οὐ ταῦτα σύ τ' ἐμοῦ κατηγορεῖς καὶ
ἔγὼ σοῦ; σὺ μὲν γὰρ ἐμὲ φῆς ἀεὶ ταῦτα λέγειν,
καὶ μέμφει μοι· ἔγὼ δε σοῦ τούναντίον, ὅτι οὐ-
C δέποτε ταῦτα λέγεις περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν, ἀλλὰ τοτὲ
μὲν τοὺς βελτίους τε καὶ κρείττους τοὺς ἴσχυ-
ροτέρους ὥριζον, αὖθις δὲ τοὺς φρονιμωτέρους,
νῦν δ' αὖ ἔτερόν τι ἥκεις ἔχων· ἀνδρειότεροί τινες
ὑπὸ σοῦ λέγονται οἱ κρείττους καὶ οἱ βελτίους.
ἀλλ' ὡς ὕαθέ, εἰπὼν ἀπαλλάγηθι τίνας ποτὲ λέ-
γεις τοὺς βελτίους τε καὶ κρείττους καὶ εἰς ὁ τι.
ΚΑΛ. Ἄλλ' εἴρηκά γε ἔγωγε τοὺς φρονίμους
τούτους γὰρ προσήκει τῶν πόλεων ἄρχειν, καὶ

τὸ δίκαιον τοῦτ' ἐστί, πλέον ἔχειν τούτους τῶν ἄλλων, τοὺς ἀρχοντας τῶν ἀρχομένων. ΣΩ. Τί δέ; αὐτῶν, ὃ ἔταῖρε; [ἢ τί ἀρχοντας ἢ ἀρχομένους;] ΚΑΛ. Πῶς λέγεις; ΣΩ. Ἐνα ἔκαστον λέγω αὐτὸν ἔαυτοῦ ἀρχοντα. ἢ τοῦτο μὲν οὐδὲν δεῖ, αὐτὸν ἔαυτοῦ ἀρχειν, τῶν δὲ ἄλλων; ΚΑΛ. Πῶς ἔαυτοῦ ἀρχοντα λέγεις; ΣΩ. Οὐδὲν ποικίλον, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ οἱ πολλοί, σώφρονα δύντα καὶ ἐγκρατῆ αὐτὸν ἔαυτοῦ, τῶν ἡδονῶν καὶ ἐπιθυμιῶν ἀρχοντα τῶν ἐν ἔαυτῷ. Ε ΚΑΛ. Ὡς ἡδὺς εἴ! τοὺς ἡλιθίους λέγεις τοὺς σώφρονας. ΣΩ. Πῶς γὰρ οὖ; οὐδεὶς δύτις οὐκ ἄν γνοίη, ὅτι οὗτοι λέγω. ΚΑΛ. Πάνυ γε σφόδρα, ὃ Σώκρατες· ἐπεὶ πῶς ἄν εὐδαίμων γένοιτο ἀνθρωπος δουλεύων διτροῦν; ἀλλὰ τοῦτ' ἐστὶ τὸ κατὰ φύσιν καλὸν καὶ δίκαιον, δὲ ἐγώ σοι νῦν παρόησιαζόμενος λέγω, ὅτι δεῖ τὸν ὁρθῶς βιωσόμενον τὰς μὲν ἐπιθυμίας τὰς ἔαυτοῦ ἐᾶν ὡς μεγίστας εἶναι καὶ μὴ κολάξειν, ταύταις δὲ ὡς μεγίσταις οὕσαις ἴκανὸν εἶναι ὑπηρετεῖν δι'⁴⁹² ἀνδρείαν καὶ φρόνησιν καὶ ἀποπιπλάναι ὃν ἂν ἀεὶ ἡ ἐπιθυμία γίγνηται. ἀλλὰ τοῦτ', οἷμαι, τοῖς πολλοῖς οὐ δυνατόν· ὅθεν ψέγονοι τοὺς τοιούτους δι' αἰσχύνην ἀποκρυπτόμενοι τὴν αὐτῶν ἀδυναμίαν, καὶ αἰσχρὸν δή φασιν εἶναι τὴν ἀκολασίαν· ὅπερ ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν ἐγὼ ἔλεγον, δουλούμενοι τοὺς βελτίους τὴν φύσιν ἀνθρώπους, καὶ αὐτοὶ οὐ δυνάμενοι ἐκπορίζεσθαι ταῖς ἡδοναῖς πλήρωσιν ἐπαινοῦσι τὴν σωφροσύνην ^B καὶ τὴν δικαιοσύνην διὰ τὴν αὐτῶν ἀνανδρίαν.

ἐπεί γε οῖς ἐξ ἀρχῆς ὑπῆρξεν ἡ βασιλέων υἱέσιν εἶναι ἡ αὐτοὺς τῇ φύσει ἵκανοὺς ἐκπορίσασθαι ἀρχήν τινα ἡ τυραννίδα ἡ δυναστείαν, τί τῇ ἀληθείᾳ αἰσχιον καὶ κάκιον εἴη σωφροσύνης [καὶ δικαιοσύνης] τούτοις τοῖς ἀνθρώποις; οῖς ἐξὸν ἀπολαύειν τῶν ἀγαθῶν καὶ μηδενὸς ἐμποδῶν ὄντος, αὐτοὶ ἔαυτοῖς δεσπότην ἐπαγάγοιντο τὸν τῶν πολλῶν ἀνθρώπων νόμον τε καὶ λόγον καὶ ψόγον; ἡ πᾶς οὐκ ἀν ἀθλιοι γεγονότες εἴησαν ὑπὸ τοῦ καλοῦ τοῦ τῆς δικαιοσύνης καὶ τῆς σωφροσύνης, μηδὲν πλέον νέμοντες τοῖς φίλοις τοῖς αὐτῶν ἡ τοῖς ἐχθροῖς, καὶ ταῦτα ἀρχοντες ἐν τῇ ἔαυτῶν πόλει; ἀλλὰ τῇ ἀληθείᾳ, ὡς Σώκρατες, ἦν φῆς σὺ διώκειν, ὥδ' ἔχει· τρυφὴ καὶ ἀκολασία καὶ ἐλευθερία, ἐὰν ἐπικουρίαν ἔχῃ, τοῦτ' ἔστιν ἀρετὴ τε καὶ εὐδαιμονία· τὰ δὲ ἀλλα ταῦτ' ἔστι τὰ καλλωπίσματα, τὰ παρὰ φύσιν συνθήματα, ἀνθρώπων φλυαρία καὶ οὐδενὸς ἄξια.

D CAP. XLVII. ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἀγεννῶς γε, ὡς Καλλίκλεις, ἐπεξέρχει τῷ λόγῳ παρόησιαζόμενος· σαφῶς γὰρ σὺ νῦν λέγεις ἂν οἱ ἄλλοι διανοοῦνται μέν, λέγειν δὲ οὐκ ἐθέλουσι. δέομαι οὖν ἔγώ σου μηδενὶ τρόπῳ ἀνεῖναι, ἵνα τῷ ὄντι κατάδηλον γένηται πᾶς βιωτέον. καί μοι λέγε· τὰς μὲν ἐπιθυμίας φῆς οὐ κολαστέον, εἰ μέλλει τις οἷον δεῖ εἶναι, ἐῶντα δὲ αὐτὰς ὡς μεγίστας πλήρωσιν αὐταῖς ἀμόθεν γέ ποθεν ἐτοιμάζειν, καὶ τοῦτο εἶναι τὴν ἀρετὴν; ΚΑΛ. Φημὶ Ε ταῦτα ἔγώ. ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἄρα ὁρθῶς λέγονται οἱ

μηδενὸς δεόμενοι εὐδαιμονες εἶναι. ΚΑΛ. Οἱ λίθοι γάρ ἀν οὗτω γε καὶ οἱ νεκροὶ εὐδαιμονέστατοι εἶεν. ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ μὲν δὴ καὶ ὡς γε σὺ λέγεις δεινὸς ὁ βίος. οὐ γάρ τοι θαυμάζοιμ' ἄν, εἰ Εὐριπίδης ἀληθῆ ἐν τοῖσδε λέγει, λέγων

τίς δ' οἶδεν, εἰ τὸ ζῆν μέν ἔστι κατθανεῖν,
τὸ κατθανεῖν δὲ ζῆν;

καὶ ἡμεῖς τῷ ὅντι ἵσως τέθναμεν · ὅπερ ἥδη του⁴⁹³ ἔγωγε καὶ ἥκουσα τῶν σοφῶν, ὡς νῦν ἡμεῖς τέθναμεν, καὶ τὸ μὲν σῶμά ἔστιν ἡμῖν σῆμα, τῆς δὲ ψυχῆς τοῦτο, ἐν φῶ ἐπιθυμίαι εἰσί, τυγχάνει ὃν οἶν ἀναπείθεσθαι καὶ μεταπίπτειν ἄνω κάτω, καὶ τοῦτο ἄρα τις μυθολογῶν κομψὸς ἀνήρ, ἵσως Σικελός τις ἢ Ἰταλικός, παράγων τῷ ὀνόματι διὰ τὸ πιθανόν τε καὶ πιστικὸν ὀνόμασε πίθον, τοὺς δὲ ἀνοήτους ἀμυήτους · τῶν δ' ἀμυήτων τοῦτο^B τῆς ψυχῆς, οὗ αἱ ἐπιθυμίαι εἰσί, τὸ ἀκόλαστον αὐτοῦ καὶ οὐ στεγανόν, ὡς τετρημένος εἴη πίθος, διὰ τὴν ἀπληστίαν ἀπεικάσας. τούναντίον δὴ οὗτος σοί, ὡς Καλλίκλεις, ἐνδείκνυται, ὡς τῶν ἐν "Αἰδον — τὸ ἀειδὲς δὴ λέγων — οὗτοι ἀθλιώτατοι ἄν εἶεν οἱ ἀμύήτοι, καὶ φοροῦεν εἰς τὸν τετρημένον πίθον ὑδωρ ἑτέρῳ τοιούτῳ τετρημένῳ κοσκίνῳ · τὸ δὲ κόσκινον ἄρα λέγει, ὡς ἔφη ὁ πρὸς ἐμὲ λέγων, τὴν ψυχὴν εἶναι · τὴν δὲ ψυχὴν κοσκίνῳ ἀπείκασε τὴν τῶν ἀνοήτων ὡς τετρημένην, ἀτε οὐ δυναμένην στέγειν δι' ἀπιστίαν τε καὶ λήθην. ταῦτ' ἐπιεικῶς μέν ἔστιν ὑπό τι ἄτοπα, δηλοῦ μὴν ὁ ἔγω βούλομαί σοι ἐνδειξάμενος, ἐάν πως οὗτος τε ὡς, πεῖσαι μεταθέσθαι, ἀντὶ τοῦ ἀπλῆ-

στως καὶ ἀκολάστως ἔχοντος βίου τὸν κοσμίως
καὶ τοῖς ἀεὶ παροῦσιν ἴκανῶς καὶ ἐξαρκούντως
ἔχοντα βίου ἐλέσθαι. ἀλλὰ πότερον πείθω τί σε
D καὶ μετατίθεσαι εὐδαιμονεστέρους εἶναι τοὺς
κοσμίους τῶν ἀκολάστων, η̄ οὐδέν, ἀλλ' ὃν καὶ
πολλὰ τοιαῦτα μυθολογῶ, οὐδέν τι μᾶλλον μετα-
θήσει; *ΚΑΛ.* Τοῦτ' ἀληθέστερον εἴρηκας, ω̄
Σώκρατες.

CAP. XLVIII. ΣΩ. Φέρε δὴ, ἀλλην σοι εἰ-
κόνα λέγω ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ γυμνασίου τῇ νῦν. σκό-
πει γάρ, εἰ τοιόνδε λέγεις περὶ τοῦ βίου ἐκατέρου
τοῦ τε σώφρονος καὶ τοῦ ἀκολάστου, οἷον εἰ δυ-
εῖν ἀνδροῖν ἐκατέρῳ πίθοι πολλοὶ εἰεν, καὶ τῷ
Ε μὲν ἑτέρῳ ὑγιεῖς καὶ πλήρεις, ὁ μὲν οἶνον, ὁ δὲ
μέλιτος, ὁ δὲ γάλακτος καὶ ἄλλοι πολλοὶ πολλῶν,
νάματα δὲ σπάνια καὶ χαλεπὰ ἐκάστου τούτων
εἴη καὶ μετὰ πολλῶν πόνων καὶ χαλεπῶν ἐκπο-
ριζόμενα· ὁ μὲν οὖν ἑτερος πληρωσάμενος μήτ'
ἐποχετεύοι μήτε τι φροντίζοι, ἀλλ' ἐνεκα τούτων
ἡσυχίαν ἔχοι· τῷ δ' ἑτέρῳ τὰ μὲν νάματα, ω̄σπερ
καὶ ἐκείνῳ, δυνατὰ μὲν πορίζεσθαι, χαλεπὰ δέ,
τὰ δ' ἀγγεῖα τετρημένα καὶ σαθρά, καὶ ἀναγκά-
494 ζοίτο ἀεὶ καὶ νύκτα καὶ ἡμέραν πιμπλάναι αὐτά,
η̄ τὰς ἐσχάτας λυποῦτο λύπας· ἀρα τοιούτου
ἐκατέρῳ ὄντος τοῦ βίου, λέγεις τὸν τοῦ ἀκολά-
στου εὐδαιμονέστερον εἶναι η̄ τὸν τοῦ κοσμίου;
πείθω τί σε ταῦτα λέγων συγχωρῆσαι τὸν κόσμον
βίου τοῦ ἀκολάστου ἀμείνω εἶναι, η̄ οὐ πείθω;
ΚΑΛ. Οὐ πείθεις, ω̄ *Σώκρατες.* τῷ μὲν γάρ
πληρωσαμένῳ ἐκείνῳ οὐκέτ' ἔστιν ἥδονή οὐδεμία,

ἀλλὰ τοῦτ' ἔστιν, ὃ νῦν δὴ ἐγὼ ἔλεγον, τὸ ὕσπερ λίθον ζῆν, ἐπειδὰν πληρώσῃ, μήτε χαίροντα ἔτι βούτη λυπούμενον. ἀλλ' ἐν τούτῳ ἔστι τὸ ἡδέως ζῆν, ἐν τῷ ὡς πλεῖστον ἐπιφρέεν. **ΣΩ.** Οὐκοῦν ἀνάγκη γ', ἂν πολὺ ἐπιφρέη, πολὺ καὶ τὸ ἀπιὸν εἶναι καὶ μεγάλ' ἄττα τὰ τρήματα εἶναι ταῖς ἐκροαῖς; **ΚΑΛ.** Πάντα μὲν οὖν. **ΣΩ.** Χαραδριοῦ τίνα αὖ σὺ βίον λέγεις, ἀλλ' οὐ νεκροῦ οὐδὲ λίθου. καί μοι λέγε, τὸ τοιόνδε λέγεις, οἷον πεινῆν καὶ πεινῶντα ἐσθίειν; **ΚΑΛ.** Ἔγωγε. **ΣΩ.** Καὶ διψῆν γε καὶ διψῶντα πίνειν; **ΚΑΛ.** Σέλεγώ, καὶ τὰς ἄλλας ἐπιθυμίας ἀπάσας ἔχοντα καὶ δυνάμενον πληροῦντα χαίροντα εὐδαιμόνως ζῆν.

ΣΑΡ. XLIX. **ΣΩ.** Εὔγε, ὃ βέλτιστε· διατέλει γὰρ ὕσπερ ἥρξω, καὶ ὅπως μὴ ἀπαισχυννεῖ. δεῖ δέ, ὡς ἔοικε, μηδ' ἐμὲ ἀπαισχυνθῆναι. καὶ πρῶτον μὲν εἰπὲ, εἰ καὶ ψωρῶντα καὶ κνησιῶντα, ἀφθόνως ἔχοντα τοῦ κνῆσθαι, κνώμενον διατελοῦντα τὸν βίον εὐδαιμόνως ἔστι ζῆν. **ΚΑΛ.** Ως ἀτοπος εἰ, ὃ Σώκρατες, καὶ ἀτεχνῶς δημηγόρος. **ΣΩ.** Τοιγάρτοι, ὃ Καλλίκλεις, Πῶλον μὲν καὶ Γοργίαν καὶ ἔξεπληξα καὶ αἰσχύνεσθαι ἐποίησα, σὺ δὲ οὐ μὴ ἐκπλαγῆς οὐδὲ μὴ αἰσχυνθῆς· ἀνδρεῖος γὰρ εἰ. ἀλλ' ἀποκρίνου μόνον. **ΚΑΛ.** Φημὶ τοίνυν καὶ τὸν κνώμενον ἡδέως ἀν βιῶναι. **ΣΩ.** Οὐκοῦν εὕπερ ἡδέως, καὶ εὐδαιμόνως; **ΚΑΛ.** Πάντα γε. **ΣΩ.** Πότερον εἰ τὴν κεφαλὴν μόνον κνησιῶν, η ἔτι τί σε ἐρωτῶ; δρα, ὃ Καλλίκλεις, τί ἀποκρινεῖ, ἐάν τίς σε τὰ ἔχόμενα

τούτοις ἐφεξῆς ἀπαντα ἐρωτᾷ. καί, *τὸ* τούτων τοιούτων ὄντων κεφάλαιον, δ τῶν κιναίδων βίος οὗτος οὐ δεινὸς καὶ αἰσχρὸς καὶ ἀθλιός; ἢ τούτους τολμήσεις λέγειν εὐδαίμονας εἶναι, ἐὰν ἀφθόνως ἔχωσιν ὥν δέονται; *ΚΑΛ.* Οὐκ αἰσχύνει εἰς τοιαῦτα ἀγων, ὃ Σώκρατες, τοὺς λόγους; *ΣΩ.* Ἡ γὰρ ἐγὼ ἀγω ἐνταῦθα, ὃ γενναῖε, ἢ ἐκεῖνος, δις ἀν φῆ ἀνέδην οὗτο τοὺς 495 χαίροντας, ὅπως ἀν χαίρωσιν, εὐδαίμονας εἶναι, καὶ μὴ διορίζηται τῶν ἡδονῶν ὅποιαι ἀγαθαὶ καὶ κακαί; ἀλλ' ἔτι καὶ νῦν λέγε, πότερον φῆσι εἶναι τὸ αὐτὸν ἡδὺ καὶ ἀγαθόν, ἢ εἶναι τι τῶν ἡδέων, διοὐκ ἔστιν ἀγαθόν; *ΚΑΛ.* Ἰνα δὴ μοι μὴ ἀνομολογούμενος ἢ δ λόγος, ἐὰν ἐτερον φήσω εἶναι, τὸ αὐτό φῆμι εἶναι. *ΣΩ.* Διαφθείρεις, ὃ Καλλίκλεις, τοὺς πρώτους λόγους, καὶ οὐκ ἀν ἔτι μετ' ἔμοι ἴκανῶς τὰ ὄντα ἐξετάζοις, εἴπερ παρὰ τὰ δοκοῦντα σαντῷ ἐρεῖς. *ΚΑΛ.* Καὶ γὰρ σύ, ὃ Σώκρατες. *ΣΩ.* Οὐ τοίνυν δρθῶς ποιῶ οὔτ' ἐγώ, εἴπερ ποιῶ τοῦτο, οὔτε σύ. ἀλλ', ὃ μακάριε, ἀθρει μὴ οὐ τοῦτο ἢ τὸ ἀγαθόν, τὸ πάντως χαίρειν· ταῦτά τε γὰρ τὰ νῦν δὴ αἰνιχθέντα πολλὰ καὶ αἰσχρὰ φαίνεται συμβαίνοντα, εἰ τοῦτο οὕτως ἔχει, καὶ ἄλλα πολλά. *ΚΑΛ.* Ως σύ γε οἴει, ὃ Σώκρατες. *ΣΩ.* Σὺ δὲ τῷ ὄντι, ὃ Καλλίκλεις, ταῦτα ἴσχυρίζει; *ΚΑΛ.* Ἔγωγε. *C CAP. L.* *ΣΩ.* Ἐπιχειρῶμεν ἀρα τῷ λόγῳ, ὡς σοῦ σπουδάζοντος; *ΚΑΛ.* Πάνυ γε σφόδρα. *ΣΩ.* Ἡθι δὴ μοι, ἐπειδὴ οὗτο δοκεῖ, διελοῦ τάδε. ἐπιστήμην που καλεῖς τι; *ΚΑΛ.* Ἔγωγε.

ΣΩ. Οὐ καὶ ἀνδρείαν νῦν δὴ ἔλεγές τινα εἶναι μετὰ ἐπιστήμης; **ΚΑΛ.** Ἐλεγον γάρ. **ΣΩ.** Ἀλλο τι οὖν ὡς ἔτερον τὴν ἀνδρείαν τῆς ἐπιστήμης δύο ταῦτα ἔλεγες; **ΚΑΛ.** Σφόδρα γε. **ΣΩ.** Τί δέ; ἥδονὴν καὶ ἐπιστήμην ταῦτὸν, η̄^D ἔτερον; **ΚΑΛ.** Ἐτερον δήπου, ω̄ σοφώτατε σύ. **ΣΩ.** Ἡ καὶ ἀνδρείαν ἔτέραν ἥδονῆς; **ΚΑΛ.** Πῶς γὰρ οὐ; **ΣΩ.** Φέρε δὴ ὅπως μεμνησόμεθα ταῦτα, ὅτι Καλλικλῆς ἔφη ὁ Ἀχαρνεὺς ἥδυ μὲν καὶ ἀγαθὸν ταῦτὸν εἶναι, ἐπιστήμην δὲ καὶ ἀνδρείαν καὶ ἀλλήλων καὶ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἔτερον. **ΚΑΛ.** Σωκράτης δέ γε ἥμῖν ὁ Ἀλωπεκῆθεν οὐχ ὁμολογεῖ ταῦτα· η̄ ὁμολογεῖ; **ΣΩ.** Οὐχ ὁμολογεῖ· οἷμαι δέ γε οὐδὲ Καλλικλῆς, ὅταν αὐτὸς αὐτὸν θεάσηται δρθῶς. εἰπὲ γάρ μοι, τοὺς εῦ πράττοντας τοῖς κακῶς πράττουσιν οὐ τούναντίον ἥγει πάθος πεπονθέναι; **ΚΑΛ.** Ἔγωγε. **ΣΩ.** Ἄρος οὖν, εἴπερ ἐναντία ἐστὶ ταῦτα ἀλλήλοις, ἀνάγκη περὶ αὐτῶν ἔχειν ω̄σπερ περὶ ὑγιείας ἔχει καὶ νόσου; οὐ γὰρ ἂμα δήπου ὑγιαίνει τε καὶ νοσεῖ ὁ ἀνθρωπος, οὐδὲ ἂμα ἀπαλλάττεται ὑγιείας τε καὶ νόσου. **ΚΑΛ.** Πῶς λέγεις; **ΣΩ.** Οἶον περὶ δτον βούλει τοῦ σώματος ἀπολαβὼν σκόπει.⁴⁹⁶ νοσεῖ που ἀνθρωπος ὁφθαλμούς, ω̄ ὄνομα ὁφθαλμία; **ΚΑΛ.** Πῶς γὰρ οὐ; **ΣΩ.** Οὐ δήπου καὶ ὑγιαίνει γε ἂμα τοὺς αὐτούς; **ΚΑΛ.** Οὐδὲ δπωστιοῦν. **ΣΩ.** Τί δέ; ὅταν τῆς ὁφθαλμίας ἀπαλλάττηται, ἀρα τότε καὶ τῆς ὑγιείας ἀπαλλάττεται τῶν ὁφθαλμῶν καὶ τελευτῶν ἂμα ἀμφοτέρων ἀπήλλακται; **ΚΑΛ.** Ἡκιστά γε.

Β ΣΩ. Θαυμάσιον γάρ, οἶμαι, καὶ ἄλογον γίγνεται. ἡ γάρ; ΚΑΛ. Σφόδρα γε. ΣΩ. Ἄλλ' ἐν μέρει, οἶμαι, ἔκατερον καὶ λαμβάνει καὶ ἀπολλύει; ΚΑΛ. Φημί. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ίσχὺν καὶ ἀσθένειαν ὥσαντως; ΚΑΛ. Ναί. ΣΩ. Καὶ τάχος καὶ βραδυτῆτα; ΚΑΛ. Πάνυ γε. ΣΩ. Ἡ καὶ τάγαθὰ καὶ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν καὶ τάνατία τούτων, πακά τε καὶ ἀθλιότητα, ἐν μέρει λαμβάνει, καὶ ἐν μέρει ἀπαλλάττεται ἔκατέρουν; ΚΑΛ. Πάντως δήπον. ΣΩ. Εὰν εὖ-
C φωμεν ἄρα ἄττα, ὅν ἄμα τε ἀπαλλάττεται ἀνθρωπος καὶ ἄμα ἔχει, δῆλον ὅτι ταῦτα γε οὐκ ἀν εἴη τό τε ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ ξακόν. ὁμολογοῦμεν ταῦτα; Καὶ εὖ μάλα σκεψάμενος ἀποκρίνουν.
ΚΑΛ. Ἄλλ' ὑπερφυῶς ὡς ὁμολογῶ.

ΣΑΡ. LI. ΣΩ. Ιθι δὴ ἐπὶ τὰ ἔμπροσθεν ὀμολογημένα. τὸ πεινῆν ἔλεγες πότερον ἡδύ, ἡ ἀνιαρὸν εἶναι; αὐτὸ λέγω τὸ πεινῆν. ΚΑΛ. Δ' Ἀνιαρὸν ἔγωγε· τὸ μέντοι πεινῶντα ἐσθίειν ἡδύ. ΣΩ. Μανθάνω· ἀλλ' οὖν τό γε πεινῆν αὐτὸ ἀνιαρόν. ἡ οὐχί; ΚΑΛ. Φημί. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ τὸ διψῆν; ΚΑΛ. Σφόδρα γε. ΣΩ. Πότερον οὖν ἔτι πλείω ἐρωτῶ, ἡ ὁμολογεῖς ἀπασαν ἔνδειαν καὶ ἐπιθυμίαν ἀνιαρὸν εἶναι;
ΚΑΛ. Ομολογῶ, ἀλλὰ μη ἐρώτα. ΣΩ. Εἰεν. διψῶντα δὲ δὴ πίνειν ἄλλο τι ἡ ἡδὺ φῆσ εἶναι;
ΚΑΛ. Ἔγωγε. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τούτου οὖν λέγεις
Ε τὸ μὲν διψῶντα λυπούμενον δήπον ἐστί; ΚΑΛ.
Ναί. ΣΩ. Τὸ δὲ πίνειν πλήρωσίς τε τῆς ἐνδείας καὶ ἡδονή; ΚΑΛ. Ναί. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν

κατὰ τὸ πίνειν χαίρειν λέγεις; ΚΑΛ. Μάλιστα. ΣΩ. Διψῶντά γε; ΚΑΛ. Φημί. ΣΩ. Ανπούμενον; ΚΑΛ. Ναί. ΣΩ. Αἰσθάνει οὖν τὸ συμβαῖνον, ὅτι λυπούμενον χαίρειν λέγεις ἄμα, ὅταν διψῶντα πίνειν λέγῃς; ἢ οὐχ ἄμα τοῦτο γίγνεται κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν τόπον καὶ χρόνον εἴτε ψυχῆς εἴτε σώματος βούλει; οὐδὲν γάρ, οἶμαι, διαφέρει. ἔστι ταῦτα, ἢ οὐ; ΚΑΛ. "Εστιν. ΣΩ. Ἄλλὰ μὴν εῦ γε πράττοντα κακῶς πράττειν ἄμα ἀδύνατον ἔφης εἶναι. ΚΑΛ. Φημὶ γάρ. ΣΩ. Ἀνιώμενον δέ γε χαίρειν δυ-497 νατὸν ὠμολόγηκας. ΚΑΛ. Φαίνεται. ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἄρα τὸ χαίρειν ἐστὶν εῦ πράττειν οὐδὲ τὸ ἀνιᾶσθαι κακῶς, ὥστε ἔτερον γίγνεται τὸ ἡδὺ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ. ΚΑΛ. Οὐκ οἶδ' ἀττα σοφίζει, ὃ Σώκρατες. ΣΩ. Οἶσθα, Ἄλλὰ ἀκκίζει, ὃ Καλλίκλεις. καὶ προϊθί γε ἔτι εἰς τοῦμπροσθεν, ὅτι ἔχων ληρεῖς, ἵνα εἰδῆς ὡς σοφὸς ὥν με νουθε- B τεῖς. οὐχ ἄμα διψῶν τε ἔκαστος ἡμῶν πέπαυται καὶ ἄμα ἡδόμενος διὰ τοῦ πίνειν; ΚΑΛ. Οὐκ οἶδα διὰ τοῦ λέγεις. ΓΟΡ. Μηδαμῶς, ὃ Καλλίκλεις, Ἄλλ' ἀποκρίνονται καὶ ἡμῶν ἔνεκα, ἵνα περιανθῶσιν οἱ λόγοι. ΚΑΛ. Ἄλλ' ἀεὶ τοιοῦτος ἐστι Σωκράτης, ὃ Γοργία· σμικρὰ καὶ ὀλίγου ἀξια ἀνερωτᾶ καὶ ἐξελέγχει. ΓΟΡ. Ἄλλὰ τί σοὶ διαφέρει; πάντως οὐ σὴ αὕτη ἡ τιμή, ὃ Καλλίκλεις· Ἄλλ' ὑπόσχες Σωκράτει ἐξελέγξαι ὅπως ἂν βούληται. ΚΑΛ. Ἐρώτα δὴ σὺ τὰ C σμικρά τε καὶ στενὰ ταῦτα, ἐπείπερ Γοργίᾳ δοκεῖ οὕτως.

САР. LII. ΣΩ. *Ενδαιίμων εῖ, ὃ Καλλίκλεις, ὅτι τὰ μεγάλα μεμύησαι πρὶν τὰ σμικρά· ἔγω δ' οὐκ ὄμην θεμιτὸν εἶναι. οὐδεν οὖν ἀπέλιπες, ἀποκρίνον, εἰ οὐχ ἄμα παύεται διψῶν ἔκαστος ἡμῶν καὶ ἡδόμενος.* **ΚΑΛ.** *Φημί.* **ΣΩ.** *Οὐκοῦν καὶ πεινῶν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιθυμιῶν καὶ ἡδονῶν ἄμα παύεται;* **ΚΑΛ.** *"Εστι ταῦτα.* **ΣΩ.** *Οὐκοῦν καὶ τῶν λυπῶν καὶ τῶν ἡδονῶν δάμα παύεται;* **ΚΑΛ.** *Ναί.* **ΣΩ.** *Ἄλλὰ μὴν τῶν ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν οὐχ ἄμα παύεται, ὡς σὺ ὠμολόγεις· νῦν δὲ οὐχ ὁμολογεῖς;* **ΚΑΛ.** *"Ἐγωγε. τί οὖν δή;* **ΣΩ.** *"Οὐ τὰ αὐτὰ γίγνεται, ὃ φίλε, τάγαθὰ τοῖς ἡδεσιν οὐδὲ τὰ κακὰ τοῖς ἀνιαροῖς. τῶν μὲν γὰρ ἄμα παύεται, τῶν δὲ οὐ, ὡς ἐτέρων ὅντων. πῶς οὖν ταῦτα ἀν εἴη τὰ ἡδέα τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς ἢ τὰ ἀνιαρὰ τοῖς κακοῖς;* *"Εὰν δὲ βούλῃ, καὶ τῆδ' ἐπίσκεψαι· οἷμαι γάρ Εσοι οὐδὲ ταῦτη ὁμολογεῖσθαι. ἀθρει δέ· τους ἀγαθοὺς οὐχὶ ἀγαθῶν παρουσίᾳ ἀγαθοὺς καλεῖς, ὥσπερ τους οὓς ἀν κάλλος παρῇ;* **ΚΑΛ.** *"Ἐγωγε.* **ΣΩ.** *Τί δέ; ἀγαθοὺς ἀνδρας καλεῖς τους ἀφρονας καὶ δειλούς; οὐ γὰρ ἄρτι γε, ἀλλὰ τους ἀνδρείους καὶ φρονίμους ἔλεγες. ἢ οὐ τουτους ἀγαθοὺς καλεῖς;* **ΚΑΛ.** *Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.* **ΣΩ.** *Τί δέ; παῦδα ἀνόητον χαίροντα ἡδη εἰδες;* **ΚΑΛ.** *"Ἐγωγε.* **ΣΩ.** *"Ανδρα δὲ οὕπω εἰδες ἀνόητον χαίροντα;* **ΚΑΛ.** *Οἶμαι ἔγωγε. ἀλλὰ τί τοῦτο;* **ΣΩ.** *Οὐδέν· ἀλλ' ἀποκρίνον.* **ΚΑΛ.** *Εἶδον.* **ΣΩ.** *Τί δέ; νοῦν ἔχοντα λυπούμενον καὶ χαίροντα;* **ΚΑΛ.** *Φημί.* **ΣΩ.**

Πότεροι δὲ μᾶλλον χαίρουσι καὶ λυποῦνται, οἱ φρόνιμοι, ἢ οἱ ἄφρονες; **ΚΑΛ.** *Οἶμαι ἔγωγε οὐ πολύ τι διαφέρειν.* **ΣΩ.** *Ἄλλ' ἀρκεῖ καὶ τοῦτο.* ἐν πολέμῳ δὲ ἥδη εἶδες ἀνδρα δειλόν; **ΚΑΛ.** *Πῶς γάρ οὖ;* **ΣΩ.** *Τί οὖν; ἀπιόντων τῶν πολεμίων πότεροί σοι ἐδόκουν μᾶλλον χαίρειν, οἱ δειλοί, ἢ οἱ ἀνδρεῖοι;* **ΚΑΛ.** *Ἀμφότεροι ἔμοιγε μᾶλλον· εἰ δὲ μή, παραπλησίως γε.* **ΣΩ.** *Οὐδὲν διαφέρει.* *χαίρουσι δ' οὖν καὶ οἱ δειλοί;* **ΚΑΛ.** *Σφόδρα γε.* **ΣΩ.** *Καὶ οἱ ἄφρονες, ὡς ἔοικε.* **ΚΑΛ.** *Ναί.* **ΣΩ.** *Προσιόντων δὲ οἱ δειλοὶ μόνον λυποῦνται, ἢ καὶ οἱ ἀνδρεῖοι;* **ΚΑΛ.** *Ἀμφότεροι.* **ΣΩ.** *Ἄρα δύοιντας;* **ΚΑΛ.** *Μᾶλλον ἵστως οἱ δειλοί.* **ΣΩ.** *Ἀπιόντων δ' οὐ μᾶλλον χαίρουσιν;* **ΚΑΛ.** *Ἴστως.* **ΣΩ.** *Οὐκοῦν λυποῦνται μὲν καὶ χαίρουσι καὶ οἱ ἄφρονες καὶ οἱ φρόνιμοι καὶ οἱ δειλοὶ καὶ οἱ ἀνδρεῖοι παραπλησίως, ὡς σὺ φήσ, μᾶλλον δὲ οἱ δειλοὶ τῶν ἀνδρείων;* **ΚΑΛ.** *Φημί.* **ΣΩ.** *Ἄλλὰ μὴν οὖ γε φρόνιμοι καὶ ἀνδρεῖοι ἀγαθοί, οἱ δὲ δειλοὶ καὶ ἄφρονες κακοί;* **ΚΑΛ.** *Ναί.* **ΣΩ.** *Παραπλησίως ἄρα χαίρουσι καὶ λυποῦνται οἱ ἀγαθοὶ καὶ οἱ κακοί;* **ΚΑΛ.** *Φημί.* **ΣΩ.** *Ἄρ' οὖν παραπλησίως εἰσὶν ἀγαθοὶ καὶ κακοὶ οἱ ἀγαθοί τε καὶ οἱ κακοί;* ἢ καὶ ἔτι μᾶλλον ἀγαθοὶ καὶ κακοί εἰσιν οἱ κακοί;

ΣΑΡ. LIII. **ΚΑΛ.** *Ἄλλὰ μὰ Δί' οὐκ οἶδ' δό τι λέγεις.* **ΣΩ.** *Οὐκ οἴσθ', ὅτι τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς ἀγαθῶν φῆς παρουσίᾳ εἶναι ἀγαθούς, κακοὺς δὲ κακῶν; τὰ δὲ ἀγαθὰ εἶναι τὰς ἥδονάς, κακὰ δὲ*

τὰς ἀνίας; *ΚΑΛ.* Ἔγωγε. *ΣΩ.* Οὐκοῦν τοῖς χαίρουσι πάρεστι τάγαθά, αἱ ἥδοναι, εἴπερ χαίρουσι; *ΚΑΛ.* Πῶς γάρ οὐ; *ΣΩ.* Οὐκοῦν ἀγαθῶν παρόντων ἀγαθοί εἰσιν οἱ χαίροντες; *ΚΑΛ.* Ναί. *ΣΩ.* Τί δέ; τοῖς ἀνιώμενοις οὐ πάρεστι τὰ κακά, αἱ λῦπαι; *ΚΑΛ.* Πάρεστι. *ΣΩ.* Κακῶν δέ γε παρουσίᾳ φῆσ σὺ εἶναι κακοὺς τοὺς κακούς. ἢ οὐκέτι φῆσ; *ΚΑΛ.* Ἔγωγε. *ΣΩ.* Ἀγαθοὶ ἄρα οἱ ἀν χαίρωσι, κακοὶ δὲ οἱ ἀν ἀνιώνται; *ΚΑΛ.* Πάνυ γε. *ΣΩ.* Οἱ μέν γε μᾶλλον μᾶλλον, οἱ δ' ἡττον ἡττον, οἱ δὲ παραπλησίως παραπλησίως; *ΚΑΛ.* Ναί. *ΣΩ.* Οὐκοῦν φῆσ παραπλησίως χαίρειν καὶ λυπεῖσθαι τοὺς φρονίμους καὶ τοὺς ἄφρονας καὶ τοὺς δειλοὺς καὶ τοὺς ἀνδρείους, ἢ καὶ μᾶλλον ἔτι τοὺς δειλούς; *ΚΑΛ.* Ἔγωγε. *ΣΩ.* Συλλόγισαι δὴ κοινῇ μετ' ἐμοῦ, τί ἡμῖν συμβαίνει ἐκ τῶν ὀμολογημένων· καὶ δῆς γάρ τοι καὶ τρίς 499 φασι καλὸν εἶναι τὰ καλὰ λέγειν τε καὶ ἐπισκοπεῖσθαι. Ἀγαθὸν μὲν εἶναι τὸν φρόνιμον καὶ ἀνδρεῖόν φαμεν. ἢ γάρ; *ΚΑΛ.* Ναί. *ΣΩ.* Κακὸν δὲ τὸν ἄφρονα καὶ δειλόν; *ΚΑΛ.* Πάνυ γε. *ΣΩ.* Ἀγαθὸν δὲ αὖ τὸν χαίροντα; *ΚΑΛ.* Ναί. *ΣΩ.* Κακὸν δὲ τὸν ἀνιώμενον; *ΚΑΛ.* Ἀνάγκη. *ΣΩ.* Ἀνιᾶσθαι δὲ καὶ χαίρειν τὸν ἀγαθὸν καὶ κακὸν ὁμοίως, ἵσως δὲ καὶ μᾶλλον τὸν κακόν; *ΚΑΛ.* Ναί. *ΣΩ.* Οὐκοῦν ὁμοίως γίγνεται κακὸς καὶ ἀγαθὸς τῷ ἀγαθῷ ἢ καὶ μᾶλλον ἀγαθὸς ὁ κακός; οὐ ταῦτα συμβαίνει, καὶ τὰ πρότερα ἐκεῖνα, ἐάν τις ταῦ-

τὰ φῆ ήδέα τε καὶ ἀγαθὰ εἶναι ; οὐ ταῦτα ἀνάγκη, ὡς Καλλίκλεις ;

CAP. LIV. *ΚΑΛ.* Πάλαι τοί σου ἀκροῶμαι,
ὡς Σώκρατες, καθομολογῶν, ἐνθυμούμενος, ὅτι,
καν παῖςων τίς σοι ἐνδῷ ὄτιοῦν, τούτου ἀσμενος
ἔχει ὥσπερ τὰ μειράκια. ὡς δὴ σὺ οἴει ἐμὲ ἢ
καὶ ἄλλον ὄντινοῦν ἀνθρώπων οὐχ ἡγεῖσθαι τὰς
μὲν βελτίους ἡδονάς, τὰς δὲ χείρους. *ΣΩ.* Ἰού
ἰού, ὡς Καλλίκλεις, ὡς πανοῦργος εἶ, καί μοι
ὥσπερ παιδὶ χρῆ, τοτὲ μὲν αὖ φάσκων οὕτως
ἔχειν, τοτὲ δὲ ἑτέρως, ἔξαπατῶν με. καίτοι οὐκ
φίμην γε κατ' ἀρχὰς ὑπὸ σοῦ ἐκόντος εἶναι ἔξα-
πατηθήσεσθαι, ὡς ὄντος φίλου· νῦν δὲ ἐψεύ-
σθην, καὶ ὡς ἔοικεν, ἀνάγκη μοι κατὰ τὸν παλαιὸν
λόγον τὸ παρὸν εὗ ποιεῖν καὶ τοῦτο δέχεσθαι τὸ
διδόμενον παρὰ σοῦ. ἔστι δὲ δῆ, ὡς ἔοικεν, ὃ
νῦν λέγεις, ὅτι ἡδοναί τινές εἰσιν αἱ μὲν ἀγαθαί,
αἱ δὲ κακαί. ἢ γάρ ; *ΚΑΛ.* Ναί. *ΣΩ.* Ἄρος
οὖν ἀγαθαὶ μὲν αἱ ὠφέλιμοι, κακαὶ δὲ αἱ βλα-
βεραί ; *ΚΑΛ.* Πάνυ γε. *ΣΩ.* Ὡφέλιμοι δέ
γε αἱ ἀγαθόν τι ποιοῦσαι, κακαὶ δὲ αἱ κακόν τι ;
ΚΑΛ. Φημί. *ΣΩ.* Ἄρος οὖν τὰς τοιάσδε λέ-
γεις, οἷον κατὰ τὸ σῶμα ἃς νῦν δὴ ἐλέγομεν ἐν
τῷ ἐσθίειν καὶ πίνειν ἡδονάς· εἰ ἄρα τούτων αἱ
μὲν υγίειαν ποιοῦσιν ἐν τῷ σώματι ἡ ἴσχὺν ἢ
ἄλλην τινὰ ἀρετὴν τοῦ σώματος, αὗται μὲν ἀγα-
θαί, αἱ δὲ τάναντία τούτων κακαί ; *ΚΑΛ.*
Πάνυ γε. *ΣΩ.* Οὐκοῦν καὶ λῦπαι ὠσαύτως αἱ Ε
μὲν χρησταί εἰσιν, αἱ δὲ πονηραί ; *ΚΑΛ.* Πῶς
γάρ οὐ ; *ΣΩ.* Οὐκοῦν τὰς μὲν χρηστὰς καὶ

ἡδονὰς καὶ λύπας καὶ αἰρετέον ἐστὶ καὶ πρακτέον; ΚΑΛ. Πάνυ γε. ΣΩ. Τὰς δὲ πονηρὰς οὐ; ΚΑΛ. Λῆλον δή. ΣΩ. Ἐνεκα γάρ που τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἅπαντα ἡμῖν ἔδοξε πρακτέον εἶναι, εἰ μημονεύεις, ἐμοί τε καὶ Πώλῳ. ἄρα καὶ σοὶ συνδοκεῖ οὕτω, τέλος εἶναι ἀπασῶν τῶν πράξεων τὸ ἀγαθόν, καὶ ἐκείνου ἐνεκεν δεῖν πάντα τὰλλα 500 πράττεσθαι, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐκεῖνο τῶν ἀλλων; σύμψηφος ἡμῖν εἶ καὶ σὺ ἐκ τρίτων; ΚΑΛ. Ἔγωγε. ΣΩ. Τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἄρα ἐνεκα δεῖ καὶ τὰλλα καὶ τὰ ἡδέα πράττειν, ἀλλ' οὐ τάγαθὰ τῶν ἡδέων. ΚΑΛ. Πάνυ γε. ΣΩ. Ἄρος' οὖν παντὸς ἀνδρός ἐστιν ἐκλέξασθαι ποῖα ἀγαθὰ τῶν ἡδέων ἐστὶ καὶ ὅποια κακά, ἢ τεχνικοῦ δεῖ εἰς ἐκαστον; ΚΑΛ. Τεχνικοῦ.

CAP. LV. ΣΩ. Ἀναμνησθῶμεν δὴ ὃν αὐτὸγὼ πρὸς Πῶλον καὶ Γοργίαν ἐτύγχανον λέγων. Βούλεγον γάρ, εἰ μημονεύεις, ὅτι εἶεν παρασκεναὶ αἱ μὲν μέχρι ἡδονῆς, αὐτὸ τοῦτο μόνον παρασκενάζουσαι, ἀγνοοῦσαι δὲ τὸ βέλτιον καὶ τὸ χεῖρον, αἱ δὲ γιγνώσκουσαι ὅ τι τε ἀγαθὸν καὶ ὅ τι κακόν· καὶ ἐτίθην τῶν μὲν περὶ τὰς ἡδονὰς τὴν μαγειρικὴν ἐμπειρίαν, ἀλλ' οὐ τέχνην, τῶν δὲ περὶ τὸ ἀγαθὸν τὴν ἴατρικὴν τέχνην. καὶ πρὸς φιλίουν, ὃ Καλλίκλεις, μήτε αὐτὸς οἷον δεῖν πρὸς ἐμὲ παίζειν μηδέ ὅ τι ἀντίτυχης παρὰ τὰ δοκοῦντα ἀποκρίνουν, μήτ' αὐτὸ τὰ παρόξυμον οὕτως ἀποδέχοντας ὡς παίζοντος. ὅρᾳς γάρ, ὅτι περὶ τούτου εἰσὶν ἡμῖν οἵ λόγοι, οὐ τί ἀντίτυχον σπουδάσειέ τις καὶ σμικρὸν νοῦν ἔχων

ἄνθρωπος, ἢ τοῦτο, ὅντινα χρὴ τρόπον ζῆν πότερον ἐπὶ ὃν σὺ παρακαλεῖς ἐμέ, τὰ τοῦ ἀνδρὸς δὴ ταῦτα πράττοντα, λέγοντά τε ἐν τῷ δήμῳ καὶ ὁγητορικὴν ἀσκοῦντα καὶ πολιτευόμενον τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον, ὃν ὑμεῖς νῦν πολιτεύεσθε, ἢ ἐπὶ τόνδε τὸν βίον τὸν ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ, καὶ τί ποτ' ἔστιν οὗτος ἐκείνου διαφέρων; ἵσως οὖν βέλτιστόν ἔστιν, ὡς ἄρτι ἐγὼ ἐπεχείρησα, διαιρεῖσθαι, διελομένους δὲ ΚΑΛ καὶ ὄμοιογήσαντας ἄλλήλοις, εἰ ἔστι τούτῳ διττῷ τῷ βίῳ, σκέψασθαι τί τε διαφέρετον ἄλλήλοιν καὶ ὄπότερον βιωτέον αὐτοῖν. ἵσως οὖν οὐπώ οἰσθα τί λέγω. **ΚΑΛ.** Οὐ δῆτα. **ΣΩ.** Ἀλλ' ἐγώ σοι σαφέστερον ἐρῶ. ἐπειδὴ ὄμοιογήκαμεν ἐγώ τε καὶ σὺ εἶναι μέν τι ἀγαθόν, εἶναι δέ τι ἥδον, ἔτερον δὲ τὸ ἥδον τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, ἔκατέρουν δὲ αὐτοῖν μελέτην τινὰ εἶναι καὶ παρασκευὴν τῆς κτήσεως, τὴν μὲν τοῦ ἥδεος Θήραν, τὴν δὲ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ — Ε αὐτὸ δέ μοι τοῦτο πρῶτον ἢ σύμφαθι, ἢ μή · σύμφης; **ΚΑΛ.** Οὕτω φημί.

ΣΑΡ. LXI. **ΣΩ.** Ιθι δή, ἀ καὶ πρὸς τούσδε ἐγὼ ἔλεγον διομολόγησάι μοι, εἰ ἄρα σοι ἔδοξα τότε ἀληθῆ λέγειν. ἔλεγον δέ που, δτι ἡ μὲν ὄψοποικὴ οὐ μοι δοκεῖ τέχνη εἶναι, ἀλλ' ἐμπειρία, ἡ⁵⁰¹ δ' ἰατρική, λέγων, δτι ἡ μὲν τούτου οὖ θεραπεύει καὶ τὴν φύσιν ἔσκεπται καὶ τὴν αἰτίαν ὃν πράττει, καὶ λόγον ἔχει τούτων ἐκάστου δοῦναι, ἡ ἰατρική. ἡ δ' ἔτερα τῆς ἥδονῆς, πρὸς ἣν ἡ θεραπεία αὐτῇ ἔστιν ἀπασα, κομιδῇ ἀτέχνως ἐπ' αὐτὴν ἔρχεται, οὔτε τι τὴν φύσιν σκεψαμένη τῆς ἥδονῆς οὔτε τὴν αἰτίαν, ἀλόγως τε παντάπασιν,

ῶς ἔπος εἰπεῖν οὐδὲν διαφιθμησαμένη, τοιβὴ καὶ ἐμπειρία, μνήμην μόνον σωζομένη τοῦ εἰωθότος
 Β γίγνεσθαι, φ δὴ καὶ πορίζεται τὰς ἡδονάς. ταῦτ'
 οὖν πρῶτον σκόπει εἰ δοκεῖ σοι ἴκανῶς λέγεσθαι,
 καὶ εἶναι τινες καὶ περὶ ψυχὴν τοιαῦται ἄλλαι
 πραγματεῖαι, αἱ μὲν τεχνικαί, προμήθειάν τινα
 ἔχουσαι τοῦ βελτίστου περὶ τὴν ψυχὴν, αἱ δὲ
 τούτον μὲν ὀλιγωροῦσαι, ἐσκεμμέναι δ' αὖ, ὥσπερ
 ἔκει, τὴν ἡδονὴν μόνον τῆς ψυχῆς, τίνα ἂν αὐτῇ
 τρόπον γίγνοιτο, ἣτις δὲ ἢ βελτίων ἢ χείρων τῶν
 ἡδονῶν οὔτε σκοπούμεναι, οὔτε μέλον αὐταῖς
 Σ ἄλλο ἢ χαρίζεσθαι μόνον, εἴτε βέλτιον εἴτε χεῖ-
 ρον. ἐμοὶ μὲν γάρ, ὡς Καλλίκλεις, δοκοῦσί τε
 εἶναι, καὶ ἔγωγέ φημι τὸ τοιοῦτον κολακείαν εἶναι
 καὶ περὶ σῶμα καὶ περὶ ψυχὴν καὶ περὶ ἄλλο,
 ὅτου ἂν τις τὴν ἡδονὴν θεραπεύῃ ἀσκέπτως ἔχων
 τοῦ ἀμείνονος τε καὶ τοῦ χείρονος. σὺ δὲ δὴ πό-
 τερον συγκατατίθεσαι ἡμῖν περὶ τούτων τὴν αὐ-
 τὴν δόξαν ἢ ἀντίφης; **ΚΑΛ.** Οὐκ ἔγωγε, ἀλλὰ
 συγχωρῶ, ἵνα σοι καὶ περανθῆ ὁ λόγος καὶ Γορ-
 Δ γίᾳ τῷδε χαρίσωμαι. **ΣΩ.** Πότερον δὲ περὶ μὲν
 μίαν ψυχὴν ἔστι τοῦτο, περὶ δὲ δύο καὶ πολλὰς
 οὐκ ἔστιν; **ΚΑΛ.** Οὐκ, ἀλλὰ καὶ περὶ δύο καὶ
 περὶ πολλάς. **ΣΩ.** Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἀθρόασις ἀμα
 χαρίζεσθαι ἔστι μηδὲν σκοπούμενον τὸ βέλτιστον;
ΚΑΛ. Οἷμαι ἔγωγε.

ΣΑΡ. LVII. **ΣΩ.** Ἔχεις οὖν εἰπεῖν αἵτινές
 εἰσιν αἱ ἐπιτηδεύσεις αἱ τοῦτο ποιοῦσαι; Μᾶλλον
 δέ, εἰ βούλει, ἐμοῦ ἐρωτῶντος, ἢ μὲν ἂν σοι δοκῇ
 τούτων εἶναι, φάθι, ἢ δ' ἂν μή, μη̄ φάθι. πρῶ-

τον δὲ σκεψώμεθα τὴν αὐλητικήν. οὐδοκεῖ σοι Ε
τοιαύτη τις εἶναι, ὡς Καλλίκλεις, τὴν ἡδονὴν ἡμῶν
μόνον διώκειν, ἄλλο δ' οὐδὲν φροντίζειν; **ΚΑΛ.**
”Εμοιγε δοκεῖ. **ΣΩ.** Οὐκοῦν καὶ αἱ τοιαίδε
ἄπασαι, οἷον ἡ κιθαριστικὴ ἡ ἐν τοῖς ἀγῶσι; **ΚΑΛ.** Ναί. **ΣΩ.** Τί δὲ ἡ τῶν χορῶν διδασκα-
λία καὶ ἡ τῶν διθυράμβων ποίησις; οὐ τοιαύτη
τις σοι καταφαίνεται; ἢ ἡγεῖ τι φροντίζειν **Κι-**
νησίαν τὸν **Μέλητος**, ὅπως ἔρει τι τοιοῦτον, ὅθεν
ἄν οἱ ἀκούοντες βελτίους γίγνοιντο, ἢ ὅ τι μέλ-⁵⁰²
λει χαριεῖσθαι τῷ ὄχλῳ τῶν θεατῶν; **ΚΑΛ.**
Δῆλον δὴ τοῦτο γε, ὡς **Σώκρατες**, **Κινησίου** γε
πέρι. **ΣΩ.** Τί δὲ ὁ πατὴρ αὐτοῦ **Μέλης**; ἢ
πρὸς τὸ βέλτιστον βλέπων ἐδόκει σοι κιθαρῳδεῖν;
ἢ ἐκεῖνος μὲν οὐδὲ πρὸς τὸ ἥδιστον; ἥντια γὰρ
ἄδων τοὺς θεατάς. ἄλλὰ δὴ σκόπει· οὐχὶ ἡ τε
κιθαρῳδικὴ δοκεῖ σοι πᾶσα καὶ ἡ τῶν διθυράμβων
ποίησις ἡδονῆς χάριν εὑρῆσθαι; **ΚΑΛ.** ”Εμοι-
γε. **ΣΩ.** Τί δὲ δὴ ἡ σεμνὴ αὕτη καὶ θαυμαστὴ ^Β
ἡ τῆς τραγῳδίας ποίησις ἐφ' ὃ ἐσπούδακε; πότε-
ρον ἐστιν αὐτῆς τὸ ἐπιχείρημα καὶ ἡ σπουδὴ, ὡς
σοὶ δοκεῖ, χαρίζεσθαι τοῖς θεαταῖς μόνον, ἢ καὶ
διαμάχεσθαι, ἐάν τι αὐτοῖς ἡδὺ μὲν ἢ καὶ κε-
χαρισμένον, πονηρὸν δέ, ὅπως τοῦτο μὲν μὴ ἔρει,
εἰ δέ τι τυγχάνει ἀηδὲς καὶ ὠφέλιμον, τοῦτο δὲ
καὶ λέξει καὶ ἄσεται, ἐάν τε χαίρωσιν ἐάν τε μή;
ποτέρως σοι δοκεῖ παρεσκευάσθαι ἡ τῶν τραγῳδι-
ῶν ποίησις; **ΚΑΛ.** Δῆλον δὴ τοῦτο γε, ὡς **Σώ-**
κρατες, ὅτι πρὸς τὴν ἡδονὴν μᾶλλον ὥρμηται καὶ
τὸ χαρίζεσθαι τοῖς θεαταῖς. **ΣΩ.** Οὐκοῦν τὸ

τοιοῦτον, ὃ Καλλίκλεις, ἔφαμεν νῦν δὴ κολα-
κείαν εἶναι; **ΚΑΛ.** Πάνυ γε. **ΣΩ.** Φέρε
δή, εἴ τις περιέλοιπο τῆς ποιήσεως πάσης τό τε
μέλος καὶ τὸν ὁνθμὸν καὶ τὸ μέτρον, ἄλλο τι ἡ
λόγοι γίγνονται τὸ λειπόμενον; **ΚΑΛ.** Ἀνάγ-
κη. **ΣΩ.** Οὐκοῦν πρὸς πολὺν ὄχλον καὶ δῆμον
οὗτοι λέγονται οἱ λόγοι. **ΚΑΛ.** Φημί. **ΣΩ.**
Δημηγορία ἄρα τίς ἐστιν ἡ ποιητική. **ΚΑΛ.**
Φαίνεται. **ΣΩ.** Οὐκοῦν δητορικὴ δημηγορία
ἄν εἴη. ἡ οὖ δητορεύειν δοκοῦσί σοι οἱ ποιηταὶ
ἐν τοῖς θεάτροις; **ΚΑΛ.** Ἐμοιγε. **ΣΩ.** Νῦν
ἄρα ήμεῖς εὑρήκαμεν δητορικήν τινα πρὸς δῆμον
τοιοῦτον, οἷον παίδων τε διοῦ καὶ γυναικῶν καὶ
ἀνδρῶν, καὶ δούλων καὶ ἐλευθέρων, ἣν οὐ πάνυ
ἀγάμεθα· κολακικὴν γὰρ αὐτὴν φαμεν εἶναι.
ΚΑΛ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΑΡ. LVIII. **ΣΩ.** Εἶεν. τί δὲ ἡ πρὸς τὸν
Ἀθηναίων δῆμον δητορικὴ καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους
Ἐτοὺς ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι δήμους τοὺς τῶν ἐλευθέρων
ἀνδρῶν, τί ποτε ήμιν αὐτῇ ἐστί; πότερόν σοι δο-
κοῦσι πρὸς τὸ βέλτιστον ἀεὶ λέγειν οἱ δητορεῖ,
τούτον στοχαζόμενοι, ὅπως οἱ πολῖται ὡς βέλτι-
στοι ἔσονται διὰ τοὺς αὐτῶν λόγους, ἥ καὶ οὗτοι
πρὸς τὸ χαρίζεσθαι τοῖς πολίταις ὡρμημένοι, καὶ
ἔνεκα τοῦ ἴδιου τοῦ αὐτῶν ὀλιγωροῦντες τοῦ κοι-
νοῦ, ὥσπερ παισὶ προσομιλοῦσι τοῖς δήμοις, χαρί-
ζεσθαι αὐτοῖς πειρώμενοι μόνον, εἰ δέ γε βελτίους
ἔσονται ἥ χείρους διὰ ταῦτα, οὐδὲν φροντίζουσιν;
ΚΑΛ. Οὐχ ἀπλοῦν ἔτι τοῦτο ἐρωτᾶς· εἰσὶ μὲν
γὰρ οἱ κηδόμενοι τῶν πολιτῶν λέγουσιν ἢ λέγου-

σιν, εἰσὶ δὲ καὶ οῖους σὺ λέγεις. ΣΩ. Ἐξαρκεῖ.
 εἰ γὰρ καὶ τοῦτό ἐστι διπλοῦν, τὸ μὲν ἔτερόν που
 τούτου κολακεία ἀν εἴη καὶ αἰσχρὰ δημηγορία,
 τὸ δ' ἔτερον καλόν, τὸ παρασκευάζειν, ὅπως ὡς
 βέλτισται ἔσονται τῶν πολιτῶν αἱ ψυχαί, καὶ
 διαμάχεσθαι λέγοντα τὰ βέλτιστα, εἴτε ἥδια εἴτε
 ἀηδέστερα ἔσται τοῖς ἀκούονσιν. ἀλλ' οὐ πώποτε Β
 σὺ ταύτην εἶδες τὴν ὁγητορικήν· ἢ εἴ τινα ἔχεις
 τῶν ὁγητόρων τοιοῦτον εἰπεῖν, τί οὐχὶ καὶ ἐμοὶ
 αὐτὸν ἔφρασας τίς ἐστιν; ΚΑΛ. Ἄλλα μὰ Δι'
 οὐκ ἔχω ἔγωγέ σοι εἰπεῖν τῶν γε νῦν ὁγητόρων οὐ-
 δένα. ΣΩ. Τί δέ; τῶν παλαιῶν ἔχεις τινὰ εἰ-
 πεῖν, δι' ὅντινα αἰτίαν ἔχουσιν Ἀθηναῖοι βελτί-
 ους γεγονέναι, ἐπειδὴ ἐκεῖνος ἥρξατο δημηγορεῖν,
 ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν χρόνῳ χείρους ὄντες; ἔγὼ μὲν γὰρ
 οὐκ οἶδα τίς ἐστιν οὗτος. ΚΑΛ. Τί δέ; Θε- C
 μιστοκλέα οὐκ ἀκούεις ἄνδρα ἀγαθὸν γεγονότα
 καὶ Κίμωνα καὶ Μιλτιάδην καὶ Περικλέα του-
 τονὶ τὸν νεωστὶ τετελευτηκότα, οὗ καὶ σὺ ἀκή-
 πος; ΣΩ. Εἰ ἔστι γε, ὡς Καλλίκλεις, ἦν πρό-
 τερον σὺ ἔλεγες ἀρετήν, ἀληθής, τὸ τὰς ἐπιθυμίας
 ἀποπιπλάναι καὶ τὰς αὐτοῦ καὶ τὰς τῶν ἄλλων·
 εἰ δὲ μὴ τοῦτο, ἀλλ' ὅπερ ἐν τῷ ὑστέρῳ λόγῳ
 ἥναγκάσθημεν ἡμεῖς ὅμολογεῖν, διὶ αὖ μὲν τῶν
 ἐπιθυμιῶν πληρούμεναι βελτίω ποιοῦσι τὸν ἄν- D
 θρωπον, ταύτας μὲν ἀποτελεῖν, αὐτὸν δὲ χείρω, μή·
 τοῦτο δὲ τέχνη τις εἶναι τοιοῦτον ἄνδρα τούτων
 τινὰ γεγονέναι ἔχεις εἰπεῖν; ΚΑΛ. Οὐκ ἔχω
 ἔγωγε πῶς εἴπω.

CAP. LIX. ΣΩ. Ἄλλ' ἐὰν ζητῆς καλῶς,

εύρησεις. ἵδωμεν δὴ οὐτωσὶν ἀτρέμα σκοπού-
μενοι, εἴ τις τούτων τοιοῦτος γέγονε. φέρε γάρ,
Ἐ ὁ ἀγαθὸς ἀνὴρ καὶ ἐπὶ τὸ βέλτιστον λέγων ἂν ἀν
λέγῃ ἄλλο τι οὐκ εἰκῇ ἔρει, ἄλλ' ἀποβλέπων πρός
τι; ὥσπερ καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι πάντες δημιουργοὶ βλέ-
ποντες πρὸς τὸ αὐτῶν ἔργον ἔκαστος οὐκ εἰκῇ
ἐκλεγόμενος προσφέρει ἢ προσφέρει πρὸς τὸ ἔργον
τὸ αὐτοῦ, ἄλλ' ὅπως ἀν εἶδός τι αὐτῷ σχῆ τοῦτο,
δὲ ἐργάζεται. οἷον εἰ βούλει ἵδεῖν τοὺς ζωγρά-
φους, τοὺς οἰκοδόμους, τοὺς ναυπηγούς, τοὺς
ἄλλους πάντας δημιουργούς, δοτίνα βούλει αὐ-
τῶν, ὡς εἰς τάξιν τινὰ ἔκαστος ἔκαστον τίθησιν ὃ
ἄν τιθῇ, καὶ προσαναγκάζει τὸ ἔτερον τῷ ἑτέρῳ
504 πρέπον τε εἶναι καὶ ἀρμόττειν, ἕως ἂν τὸ ἄπαν
συστήσηται τεταγμένον τε καὶ κεκοσμημένον
πρᾶγμα, καὶ οἵ τε δὴ ἄλλοι δημιουργοὶ καὶ οὓς
νῦν δὴ ἐλέγομεν, οἵ περὶ τὸ σῶμα παιδοτρίβαι τε
καὶ ἰατροί, κοσμοῦσί που τὸ σῶμα καὶ συντάττου-
σιν. διολογοῦμεν οὖτο τοῦτ' ἔχειν, ἢ οὐ ;
ΚΑΛ. Ἐστω τοῦτο οὖτο. **ΣΩ.** Τάξεως ἄρα
καὶ κόσμου τυχοῦσα οἰκία χρηστὴ ἀν εἴη, ἀταξίας
B δὲ μοχθηρά; **ΚΑΛ.** Φημί. **ΣΩ.** Οὐκοῦν καὶ
πλοῖον ὠσαύτως; **ΚΑΛ.** Ναί. **ΣΩ.** Καὶ μὴν
καὶ τὰ σώματά φαμεν τὰ ἡμέτερα; **ΚΑΛ.**
Πάνν γε. **ΣΩ.** Τί δ' ἡ ψυχή; ἀταξίας τυχοῦ-
σα ἔσται χρηστή, ἢ τάξεώς τε καὶ κόσμου τινός;
ΚΑΛ. Ἀνάγκη ἐκ τῶν πρόσθεν καὶ τοῦτο συνο-
μολογεῖν. **ΣΩ.** Τί οὖν ὄνομά ἔστιν ἐν τῷ σώ-
ματι τῷ ἐκ τῆς τάξεώς τε καὶ τοῦ κόσμου γιγνο-
μένῳ; **ΚΑΛ.** Ὑγίειαν καὶ ἴσχὺν ἵσως λέγεις.

ΣΩ. "Εγωγε. τί δὲ αὖτις ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ἐγγιγνο-
μένῳ ἐκ τῆς τάξεως καὶ τοῦ κόσμου; πειρῶ εὐ-
ρεῖν καὶ εἰπεῖν ὅσπερ ἐκείνῳ τὸ ὄνομα. **ΚΑΛ.**
Τί δὲ οὐκ αὐτὸς λέγεις, ὃ Σώκρατες; **ΣΩ.**
"Άλλ' εἴ σοι ἥδιόν ἐστιν, ἔγὼ ἐρῶ. σὺ δέ, ἂν
μέν σοι δοκῶ ἔγὼ καλῶς λέγειν, φάθι· εἰ δὲ μή,
ἔλεγχε καὶ μὴ ἐπίτρεπε. ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ ταῖς μὲν
τοῦ σώματος τάξεσιν ὄνομα εἶναι ὑγιεινόν, ἐξ
οὗ ἐν αὐτῷ η ὑγίεια γίγνεται καὶ η ἄλλη ἀρετὴ
τοῦ σώματος. ἔστι ταῦτα η οὐκ ἔστιν; **ΚΑΛ.** D
"Ἐστι. **ΣΩ.** Ταῖς δὲ τῆς ψυχῆς τάξεσί τε καὶ
κοσμήσεσι νόμιμόν τε καὶ νόμος, ὅθεν καὶ νόμι-
μοι γίγνονται καὶ κόσμοι· ταῦτα δ' ἔστι δικαιο-
σύνη τε καὶ σωφροσύνη. φήσ, η οὐ; **ΚΑΛ.**
"Ἐστω.

Cap. LX. **ΣΩ.** Οὐκοῦν πρὸς ταῦτα αὖτις βλέ-
πων ὁ ὁρταρ ἐκεῖνος, ὁ τεχνικός τε καὶ ἀγα-
θός, καὶ τοὺς λόγους προσοίσει ταῖς ψυχαῖς οὓς
ἄν λέγῃ καὶ τὰς πράξεις ἀπάσας, καὶ δῶρον
ἔάν τι διδῷ, δώσει, καὶ ἔάν τι ἀφαιρῆται, ἀφαι-
ρήσεται, πρὸς τοῦτο ἀεὶ τὸν νοῦν ἔχων, ὅπως E
ἄν αὐτοῦ τοῖς πολίταις δικαιοσύνη μὲν ἐν ταῖς
ψυχαῖς γίγνηται, ἀδικία δὲ ἀπαλλάττηται, καὶ
σωφροσύνη μὲν ἔγγιγνηται, ἀκολασία δὲ ἀπαλ-
λάττηται, καὶ η ἄλλη ἀρετὴ ἔγγιγνηται, κακία
δὲ ἀπίη; συγχωρεῖς, η οὐ; **ΚΑΛ.** Συγχωρῶ.
ΣΩ. Τί γάρ ὅφελος, ὃ Καλλίκλεις, σώματί γε
κάμνοντι καὶ μοχθηρῶς διακειμένῳ σιτίᾳ πολλὰ
διδόναι καὶ τὰ ἥδιστα η ποτὰ η ἄλλ' ὅτιοῦν, δ
μὴ ὄνήσει αὐτὸν ἔσθ' ὅτε πλέον η τούναντίον, κα-

τοῦτα γε τὸν δίκαιον λόγον, καὶ ἔλαττον; ἔστι ταῦτα;
ΚΑΛ. Ἐστω. **ΣΩ.** Οὐ γάρ, οἶμαι, λυσιτελεῖ μετὰ μοχθηρίας σώματος ζῆν ἀνθρώπῳ· ἀνάγκη γάρ οὗτο καὶ ζῆν μοχθηρῶς. ἢ οὐχ οὗτο;
ΚΑΛ. Ναί. **ΣΩ.** Οὐκοῦν καὶ τὰς ἐπιθυμίας ἀποπιμπλάναι, οἶον πεινῶντα φαγεῖν δύον βούλεται ἢ διψῶντα πιεῖν, ὑγιαίνοντα μὲν ἔωσιν οἵ ἵατροί ὡς τὰ πολλά, κάμνοντα δέ, ὡς ἐπος εἰπεῖν οὐδέποτ' ἔωσιν ἐμπίπλασθαι ὅν ἐπιθυμεῖ; συγχωρεῖς τοῦτο γε καὶ σύ;
ΚΑΛ. **Β**Ἐγωγε. **ΣΩ.** Περὶ δὲ ψυχῆν, ὡς ἄριστε, οὐχ ὁ αὐτὸς τρόπος; ἔνος μὲν ἀν πονηρὰ ἢ, ἀνόητός τε οὖσα καὶ ἀκόλαστος καὶ ἄδικος καὶ ἀνόσιος, εἴργειν αὐτὴν δεῖ τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν καὶ μὴ ἐπιτρέπειν ἄλλ' ἄττα ποιεῖν ἢ ἀφ' ὅν βελτίων ἔσται; φήσ, ἢ οὐ;
ΚΑΛ. Φημί. **ΣΩ.** Οὗτο γάρ που αὐτῇ ἀμεινον τῇ ψυχῇ. **ΚΑΛ.** Πάνυ γε. **ΣΩ.** Οὐκοῦν τὸ εἴργειν ἔστιν ἀφ' ὅν ἐπιθυμεῖ κολάζειν;
ΚΑΛ. Ναί. **ΣΩ.** Τὸ κολάζεσθαι ἄρα τῇ ψυχῇ ἀμεινόν ἔστιν ἢ ἡ ἀκολασία, ὥσπερ σὺ νῦν δὴ σφόν. **ΚΑΛ.** Οὐκ οἶδ' ἄττα λέγεις, ὡς **Σώκρατες**, ἄλλ' ἄλλον τινὰ ἐρώτα. **ΣΩ.** Οὗτος ἀνηρ οὐχ ὑπομένει ὥφελούμενος καὶ αὐτὸς τοῦτο πάσχων, περὶ οὗ ὁ λόγος ἔστι, κολαζόμενος. **ΚΑΛ.** Οὐδέ γέ μοι μέλει οὐδὲν ὅν σὺ λέγεις, καὶ ταῦτά σοι Γοργίου χάριν ἀπεκρινάμην. **ΣΩ.** Εἰεν. τί οὖν δὴ ποιήσομεν; μεταξὺ τὸν λόγον καταλύομεν; **ΚΑΛ.** Αὐτὸς γνώσει. **ΣΩ.** Ἄλλ' οὐδὲ τοὺς μύθους φασὶ μεταξὺ θέμις εἶναι καταλείπειν, ἄλλ' ἐπιθέντας κεφαλήν, ἵνα μὴ ἄνευ

κεφαλῆς περιή. ἀπόκριναι οὖν καὶ τὰ λοιπά,
ἴνα ἡμῖν ὁ λόγος κεφαλὴν λάβῃ.

CAP. LXI. ΚΑΛ. Ὡς βίαιος εἶ, ὃ Σώκρατες. ἐὰν δὲ ἐμοὶ πείθῃ, ἔάσεις χαίρειν τοῦτον τὸν λόγον, ἦ καὶ ἄλλω τῷ διαλέξει. **ΣΩ.** Τίς οὖν ἄλλος ἔθελε; μὴ γάρ τοι ἀτελῆ γε τὸν λόγον καταλείπωμεν. **ΚΑΛ.** Αὐτὸς δὲ οὐκ ἂν δύναιο διελθεῖν τὸν λόγον, ἦ λέγων κατὰ σαυτὸν Εἷ ἀποκρινόμενος σαυτῷ; **ΣΩ.** Ινα μοι τὸ τοῦ Ἐπιχάρμου γένηται, ἃ πρὸ τοῦ δύο ἄνδρες ἔλεγον, εἰς ὃν ἵκανὸς γένωμαι. ἀτὰρ κινδυνεύει ἀναγκαιότατον εἶναι οὕτως. εἰ μέντοι ποιήσομεν, οἷμαι ἔγωγε χρῆναι πάντας ἥμᾶς φιλονείκως ἔχειν πρὸς τὸ εἰδέναι τὸ ἀληθὲς τί ἐστι περὶ ἀν λέγομεν καὶ τί ψεῦδος· κοινὸν γάρ ἀγαθὸν ἅπασι φανερὸν γενέσθαι αὐτό. δίειμι μὲν οὖν τῷ λόγῳ ἔγὼ ὡς ἂν μοι δοκῇ ἔχειν· ἐὰν δέ τῷ 506 ὑμῶν μὴ τὰ ὅντα δοκῶ ὅμολογεῖν ἔμαντῷ, χρὴ ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι καὶ ἐλέγχειν. οὐδὲ γάρ τοι ἔγωγε εἰδὼς λέγω ἃ λέγω, ἀλλὰ ζητῷ κοινῇ μεθ' ὑμῶν, ὅστε, ἀν τι φαίνηται λέγων ὁ ἀμφισβητῶν ἐμοί, ἔγὼ πρῶτος συγχωρήσομαι. λέγω μέντοι ταῦτα, εἰ δοκεῖ χρῆναι διαπερανθῆναι τὸν λόγον· εἰ δὲ μὴ βούλεσθε, ἐῶμεν δὴ χαίρειν καὶ ἀπίωμεν. **ΓΟΡ.** Άλλ' ἐμοὶ μὲν οὐ δοκεῖ, ὃ Σώκρατες, χρῆναι πω ἀπιέναι, ἀλλὰ διεξελθεῖν σε τὸν λόγον· φαίνεται δέ μοι καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις δοκεῖν. βούλομαι γάρ ἔγωγε καὶ αὐτὸς ἀκοῦσαι σου αὐτοῦ διύντος τὰ ἐπίλοιπα. **ΣΩ.** Άλλὰ μὲν δή, ὃ Γοργία, καὶ αὐτὸς ἡδέως μὲν ἀν Καλ-

λικλεῖ τούτῳ ἔτι διελεγόμην, ἕως αὐτῷ τὴν τοῦ Ἀμφίονος ἀπέδωκα δῆσιν ἀντὶ τῆς τοῦ Ζήθου· ἐπειδὴ δὲ σύ, ὁ Καλλίκλεις, οὐκ ἐθέλεις συνδιαπερᾶναι τὸν λόγον, ἀλλ' οὖν ἐμοῦ γε ἀκούων Σ ἐπιλαμβάνου, ἐάν τι σοι δοκῶ μὴ καλῶς λέγειν. καί με ἐὰν ἐξελέγξῃς, οὐκ ἀχθεσθήσομαι σοι, ὥσπερ σὺ ἐμοί, ἀλλὰ μέγιστος εὐεργέτης παρ' ἐμοὶ ἀναγεγράψει. ΚΑΛ. Λέγε, ὁ γαθέ, αὐτὸς καὶ πέραινε.

CAP. LXII. ΣΩ. Ἀκονε δὴ ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἐμοῦ ἀναλαβόντος τὸν λόγον. Ἄρα τὸ ήδυ καὶ τὸ ἀγαθὸν τὸ αὐτό ἐστιν; Οὐ ταῦτόν, ὡς ἔγὼ καὶ Καλλικλῆς ὠμολογήσαμεν. Πότερον δὲ τὸ ήδυ ἔνεκα τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ πρακτέον, η τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἔνεκα τοῦ ήδέος; Τὸ ήδυ ἔνεκα τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ. Ἡδὺ Δ δέ ἐστι τοῦτο, οὗ παραγενομένου ήδόμεθα; ἀγαθὸν δέ, οὗ παρόντος ἀγαθοί ἐσμεν; Πάνυ γε. Ἀλλὰ μὴν ἀγαθοί γέ ἐσμεν καὶ ἡμεῖς καὶ τὰλλα πάντα δσα ἀγαθά ἐστιν, ἀρετῆς τινος παραγενομένης; Ἐμοιγε δοκεῖ ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι, ὁ Καλλίκλεις. Ἀλλὰ μὲν δὴ η γε ἀρετὴ ἐκάστου, καὶ σκεύουσι καὶ σώματος καὶ ψυχῆς αὖ καὶ ζώου παντός, οὐ τῷ εἰκῇ κάλλιστα παραγίγνεται, ἀλλὰ τὰλλει καὶ δρθότητι καὶ τέχνῃ, ητις ἐκάστῳ ἀποδέδοται αὐτῶν. Ἄρα ἐστι ταῦτα; Ἔγὼ μὲν Ε γάρ φημι. Τάξει ἄρα τεταγμένον καὶ πεκοσμημένον ἐστὶν η ἀρετὴ ἐκάστου; Φαίην ἄν ἔγωγε. Κόσμος τις ἄρα ἐγγενόμενος ἐν ἐκάστῳ δ ἐκάστου οἰκεῖος ἀγαθὸν παρέχει ἐκαστον τῶν δῆτων; Ἐμοιγε δοκεῖ. Καὶ ψυχὴ ἄρα κόσμον ἔχουσα

τὸν ἔαυτῆς ἀμείνων τῆς ἀκοσμήτου; Ἀνάγκη.
 Ἀλλὰ μὴν ᾧ γε κόσμον ἔχουσα κοσμία; Πῶς
 γὰρ οὐ μέλλει; Ή δέ γε κοσμία σώφρων; 507
 Πολλὴ ἀνάγκη. Ή ἄρα σώφρων ψυχὴ ἀγαθή.
 Ἐγὼ μὲν οὐκ ἔχω παρὰ ταῦτα ἄλλα φάναι, ὡ
 φίλε Καλλίκλεις· σὺ δ' εἰ ἔχεις, δίδασκε. ΚΛΛ.
 Λέγ', ὡ γαθέ. ΣΩ. Λέγω δὴ, δτι, εἰ ἡ σώφρων
 ἀγαθή ἐστιν, ἡ τούναντίον τῇ σώφρονι πεπονθυῖα
 πακή ἐστιν. ἦν δὲ αὗτη ἡ ἀφρων τε καὶ ἀκό-
 λαστος; Πάνυ γε. Καὶ μὴν ὁ γε σώφρων τὰ
 προσήκοντα πράττοι ἀν καὶ περὶ θεοὺς καὶ περὶ
 ἀνθρώπους; οὐ γὰρ ἀν σωφρονοῖ τὰ μὴ προσή-
 κοντα πράττων. Ἀνάγκη ταῦτ' εἶναι οὕτω.
 Καὶ μὴν περὶ μὲν ἀνθρώπους τὰ προσήκοντα
 πράττων δίκαιοι ἀν πράττοι, περὶ δὲ θεοὺς δσια·
 τὸν δὲ τὰ δίκαια καὶ δσια πράττοντα ἀνάγκη δί-
 καιον καὶ δσιον εἶναι; Ἐστι ταῦτα. Καὶ μὲν
 δὴ καὶ ἀνδρεῖον γε ἀνάγκη; οὐ γὰρ δὴ σώφρονος
 ἀνδρός ἐστιν οὔτε διώκειν οὔτε φεύγειν ἢ μὴ προσ-
 ἤκει, ἀλλ' ἢ δεῖ καὶ πράγματα καὶ ἀνθρώπους
 καὶ ἥδονας καὶ λύπας φεύγειν καὶ διώκειν, καὶ
 ὑπομένοντα καρτερεῖν ὅπου δεῖ· ὥστε πολλὴ
 ἀνάγκη, ὡ Καλλίκλεις, τὸν σώφρονα ὥσπερ διηλ-
 θομεν, δίκαιον δοντα καὶ ἀνδρεῖον καὶ δσιον ἀγα-
 θὸν ἀνδρα εἶναι τελέως, τὸν δὲ ἀγαθὸν εῦ τε καὶ
 καλῶς πράττειν ἢ ἀν πράττη, τὸν δ' εῦ πράττον-
 τα μακάριόν τε καὶ εὐδαίμονα εἶναι, τὸν δὲ πο-
 νηρὸν καὶ κακῶς πράττοντα ἄθλιον. οὕτος δ' ἀν
 εἴη ὁ ἐναντίως ἔχων τῷ σώφρονι, ὁ ἀκόλαστος, ὃν
 σὺ ἐπήνεις. ΚΑΡ. LXIII. Ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν ταῦτα

οὗτο τίθεμαι καὶ φημι ταῦτα ἀληθῆ εἶναι. εἰ δὲ
 Δ ἔστιν ἀληθῆ, τὸν βουλόμενον, ὡς ἔοικεν, εὐδαι-
 μονα εἶναι σωφροσύνην μὲν διωκτέον καὶ ἀσκη-
 τέον, ἀκολασίαν δὲ φευκτέον ὡς ἔχει ποδῶν ἔκα-
 στος ἡμῶν, καὶ παρασκευαστέον μάλιστα μὲν
 μηδὲν δεῖσθαι τοῦ κολάζεσθαι, ἐὰν δὲ δεηθῆ ἡ
 αὐτὸς ἡ ἄλλος τις τῶν οἰκείων, ἡ ἴδιωτης ἡ πόλις,
 ἐπιθετέον δίκην καὶ κολαστέον, εἰ μέλλει εὐδαι-
 μων εἶναι. οὗτος ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ ὁ σκοπὸς εἶναι,
 πρὸς ὃν βλέποντα δεῖ ζῆν, καὶ πάντα εἰς τοῦτο
 τὰ αὐτοῦ συντείνοντα καὶ τὰ τῆς πόλεως, ὅπως
 Ε δικαιοσύνη παρέσται καὶ σωφροσύνη τῷ μακαρίῳ
 μέλλοντι ἔσεσθαι, οὕτω πράττειν, οὐκ ἐπιθυμίας
 ἔῶντα ἀκολάστους εἶναι καὶ ταῦτας ἐπιχειροῦντα
 πληροῦν, ἀνήνυτον κακόν, ληστοῦ βίον ζῶντα.
 οὕτε γὰρ ἀν ἄλλῳ ἀνθρώπῳ προσφιλῆς ἀν εἴη ὁ
 τοιοῦτος οὕτε θεῷ. κοινωνεῖν γὰρ ἀδύνατος ·
 ὅτῳ δὲ μὴ ἔνι κοινωνία, φιλία οὐκ ἀν εἴη. φασὶ
 δ' οἱ σοφοί, ὡς Καλλίκλεις, καὶ οὐρανὸν καὶ γῆν
 508 καὶ θεοὺς καὶ ἀνθρώπους τὴν κοινωνίαν συνέχειν
 καὶ φιλίαν καὶ κοσμιότητα καὶ σωφροσύνην καὶ
 δικαιότητα, — καὶ τὸ δλον τοῦτο διὰ ταῦτα κό-
 σμον καλοῦσιν, ὡς ἔταιρε, — οὐκ ἀκοσμίαν οὐδὲ
 ἀκολασίαν. σὺ δέ μοι δοκεῖς οὐ προσέχειν τὸν
 νοῦν τούτοις, καὶ ταῦτα σοφὸς ὁν, ἀλλὰ λέληθέ
 σε, ὅτι ἡ ἴσοτης ἡ γεωμετρικὴ καὶ ἐν θεοῖς καὶ ἐν
 ἀνθρώποις μέγα δύναται. σὺ δὲ πλεονεξίαν οὔει
 δεῖν ἀσκεῖν · γεωμετρίας γὰρ ἀμελεῖς. Εἰεν. ἡ
 Β ἔξελεγκτέος δὴ οὗτος ὁ λόγος ἡμῖν ἔστιν, ὡς οὐ
 δικαιοσύνης καὶ σωφροσύνης κτήσει εὐδαιμονες

οἱ εὐδαιμονες, κακίας δὲ οἱ ἀθλιοι· ἢ εἰ οὗτος ἀληθής ἐστι, σκεπτέον τί τὰ συμβαίνοντα. τὰ πρόσθεν ἐκεῖνα, ὡς Καλλίκλεις, συμβαίνει πάντα, ἐφ' οὓς σύ με ἥρου, εἰ σπουδάζων λέγοιμι, λέγοντα, ὅτι κατηγορητέον εἴη καὶ αὐτοῦ καὶ νίκeos καὶ ἔταιρου, ἐάν τι ἀδικῆ, καὶ τῇ δητορικῇ ἐπὶ τοῦτο χρηστέον. καὶ ἂν Πῶλον αἰσχύνῃ ὃν συγχωρεῖν, ἀληθῆ ἄρα ἦν, τὸ εἶναι τὸ ἀδικεῖν τοῦτο ἀδικεῖσθαι, ὅσῳπερ αἰσχιον, τοσούτῳ κάκιον· καὶ τὸν μέλλοντα ὁρθὸς δητορικὸν ἔσεσθαι δίκαιον ἄρα δεῖ εἶναι καὶ ἐπιστήμονα τῶν δικαίων, ὃ αὖ Γοργίαν ἔφη Πῶλος δι' αἰσχύνην ὁμολογῆσαι.

CAP. LXIV. Τούτων δὲ οὕτως ἔχόντων, σκεψώμεθα τί ποτ' ἐστὶν ἂν σὺ ἐμοὶ ὄνειδίζεις, ἄρα καλῶς λέγεται, ἢ οὔ, ὡς ἄρα ἐγὼ οὐχ οἶστος τ' εἰμὶ βοηθῆσαι οὔτε ἐμαυτῷ οὔτε τῶν φίλων οὐδενὶ οὐδὲ τῶν οἰκείων, οὐδὲ ἐκσῶσαι ἐκ τῶν μεγίστων κινδύνων, εἰμὶ δὲ ἐπὶ τῷ βουλομένῳ ὅσπερ οἱ ἀτιμοι τοῦ ἐθέλοντος, ἀν τε τύπτειν βούληται, τὸ νεανικὸν δὴ τοῦτο τοῦ σοῦ λόγου, ἐπὶ κόρφης, ἐάν τε χρήματα ἀφαιρεῖσθαι, ἐάν τε ἐκβάλλειν ἐκ τῆς πόλεως, ἐάν τε, τὸ ἐσχατον, ἀποκτεῖναι· καὶ οὕτω διακεῖσθαι πάντων δὴ αἰσχιστόν ἐστιν, ὡς ὁ σὸς λόγος. ὁ δὲ δὴ ἐμός, ὅστις πολλάκις μὲν ἥδη εἴρηται, οὐδὲν δὲ κωλύει καὶ ἔτι λέγεσθαι· οὐ φημι, ὡς Καλλίκλεις, τὸ τύπτεσθαι ἐπὶ κόρφης ἀδίκως Ε αἰσχιστον εἶναι, οὐδέ γε τὸ τέμνεσθαι οὔτε τὸ σῶμα τὸ ἐμὸν οὔτε τὸ βαλάντιον, ἀλλὰ τὸ τύπτειν καὶ ἐμὲ καὶ τὰ ἐμὰ ἀδίκως καὶ τέμνειν καὶ αἰσχιον καὶ κάκιον, καὶ κλέπτειν γε ἄμα καὶ ἀνδρα-

ποδίζεσθαι καὶ τοιχωρυχεῖν καὶ συλλήβδην ὅτιοῦν
ἀδικεῖν καὶ ἐμὲ καὶ τὰ ἐμὰ τῷ ἀδικοῦντι καὶ αἰ-
σχιον καὶ κάκιον εἶναι η̄ ἐμοὶ τῷ ἀδικουμένῳ.
ταῦτα ἡμῖν ἀνω ἔκει ἐν τοῖς ἐμπροσθεν λόγοις
509 οὗτω φανέντα, ὡς ἐγὼ λέγω, κατέχεται καὶ δέ-
δεται, καὶ εἰ ἀγροικότερόν τι εἰπεῖν ἐστι, σιδηροῖς
καὶ ἀδαμαντίνοις λόγοις, ὡς γοῦν ἀν δόξειεν
οὐτωσίν, οὓς σὺ εἰ μὴ λύσεις η̄ σου τις νεανικώ-
τερος, οὐχ οἶόν τε, ἄλλως λέγοντα η̄ ὡς ἐγὼ νῦν
λέγω, καλῶς λέγειν · ἐπεὶ ἐμοιγε ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος
ἐστὶν ἀεί, ὅτι ἐγὼ ταῦτα οὐκ οἶδα δπως ἔχει, ὅτι
μέντοι ὅν ἐγὼ ἐντειύχηκα, ὥσπερ νῦν, οὐδεὶς οἶσ
B τ' ἐστὶν ἄλλως λέγων μὴ οὐ καταγέλαστος εἶναι.
ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν αὐτὸίθημι ταῦτα οὕτως ἔχειν. εἰ δὲ
οὕτως ἔχει, καὶ μέγιστον τῶν κακῶν ἐστιν η̄ ἀδι-
κία τῷ ἀδικοῦντι, καὶ ἔτι τούτον μεῖζον μεγίστον
ὄντος, εἰ οἶόν τε, τὸ ἀδικοῦντα μὴ διδόναι δίκην,
τίνα ἀν βοήθειαν μὴ δυνάμενος ἀνθρωπος βοη-
θεῖν ἔαντῷ καταγέλαστος ἀν τῇ ἀληθείᾳ εἴη;
ἄρα οὐ ταύτην, ἡτις ἀποτρέψει τὴν μεγίστην
ἡμῶν βλάβην; ἄλλὰ πολλὴ ἀνάγκη ταύτην εἶναι
τὴν αἰσχίστην βοήθειαν, μὴ δύνασθαι βοηθεῖν
μήτε ἔαντῷ μήτε τοῖς αὐτοῦ φίλοις τε καὶ οἰκεί-
C οις, δευτέραν δὲ τὴν τοῦ δευτέρου κακοῦ καὶ τρί-
την τὴν τοῦ τρίτου, καὶ τὰλλα οὕτως · ὡς ἑκά-
στον κακοῦ μέγεθος πέφυκεν, οὕτω καὶ κάλλος
τοῦ δυνατὸν εἶναι ἐφ' ἔκαστα βοηθεῖν καὶ αἰσχύ-
νη τοῦ μή. ἄρα ἄλλως, η̄ οὕτως ἔχει, ὥστη Καλλί-
κλεις; **ΚΑΛΛ.** Οὐκ ἄλλως.

CAP. LXV. ΣΩ. Δυοῖν οὖν ὄντοιν, τοῦ ἀδι-

κεῖν τε καὶ ἀδικεῖσθαι, μεῖζον μέν φαμεν κακὸν τὸ ἀδικεῖν, ἔλαττον δὲ τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι. τί οὖν ἀν παρασκευασάμενος ἄνθρωπος βοηθήσειεν αὐτῷ, ὅστε ἀμφοτέρας τὰς ὡφελείας ταύτας ἔχειν, τὴν Δ τε ἀπὸ τοῦ μὴ ἀδικεῖν καὶ τὴν ἀπὸ τοῦ μὴ ἀδικεῖσθαι; πότερα δύναμιν, ἢ βούλησιν; ἀδε δὲ λέγω· πότερον ἐὰν μὴ βούληται ἀδικεῖσθαι, οὐκ ἀδικήσεται, ἢ ἐὰν δύναμιν παρασκευάσῃ τοῦ μὴ ἀδικεῖσθαι, οὐκ ἀδικήσεται; **ΚΑΛ.** Λῆλον δὴ τοῦτο γε, ὅτι ἐὰν δύναμιν. **ΣΩ.** Τί δὲ δὴ τοῦ ἀδικεῖν; πότερον ἐὰν μὴ βούληται ἀδικεῖν, ἵκανὸν τοῦτ' ἐστίν — οὐ γὰρ ἀδικήσει —, ἢ καὶ Ε ἐπὶ τοῦτο δεῖ δύναμίν τινα καὶ τέχνην παρασκευάσασθαι, ὡς, ἐὰν μὴ μάθῃ αὐτὰ καὶ ἀσκήσῃ, ἀδικήσει; Τί οὐκ αὐτό γέ μοι τοῦτο ἀπεκρίνω, ὁ Καλλίκλεις; πότερόν σοι δοκοῦμεν ὁρῶς ἀναγκασθῆναι ὁμολογεῖν ἐν τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν λόγοις ἐγώ τε καὶ Πᾶλος, ἢ οὐ, ἥνικα ὁμολογήσαμεν μηδένα βουλόμενον ἀδικεῖν, ἀλλ' ἀκοντας τοὺς ἀδικοῦντας πάντας ἀδικεῖν; **ΚΑΛ.** "Εστω σοι τοῦτο, ὁ Σώκρατες, οὗτως, ἵνα διαπεράνης⁵¹⁰ τὸν λόγον. **ΣΩ.** Καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦτο ἄρα, ὡς ἔοικε, παρασκευαστέον ἐστὶ δύναμίν τινα καὶ τέχνην, ὅπως μὴ ἀδικήσωμεν. **ΚΑΛ.** Πάνυ γε. **ΣΩ.** Τίς οὖν ποτ' ἐστὶ τέχνη τῆς παρασκευῆς τοῦ μηδὲν ἀδικεῖσθαι ἢ ὡς ὀλίγιστα; σκέψαι, εἰ σοὶ δοκεῖ ἥπερ ἐμοί. ἐμοὶ μὲν γὰρ δοκεῖ ἥδε· ἢ αὐτὸν ἄρχειν δεῖν ἐν τῇ πόλει ἢ καὶ τυραννεῖν, ἢ τῆς ὑπαρχούσης πολιτείας ἐταῖρον εἶναι. **ΚΑΛ.** Ορᾶς, ὁ Σώκρατες, ὡς ἐγὼ ἔτοιμός εἰμι

Β ἐπαινεῖν, ἄν τι καλῶς λέγῃς; τοῦτό μοι δοκεῖς πάνυ καλῶς εἰρηκέναι.

CAP. LXVI. ΣΩ. Σκόπει δὴ καὶ τόδε ἐάν σοι δοκῶ εῦ λέγειν. φίλος μοι δοκεῖ ἔκαστος ἔκάστι φ εἶναι ὡς οἶόν τε μάλιστα, δηπερ οἱ παλαιοί τε καὶ σοφοὶ λέγουσιν, ὁ ὅμοιος τῷ ὅμοιῷ. οὐ καὶ σοί; ΚΑΛ. Ἐμοιγε. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ὅπου τύραννός ἐστιν ἀρχων ἄγριος καὶ ἀπαίδευτος, εἴ τις τούτου ἐν τῇ πόλει πολὺ βελτίων εἴη, φοβοῖτο δήπου ἄν αὐτὸν ὁ τύραννος καὶ τούτῳ ἐξ ἀπαντος τοῦ νοῦ οὐκ ἄν ποτε δύναιτο φίλος γενέσθαι; ΚΑΛ. Ἐστι ταῦτα. ΣΩ. Οὐδέ γε εἴ τις πολὺ φαυλότερος εἴη, οὐδ' ἄν οὗτος· καταφρονοῦ γὰρ ἄν αὐτοῦ ὁ τύραννος καὶ οὐκ ἄν ποτε ὡς πρὸς φίλον σπουδάσειε. ΚΑΛ. Καὶ ταῦτ' ἀληθῆ. ΣΩ. Λείπεται δὴ ἐκεῖνος μόνος ἀξιος λόγου φίλος τῷ τοιούτῳ, ὃς ἄν, ὁμοήθης ἄν, ταῦτα ψέγων καὶ ἐπαινῶν ἐθέλῃ ἀρχεσθαι καὶ ὑποκεῖσθαι τῷ ἀρχοντι. οὗτος μέγα ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ πόλει δυνήσεται· τοῦτον οὐδεὶς χαίρων ἀδικήσει. οὐχ οὗτος ἔχει; ΚΑΛ. Ναί. ΣΩ. Εἰ ἄρα τις ἐννοήσειεν ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ πόλει τῶν νέων, Τίνα ἄν τρόπον ἐγὼ μέγα δυναίμην καὶ μηδείς με ἀδικοίη, αὐτῇ, ὡς ἔοικεν, αὐτῷ ὁδός ἐστιν, εὐθὺς ἐκ νέου ἐθίζειν αὐτὸν τοῖς αὐτοῖς χαίρειν καὶ ἀχθεσθαι τῷ δεσπότῃ, καὶ παρασκευάζειν, ὅπως ὅτι μάλιστα ὅμοιος ἐσται ἐκείνῳ. Ε οὐχ οὗτος; ΚΑΛ. Ναί. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τούτῳ τῷ μὲν μὴ ἀδικεῖσθαι καὶ μέγα δύνασθαι, ὡς ὁ ὑμέτερος λόγος, ἐν τῇ πόλει διαπεπράξεται.

ΚΑΛ. Πάνυ γε. **ΣΩ.** Ἄρος οῦν καὶ τὸ μὴ ἀδικεῖν; ἢ πολλοῦ δεῖ, εἴπερ ὅμοιος ἔσται τῷ ἄρχοντι, ὃντι ἀδίκῳ, καὶ παρὰ τούτῳ μέγα δυνήσεται; ἀλλ' οἷμαι ἔγωγε, πᾶν τούναντίον οὐτωσὶ ἡ παρασκευὴ ἔσται αὐτῷ ἐπὶ τὸ οἶω τε εἶναι ὡς πλεῖστα ἀδικεῖν καὶ ἀδικοῦντα μὴ διδόναι⁵¹¹ δίκην. ἢ γάρ; **ΚΑΛ.** Φαίνεται. **ΣΩ.** Οὐκοῦν τὸ μέγιστον αὐτῷ κακὸν ὑπάρξει, μοχθηρῷ ὃντι τὴν ψυχὴν καὶ λελωβημένῳ διὰ τὴν μίμησιν τοῦ δεσπότου καὶ δύναμιν. **ΚΑΛ.** Οὐκ οἶδ', ὅπῃ στρέφεις ἐκάστοτε τοὺς λόγους ἀνω καὶ κάτω, ὡς Σώκρατες. ἢ οὐκ οἰσθα, ὅτι οὗτος ὁ μιμούμενος τὸν μὴ μιμούμενον ἐκεῖνον ἀποκτενεῖ, ἐὰν βούληται, καὶ ἀφαιρήσεται τὰ ὃντα; **ΣΩ.** Οἶδα, ⁵¹² ὡς γαθὲ Καλλίκλεις, εἰ μὴ κωφός γ' εἰμί, καὶ σοῦ ἀκούων καὶ Πάλου ἀρτὶ πολλάκις καὶ τῶν ἀλλων ὀλίγου πάντων τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει. ἀλλὰ καὶ σὺ ἔμου ἄκουε, ὅτι ἀποκτενεῖ μέν, ἀν βούληται, ἀλλὰ πονηρὸς ὥν καλὸν καγαθὸν ὃντα. **ΚΑΛ.** Οὐκοῦν τοῦτο δὴ καὶ τὸ ἀγανακτητόν; **ΣΩ.** Οὐ νοῦν γε ἔχοντι, ὡς ὁ λόγος σημαίνει. ἢ οἵει δεῖν τοῦτο παρασκευάζεσθαι ἀνθρωπον, ὡς πλεῖστον χρόνον ζῆν, καὶ μελετᾶν τὰς τέχνας ταύτας, αἱ ήμᾶς ἀεὶ ἐκ τῶν κινδύνων σώζουσιν, ὡςπερ καὶ ἦν σὺ κε-⁵¹³ λεύεις ἐμὲ μελετᾶν τὴν ἡγητορικήν, τὴν ἐν τοῖς δικαστηρίοις διασώζουσαν; **ΚΑΛ.** Ναὶ μὰ Διὸς ὁρθῶς γέ σοι συμβούλεύων.

ΣΑΡ. LXVII. **ΣΩ.** Τί δέ, ὡς βέλτιστε; ἢ καὶ ἡ τοῦ νεῦν ἐπιστήμη σεμνή τίς σοι δοκεῖ εἶναι; **ΚΑΛ.** Μὰ Δί' οὐκ ἔμοιγε. **ΣΩ.** Καὶ

μην σώζει γε καὶ αὗτη ἐκ θανάτου τοὺς ἀνθρώπους, ὅταν εἰς τοιοῦτον ἐμπέσωσιν, οὐδὲ ταύτης
 Δ τῆς ἐπιστήμης. εἰ δ' αὕτη σοι δοκεῖ σμικρὰ εἶναι, ἔγώ σοι μείζονα ταύτης ἔφω, τὴν κυβερνητικήν, ἥ οὐ μόνον τὰς ψυχὰς σώζει, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰ σώματα καὶ τὰ χρήματα ἐκ τῶν ἐσχάτων κινδύνων, ὥσπερ ἡ ὁγητορική. καὶ αὕτη μὲν προσεσταλμένη ἐστὶ καὶ κοσμία, καὶ οὐ σεμνύνεται ἐσχηματισμένη ὡς ὑπερήφανόν τι διαπραττομένη, ἀλλὰ ταῦτα διαπραξαμένη τῇ δικανικῇ, ἐὰν μὲν ἐξ Αἰγύπτου δεῦρο σώσῃ, οἷμαι, δύ' ὄбоλοὺς ἐπράξατο, ἐὰν δὲ ἐξ Αἰγύπτου ἦ ἐκ τοῦ Πόντου, ἐὰν πάμπολυ ταύτης τῆς μεγάλης εὐεργεσίας, σώσασ' ἀνῦν δὴ ἔλεγον, καὶ αὐτὸν καὶ παιδας καὶ χρήματα καὶ γυναικας, ἀποβιβάσασ' εἰς τὸν λιμένα δύο δραχμὰς ἐπράξατο, καὶ αὐτὸς ὁ ἔχων τὴν τέχνην καὶ ταῦτα διαπραξάμενος ἐκβὰς παρὰ τὴν θάλατταν καὶ τὴν ναῦν περιπατεῖ ἐν μετρίῳ σχήματι. λογίζεσθαι γάρ, οἷμαι, ἐπίσταται, ὅτι ἄδηλόν ἐστιν οὕστινάς τε ὀφέληκε τῶν συμπλεόντων οὐκ ἐάσας καταποντωθῆναι καὶ οὕστινας ἔβλαιψεν, εἰδὼς, ὅτι οὐδὲν αὐτοὺς βελτίους ἐξεβίσασεν ἢ οἷοι ἐνέβησαν, οὔτε τὰ σώματα οὔτε τὰς ψυχὰς. λογίζεται οὖν, ὅτι οὐκ, εἰ μέν τις μεγάλοις καὶ ἀνιάτοις νοσήμασι κατὰ τὸ σῶμα συνεχόμενος μὴ ἀπεπνίγη, οὗτος μὲν ἀθλιός ἐστιν, ὅτι οὐκ ἀπέθανε, καὶ οὐδὲν ὑπ' αὐτοῦ ὀφέληται. εἰ δέ τις ἄρα ἐν τῷ τοῦ σώματος τιμιωτέρῳ, τῇ ψυχῇ, πολλὰ νοσήματα ἔχει καὶ ἀνίατα, τούτῳ δὲ βιωτέον ἐστὶ καὶ τοῦτον ὄνησειεν, ἂν τε ἐκ

θαλάττης ἀν τε ἐκ δικαιοσηρίου ἀν τε ἄλλοθεν ὅποθενοῦν σώσῃ, ἀλλ' οἶδεν, ὅτι οὐκ ἄμεινόν ἔστι βέ
ζῆν τῷ μοχθηρῷ ἀνθρώπῳ· κακῶς γὰρ ἀνάγκη
ἔστι βέζην. CAP. LXVIII. Διὰ ταῦτα οὐ νόμος
ἔστι σεμνύνεσθαι τὸν κυβερνήτην, καίπερ σώζοντα
ἡμᾶς. οὐδέ γε, ὃ θαυμάσιε, τὸν μηχανοποιόν, ὃς
οὐτε στρατηγοῦ, μὴ ὅτι κυβερνήτου, οὐτε ἄλλου
οὐδενὸς ἐλάττω ἐνίστε δύναται σώζειν· πόλεις
γὰρ ἔστιν ὅτε ὅλας σώζει. μὴ σοι δοκεῖ κατὰ τὸν
δικαιοικὸν εἶναι; καίτοι εἰ βούλοιτο λέγειν, ὃ
Καλλίκλεις, ἀπερ ὑμεῖς, σεμνύνων τὸ πρᾶγμα,
καταχώσειεν ἀν ὑμᾶς τοῖς λόγοις, λέγων καὶ πα- C
ρακαλῶν ἐπὶ τὸ δεῦρ γίγνεσθαι μηχανοποιούς, ὃς
οὐδὲν τἀλλά ἔστιν· ἵκανὸς γὰρ αὐτῷ ὁ λόγος.
ἄλλὰ σὺ οὐδὲν ἡττον αὐτοῦ καταφρονεῖς καὶ τῆς
τέχνης τῆς ἐκείνου, καὶ ὡς ἐν ὀνείδει ἀποκαλέσαις
ἀν μηχανοποιόν, καὶ τῷ υἱεῖ αὐτοῦ οὔτ' ἀν δοῦ-
ναι θυγατέρα ἐθέλοις, οὔτ' ἀν αὐτὸς τῷ σαυτοῦ
λαβεῖν τὴν ἐκείνου. καίτοι ἐξ ὧν τὰ σαυτοῦ ἐπαι-
νεῖς, τίνι δικαίῳ λόγῳ τοῦ μηχανοποιοῦ καταφρο-
νεῖς καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὧν νῦν δὴ ἔλεγον; οἴδ' ὅτι D
φαίης ἀν βελτίων εἶναι καὶ ἐκ βελτιόνων. τὸ δὲ
βέλτιον εἰ βελτίων ὃ ἐγὼ λέγω, ἀλλ' αὐτὸ τοῦτ'
ἔστιν ἀρετῇ, τὸ σώζειν αὐτὸν καὶ τὰ ἔαυτοῦ ὄντα
ὅποῖς τις ἐτυχε, καταγέλαστός σοι ὁ ψόγος γίγνε-
ται καὶ μηχανοποιοῦ καὶ ιατροῦ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων
τεχνῶν, δσαι τοῦ σώζειν ἐνεκα πεποίηνται. ἀλλ',
ὦ μακάριε, ὅρα μὴ ἄλλο τι τὸ γενναῖον καὶ τὸ
ἄγαθὸν ἢ τοῦ σώζειν τε καὶ σώζεσθαι. μὴ γὰρ
τοῦτο μέν, τὸ βέζην ὅποσονδὴ χρόνον, τόν γε ὡς E

ἀληθῶς ἄνδρα ἔατέον ἐστὶ καὶ οὐ φιλοψυχητέον,
 ἀλλὰ ἐπιτρέψαντα περὶ τούτων τῷ θεῷ καὶ πι-
 στεύσαντα ταῖς γυναιξὶν, ὅτι τὴν εἰμαρμένην
 οὐδ' ἀν εἴς ἐκφύγοι, τὸ ἐπὶ τούτῳ σκεπτέον, τίν'
 ἀν τρόπον τοῦτον δν μέλλει χρόνον βιῶνται ὡς
 ἀριστα βιώῃ, ἀρα ἐξομοιῶν αὐτὸν τῇ πολιτείᾳ
 513 ταύτῃ, ἐν ᾧ ἀν οἰκῇ, καὶ νῦν δὲ ἄρα δεῖ σὲ ὡς
 ὁμοιότατον γίγνεσθαι τῷ δῆμῳ τῷ Ἀθηναίων, εἰ
 μέλλεις τούτῳ προσφιλῆς εἶναι καὶ μέγα δύνα-
 σθαι ἐν τῇ πόλει; τοῦθ' ὅρα εἰς σοὶ λυσιτελεῖ καὶ
 ἐμοί, ὅπως μή, ὃ δαιμόνιε, πεισόμεθα ὅπερ φασὶ¹
 τὰς τὴν σελήνην καθαιρούσας, τὰς Θετταλίδας.
 σὺν τοῖς φιλτάτοις ἡ αἵρεσις ἥμιν ἐσται ταύτης
 τῆς δυνάμεως τῆς ἐν τῇ πόλει. εἰ δέ σοι οἶει ὄν-
 τινοῦν ἀνθρώπων παραδώσειν τέχνην τινὰ τοιαύ-
 Β την, ἥτις σε ποιήσει μέγα δύνασθαι ἐν τῇ πόλει
 τῇδε ἀνόμοιον ὅντα τῇ πολιτείᾳ εἴτ' ἐπὶ τὸ βέλτι-
 ον εἴτ' ἐπὶ τὸ χεῖρον, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, οὐκ ὁρθῶς
 βουλεύει, ὃ Καλλίκλεις· οὐ φίλος μιμητὴν δεῖ εἴ-
 ναι, ἀλλ' αὐτοφυῶς ὁμοιον τούτοις, εἰ μέλλεις τι
 γνήσιον ἀπεργάζεσθαι εἰς φιλίαν τῷ Ἀθηναίων
 δῆμῳ καὶ ναὶ μὰ Δία τῷ Πυριλάμπους γε πρός.
 ὅστις οὖν σε τούτοις ὁμοιότατον ἀπεργάσεται, οὐ-
 τός σε ποιήσει, ὡς ἐπιθυμεῖς πολιτικὸς εἶναι, πο-
 Σ λιτικὸν καὶ ὁητορικόν· τῷ αὐτῶν γάρ ἥθει λεγο-
 μένων τῶν λόγων ἔκαστοι χαίρουσι, τῷ δὲ ἄλλο-
 τριῷ ἄχθονται. εἰ μή τι σὺ ἄλλο λέγεις, ὃ φίλη
 κεφαλή. Λέγομέν τι πρὸς ταῦτα, ὃ Καλλίκλεις;

CAP. LXIX. ΚΑΛ. Οὐκ οἶδ' ὄντινά μοι τρό-
 πον δοκεῖς εῦ λέγειν, ὃ Σώκρατες. πέπονθα δὲ

τὸ τῶν πολλῶν πάθος· οὐ πάνυ σοι πείθομαι.

ΣΩ. Ὁ δῆμου γὰρ ἔρως, ὃ Καλλίκλεις, ἐνὼν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ τῇ σῇ ἀντιστατεῖ μοι· ἀλλ' ἐὰν πολλά κις ἵσως καὶ βέλτιον ταῦτα ταῦτα διασκοπώμεθα, πεισθήσει. ἀναμνήσθητι δ' οὖν, δτὶ δύ' ἔφαμεν εἶναι τὰς παρασκευὰς ἐπὶ τὸ ἔκαστον θεραπεύειν καὶ σῶμα καὶ ψυχὴν, μίαν μὲν πρὸς ἡδονὴν ὄμιλεῖν, τὴν ἐιέραν δὲ πρὸς τὸ βέλτιστον, μὴ καταχαριζόμενον, ἀλλὰ διαμαχόμενον. οὐ ταῦτα ἦν ἀ τότε ὠφιζόμεθα; **ΚΑΛ.** Πάνυ γε. **ΣΩ.** Οὐκοῦν ἡ μὲν ἐτέρα, ἡ πρὸς ἡδονὴν, ἀγεννῆς καὶ οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἡ κολακεία τυγχάνει οὖσα. ἡ γάρ; **ΚΑΛ.** Ἐστω, εἰ βούλει, σοὶ οὗτος. **ΣΩ.** Ἡ δέ γε ἐτέρα, ὅπως ὡς βέλτιστον ἔσται τοῦτο, εἴτε σῶμα τυγχάνει ὃν εἴτε ψυχή, ὃ θεραπεύομεν; **ΚΑΛ.** Πάνυ γε. **ΣΩ.** Ἄρ, οὖν οὗτος ἡμῖν ἐπιχειρητέον ἔστι τῇ πόλει καὶ τοῖς πολίταις θεραπεύειν ὡς βελτίστους αὐτοὺς τοὺς πολίτας ποιοῦντας; ἀνευ γὰρ δὴ τούτου, ὡς ἐν τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν εὑρίσκομεν, οὐδὲν ὄφελος ἄλλην εὐεργεσίαν 514 οὐδεμίαν προσφέρειν, ἐὰν μὴ καλὴ κάγαθὴ ἡ διάνοια ἡ τῶν μελλόντων ἡ χρήματα πολλὰ λαμβάνειν ἡ ἀρχὴν τινῶν ἡ ἄλλην δύναμιν ἡτινοῦν. Θῶμεν οὗτος ἔχειν; **ΚΑΛ.** Πάνυ γε, εἴ σοι ἥδιον. **ΣΩ.** Εἰ οὖν παρεκαλοῦμεν ἄλλήλους, ὃ Καλλίκλεις, δημοσίᾳ πράξαντες τῶν πολιτικῶν πραγμάτων, ἐπὶ τὰ οἰκοδομικά, ἡ τειχῶν ἡ νεωρίων ἡ ἱερῶν ἐπὶ τὰ μέγιστα οἰκοδομήματα, πότερον ἔδει ἀν ἡμᾶς σκέψασθαι ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς καὶ εξετάσαι, πρῶτον μὲν εἰ ἐπιστάμεθα τὴν τέχνην, ἡ

οὐκ ἐπιστάμεθα, τὴν οἰκοδομικήν, καὶ παρὰ τοῦ
ἔμαθομεν; ἔδει ἂν, ἢ οὐ; **ΚΑΛ.** Πάνν γε.
ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν δεύτερον αὖ τόδε, εἴ τι πώποτε
οἰκοδόμημα ὠκοδομήκαμεν ἵδιᾳ ἢ τῶν φίλων τινὶ^ν
ἢ ἡμέτερον αὐτῶν, καὶ τοῦτο τὸ οἰκοδόμημα κα-
λὸν ἢ αἰσχρόν ἐστι. καὶ εἰ μὲν εὑρίσκομεν σκο-
C πούμενοι διδασκάλους τε ἡμῶν ἀγαθοὺς καὶ ἐλλο-
γίμους γεγονότας καὶ οἰκοδομήματα πολλὰ μὲν
καὶ καλὰ μετὰ τῶν διδασκάλων ὠκοδομημένα
ἡμῖν, πολλὰ δὲ καὶ ἵδιᾳ ὑφ' ἡμῶν, ἐπειδὴ τῶν
διδασκάλων ἀπηλλάγημεν, οὗτω μὲν διακειμένων,
νοῦν ἔχοντων ἣν ἂν ἴέναι ἐπὶ τὰ δημόσια ἔργα·
εἰ δὲ μήτε διδάσκαλον εἴχομεν ἡμῶν αὐτῶν ἐπι-
δεῖξαι οἰκοδομήματά τε ἢ μηδὲν ἢ πολλὰ καὶ μη-
δενὸς ἄξια, οὗτω δὲ ἀνόητον ἣν δήπου ἐπιχειρεῖν
τοῖς δημοσίοις ἔργοις καὶ παρακαλεῖν ἀλλήλους
ἐπ' αὐτά. φῶμεν ταῦτα ὁρθῶς λέγεσθαι, ἢ οὐ;
D ΚΑΛ. Πάνν γε.

CAP. LXX. **ΣΩ.** Οὐκοῦν οὗτω πάντα, τά τε
ἄλλα, καν εἰ ἐπιχειρήσαντες δημοσιεύειν παρεκα-
λοῦμεν ἀλλήλους ὡς ἴκανοὶ ἴατροὶ ὅντες, ἐπεσκε-
ψάμεθα δήπου ἂν ἔγώ τε σὲ καὶ σὺ ἐμέ, Φέρε
πρὸς θεῶν, αὐτὸς δὲ ὁ Σωκράτης πῶς ἔχει τὸ σῶ-
μα πρὸς ὑγίειαν; ἢ ἥδη τίς ἄλλος διὰ Σωκράτην
ἀπηλλάγη νόσου, ἢ δοῦλος ἢ ἐλεύθερος; **Κἄν**
Ε ἔγώ, οἶμαι, περὶ σοῦ ἔτερα τοιαῦτα ἐσκόπουν.
καὶ εἰ μὴ ηὑρίσκομεν δι' ἡμᾶς μηδένα βελτίω γε-
γονότα τὸ σῶμα, μήτε τῶν ἔνεων μήτε τῶν ἀστῶν,
μήτε ἄνδρα μήτε γυναῖκα, πρὸς Λιός, ὡς Καλλί-
κλεις, οὐ καταγέλαστον ἂν ἣν τῇ ἀληθείᾳ εἰς το-

σοῦτον ἀνοίας ἐλθεῖν ἀνθρώπους, ὅστε, πρὸν ἴδιωτεύοντας πολλὰ μὲν ὅπως ἐτύχομεν ποιῆσαι, πολλὰ δὲ κατορθῶσαι καὶ γυμνάσασθαι ἵκανῶς τὴν τέχνην, τὸ λεγόμενον δὴ τοῦτο, ἐν τῷ πίθῳ τὴν κεραμείαν ἐπιχειρεῖν μανθάνειν, καὶ αὐτούς τε δημοσιεύειν ἐπιχειρεῖν καὶ ἄλλους τοιούτους παρακαλεῖν; οὐκ ἀνόητόν σοι δοκεῖ ἂν εἶναι οὕτω πράττειν; **ΚΑΛ.** Ἐμοιγε. **ΣΩ.** Νῦν δέ, ὥ⁵¹⁵ βέλτιστε ἀνδρῶν, ἐπειδὴ σὺ μὲν αὐτὸς ἄρτι ἄρχει πράττειν τὰ τῆς πόλεως πράγματα, ἐμὲ δὲ παρακαλεῖς καὶ ὀνειδίζεις, ὅτι οὐ πράττω, οὐκ ἐπισκεψόμεθα ἄλλήλους, Φέρε, Καλλικλῆς ἥδη τινὰ βελτίω πεποίηκε τῶν πολιτῶν; ἔστιν δοτις πρότερον πονηρὸς ὃν ἄδικός τε καὶ ἀκόλαστος καὶ ἄφρων διὰ Καλλικλέα καλός τε κάγαθὸς γέγονεν, ἡ ἔνος ἡ ἀστός, ἡ δοῦλος ἡ ἐλεύθερος; **Λέγε** ^Β μοι, ἐάν τίς σε ταῦτα ἔξετάζῃ, ὡς Καλλίκλεις, τί ἔρεις; τίνα φήσεις βελτίω πεποιηκέναι ἀνθρωπον τῇ συνουσίᾳ τῇ σῇ; — Ὁκνεῖς ἀποκρίνασθαι, εἴπερ ἔστι τοιόνδε τι ἔργον σὸν ἔτι ἴδιωτεύοντος, πρὸν δημοσιεύειν ἐπιχειρεῖν; **ΚΑΛ.** Φιλόνεικος εἰ, ὡς **Σώκρατες.**

ΣΑΡ. LXXI. **ΣΩ.** Άλλ' οὐ φιλονεικίᾳ γε ἔρωτῷ, ἄλλ' ὡς ἀληθῶς βουλόμενος εἰδέναι δοτινά ποτε τρόπον οἵει δεῖν πολιτεύεσθαι ἐν ἡμῖν, εἰ ἄλλου του ἄρα ἐπιμελήσει ἡμῖν ἐλθὼν ἐπὶ τὰ τῆς ^С πόλεως πράγματα ἡ ὅπως ὅτι βέλτιστοι οἱ πολῖται ὄμεν. ἡ οὐ πολλάκις ἥδη ὠμολογήκαμεν τοῦτο δεῖν πράττειν τὸν πολιτικὸν ἄνδρα; ὠμολογήκαμεν, ἡ οὐ; ἀποκρίνουν. **Ωμολογήκαμεν.** ἔγῳ

ὑπὲρ σοῦ ἀποκρινοῦμαι. Εἰ τοίνυν τοῦτο δεῖ τὸν ἄγαθὸν ἄνδρα παρασκευάζειν τῇ ἑαυτοῦ πόλει, νῦν μοι ἀναμνησθεὶς εἰπὲ περὶ ἐκείνων τῶν ἄνδρῶν ὃν ὀλίγῳ πρότερον ἔλεγες, εἰ ἔτι σοι δοῦκοῦσιν ἄγαθοὶ πολῖται γεγονέναι, Περικλῆς καὶ Κίμων καὶ Μιλτιάδης καὶ Θεμιστοκλῆς. ΚΑΛ. "Εμοιγε. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν εἴπερ ἄγαθοί, δῆλον ὅτι ἔκαστος αὐτῶν βελτίους ἐποίει τοὺς πολίτας ἀντὶ χειρόνων. ἐποίει, ἢ οὐ; ΚΑΛ. Ναί. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ὅτε Περικλῆς ἥρχετο λέγειν ἐν τῷ δήμῳ, χείρους ἥσαν οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἢ ὅτε τὰ τελευταῖα ἔλεγεν; ΚΑΛ. "Ισως. ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἵσως δὴ, ὡς βέλτιστε, ἀλλ' ἀνάγκη ἐκ τῶν ὡμολογημένων, Ε εἴπερ ἄγαθός γ' ἦν ἐκεῖνος πολίτης. ΚΑΛ. Τί οὖν δὴ; ΣΩ. Οὐδέν. ἀλλὰ τόδε μοι εἴπερ ἐπὶ τούτῳ, εἰ λέγονται Ἀθηναῖοι διὰ Περικλέα βελτίους γεγονέναι, ἢ πᾶν τούναντίον διαφθαρῆναι ὑπ' ἐκείνου. ταυτὶ γὰρ ἔγωγε ἀκούω, Περικλέα πεποιηκέναι Ἀθηναίους ἀργοὺς καὶ δειλοὺς καὶ λάλους καὶ φιλαργύρους, εἰς μισθοφορίαν πρῶτον καταστήσαντα. ΚΑΛ. Τῶν τὰ ὡτα κατεαγότων ἀκούεις ταῦτα, ὡς Σώκρατες. ΣΩ. Ἄλλα τάδε οὐκέτι ἀκούω, ἀλλ' οἶδα σαφῶς καὶ ἔγὼ καὶ σύ, ὅτι τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ηὔδοκίμει Περικλῆς καὶ οὐδεμίαν αἰσχρὰν δίκην κατεψηφίσαντο αὐτοῦ Ἀθηναῖοι, ἥνικα χείρους ἥσαν. ἐπειδὴ δὲ καλοὶ 516 κάγαθοὶ γεγόνεσαν ὑπ' αὐτοῦ, ἐπὶ τελευτῇ τοῦ βίου τοῦ Περικλέους, κλοπὴν αὐτοῦ κατεψηφίσαντο, ὀλίγου δὲ καὶ θανάτου ἐτίμησαν, δῆλον ὅτι ὡς πονηροῦ ὅντος.

Cap. LXXII. *ΚΑΛ.* Τί οὖν ; τούτου ἔνεκα κακὸς ἦν Περικλῆς ; *ΣΩ.* Ὁνων γοῦν ἀν ἐπιμελητὴς καὶ ἵππων καὶ βοῶν τοιοῦτος ὃν κακὸς ἀν ἐδόκει εἶναι, εἰ παραλαβὼν μὴ λακτίζοντας μηδὲ κυρίτοντας μηδὲ δάκνοντας ἀπέδειξε ταῦτα ἀπαντα ποιοῦντας δι' ἀγριότητα. ἢ οὐ δοκεῖ σοι κακὸς εἶναι ἐπιμελητὴς ὁστισοῦν ὅτουοῦν ζώου, ὃς B ἀν παραλαβὼν ἡμερώτερα ἀποδείξῃ ἀγριώτερα ἢ παρέλαθε ; *Δοκεῖ,* ἢ οὐ ; *ΚΑΛ.* Πάνυ γε, ἵνα σοι χαρίσωμαι. *ΣΩ.* Καὶ τόδε τοίνυν μοι χάρισαι ἀποκρινάμενος, πότερον καὶ ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἐν τῷν ζῷων ἐστίν, ἢ οὐ ; *ΚΑΛ.* Πῶς γὰρ οὐ ; *ΣΩ.* Οὐκοῦν ἀνθρώπων Περικλῆς ἐπεμέλετο ; *ΚΑΛ.* Ναί. *ΣΩ.* Τί οὖν ; οὐκ ἔδει αὐτούς, ὡς ἄρτι ὥμολογοῦμεν, δικαιοτέρους γεγονέναι ἀγτὶ ἀδικωτέρων ὑπ' ἐκείνου, εἴπερ ἐκεῖνος ἐπεμελεῖτο C αὐτῶν ἀγαθὸς ὃν τὰ πολιτικά ; *ΚΑΛ.* Πάνυ γε. *ΣΩ.* Οὐκοῦν οἵ γε δίκαιοι ἡμεροι, ὡς ἔφη Ὁμηρος. σὺ δὲ τί φήσ; οὐχ οὕτως ; *ΚΑΛ.* Ναί. *ΣΩ.* Άλλὰ μὴν ἀγριωτέρους γε αὐτοὺς ἀπέφηνεν ἢ οἵους παρέλαθε, καὶ ταῦτ' εἰς αὐτόν, δν ἥκιστ' ἀν ἐβούλετο. *ΚΑΛ.* Βούλει σοι ὥμολογήσω ; *ΣΩ.* Εἰ δοκῶ γέ σοι ἀληθῆ λέγειν. *ΚΑΛ.* Ἔστω δὴ ταῦτα. *ΣΩ.* Οὐκοῦν εἴπερ ἀγριωτέρους, ἀδικωτέρους τε καὶ χείρους ; *ΚΑΛ.* Ἔστω. *ΣΩ.* Οὐκ ἄρ τὸ ἀγαθὸς τὰ πολιτικὰ Πε- D ρικλῆς ἦν ἐκ τούτου τοῦ λόγου. *ΚΑΛ.* Οὐ σύ γε φήσ. *ΣΩ.* Μὰ Δί' οὐδέ γε σὺ ἐξ ὅν ὥμολογεῖς. Πάλιν δὲ λέγε μοι περὶ Κίμωνος . οὐκ ἔξωστρακισαν αὐτὸν οὗτοι, οὓς ἐθεράπευεν, ἵνα

αὐτοῦ δέκα ἐτῶν μὴ ἀκούσειαν τῆς φωνῆς; καὶ Θεμιστοκλέα ταῦτα ταῦτα ἐποίησαν καὶ φυγῆ προσεζημίωσαν; Μιλτιάδην δὲ τὸν ἐν Μαραθῶνι Ε εἰς τὸ βάρος ἐμβαλεῖν ἐψηφίσαντο, καὶ εἰ μὴ διὰ τὸν πρύτανιν, ἐνέπεσεν ἄν; Καίτοι οὗτοι, εἰ ἦσαν ἄνδρες ἀγαθοί, ὡς σὺ φήσ, οὐκ ἄν ποτε ταῦτα ἐπασχον. οὐκονν οἴ γε ἀγαθοὶ ἥνιοχοι κατ' ἀρχὰς μὲν οὐκ ἐκπίπτουσιν ἐκ τῶν ζευγῶν, ἐπειδὴν δὲ θεραπεύσωσι τοὺς ἵππους καὶ αὐτοὶ ἀμείνους γένωνται ἥνιοχοι, τότε ἐκπίπτουσιν. οὐκ ἔστι ταῦτ' οὔτε ἐν ἥνιοχείᾳ οὔτε ἐν ἄλλῳ ἐργῷ οὐδενί. ἢ δοκεῖ σοι; **ΚΑΛ.** Οὐκ ἔμοιγε. **ΣΩ.** Ἀληθεῖς ἀρα, ὡς ἔοικεν, οἱ ἐμπροσθεν λόγοι 517 ἦσαν, ὅτι οὐδένα ἥμετς ἴσμεν ἄνδρα ἀγαθὸν γεγονότα τὰ πολιτικὰ ἐν τῇδε τῇ πόλει. σὺ δὲ ὀμολόγεις τῶν γε νῦν οὐδένα, τῶν μέντοι ἐμπροσθεν, καὶ προείλου τούτους τοὺς ἄνδρας. οὗτοι δὲ ἀνεφάνησαν ἐξ ἵσου τοῖς νῦν ὅντες, ὥστε, εἰ οὗτοι ἥντορες ἦσαν, οὐτε τῇ ἀληθινῇ ὥντορικῃ ἐχρῶντο — οὐ γὰρ ἄν ἐξέπεσον — οὐτε τῇ κολακικῇ.

Cap. LXXXIII. ΚΑΛ. Ἀλλὰ μέντοι πολλοῦ
Β γε δεῖ, ὃ Σώκρατες, μὴ ποτέ τις τῶν νῦν ἐργα τοιαῦτα ἐργάσηται, οἷα τούτων ὃς βούλει εἰργασται. **ΣΩ.** Ὡ δαιμόνιε, οὐδὲν ἐγὼ ψέγω τούτους, ὡς γε διακόνους εἶναι πόλεως, ἀλλὰ μοι δοκοῦσι τῶν γε νῦν διακονικώτεροι γεγονέναι καὶ μᾶλλον οἵοι τε ἐκπορίζειν τῇ πόλει ὡν ἐπεθύμει. ἀλλὰ γὰρ μεταβιβάζειν τὰς ἐπιθυμίας καὶ μὴ ἐπιτρέπειν, πείθοντες καὶ βιαζόμενοι ἐπὶ τοῦτο, ὅθεν ἔμελλον ἀμείνους ἔσεσθαι οἱ πολῖται, ὡς ἔπος

εἰπεῖν οὐδὲν τούτων διέφερον ἐκεῖνοι· ὅπερ μόνον C
 ἔργον ἐστὶν ἀγαθοῦ πολίτου. ναῦς δὲ καὶ τείχη
 καὶ νεώρια καὶ ἄλλα πολλὰ τοιαῦτα καὶ ἐγώ σοι
 ὁμολογῶ δεινοτέρους εἶναι ἐκείνους τούτων ἐκπο-
 ρίζειν. Πρᾶγμα οὖν γελοῖον ποιοῦμεν ἐγώ τε
 καὶ σὺ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις. ἐν παντὶ γὰρ τῷ χρόνῳ,
 ὃν διαλεγόμεθα, οὐδὲν πανόμεθα εἰς τὸ αὐτὸν ἀεὶ^D
 περιφερόμενοι καὶ ἀγνοοῦντες ἄλληλων ὃ τι λέ-
 γομεν. ἐγὼ γοῦν σε πολλάκις οἷμαι ὡμολογηκέναι
 καὶ ἐγνωκέναι, ὡς ἄρα διττὴ αὐτῇ τις ἡ πραγμα-
 τεία ἐστὶν καὶ περὶ τὸ σῶμα καὶ περὶ τὴν ψυχήν,
 καὶ ἡ μὲν ἑτέρα διακονική ἐστιν, ἡ δυνατὸν εἶναι
 ἐκπορίζειν, ἐὰν μὲν πεινῆ τὰ σώματα ἡμῶν, σιτία,
 ἐὰν δὲ διψῆ, ποτά, ἐὰν δὲ διγῶ, ἴματια, στρώμα-
 τα, ὑποδήματα, ἄλλα δὲν ἔρχεται σώματα εἰς ἐπι-
 θυμίαν. καὶ ἐξεπίτηδές σοι διὰ τῶν αὐτῶν εἰκό-
 νων λέγω, ἵνα ὅπον καταμάθῃς. τούτων γὰρ
 ποριστικὸν εἶναι ἡ κάπηλον ὄντα ἡ ἐμπορον ἡ
 δημιουργόν του αὐτῶν τούτων, σιτοποιὸν ἡ ὄψο-^E
 ποιὸν ἡ ὑφάντην ἡ σκυτοτόμον ἡ σκυτοδεψόν, οὐ-
 δὲν θαυμαστόν ἐστιν, ὄντα τοιοῦτον δόξαι καὶ
 αὐτῷ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις θεραπευτὴν εἶναι σώματος,
 παντὶ τῷ μὴ εἰδότι, δτι ἐστι τις παρὰ ταύτας
 ἀπάσας τέχνη γυμναστική τε καὶ ἰατρική, ἡ δὴ
 τῷ ὄντι ἐστὶ σώματος θεραπεία, ἥνπερ καὶ προσή-
 κει τούτων ἀρχεῖν πασῶν τῶν τεχνῶν καὶ χρῆ-
 σθαι τοῖς τούτων ἔργοις διὰ τὸ εἰδέναι ὃ τι τὸ
 χρηστὸν καὶ πονηρὸν τῶν σιτίων ἡ ποτῶν ἐστιν^{b18}
 εἰς ἀρετὴν σώματος, τὰς δ' ἄλλας πάσας ταύτας
 ἀγνοεῖν· διὸ δὴ καὶ ταύτας μὲν δουλοπρεπεῖς τε

καὶ διακονικὰς καὶ ἀνελευθέρους εἶναι περὶ σώματος πραγματείαν, τὰς ἄλλας τέχνας· τὴν δὲ γυμναστικὴν καὶ ιατρικὴν κατὰ τὸ δίκαιον δεσποίνας εἶναι τούτων. ταῦτα οὖν ταῦτα ὅτι ἔστι καὶ περὶ ψυχῆν, τοτὲ μέν μοι δοκεῖς μανθάνειν ὅτι λέγω, καὶ ὁμολογεῖς ὡς εἰδὼς, ὃ τι ἔγω λέγω· ἥκεις δὲ ὀλίγον ὑστερον λέγων, ὅτι [ἄνθρωποι]
 Β καλοὶ κἀγαθοὶ γεγόνασι πολῖται ἐν τῇ πόλει, καὶ ἐπειδὴν ἔγω ἐρωτῶ οἵτινες, δοκεῖς μοι ὁμοιοτάτους προτείνεσθαι ἀνθρώπους περὶ τὰ πολιτικά, ὥσπερ
 ἄν εἰ περὶ τὰ γυμναστικὰ ἔμου ἐρωτῶντος οἵτινες
 ἀγαθοὶ γεγόνασιν ἢ εἰσὶ σωμάτων θεραπευταί,
 ἔλεγές μοι πάνυ σπουδάζων, Θεαρίων ὁ ἀρτοκόπος
 καὶ Μίθαικος ὁ τὴν ὁψοπούιαν συγγεγραφῶς τὴν
 Σικελικὴν καὶ Σάραμβος ὁ κάπηλος, ὅτι οὗτοι
 θαυμάσιοι γεγόνασι σωμάτων θεραπευταί, ὁ μὲν
 C ἀρτοὺς θαυμαστοὺς παρασκευάζων, ὁ δὲ ὁψον, ὁ
 δὲ οἶνον.
 CAP. LXXIV.
"Ισως ἀν οὖν ἥγανάκτεις, εἴς σοι ἔλεγον ἔγω, ὅτι, "Ανθρωπε, ἐπαΐεις οὐδὲν περὶ γυμναστικῆς· διακόνους μοι λέγεις καὶ ἐπιθυμιῶν παρασκευαστὰς ἀνθρώπους, οὐκ ἐπαΐοντας καλὸν κἀγαθὸν οὐδὲν περὶ αὐτῶν, οἶ, ἄν οὗτοι τύχωσιν, ἐμπλήσαντες καὶ παχύναντες τὰ σώματα τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἐπαινούμενοι ὑπ' αὐτῶν, προσαπολοῦσιν αὐτῶν καὶ τὰς ἀρχαίας σάρκας. οἱ δ' αὖ δι' ἀπειρίαν οὐ τοὺς ἔστιωντας αἰτιάσονται τῶν νόσων αἰτίους εἶναι καὶ τῆς ἀποβολῆς τῶν ἀρχαίων σαρκῶν, ἀλλ' οἱ ἄν αὐτοῖς τύχωσι τότε παρόντες καὶ συμβουλεύοντές τι, ὅταν δὴ αὐτοῖς ἥκῃ ἡ τότε πλησμονὴ νόσον φέρουσα

συχνῷ ὕστερον χρόνῳ, ἅτε ἀνευ τοῦ ὑγιεινοῦ γεγονοῦ, τούτους αἰτιάσονται καὶ ψέξουσι καὶ κακόν τι ποιήσουσιν, ἂν οἶοί τ' ὅσι, τοὺς δὲ προτέρους ἐκείνους καὶ αἰτίους τῶν κακῶν ἐγκωμιά-Ε σουσι. καὶ σὺ νῦν, ὁ Καλλίκλεις, ὁμοιότατον τούτῳ ἐργάζει· ἐγκωμιάζεις ἀνθρώπους, οἱ τούτους είστιάκασιν εὐωχοῦντες ὃν ἐπεθύμουν, καὶ φασι μεγάλην τὴν πόλιν πεποιηκέναι αὐτούς· διὰ δὲ οἰδεῖ καὶ ὑπουρλός ἐστι δι’ ἐκείνους τοὺς παλαιούς, οὐκ αἰσθάνονται. ἄνευ γάρ σωφροσύ-519 νης καὶ δικαιοσύνης λιμένων καὶ νεωρίων καὶ τειχῶν καὶ φόρων καὶ τοιούτων φλυαριῶν ἐμπεπλήκασι τὴν πόλιν. δταν οὖν ἔλθῃ ἡ καταβολὴ αὗτη τῆς ἀσθενείας, τοὺς τότε παρόντας αἰτιάσονται συμβούλους, Θεμιστοκλέα δὲ καὶ Κίμωνα καὶ Περικλέα ἐγκωμιάσουσι, τοὺς αἰτίους τῶν κακῶν· σοῦ δὲ ἵσως ἐπιλήψονται, ἐὰν μὴ εὐλαβῇ, καὶ τοῦ ἐμοῦ ἔταιρον Ἀλκιβιάδου, δταν καὶ τὰ ἀρχαῖα προσαπολλύωσι πρὸς οὓς ἐκτήσαντο, οὐκ Β αἰτίων ὅντων τῶν κακῶν, ἀλλ’ ἵσως συναιτίων. καίτοι ἔγωγε ἀνόητον πρᾶγμα καὶ νῦν δρῶ γιγνόμενον καὶ ἀκούω τῶν παλαιῶν ἀνδρῶν πέρι. αἰσθάνομαι γάρ, δταν ἡ πόλις τινὰ τῶν πολιτικῶν ἀνδρῶν μεταχειρίζηται ὡς ἀδικοῦντα, ἀγανακτούντων καὶ σχετλιαζόντων, ὡς δεινὰ πάσχοντι· πολλὰ καὶ ἀγαθὰ τὴν πόλιν πεποιηκότες ἄρα ἀδίκως ὑπ’ αὐτῆς ἀπόλλυνται, ὡς ὁ τούτων λόγος. τὸ δὲ ὅλον ψεῦδος ἐστι. προστάτης γάρ πόλεως Σ οὐδ’ ἀν εἴς ποτε ἀδίκως ἀπόλοιτο ὑπ’ αὐτῆς τῆς πόλεως, ἡς προστατεῖ. κινδυνεύει γάρ ταῦτὸν

εἶναι, ὅσοι τε πολιτικοὶ προσποιοῦνται εἶναι καὶ
ὅσοι σοφισταί. καὶ γὰρ οἱ σοφισταί, τᾶλλα σοφοὶ
ὄντες, τοῦτο ἀτοπὸν ἐργάζονται πρᾶγμα· φά-
σκοντες γὰρ ἀρετῆς διδάσκαλοι εἶναι πολλάκις
κατηγοροῦσι τῶν μαθητῶν, ὡς ἀδικοῦσι σφᾶς αὐ-
τούς, τούς τε μισθοὺς ἀποστεροῦντες καὶ ἄλλην
χάριν οὐκ ἀποδιδόντες, εὖ παθόντες ὑπ' αὐτῶν.
Δικαὶ τούτου τοῦ λόγου τί ἀν ἀλογώτερον εἴη
πρᾶγμα, ἀνθρώπους ἀγαθοὺς καὶ δικαίους γενο-
μένους, ἔξαιρεθέντας μὲν ἀδικίαν ὑπὸ τοῦ διδα-
σκάλου, σχόντας δὲ δικαιοσύνην, ἀδικεῖν τούτῳ δ
οὐκ ἔχουσιν; οὐ δοκεῖ σοι τοῦτο ἀτοπὸν εἶναι, ὡ
ἔταιρε; Ὡς ἀληθῶς δημηγορεῖν με ἡνάγκασας,
ὅς Καλλίκλεις, οὐκ ἔθέλων ἀποκρίνεσθαι.

Cap. LXXV. ΚΑΛ. Σὺ δ' οὐκ ἀν οἶός τ'
Ε εἶης λέγειν, εἰ μή τίσ σοι ἀποκρίνοιτο; **ΣΩ.**
"Εοικά γε· νῦν γοῦν συχνοὺς τείνω τῶν λόγων,
ἐπειδὴ μοι οὐκ ἔθέλεις ἀποκρίνεσθαι. ἀλλ', ὡ
γαθέ, εἰπὲ πρὸς φιλίου, οὐ δοκεῖ σοι ἀλογον εἶ-
ναι ἀγαθὸν φάσκοντα πεποιηκέναι τινὰ μέμφε-
σθαι τούτῳ, δι τοῦ ὑψ' ἔαυτοῦ ἀγαθὸς γεγονώς τε
καὶ ὡν ἔπειτα πονηρός ἐστιν; **ΚΑΛ.** "Εμοιγε
δοκεῖ. **ΣΩ.** Οὐκοῦν ἀκούεις τοιαῦτα λεγόντων
520 τῶν φασκόντων παιδεύειν ἀνθρώπους εἰς ἀρετὴν;
ΚΑΛ. "Εγωγε. ἀλλὰ τί ἀν λέγοις ἀνθρώπων πέρι
οὐδενὸς ἀξίων; **ΣΩ.** Τί δ' ἀν περὶ ἔκείνων λέ-
γοις, οἵ φάσκοντες προεστάναι τῆς πόλεως καὶ
ἐπιμελεῖσθαι, δπως ὡς βελτίστη ἔσται, πάλιν αὐτῆς
κατηγοροῦσιν, ὅταν τύχωσιν, ὡς πονηροτάτης;
οἵει τι διαφέρειν τούτους ἔκείνων; ταῦτον, ὡς μα-

κάρι', ἐστὶ σοφιστὴς καὶ δῆταρ, ἡ ἐγγύς τι καὶ παραπλήσιον, ὥσπερ ἐγὼ ἔλεγον πρὸς Πῶλον. σὺ δὲ δι' ἄγνοιαν τὸ μὲν πάγκαλόν τι οἴει εἶναι, Β τὴν δητορικήν, τοῦ δὲ καταφρονεῖς. τῇ δὲ ἀληθείᾳ κάλλιον ἐστι σοφιστικὴ δητορικῆς ὅσφπερ νομοθετικὴ δικαστικῆς καὶ γυμναστικὴ ἴατρικῆς. μόνοις δ' ἔγωγε καὶ φίμην τοῖς δημηγόροις τε καὶ σοφισταῖς οὐκ ἐγχωρεῖν μέμφεσθαι τούτῳ τῷ πράγματι, ὃ αὐτοὶ παιδεύουσιν, ὡς πονηρόν ἐστιν εἰς σφᾶς, ἡ τῷ αὐτῷ λόγῳ τούτῳ ἀμα καὶ ἔαντῶν κατηγορεῖν, ὅτι οὐδὲν ὀφελήκασιν οὖς φασιν ὀφελεῖν. οὐχ οὕτως ἔχει; ΚΑΛ. Πάνυ γε. ΣΩ. Καὶ προέσθαι γε δήπου τὴν εὐεργεσίαν ἀνευ μισθοῦ, ὡς τὸ εἰκός, μόνοις τούτοις ἐνεχώρει, εἴπερ ἀληθῆ ἔλεγον. ἀλλην μὲν γὰρ εὐεργεσίαν τις εὐεργετηθείς, οἷον ταχὺς γενόμενος διὰ παιδοτρίβην, ἵσως ἀν ἀποστερήσει τὴν χάριν, εἰ προοῖτο αὐτῷ ὁ παιδοτρίβης καὶ μὴ συνθέμενος αὐτῷ μισθὸν ὅτι μάλιστα ἀμα μεταδιδοὺς τοῦ τάχους Δ λαμβάνοι τὸ ἀργύριον· οὐ γὰρ τῇ βραδυτῆτι, οἷμαι, ἀδικοῦσιν οἱ ἀνθρώποι, ἀλλ' ἀδικίᾳ. ἢ γάρ; ΚΑΛ. Ναί. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν εἴ τις αὐτῷ τοῦτο ἀφαιρεῖ, τὴν ἀδικίαν, οὐδὲν δεινὸν αὐτῷ μήποτε ἀδικηθῆ, ἀλλὰ μόνῳ ἀσφαλὲς ταύτην τὴν εὐεργεσίαν προέσθαι, εἴπερ τῷ ὅντι δύναιτο τις ἀγαθοὺς ποιεῖν. οὐχ οὕτως; ΚΑΛ. Φημί.

CAP. LXXVI. ΣΩ. Λιὰ ταῦτ' ἄρα, ὡς ἔοικε, τὰς μὲν ἄλλας συμβουλὰς συμβουλεύειν λαμβάνοντα ἀργύριον, οἷον οἰκοδομίας πέρι ἡ τῶν ἄλλων τεχνῶν, οὐδὲν αἰσχρόν. ΚΑΛ. Ἔοικέ Ε

γε. ΣΩ. Περὶ δέ γε ταύτης τῆς πράξεως, ὅντιν' ἀν τις τρόπον ὡς βέλτιστος εἴη καὶ ἄριστα τὴν αὐτοῦ οἰκίαν διοικοῦ ἢ πόλιν, αἰσχρὸν νενόμισται μὴ φάναι συμβουλεύειν, ἐὰν μή τις αὐτῷ ἀργύριον διδῷ. ἢ γάρ; **ΚΑΛ.** Ναί. **ΣΩ.** Λῆλον γάρ, ὅτι τοῦτο αἴτιόν ἐστιν, ὅτι μόνη αὕτη τῶν εὐεργεσιῶν τὸν εὖ παθόντα ἐπιθυμεῖν ποιεῖ ἀντ', εὖ ποιεῖν, ὥστε καλὸν δοκεῖ τὸ σημεῖον εἶναι, εἰ εὖ ποιήσας ταύτην τὴν εὐεργεσίαν ἀντ' εὖ πείσεται· εἰ δὲ μή, οὐ. ἔστι ταῦτα οὗτως ἔχοντα;

ΚΑΛ. Ἐστιν. **ΣΩ.** Ἐπὶ ποτέραν οὖν με παρακαλεῖς τὴν θεραπείαν τῆς πόλεως; διόρισόν μοι· τὴν τοῦ διαμάχεσθαι Ἀθηναίοις, δπως ὡς βέλτιστοι ἔσονται, ὡς ἵατρόν, ἢ ὡς διακονήσοντα καὶ πρὸς χάριν ὁμιλήσοντα; Τάληθῆ μοι εἰπέ, ὡς Καλλίκλεις· δίκαιος γάρ εἰ, ὥσπερ ἦρξω παρόησιάζεσθαι πρὸς ἐμέ, διατελεῖν ἀ νοεῖς λέγων. καὶ νῦν εὖ καὶ γενναιώς εἰπέ. **ΚΑΛ.** Λέγω τοίνυν, ὅτι ὡς διακονήσοντα. **ΣΩ.** Κολακεύσοντα ἄρα με, ὡς γενναιότατε, παρακαλεῖς. **ΚΑΛ.** Εἴ σοι Μυσόν γε ἥδιον καλεῖν, ὡς Σώκρατες· ὡς εἰ μὴ ταῦτά γε ποιήσεις — **ΣΩ.** Μή εἴπῃς δο πολλάκις εἴρηκας, ὅτι ἀποκτενεῖ με δο βουλόμενος, ἵνα μὴ αὖ καὶ ἐγὼ εἴπω, ὅτι πονηρός γε ὁν ἀγαθὸν ὅντα· μηδ' ὅτι ἀφαιρήσεται, ἐάν στι ἔχω, ἵνα μὴ αὖ ἐγὼ εἴπω, ὅτι Ἀλλ' ἀφελόμενος οὐχ ἔξει δο τι χρήσεται αὐτοῖς, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ με ἀδίκως ἀφείλετο, οὗτο καὶ λαβὼν ἀδίκως χρήσεται· εἰ δὲ ἀδίκως, αἰσχρῶς· εἰ δὲ αἰσχρῶς, κακῶς.

CAP. LXXVII. ΚΑΛ. Ὡς μοι δοκεῖς, ὡς Σώκρατες, πιστεύειν μηδ' ἀν ἐν τούτων παθεῖν, ὡς οἰκῶν ἐκποδὼν καὶ οὐχ ἀν εἰσαχθεὶς εἰς δικαστήριον ὑπὸ πάνυ ἵσως μοχθηροῦ ἀνθρώπου καὶ φαύλου! ΣΩ. Ἀνόητος ἄρα εἰμί, ὡς Καλλίκλεις, ὡς ἀληθῶς, εἰ μὴ οἴομαι ἐν τῇδε τῇ πόλει ὄντινοῦν ἀν, ὃ τι τύχοι, τοῦτο παθεῖν. τόδε μέν-
τοι εὖ οἶδ', δτι, ἐάνπερ εἰσίω εἰς δικαστήριον περὶ τούτων τινὸς κινδυνεύων ὃν σὺ λέγεις, πονηρός τίς με ἔσται ὁ εἰσάγων· οὐδεὶς γὰρ ἀν χρηστὸς μὴ ἀδικοῦντ' ἀνθρώπων εἰσαγάγοι. καὶ οὐδέν γε ἀτοπον, εἰ ἀποθάνοιμι. βούλει σοι εἴπω, διότι ταῦτα προσδοκῶ; ΚΑΛ. Πάνυ γε. ΣΩ. Οἴμαι μετ' ὀλίγων Ἀθηναίων, ἵνα μὴ εἴπω μόνος, ἐπιχειρεῖν τῇ ὡς ἀληθῶς πολιτικῇ τέχνη καὶ πράττειν τὰ πολιτικὰ μόνος τῶν νῦν. ἀτε οὖν οὐ πρὸς χάριν λέγων τοὺς λόγους οὓς λέγω ἐκάστοτε, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὸ βέλτιστον, οὐ πρὸς τὸ ἥδι-
στον, καὶ οὐχ ἐθέλων ποιεῖν ἀ σὺ παραινεῖς, τὰ κομψὰ ταῦτα, οὐχ ἔξω ὃ τι λέγω ἐν τῷ δικαστηρίῳ. ὃ αὐτὸς δέ μοι ἥκει λόγος, ὅνπερ πρὸς Πῶλον ἔλεγον· κρινοῦμαι γὰρ ὡς ἐν παιδίοις ἰατρὸς ἀν κρίνοιτο κατηγοροῦντος ὁψοποιοῦ. σκόπει γάρ, τί ἀν ἀπολογοῦτο ὁ τοιοῦτος ἀνθρώπος ἐν τούτοις ληφθείς, εἰ αὐτοῦ κατηγοροῦ τις λέγων, δτι Ὡ παιδεῖς, πολλὰ ὑμᾶς καὶ κακὰ ὅδε εἴργασται ἀνὴρ καὶ αὐτούς, καὶ τοὺς νεωτάτους ὑμῶν διαφθείρει, τέμνων τε καὶ κάσων καὶ ἴσχναίνων⁵²² καὶ πνίγων ἀπορεῖν ποιεῖ, πικρότατα πάματα δεδουὶς καὶ πεινῆν καὶ διψῆν ἀναγκάζων, οὐχ ὥσπερ

ἔγω πολλὰ καὶ ἡδέα καὶ παντοδαπὰ εὐώχουν
ὑμᾶς. τί ἀν οἵει ἐν τούτῳ τῷ κακῷ ἀποληφθέντα
τὸν ἰαιρὸν ἔχειν εἰπεῖν; ἢ εἰ εἴποι τὴν ἀλήθειαν,
ὅτι Ταῦτα πάντα ἔγω ἐποίουν, ὃ παιδεις, ὑγιει-
νῶς, ὅπόσον οἴει ἀν ἀναβοῆσαι τοὺς τοιούτους
δικαστάς; οὐ μέγα; ΚΑΛ. Ἰσως οἴεσθαι γε
χρή. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν οἴει ἐν πάσῃ ἀπορίᾳ ἂν αὐ-
τὸν ἔχεσθαι ὅ τι χρή εἰπεῖν; ΚΑΛ. Πάνυ γε.

CAP. LXXVIII. ΣΩ. Τοιοῦτον μέντοι καὶ
ἔγω οἶδ' ὅτι πάθος πάθοιμι ἀν εἰσελθὼν εἰς δικα-
στήριον. οὔτε γάρ ήδονάς ἃς ἐκπεπόρικα ἔξω
αὐτοῖς λέγειν, ἃς οὗτοι εὐεργεσίας καὶ ὥφελείας
νομίζουσιν, ἔγω δὲ οὔτε τοὺς πορίζοντας ζηλῶ
οὔτε οἷς πορίζεται· ἐάν τέ τίς με ἢ νεωτέρους φῆ
διαφθείρειν ἀπορεῖν ποιοῦντα, ἢ τοὺς πρεσβυτέ-
ρους κακηγορεῖν λέγοντα πικροὺς λόγους ἢ ἴδιᾳ
ἢ δημοσίᾳ, οὔτε τὸ ἀληθὲς ἔξω εἰπεῖν, ὅτι Δικαίως
επάντα ταῦτα ἔγω λέγω, καὶ πράττω τὸ ὑμέτερον
δὴ τοῦτο, ὃ ἀνδρες δικασταί, οὔτε ἄλλο οὐδέν.
ῶστε ἵσως, ὅ τι ἀν τύχω, τοῦτο πείσομαι. ΚΑΛ.
Δοκεῖ οὖν σοι, ὃ Σώκρατες, καλῶς ἔχειν ἄνθρω-
πος ἐν πόλει οὕτως διακείμενος καὶ ἀδύνατος ὥν
έαντῷ βοηθεῖν; ΣΩ. Εἰ ἐκεῖνό γε ἐν αὐτῷ
ὑπάρχοι, ὃ Καλλίκλεις, ὃ σὺ πολλάκις ὡμολόγη-
σας· εἰ βεβοηθηκὼς εἴη αὐτῷ, μήτε περὶ ἀνθρώ-
πους μήτε περὶ θεοὺς ἀδικον μηδὲν μήτε εἰρηκώς
μήτε εἰργασμένος. αὕτη γάρ τις βοήθεια ἔαντῷ
πολλάκις ἡμῖν ὡμολόγηται κρατίστη εἶναι. εἰ
μὲν οὖν ἐμέ τις ἔξελέγχοι ταύτην τὴν βοήθειαν
ἀδύνατον ὄντα ἐμαυτῷ καὶ ἄλλῳ βοηθεῖν, αἰσχυ-

νούμην ἀν καὶ ἐν πολλοῖς καὶ ἐν ὀλίγοις ἐξελεγχόμενος καὶ μόνος ὑπὸ μόνου, καὶ εἰ διὰ ταύτην τὴν ἀδυναμίαν ἀποθνήσκοιμι, ἀγανακτοίην ἄν· εἰ δὲ κολακικῆς ὁγητορικῆς ἐνδείᾳ τελευτώῃ ἔγωγε, εὐ οἶδα, ὅτι φραδίως ἵδοις ἄν με φέροντα τὸν θάνατον. αὐτὸ μὲν γὰρ τὸ ἀποθνήσκειν οὐδεὶς φοβεῖται, δοτις μὴ παντάπασιν ἀλόγιστός τε καὶ ἄνανδρος ἐστι, τὸ δὲ ἀδικεῖν φοβεῖται· πολλῶν γὰρ ἀδικημάτων γέμοντα τὴν ψυχὴν εἰς "Αἰδου ἀφίκεσθαι πάντων ἔσχατον πακῶν ἐστιν. εἰ δὲ βούλει, σοὶ ἔγώ, ὡς τοῦτο οὕτως ἔχει, ἐθέλω λόγον λέξαι. ΚΛΔ. Ἄλλ' ἐπείπερ γε καὶ τάλλα ἐπέραντας, καὶ τοῦτο πέρανον.

CAP. LXXIX. ΣΩ. ⁵²³"Ακονε δή, φασί, μάλα καλοῦ λόγουν, ὃν σὺ μὲν ἥγήσει μῦθον, ὡς ἔγὼ οἴμαι, ἔγὼ δὲ λόγον· ὡς ἀληθῆ γὰρ ὅντα σοι λέξω ἀ μέλλω λέγειν. ⁵²⁴"Ωσπερ γὰρ ⁵²⁵"Ομηρος λέγει, διενείμαντο τὴν ἀρχὴν ὁ Ζεὺς καὶ ὁ Ποσειδῶν καὶ ὁ Πλούτων, ἐπειδὴ παρὰ τοῦ πατρὸς παρέλαβον. ἦν οὖν νόμος ὃδε περὶ ἀνθρώπων ἐπὶ Κρόνουν, καὶ ἀεὶ καὶ νῦν ἔτι ἔστιν ἐν Θεοῖς, τῶν ἀνθρώπων τὸν μὲν δικαίως τὸν βίον διελθόντα καὶ δοσίως, ἐπειδὰν τελευτήσῃ, ἐς μακάρων νήσους ἀπιόντα οἰκεῖν ἐν πάσῃ εὐδαιμονίᾳ ἐκτὸς πακῶν, τὸν δὲ ἀδίκως καὶ ἀθέως εἰς τὸ τῆς τίσεώς τε καὶ δίκης δεσμωτήριον, ὃ δὴ τάρταρον παλοῦσιν, ἴέναι. τούτων δὲ δικασταὶ ἐπὶ Κρόνου καὶ ἔτι νεωστὶ τοῦ Διὸς τὴν ἀρχὴν ἔχοντος ζῶντες ἥσαν ζώντων, ἐκείνη τῇ ἡμέρᾳ δικάζοντες, ἢ μέλλοιεν τελευτᾶν. πακῶς οὖν αἱ δίκαιαι ἐκρίνοντο. ὃ τε οὖν Πλούτων

καὶ οἱ ἐπιμεληταὶ οἱ ἐκ μακάρων νήσων ἴόντες
 C ἔλεγον πρὸς τὸν Δία, ὅτι φοιτῶν σφιν ἄνθρωποι
 ἔκατέρωσε ἀνάξιοι. εἶπεν οὖν ὁ Ζεύς, Ἐλλ᾽
 ἔγώ, ἔφη, παύσω τοῦτο γιγνόμενον. νῦν μὲν γὰρ
 κακῶς αἱ δίκαιαι δικάζονται. ἀμπεχόμενοι γάρ,
 ἔφη, οἱ κρινόμενοι κρίνονται· ζῶντες γὰρ κρίνον-
 ται. πολλοὶ οὖν, ή δ' ὅς, ψυχὰς πονηρὰς ἔχοντες
 ἡμφιεσμένοι εἰσὶ σώματά τε καλὰ καὶ γένη καὶ
 πλούτους, καί, ἐπειδὰν ή κρίσις ή, ἔρχονται αὐ-
 τοῖς πολλοὶ μάρτυρες, μαρτυρήσοντες, ὡς δικαίως
 D βεβιώκασιν. οἱ οὖν δικασταὶ ὑπό τε τούτων ἐκ-
 πλήττονται, καὶ ἀμα καὶ αὐτοὶ ἀμπεχόμενοι δι-
 κάζονται, πρὸ τῆς ψυχῆς τῆς αὐτῶν ὄφθαλμοὺς καὶ
 ὤτα καὶ ὄλον τὸ σῶμα προκεκαλυμμένοι. ταῦτα
 δὴ αὐτοῖς πάντα ἐπίπροσθεν γίγνεται, καὶ τὰ αὐ-
 τῶν ἡμφιέσματα καὶ τὰ τῶν κρινομένων. πρῶτον
 μὲν οὖν, ἔφη, πανστέον ἐστὶ προειδότας αὐτοὺς
 τὸν θάνατον· νῦν μὲν γὰρ προϊστασι. τοῦτο μὲν
 οὖν καὶ δὴ εἴρηται τῷ Προμηθεῖ δῆτας ἀν παύσῃ
 E αὐτῶν. ἐπειτα γυμνοὺς κριτέον ἀπάντων τού-
 των· τεθνεῶτας γὰρ δεῖ κρίνεσθαι. καὶ τὸν κρι-
 τὴν δεῖ γυμνὸν εἶναι, τεθνεῶτα, αὐτῇ τῇ ψυχῇ
 αὐτὴν τὴν ψυχὴν θεωροῦντα ἔξαίφνης ἀποθανόν-
 τος ἐκάστου, ἔρημον πάντων τῶν συγγενῶν καὶ
 καταλιπόντα ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς πάντα ἐκεῖνον τὸν
 κόσμον, ἵνα δικαία η κρίσις ή. ἔγὼ μὲν οὖν ταῦ-
 τα ἐγνωκὼς πρότερος ή ὑμεῖς ἐποιησάμην δικα-
 στὰς νίεῖς ἐμαυτοῦ, δύο μὲν ἐκ τῆς Ἀσίας, Μίνω
 524τε καὶ Ῥαδάμανθυν, ἕνα δὲ ἐκ τῆς Εὐρώπης,
 Αἰακόν. οὗτοι οὖν ἐπειδὰν τελευτήσωσι, δικά-

σουσιν ἐν τῷ λειμῶνι, ἐν τῇ τριόδῳ ἐξ ἣς φέρετον τὸ ὄδω, ἡ μὲν εἰς μακάρων νήσους, ἡ δ' εἰς τάρταρον. καὶ τοὺς μὲν ἐκ τῆς Ἀσίας Ῥαδάμανθυς κρινεῖ, τοὺς δὲ ἐκ τῆς Εὐρώπης Αἰακός. Μίνω δὲ πρεσβεῖα δώσω, ἐπιδιαιρίνειν, ἐὰν ἀπορητόν τι τῷ ἔτερῳ, ἵνα ὡς δικαιοτάτη ἡ κρίσις ἢ περὶ τῆς πορείας τοῖς ἀνθρώποις.

CAP. LXXX. *Ταῦτ' ἔστιν, ὃ Καλλίκλεις, ἀ*
ἐγὼ ἀκηκοὼς πιστεύω ἀληθῆ εἶναι· καὶ ἐκ τού-
των τῶν λόγων τοιόνδε τι λογίζομαι συμβαίνειν.
'Ο θάνατος τυγχάνει ὅν, ὡς ἔμοὶ δοκεῖ, οὐδὲν
ἄλλο ἢ δυοῖν πραγμάτοιν διάλυσις, τῆς ψυχῆς
καὶ τοῦ σώματος, ἀπ' ἀλλήλοιν. ἐπειδὰν δὲ δια-
λυθῆτον ἄρα ἀπ' ἀλλήλοιν, οὐ πολὺ ἥττον ἐκά-
τερον αὐτοῖν ἔχει τὴν ἔξιν τὴν αὐτοῦ ἥνπερ καὶ
ὅτε ἔζη ὁ ἀνθρωπός, τό τε σῶμα τὴν φύσιν τὴν
αὐτοῦ καὶ τὰ θεραπεύματα καὶ τὰ παθήματα,
ἔνδηλα πάντα. οἷον εἴ τινος μέγα ἦν τὸ σῶμα
φύσει ἢ τροφῇ ἢ ἀμφότερα ζῶντος, τούτου καὶ
ἐπειδὰν ἀποθάνῃ ὁ νεκρὸς μέγας· καὶ εἰ παχύς,
παχύς καὶ ἀποθανόντος, καὶ τᾶλλα οὐτως. καὶ
εἰ αὖ ἐπετήδενε κομᾶν, κομήτης τούτου καὶ ὁ νε-
κρός. μαστιγίας αὖ εἴ τις ἦν καὶ ἴχνη εἶχε τῶν
πληγῶν οὐλὰς ἐν τῷ σώματι ἢ ὑπὸ μαστίγων ἢ
ἄλλων τραυμάτων ζῶν, καὶ τεθνεῶτος τὸ σῶμα
ἔστιν ἰδεῖν ταῦτα ἔχον. κατεαγότα τε εἴ του ἦν
μέλη ἢ διεστραμμένα ζῶντος, καὶ τεθνεῶτος ταῦτα
ταῦτα ἔνδηλα. ἐνὶ δὲ λόγῳ, οἷος εἶναι παρε-
σκεύαστο τὸ σῶμα ζῶν, ἔνδηλα ταῦτα καὶ τελευ-
τήσαντος ἢ πάντα ἢ τὰ πολλὰ ἐπί τινα χρόνον.

ταύτὸν δή μοι δοκεῖ τοῦτ' ἄρα καὶ περὶ τὴν ψυχὴν εἶναι, ὃ Καλλίκλεις· ἔνδηλα πάντα ἐστὶν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ, ἐπειδὰν γυμνωθῆ τοῦ σώματος, τά τε τῆς φύσεως καὶ τὰ παθήματα ἀ διὰ τὴν ἐπιτήδευσιν ἐκάστου πράγματος ἔσχεν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ὁ Ε ἀνθρωπος. Ἐπειδὰν οὖν ἀφίκωνται παρὰ τὸν δικαστήν, οἱ μὲν ἐκ τῆς Ἀσίας παρὰ τὸν Ῥαδάμανθυν, ὁ Ῥαδάμανθυς ἐκείνους ἐπιστήσας θεᾶται ἐκάστου τὴν ψυχήν, οὐκ εἰδὼς ὅτου ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ πολλάκις τοῦ μεγάλου βασιλέως ἐπιλαβόμενος ἢ ἄλλου ὅτουοῦν βασιλέως ἢ δυνάστου κατεῖδεν οὐδὲν ὑγιὲς ὃν τῆς ψυχῆς, ἀλλὰ διαμεμαστιγωμένην καὶ οὐλῶν μεστὴν ὑπὸ ἐπιορκιῶν καὶ ἀδικίας, ἢ ἐκάστῳ ἢ πρᾶξι αὐτοῦ ἐξωμόρξατο εἰς τὴν ψυχήν, καὶ πάντα σκολιὰ ὑπὸ ψεύδους καὶ ἀλαζονείας καὶ οὐδὲν εὐθὺ διὰ τὸ ἄνευ ἀληθείας τεθράψθαι· καὶ ὑπὸ ἐξουσίας καὶ τρυφῆς καὶ ὑβρεως καὶ ἀκρατίας τῶν πράξεων ἀσυμμετρίας τε καὶ αἰσχρότητος γέμουσαν τὴν ψυχὴν εἶδεν. Ἰδὼν δὲ ἀτίμως ταύτην ἀπέπεμψεν εὐθὺ τῆς φρουρᾶς, οἷ μέλλει ἐλθοῦσα ἀνατλῆναι τὰ προσήκοντα πάθη. CAP. LXXXI. Προσήκει δὲ παντὶ τῷ Β ἐν τιμωρίᾳ ὄντι, ὑπὸ ἄλλου ὁρθῶς τιμωρουμένῳ, ἢ βελτίονι γίγνεσθαι καὶ ὄντινασθαι ἢ παραδείγματι τοῖς ἄλλοις γίγνεσθαι, ἵν’ ἄλλοι ὁρῶντες πάσχοντα ἀ ἀν πάσχῃ φοβούμενοι βελτίους γίγνωνται. εἰσὶ δὲ οἱ μὲν ὡφελούμενοί τε καὶ δίκην διδόντες ὑπὸ θεῶν τε καὶ ἀνθρώπων οὗτοι, οἱ ἄνιάσιμα ἀμαρτήματα ἀμάρτωσιν· ὅμως δὲ δι’ ἀλγηδόνων καὶ ὁδυτῶν γίγνεται αὐτοῖς ἢ ὡφέλεια καὶ

ἐνθάδε καὶ ἐν Ἱδον· οὐ γάρ οἶόν τε ἄλλως ἀδικίας ἀπαλλάττεσθαι. οἱ δ' ἀν τὰ ἔσχατα ἀδικήσωσι καὶ διὰ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἀδικήματα ἀνίατοι γένωνται, ἐκ τούτων τὰ παραδείγματα γίγνεται, καὶ οὗτοι αὐτοὶ μὲν οὐκέτι ὄντες τούτους ὄρῶντες διὰ τὰς ἀμαρτίας τὰ μέγιστα καὶ ὁδυνηρότατα καὶ φοβερώτατα πάθη πάσχοντας τὸν ἀεὶ χρόνον, ἀτεχνῶς παραδείγματα ἀνηρτημένους ἔκει ἐν Ἱδον ἐν τῷ δεσμωτηρίῳ, τοῖς ἀεὶ τῶν ἀδίκων ἀφικνουμένοις θεάματα καὶ νουθετήματα. ὃν ἐγώ φημι ἔνα καὶ Ἀρχέλαον ἔσεσθαι, εἰ ἀληθῆ λέγει Πᾶλος, καὶ ἄλλον ὅστις ἀν τοιοῦτος τύραννος ἦ. οἷμαι δὲ καὶ τοὺς πολλοὺς εἶναι τούτων τῶν παραδειγμάτων ἐκ τυράννων καὶ βασιλέων καὶ δυναστῶν καὶ τὰ τῶν πόλεων πραξάντων γεγονότας· οὗτοι γάρ διὰ τὴν ἔξουσίαν μέγιστα καὶ ἀνοσιώτατα ἀμαρτήματα ἀμαρτάνουσι. μαρτυρεῖ δὲ τούτοις καὶ Ὁμηρος· βασιλέας γάρ καὶ δυνάστας ἔκεινος πεποίηκε τοὺς ἐν Ἱδον τὸν ἀεὶ Εχρόνον τιμωρουμένους, Τάνταλον καὶ Σίσυφον καὶ Τίτυρον. Θερσίτην δέ, καὶ εἴ τις ἄλλος πονηρὸς ἦν ἴδιώτης, οὐδεὶς πεποίηκε μεγάλαις τιμωρίαις συνεχόμενον ὡς ἀνίατον· οὐ γάρ, οἷμαι, ἔξην αὐτῷ· διὸ καὶ εὐδαιμονέστερος ἦν ἢ οἷς ἔξην. ἀλλὰ γάρ, ὡς Καλλίκλεις, ἐκ τῶν δυναμένων εἰσὶ καὶ οἱ σφόδρα πονηροὶ γιγνόμενοι ἄνθρωποι ·⁵²⁶ οὐδὲν μὴν κωλύει καὶ ἐν τούτοις ἀγαθοὺς ἄνδρας ἐγγίγνεσθαι, καὶ σφόδρα γε ἄξιον ἀγασθαι τῶν γιγνομένων· χαλεπὸν γάρ, ὡς Καλλίκλεις, καὶ

πολλοῦ ἐπαίνου ἄξιον ἐν μεγάλῃ ἐξουσίᾳ τοῦ ἀδικεῖν γενόμενον δικαίως διαβιῶνται. ὅλιγοι δὲ γίγνονται οἱ τοιοῦτοι· ἐπεὶ καὶ ἐνθάδε καὶ ἄλλοθι γεγόνασιν, οἷμαι δὲ καὶ ἔσονται καλοὶ κἀγαθοὶ Β ταύτην τὴν ἀρετὴν τὴν τοῦ δικαίως διαχειρίζειν ἀ ἄν τις ἐπιτρέπῃ· εἰς δὲ καὶ πάνυ ἐλλόγιμος γέγονε καὶ εἰς τοὺς ἄλλους Ἑλληνας, Ἀριστείδης ὁ Λυσιμάχου. οἱ δὲ πολλοί, ὡς ἀριστεῖ, κακοὶ γίγνονται τῶν δυναστῶν. CAP. LXXXII. Ὁπερ οὖν ἔλεγον, ἐπειδὰν ὁ Ἡράδάμανθος ἐκεῖνος τοιοῦτόν τινα λάβη, ἄλλο μὲν περὶ αὐτοῦ οὐκ οἴδεν οὐδέν, οὐθ' ὅστις οὕθ' ὕντινων, ὅτι δὲ πονηρός τις· καὶ τοῦτο κατιδὼν ἀπέπεμψεν εἰς τάρταρον, Σ ἐπισημηνάμενος, ἐάν τε ἴδιμος ἐάν τε ἀνίατος δοκῇ εἶναι· ὁ δὲ ἐκεῖσε ἀφικόμενος τὰ προσήκοντα πάσχει. ἐνίστε δ' ἄλλην εἰσιδὼν ὅσιως βεβιωκυῖαν καὶ μετ' ἀληθείας, ἀνδρὸς ἴδιώτου ἢ ἄλλου τινός, μάλιστα μέν, ἔγωγέ φημι, ὡς Καλλίκλεις, φιλοσόφου τὰ αντοῦ πράξαντος καὶ οὐ πολυπραγμονήσαντος ἐν τῷ βίῳ, ἥγασθη τε καὶ ἐς μακάρων νήσους ἀπέπεμψε. ταῦτα ταῦτα καὶ ὁ Αἰακός. ἐκάτερος δὲ τούτων ἡάβδον ἔχων δικάζει. Δ ὁ δὲ Μίνως ἐπισκοπῶν κάθηται μόνος, ἔχων χρυσοῦν σκῆπτρον, ὡς φησιν Ὁδυσσεὺς ὁ Ὄμηρος ἰδεῖν αὐτὸν

χρύσεον σκῆπτρον ἔχοντα, θεμιστεύοντα νέκυσσιν.

Ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν, ὡς Καλλίκλεις, ὑπὸ τούτων τῶν λόγων πέπεισμαι, καὶ σκοπῶ, ὅπως ἀποφανοῦμαι τῷ κριτῇ ὡς ὑγιεστάτην τὴν ψυχήν. χαίρειν οὖν

εάσσας τὰς τιμὰς τὰς τῶν πολλῶν ἀνθρώπων, τὴν
ἀλήθειαν σκοπῶν πειράσομαι τῷ ὅντι ὡς ἀν δύνω-
μαι βέλτιστος ὥν καὶ ζῆν καί, ἐπειδὰν ἀποθνή-
σκω, ἀποθνήσκειν. παρακαλῶ δὲ καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους
πάντας ἀνθρώπους, καθ' ὃσον δύναμαι, καὶ δὴ
καὶ σὲ ἀντιπαρακαλῶ ἐπὶ τοῦτον τὸν βίον καὶ
τὸν ἀγῶνα τοῦτον, ὃν ἔγώ φημι ἀντὶ πάντων τῶν
ἐνθάδε ἀγώνων εἶναι, καὶ ὀνειδίζω σοι, ὅτι οὐχ
οὗτος τ' ἔσει σαντῷ βοηθῆσαι, ὅταν ἡ δίκη σοι ἡ
καὶ ἡ κρίσις ἦν νῦν δὴ ἔγὼ ἔλεγον, ἀλλὰ ἔλθων
παρὰ τὸν δικαστὴν τὸν τῆς Αἰγίνης νέον, ἐπειδάν⁵²⁷
σου ἐπιλαβόμενος ἄγῃ, χασμήσει καὶ ἰλιγγιάσεις
οὐδὲν ἥπτον ἡ ἔγὼ ἐνθάδε σὺ ἔκει, καί σε ἵσως
τυπτήσει τις καὶ ἐπὶ κόρδης ἀτίμως, καὶ πάντως
προπηλακιεῖ.

Τάχα δ' οὖν ταῦτα μῆθός σοι δοκεῖ λέγεσθαι,
ὡσπερ γραός, καὶ καταφρονεῖς αὐτῶν. καὶ οὐδέν
γ' ἀν ἦν θαυμαστὸν καταφρονεῖν τούτων, εἴ πη
ζητοῦντες εἴχομεν αὐτῶν βελτίω καὶ ἀληθέστερα
εὑρεῖν· νῦν δὲ ὁρᾶς, ὅτι τρεῖς ὅντες ὑμεῖς, οἵπερ
σοφώτατοί ἔστε τῶν νῦν Ἑλλήνων, σύ τε καὶ ^BΠῶλος καὶ Γοργίας, οὐκ ἔχετε ἀποδεῖξαι, ὡς δεῖ
ἄλλον τινὰ βίον ζῆν ἡ τοῦτον, ὡσπερ καὶ ἔκεισε
φαίνεται συμφέρων, ἀλλ' ἐν τοσούτοις λόγοις τῶν
ἄλλων ἔλεγχομένων μόνος οὗτος ἡρεμεῖ ὁ λόγος,
ὡς εὐλαβητέον ἔστι τὸ ἀδικεῖν μᾶλλον ἡ τὸ ἀδι-
κεῖσθαι, καὶ παντὸς μᾶλλον ἀνδρὶ μελετητέον οὐ
τὸ δοκεῖν εἶναι ἀγαθόν, ἀλλὰ τὸ εἶναι καὶ ἴδιᾳ
καὶ δημοσίᾳ· ἐὰν δέ τις κατά τι κακὸς γίγνηται,
κολαστέος ἔστι, καὶ τοῦτο δεύτερον ἀγαθὸν μετὰ ^C

τὸ εἶναι δίκαιον, τὸ γίγνεσθαι καὶ κολαζόμενον διδόναι δίκην· καὶ πᾶσαν κολακείαν καὶ τὴν περὶ ἔαυτὸν καὶ τὴν περὶ τοὺς ἄλλους, καὶ περὶ ὀλίγους καὶ περὶ πολλούς, φευκτέον· καὶ τῇ ὁρτορικῇ οὗτῳ χρηστέον, ἐπὶ τὸ δίκαιον ἀεί, καὶ τῇ ἄλλῃ πάσῃ πράξει.

CAP. LXXXIII. Ἐμοὶ οὖν πειθόμενος ἀκολούθησον ἐνταῦθα, οἷς ἀφικόμενος εὐδαιμονήσεις καὶ ζῶν καὶ τελευτήσας, ὡς ὁ λόγος σημαίνει. καὶ ἔασόν τινά σου καταφρονῆσαι ὡς ἀνοήτου Δ καὶ προπηλακίσαι, ἐὰν βούληται, καὶ ναὶ μὰ Δία σύ γε θαρρῶν πατάξαι τὴν ἀτιμον ταύτην πληγήν· οὐδὲν γὰρ δεινὸν πείσει, ἐὰν τῷ ὅντι ἦς καλὸς κάγαθός, ἀσκῶν ἀρετήν. κἀπειτα οὗτῳ κοινῇ ἀσκήσαντες, τότε ἥδη, ἐὰν δοκῇ χρῆναι, ἐπιθησόμεθα τοῖς πολιτικοῖς, ἢ ὅποιον ἂν τι ἡμῖν δοκῇ, τότε βουλευσόμεθα, βελτίους ὅντες βουλεύεσθαι ἢ νῦν. αἰσχρὸν γὰρ ἔχοντάς γε ὡς νῦν φαινόμεθα ἔχειν, ἐπειτα νεανιεύεσθαι ὡς τι ὅντας, οἷς Ε οὐδέποτε ταῦτα δοκεῖ περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν, καὶ ταῦτα περὶ τῶν μεγίστων· εἰς τοσοῦτον ἥκομεν ἀπαιδευσίας! ὥσπερ οὖν ἡγεμόνι τῷ λόγῳ χρησώμεθα τῷ νῦν παραφανέντι, ὃς ἡμῖν σημαίνει, δι τοιούτος ὁ τρόπος ἀριστος τοῦ βίου, καὶ τὴν δικαιοσύνην καὶ τὴν ἄλλην ἀρετὴν ἀσκοῦντας καὶ ζῆν καὶ τεθνάναι. τούτῳ οὖν ἐπώμεθα, καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους παρακαλῶμεν, μὴ ἔκείνῳ, φησὶ πιστεύων ἐμὲ παρακαλεῖς· ἔστι γὰρ οὐδενὸς ἄξιος, φησὶ Καλλίκλεις.

N O T E S.

NOTES.

N. B. The references follow the marginal pages and letters of the text, which are those of the Paris edition of 1578, edited by H. Stephanus. Mt. stands for Matthiae's Grammar, second edition; K., for Kühner's Middle Grammar, translated by Edwards and Taylor; Cr., for Crosby's, second edition; and Soph., for that of Sophocles, quoted according to the original sections: — in the new edition (1847) the earlier and present sections are collated at the beginning.

447 A. *οὐτω μεταλαγχάνειν*, *so to take part in*; i. e. in the present instance, *to take no part in at all*. Callicles says, — “It were well to have such a share in a battle, as you have had in listening to Gorgias”; i. e. it were well to arrive too late for an unpleasant employment, but not for a feast such as we have had. For the selection of *war* in this proverbial phrase, comp. Phædr. 242, B, *οὐ πόλεμον ἀγγέλλεις*, *what you tell me is not at all disagreeable*; and so Laws, 702, D. — *τὸ λεγόμενον*, *as the saying is*. Soph. § 167, N. 2. Cr. § 334. 8. The accusative may be explained by considering it as the object of the general notion of action contained in the verbs, = are we doing *τὸ λεγόμενον*, i. e. are we too late. — *ἐπεδειξατο*. This verb in the middle, with an accus. (e. g. *σοφιαν* or a neuter adjective) or without, especially denotes that ostentatious display of their art, which the sophists and rhetoricians at this time were wont to make. — *τούτων* refers to *ἥκομεν καὶ ὑστεροῦμεν*. As the verbs denote but one act, *τούτον* might be used equally well, and the plural is not unfrequently used in referring to a single verb. Comp. 492, C.

B. *ἴγαν γὰρ καὶ λάσσομαι.* *καὶ*, also, refers to a suppressed clause. *No matter : for if I did the harm, I will also find the remedy.* According to Olympiod. and a Schol., the words are drawn from the Telephus of Euripides, being spoken by Achilles, who wounded that hero. — *εἰ μὲν δοκεῖ.* The indic. implies belief that such is the view of Socrates; while in *ἔτι δὲ βούλη* the subjunctive expresses the wish as a mere possible contingency. — *εἰσαῦθις, again, at another time, hereafter.* So *εἰσαῦθις ἀναβαλοῦ*, Sympos. 174, E; *εἰσαῦθις ἀποθέσθαι*, Euthydem. 275, A. — *τι δαι;* usually, where *δαι* is found, *δὲ* is in some MSS. as a various reading. The longer form, it is now admitted, is properly retained after *τι* and *πῶς*, where wonder or indignation is expressed. — *οὐκοῦν . . . νῦν.* Stallb., Ast, and others explain the construction by regarding *ἥξειν* as used imperatively (Soph. § 219, N. 6; Cr. § 625; K. § 306, R. 11), *ἀκοῦσαι Τοφείον* being understood. I incline to regard *ἐπιδειξεται* *νῦν* as the proper apodosis, which, owing to the intervention of the clause beginning with *γάρ*, deserts its own construction for that of the interposed clause. The sense is, *Well, then, whenever you wish to come to my house, Gorgias will exhibit to you, for he lodges with me.* So, apparently, Heindorf. Comp. Soph. CEd. R. 227–229, where the clause *πείσεται γάρ οὐδὲν* turns the apodosis following it, which would be naturally *γῆς ἀπίτω ἀβλαβής*, into *γῆς δ' ὑπεισιν ἀβλαβής.* — *εὖ λέγεις*, i. e. you are very civil in inviting us to your house, and quite right in wishing to spare Gorgias further fatigue. But, etc.

C. *διαλεχθῆναι*, here, *to discourse by way of question and answer*, tacitly contrasted with an *ἐπιδειξις*, in which Gorgias would be the sole speaker. Hence, *to hold a discussion, or search for truth* in that way, as Socrates did. Socrates, in Xen. Mem. 4. 5. 12, defines it *κοινῇ βούλευσθαι διαλέγοντας κατὰ γένη τὰ πράγματα.* In the end, the

notion of question and answer faded away from the derivatives of this word ; and that of logical reasoning, or that of the science of unchangeable, absolute truth, remained.

— δύναμις, *essence, nature.* — τοῦ ἀρδός pronominis fere partes agit, ut exprimi possit pronomine possessivo. Ast. *The art of the man* — his art, with perhaps something of contempt in τοῦ ἀρδός. — τὸ αὐτὸν ἐρωτᾶν, *to ask him in person, or himself.* And so 481, B. αὐτὸν is taken with the object of ἐρωτᾶν not expressed.

D. ἔροῦ, second aor., not ἔρουν. No present is used by the Attics. Soph. § 118, *sub voce*; K. § 166; Cr. § 298. — ὅπι ἐπαγγέλλει ἀποχρίνεσθαι. Cic. de Fin. 2, init.: “Quorum [sophistarum] e numero primus est ausus Leontinus Gorgias in conventu poscere quæstionem, id est, jubere dicere, qua de re quis vellet audire.” This is spoken of at length by Philostr. Vit. Sophist., Proœm.

448 A. ἡ πον . . . ἀποχρίνει, *no doubt, then, you answer with ease, O Gorgias.* Ast translates φαδίως, *libenter*, but his power to answer, and not his willingness, is in question. — ἀν δέ γε βούλη, ἔμοῦ, sc. λάμβανε πεῖσαν. For λ. πεῖσαν spoken of a person, comp. εἰ βούλει λαβεῖν μου πεῖσαν, Protag. 341, E, cited by Ast. — τι δὲ . . . ξκανῶς; *but what difference does that make, if I answer well enough for you?* To the common formula, τι τοῦτο; is sometimes added διαφέρει, which Stallb. here supplies. But τι can well be a nominative. τι τοῦτο; *what is that?* i. e. what of that?

B. Ἡρόδικος, a brother of Gorgias, of whom we know nothing besides his name and calling. He is not to be confounded, as the Scholiast well observes, with another man often mentioned by Plato, Herodicus of Selymbria in Thrace, and originally of Megara; who first taught gymnastics, but on the failure of his health gave himself up to the attempt to recover it; and was among the earliest to

cure diseases by exercise. —— *τίνα ἀν . . . ὄνομάζουεν*. The predicate-accusative with *καλεῖν*, *ὄνομάζειν*, may be *τίνα*, referring to any one by name or by some appellation taken from his art, business, etc.; or *τι*, which is neuter on account of *ὄνομα*. Here in *τίνα ἀν . . . οὐχ ὅπερ* both forms occur together. —— *ἢ ὁ ἀδελφὸς αὐτοῦ*. Polygnotus of Thasos, the most celebrated of this family of painters. He painted upon the wall of the Stoa Poecile at Athens gratuitously, and at Delphi. Of his pictures from epic subjects in a hall near the Delphian temple, Pausanias gives a minute account (10. 25. seq.), which has enabled two artists of the present day to reproduce his designs in the spirit of ancient art.

C. *νῦν δ' ἐπειδή*. In this sentence, both the main clause and that which furnishes the reason are interrogative, a usage which would be awkward in English, but is lively and favorable to brevity. A little below, 451, A, we have the interrogative included between the article and participle (*ἢ περὶ τι . . . ἔχοντα*), as it often is found within a relative sentence. Comp. Cr. § 539. 2. —— *ὦ Χαιρεψῶν*. The words which follow are plainly not in the style of conversation. The juxtaposition of words from the same root (*ἐμπειριῶν* *ἐμπειρῶς*, *ἄλλοι* *ἄλλων* *ἄλλως*, *ἀριστῶν* *ἀριστοῖ*), *αιῶνα* for *βίον*, and the antithetical form of the clauses all show, that either the style of Polus is imitated by Plato, or that words from a treatise of his are here put into his mouth. They are quoted as his by Syrianus on Hermogenes. (4. 44. Walz.) See 462, B.

D. *σοὶ βουλομένῳ ἔστιν*. Soph. § 196, N. 2; Cr. § 408; K. 284. 10. c. —— *δῆλος γὰρ . . . διαλέγεσθαι*, for it is plain to me, even from what he has said, that Polus has studied the art of rhetoric, so called, rather than how to discourse (logically) by way of question and answer. *δῆλος*, etc., for *δῆλόν* *ἔστι*, *ὅτι Πῶλος*, by attraction, as it is sometimes called. The

tendency to give prominence to the main word — here the subject — of the second clause caused it to be pushed forward into the leading clause. This made that clause personal instead of impersonal, and bound the two clauses together more closely.

E. ἐρωτᾷ. So all the MSS., but the editors give ἡρώιται,* on account of ποία τις εἴη. But this is unnecessary, for the present may be rhetorically for the imperfect, or may include it. Nobody asks you = nobody asked you or now asks you. Comp. Xen. Anab. 1. 1. 3, διαβάλλει . . . ὡς ἐπιθυμουλεύοι, for διέβαλλε. In this sentence, ποῖος and τις, which belong to direct inquiry, are found in company with ὅστις, by which indirect questions are introduced. Comp. ποία and ὁποῖα together, 500, A. Comp. also οἷαν for ὁποῖαν, 450, C, ὥστα for ὁπόστα, 451, B, and other passages. — ὥσπερ τὰ ἔμπροσθεν. For the asyndeton, comp. 450, B, note. For τὰ ἔμπροσθεν, comp. Soph. § 141, N. 1; Cr. § 478, a. The second clause begins at καὶ τὸν οὖτας.

449 A. ὑποτείνεσθαι, est quæstionem ita proponere ut alteri subjicias quid respondendum sit, et in universo proponere quæstionem. Ast. — ὡς τίος . . . τίχνης. Another form of compound interrogation, when one clause has the participial structure (*ἐπιστήμονα, sc. ὄντα*). — ἀγαθόν γε, not *bene moratum*, as Routh translates it, but plainly *egregium certe*. — ὡς ἔφη "Ομηρος. Il. 6. 211, and elsewhere.

B. οὐκοῦν. See Preface. — ἀλοθι. See Introd. pp. xiii., xiv. — ἀλλ' ὅπερ, etc., but be not false to the promise you make. Socrates takes for granted that he consents. Hence ὅπερ, which Ast would change into εἰπερ, is justly defended by Stallb. — εἰσὶ . . . ποιεῖσθαι, = ἀραικαῖόν ἔστιν ἔριας (Heind.), or ἐν ἔριαις ποιεῖσθαι. See 448, D. In some of the answers it is necessary to discourse at length.

* Stallb. has ἐρωτᾷ in his second edition.

C, D. ὡς διὰ βραχυτάτων = ὡς βραχύτατα, or ὡς οἰόν τε διὰ βραχυτάτων, just below.—With this boast of Gorgias, comp. the ironical passages in Protag. 329, B, 334, D. The latter runs thus : — “O Protagoras, I happen to be an oblivious sort of person, and if I have a long speech made to me, I forget what is the topic of discourse; therefore, as, in case I were somewhat deaf, you would think that you ought to talk in a louder tone with me than with others, to carry on a conversation with me; so, seeing I am so forgetful, abridge your answers, and make them shorter, to enable me to follow you.” — πάνυ . . . ἐπεικῶς, *quite sufficiently, or very well.*

E. ποίους τούτους . . . ὑγιαίνοιεν; *what kind of words? are they those which make known by what sort of regimen the sick can get well?* Understand περὶ with ποίους τούτους; as in 450, A, line 4. This is a condensed expression for ποῖοι εἰσιν οὗτοι περὶ οὓς ἔστιν; The subject of ὑγιαίνοιεν is attracted forwards to δηλοῦσι as its object. ὡς is *quomodo*, not *ut*, and to be taken with διαιτώμενοι. The two words have the same sense as τίνι διαιτῇ. Comp. 453, C. — οὐκοῦν περὶ ὄντερ, etc. = οὐκοῦν ποιεῖ δυνατοὺς καὶ φρονεῖν περὶ τούτων περὶ ὄντερ λέγειν δυνατοὺς ποιεῖ.

B. οὕτως ἔχουσιν · ἐκάστη. One of a number of the in- 450 stances of asyndeton which occur in this dialogue. Some are owing to earnestness of feeling (449, A, ὥσπερ . . . ἀπεκρίνω); some heighten the effect of contrast by bringing clauses closely together (503, E, τὸν ζωγράφονς . . . τὸν ἄλλον), or making a word more emphatic (510, C); but in the greater number the second clause is added without a particle to explain the first, and, like a noun in apposition, would rather be separated than connected by a particle. Comp. K. § 325. — ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν. This common phrase nearly always, in this work, moderates the force of some universal word, as πᾶς, οὐδείς. According to Lobeck (para-

lipom. Gram. Græc. 59), ἔπος εἰπεῖν occurs very often, εἰπεῖν ἔπος rarely. It denotes, 1. *ut ita dicam*, as here; 2. *speaking inaccurately*, the opposite of ἀκριβεῖ λόγῳ. — τῆς δὲ ρητορικῆς. The sense is, *But there is no such manual operation pertaining to rhetoric, but all its activity and efficiency are exercised by means of words.* The Scholiast says, that χειρούργημα and κύρωσις are provincial words brought by Gorgias from his native town, Leontini. This is probably a mere random assertion, and unlikely in itself. But the use of these words, instead of χειρουργία and κῦρος, may be intended to show forth the artificial and elaborate style of Gorgias. Thucydides uses κύρωσις (Lib. 6. 103).

C. ἀρ' οὖν . . . καλεῖν; *Indeed, I perceive what sort of art you wish to call it.* So Ast. “Formula ἀρ' οὖν eodem modo ut οὐκ οὖν initio per interrogationem cum negatione junctam affirmat.” Hermann on Soph. Antig. 628 (632). Or we need only say that ἀρά, as it often does, requires an affirmative answer. Stallb. retains the interrogative force of ἀρά, and supposes the question to require a negative answer. *Do I understand*, etc., i. e. *I do not understand*. But μαρθάρω can denote a perception that is not yet clear. Prof. Crosby remarks on this passage as follows:—“Is there not a species of anacoluthon at the beginning of this chapter? ‘Do I then understand what you would call it? However, I shall soon know.’ He seems to me to be first intending to ask Gorgias directly, whether the idea he obtains from his answer is the true one; but then another mode of satisfying himself occurs, and he changes the discourse abruptly.” — For τῶν μὲν . . . ἔναιαι δέ, comp. Soph. § 142, N. 3.

E. οὐχ ὅτι . . . εἰπεῖς, *although in the expression which you make use of you so said.* οὐτως refers to the succeeding subordinate clause. οὐχ ὅτι is properly elliptical for οὐ λέγω, or οὐκ ἐρώ ὅτι, and sometimes, followed by ἀλλά, means *not*

only, or not only not. Comp. Mt. § 624. 4. — δυσχεραινεῖν, *to be captious* in the discourse or discussion.

B. εἴποιμ' ἀν . . . ὄντα. Complete the sentence by τις 451 τῶν κῦρος ἔχουσῶν, *I would say that it is one of those arts that exert their power with regard to* (whose efficiency consists in inquiring concerning) *the odd and even, how many there can be of each*, i. e. that it is an art, which asks *how many there are*, and whose elements are odd and even numbers. γρῶσις is due to a copyist, who thought the structure deficient. — ὁσπερ οἱ ἐν τῷ δῆμῳ συγγραφόμενοι, *as those say who draw up written motions in the meetings of the people*, i. e. who offer amendments in the assembly. The clearest light has been thrown upon this phrase recently by Boeckh, in his *Inscriptiones Græcæ*, Vol. I. No. 84. The allusion is to the formula τὰ μὲν ἄλλα καθάπερ τῇ βουλῇ, sc. ἔδοξεν, which was used by those, who, in the assembly, made amendments to the decrees or *probouleumata* brought down from the council. They employed the phrase to avoid the trouble of reading over those parts of the decree which they left unaltered. σύγγραμμα is so used of a clause in a decree by Aeschines c. Ctes. § 127 Bekker. The Scholiast, with less success, explains these words of cases where two or more bills proposed by the same person followed one another in succession. It was the custom to prefix the names of the citizen, of his father, his demus, and tribe, to his resolution. In such cases the herald, says he, to save time, would say τὰ μὲν ἄλλα κατὰ ταὐτά, *the same as before*. But this explanation is unfortunate for several obvious reasons. Still more so is Coray's, who understands οἱ συγγραφόμενοι of public contractors.

C. διαφέρει δὲ τοσοῦτον, etc., *but it differs* (ἢ λογιστική) *thus much: that the art of calculating considers how the odd and the even are related to themselves* (i. e. odd to odd and even to even) *and to each other in respect to number.*

For πῶς ἔχει πλήθους, see Soph. § 188, N.; Cr. § 363, β; K. § 274. 3. This definition of λογιστικὴ is found again in Charmides, 166, A. Arithmetic seems in Plato's definition to be employed with number in general, and λογιστικὴ to be the vulgar art of reckoning, in which numbers are considered in their relations. A later distinction in the science of number was into Arithmetic, which inquired περὶ τοῦ ποσοῦ καθ' ἑαντό, and Music περὶ τοῦ πρὸς ὅλο, i. e. concerning the relations of numbers. Sometimes, as here, the former term included the whole science of number, but was used ἴδιαιτερον περὶ τοῦ ποσοῦ καθ' αὐτό, more especially of numbers in themselves considered.

D. The second *ti* is added by Stallbaum from a conjecture of Heindorf, and seems necessary to the text. The stars denote insertion. —— ἀμφισβητήσιμον καὶ τοῦτο λέγεις. See Eurip. Alcest. 106, and p. 452, E, *ti . . . τοῦτο λέγεις*; also Cr. § 528.

E. τοῦτο τὸ σκολιόν. This scolium, or *table-song*, is ascribed by the Scholiast to Simonides or to Epicharmus. It is often quoted, as by Athenaeus at the end of his work. Comp. a fine passage, Laws 1. 631. The whole song is, —

“ ὑγιαίνειν μὲν ἄριστον ἀνδρὶ θνατῷ,
δεύτερον δὲ καλὸν φυὲ γενέσθαι,
τὸ τρίτον δὲ πλουτεῖν ἀδόλως,
καὶ τὸ τέταρτον ἡβᾶν μετὰ τῶν φίλων.”

Plato does not allude to the last line, because no trade or employment is concerned with it.

452 A. *iatros* τε . . . χοηματιστῆς. They are named in the order suggested by the scolium. Heindorf wished to read ὁ *iatros* τε, but Buttmann observes (the remark does not appear in the second ed. of Heind.), that the article so used would denote that one person had all the attributes mentioned: ὁ τε *iatros* καὶ χοηματιστῆς, on the contrary, would

sufficiently discriminate the persons; or, in ambiguous cases, ὁ τε λατρὸς καὶ ὁ χρηματιστής. — εἴποι . . . ὅτι . . . ἔξαπατεց. For oratio recta after ὅτι, comp. Cr. § 609, α.

B. Θαυμάζοιμι γ' ἀν . . . εἰ σοι ἔχει. The reason, according to Stallb., why there is here an indic. in the protasis with an opt. in the apodosis is, that what the paedotribe says, “interlocutoris mentem potius quam suam ipsius opinionem respiciat.” As, however, ἔχει ἐπιδεῖξαι is, in *his own opinion*, only a possibility, he says Θαυμάζοιμι ἀν. But perhaps Θαυμάζοιμι ἀν may be considered the optative of politeness, which expresses, under the form of a possibility, something real and absolute. Comp. Kühner’s largest Gr. § 817. 6. — τέκνης depends on ἀγαθόν, *good* pertaining to his art.

C. πάνυ καταφρονῶν ἀπάντων is added in satire, to show the higher pretensions of the meanest of the three employments. Gorgias and the sophists held philosophy in like contempt, compared with the arts of show. One of the comic poets, Anaxandrides (Athenæus, 694, F), proposes to comply with these high claims so far as to change the place of the second and third lines of the scolium. He says, “when the author of it named making money as the third best thing,” —

“ τοῦθ', ὄρας, ἐμαίνετο,
μετὰ τὴν ὑγίειαν γάρ τὸ πλούτειν διαφέρει.
καλὸς δὲ πεινῶν ἔστιν αἰσχρὸν θηρίον.”

— καὶ μὴν . . . ὅδε, and yet you see Gorgias here maintains on the contrary.

D. καὶ σὲ . . . αὐτοῦ. There is here a change not unknown to our language from the relative to the demonstrative construction. — αὐτοῖς τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, i.e. the cause why the men themselves who are possessed of the art are free. αὐτοῖς is used on account of the contrast with others whom they govern. There is here a certain rhetorical col-

oring, which may be intended as an imitation of the style of Gorgias.

E. *τὸ πειθεῖν ἔγωγ' οἶόν τ' εἴραι*, *I certainly pronounce it, or mean by it the being able to persuade, etc.* — *ἐν ὅλῳ συλλόγῳ*, facile intelligas *τοὺς συλλεγέντας*. Stallb. — *ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ δυνάμει*, i. e. when in or invested with this power. — *ἀλλὰ σοὶ* is added as if *ὅλῳ* had not gone before. Comp. 521, D, *οὐ πρὸς χάριν . . . ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὸ βελτιστον*, *οὐ πρὸς τὸ ἡδιστον*.

453 A. *τὸ κεφαλαιον εἰς τοῦτο τελευτᾶ*, i. e. its sum and substance, its essential quality ends in this or tends to this as its result, *τοῦτο* referring to *πειθοῦς*. *τελευτᾶ*, meaning *to end*, takes the preposition *εἰς* and adverbs of motion to a place after it, as including the previous motion, together with the end itself; = *to come to an end*. So *ἄρχειν*, *to begin*, is joined with *ἀπὸ*, *ἐκ*, and adverbs of motion from a place, = *to start*. — *ἡ ἔχεις . . . δύνασθαι*. Here *τι* seems to be taken with *δύνασθαι*, and *ἐπὶ πλέον* is *to a greater extent, plus*. Comp. *ταῦτα ἐπὶ πλέον εἰπεῖν*, Laws 697, C; *ἐπὶ πλέον τι δύναται*, Politicus 305, B. So also *ξ' ἔλαττον*, *ἐπὶ πολὺ*, *ἐπὶ συμφόν* (Soph. Electr. 414), are used.

B. *ἔγώ γὰρ . . . τούτων ἔνα*, *be assured that I, as I flatter myself, — if any other person engages in conversation with another, because he wishes to know the very nature of that about which the discourse is held, that I also, I say, — am a person of that description.* It is often the case, as here, that an infinitive and its subject are introduced after *ὅτι*. This happens, for the most part, when a clause intervening between *ὅτι* and the infinitive renders the change from the grammatical construction to its equivalent one less obvious. But here there is an anacoluthon also. Owing to the change just mentioned, *ἔγώ* is left by itself, and *ἔμε* takes its place. — *ἔγώ . . . οὐκ οἶδα*. Here notice the emphatic position of *ἔγώ*, the attraction of *τὴν . . . πειθώ* to the main

sentence, in which *οἴδα* is, and the interposition of *εἰ* *ἴστη* *ὅτι* between the adverb and the verb.

C. *οὐ σοῦ ἔνεκα . . . λέγεται*, *not on your account* (to draw any thing further from you), *but on account of the discussion, that it may go on in the way in which it can make the subject discussed most clear to us.* Some authorities have *ποιῆ*, which arose from not perceiving that *ὡς* here is *quomodo*, and not *ut*. See 449, E. — *ώσπερ ἄν*. *ἄν* belongs to *ἡρόμην*, and is repeated on account of its distance from the verb, occasioned by the conditional clause. Comp. 447, D. — *Ζεῦξις*. As this great painter painted for Archelaus, king of Macedon, who died in the same year with Socrates, there is here no anachronism, and Pliny's date for his entrance on his art (Olymp. 95. 4, after the death of Socrates), must be incorrect. — *καὶ ποῦ*. These words have given no little trouble to the interpreters, because *the place where* a painter's works are, which is their natural meaning, has nothing to do with the definition of his art. Ast's explanation of *ποῦ* as meaning *where, in what thing, in regard to what* (i. e. what animals and what properties of them, etc.), and Cousin's, *where, on what*, as canvas or stone, are hardly deserving of mention. Others suppose the text corrupt. Heind. conjectures *πόσου*, *for how much*, and Coray, *τοῦ*, *whose son*. But how the compensation or the father of Zeuxis had any thing more to do with the definition of his art than the place where he painted, they do not inform us. Stallb., after Routh, would read *πῶς*, which makes good sense, though it departs too much from the letters of the actual text. I conjecture (that I likewise may contribute my mite) that the sentence originally ended at *γράφων*; which, indeed, may be argued from the fact, that Plato afterwards only alludes to *τὰ ζῶα*. To this *τὰ ποῖα τῶν ζῶων*, and *ἄλλα πολλὰ ζῶα* point; and no other definition of the art of Zeuxis is hinted at. Next to *γράφων*

came ἦ οὐ, *HOR*, which was corrupted into *πορ*; and then καὶ was added to bring ποῦ into grammatical connection with the sentence. For the confusion of *Η* and *Π* in the MSS., Bast's Epist. Palæograph. in Schæfer's Gregory Corinth., p. 716, may be consulted. A similar corruption of ἦ οὐ into ποῦ, in Repub. 437, D, is removed in modern editions.

D. καλῶς ἄν σοι ἀπεκένθιτο; *would your answer have been a good one?* This verb, like several other deponents, is used both actively and passively,—a usage almost confined to the perfect, pluperfect, and aorist. Comp. Soph. § 208, N. 2; K. § 252; Cr. § 564. — οὐ δῆτα denies the latter part of the alternative, οὐ πείθει.

454 A. τὸν λέγοντα, *him who makes this assertion*, that rhetoric is the art of persuasion.

B, C. ταύτης . . . τῆς πειθοῦς λέγω, sc. τὴν φητορικὴν τέχνην εἴναι. — ἀλλ᾽ ἵνα μὴ θαυμάσῃς, etc. The form of this sentence changes a little as it proceeds. ὅπερ γὰρ λέγω is written as if μὴ θαύμασε had gone before. The proper apodosis of ἵνα . . . θαυμάσῃς is τοῦ ξῆς . . . ἔργοντω, but the connection is broken up by γὰρ in ὅπερ γὰρ λέγω. The sense of ὅπερ . . . λέγω is, *for as I say* (i. e. as I was just saying, 453, C), *I put the inquiry that the discourse may be finished in due order,—not on your account, but that we may not be in the habit of too soon catching up each other's words on mere suspicion* (of what they mean, and without giving one another time for explanation). With προαρπάζειν . . . τὰ λεγόμενα, comp. Herodot. 9. 91, ὁ δὲ ὑπαρπάσας τὸν ἐπίλοιπον λόγον.

E. βούλει . . . θῶμεν like *visne videamus, volo hoc contin-*
gat. Soph. § 219. 3, last ed.; Cr. § 611. 3; K. § 259. 1. 6.

455 A. πιστευτικῆς, *productive of belief*. — διδασκαλικῆς, *able to impart instruction or knowledge*, i. e. knowledge founded upon absolute, unchangeable principles. — ἀλλὰ πιστικὸς

μόνον, able to cause belief and nothing more (aiming at conviction, and not at truth). This word has been altered into *πειστικός* by Stephens, Heindorf, Coray, and Buttmann; and some MSS. favor the change. Bekker, Stallb., and Ast, with reason, retain *πιστικός*. For, as is shown by Ast at great length, *πειστικός* denotes (*having relation to, having to do with, i. e.*) *able to produce πιθάρι*, and is the more general word, and not necessarily opposed to *διδασκαλικός*; while *πιστικός* means *able to produce πιστή*, which has just been contrasted with *ἐπιστήμην* (454, D). Again, as to the form of the word,—which, according to Buttmann, cannot analogically be derived from *πιστίς*,—Ast observes that adjectives in *-ικός* are freely derived, not only from verbals, but also from nouns (*ἀρχή, ἀρχικός*), adjectives (*φίλος, φιλικός*), and imaginary forms (*νονθεικός* from *νονθέτης*). What objection, then, is there to regarding *πιστός*, or *πιστίς* (comp. *φύσις, φυσικός, φθίσις, φθισικός*), as the source of *πιστικός*? However derived, such words may take a genitive. But here there is no necessity of supplying a genitive with *πιστικός*.

B. *ἴδωμεν τί ποτε καὶ λέγομεν.* The force of *καὶ* in such a case, before a verb, seems to me to correspond with that of *even*. *Let us see what we are even saying*, where an emphasis is thrown on the verb; = *what we can mean*. A few MSS. have *λέγωμεν*, which gives the inapposite sense of *let us see what we shall say*. — *περὶ ἵστρῶν αἰρέσεως.* “The ancient states maintained public physicians at a salary; and Hippocrates is said to have been so employed at Athens. Such physicians had assistants, especially slaves, who practised among the poorer sort of people. The famous Democedes of Croton, about Olymp. 60, although as yet little money was in circulation, received the large salary of thirty-six Æginetic minæ or an Attic talent of silver (\$1,017). When he was called to Athens, he received one hundred minæ

(§ 1,692), until Polycrates, tyrant of Samos, engaged his services for two talents (§ 2,034)." Boeckh's Civil Econ. of Athens, I. § 21. — *ἄλλο τι η* (literally, *is there any thing else than, is it not true*) is a very common formula in Plato, meaning no more than *nonne*. Very often *ἄλλο τι*, without *η*, is found in the same sense at the beginning of a sentence; and Bekker always prefers it to *ἄλλο τι η*. According to Hermann on Viger, note 110, when the latter is used, the interrogation extends to the end of the sentence; but when *ἄλλο τι*, it stops with those words. — *αἰρεῖσθαι* is in the middle. — After *η νεωρίων*, supply *συμβουλεύεται* δ *φητορικός*. And, just below, a similar clause, which is to be supplied in thought before *ἄλλ' οἱ στρατηγικοί*, is afterwards in part expressed. — A passage precisely like this occurs in Protag. 319, B.

C. *τὸ σὸν σπεύδειν, tuis rebus studere.* See 458, B, note. — *τινας σχεδὸν καὶ συχνούς.* *τινὲς* includes many and few, as the more generic word (Wytttenbach on Phædo, p. 116), and therefore *πολλοί, ὀλίγοι*, and similar words, often follow to define it. Here *καὶ*, on account of the position of *σχεδόν*, seems to me not to be *and*, but *even*. The sense is, *some, almost even many*, i. e. *some, indeed even quite a number*.

D. *αὐτὸς . . . καλῶς ὑφῆγήσω, for you yourself have admirably led the way*, i. e. in speaking about the docks, etc., just now you suggested a good answer.

E. *τὰ δ' ἐκ τῆς Περικλέοντος.* *τὰ δέ* is used as if *τὰ μὲν* had preceded: *and partly through that of Pericles.* — *ἐκ τῶν δημιουργῶν, through the advice of the artificers.* Heind. and Buttmann wish to read *τῆς δημιουργῶν*. But there is no need of this, because a man effects what his advice effects; and such brevity is common in Greek. Thus, in Alcibiad. I. 135, E, cited by Ast, we have *πελαργοῦ ἄρα δέ μὸς ἔρως οὐδὲν διοίσει, my love then will not differ*

from a stork, i. e. from a stork's love; and in Repub. 375, A, we have *οἵτινες τι διαφέρειν φύσιν γενναιοῖν σκύλακος εἰς φυλακὴν* (in respect to keeping guard) *νεαρίσκου εὐγενοῦς*; Comp. Soph. § 186, N. 1. — *τοῦ διὰ μέσου τείχους*. According to Colonel Leake (Topography of Athens, 354–357), this expression denotes *both the long walls*, which, as he supposes, reached from Athens to Piræus and Port Phalerum; so named as being between the city and the seaports, and also called *τεῖχος* in the singular, as forming a sort of fortification. Plutarch (Vita Pericl. § 13), alluding to this passage, interprets the words — perhaps carelessly — by *τὸ μακρὸν τεῖχος*, and thus sanctions Leake's view. But Harpocration, s. v. *διὰ μέσου τείχους*, explains the phrase of the *southern* of the two long walls, so styled as being *between* the northern and the Phaleric wall; and this southern wall it is, says he, which Plato mentions in Gorgias. This is so confirmed by Thucyd. 2. 13, — who speaks of a Phaleric wall reaching to the city, and also of the long walls reaching, both of them, from the city to Piræus, the outer or northern one of which was guarded, — that it is not easy to see how the opinion of Leake can stand. See the commentators on Thucyd. l. c., especially Dr. Arnold. Now this inner or southern leg of the long walls, *τὸ μακρὸν τεῖχος τὸ νότιον* (Æschin. de Fals. Leg. § 174, Bekker), was built after the thirty years' peace with Sparta, i. e. after B. C. 445, when Pericles began to be at the head of affairs, and when Socrates was over twenty years old.

A. *οἱ νικῶντες τὰς γνώμας*, Soph. § 164, N. 2; K. § 278. 456 2; Cr. § 433. — *πάλαι ἐρωτῶ*. *πάλαι* is very often found with the present of an action begun in the past and still continued. — Join *τὸ μέγεθος* with *δαιμονία*, as the accus. of specification. — *εἰ πάντα γε εἰδείης*. The apodosis must be something like *δαιμονία ἀν καταφαίνοιτο*, which is pointed at by *γε*.

B. μετὰ τοῦ ἀδελφοῦ. See 448, B. —— ἡ τεμεῖν ἡ καῦσαι, etc., *to put himself into the physician's hands, to be cut or cauterized.* A heated iron was applied to the wound for the purpose of stanching blood by the *ἰατρός*, who, as Routh observes, exercised both the medical and the surgical arts. παρασχεῖν, sc. ξαντόν; comp. 475, D. For τεμεῖν, καῦσαι, see Soph. § 219. 2; Cr. § 621. β. An infinitive so used, if it have the direct object of the leading verb for its subject, is in the passive, but otherwise in the active.

C. οὐδαμοῦ . . . φανῆται, *would be of no account.* Comp. Soph. Antig. 183, τοῦτον οὐδαμοῦ λέγω; Xen. Memorab. I. 2. 52, μηδαμοῦ εἶναι, *to be nowhere, in no estimation.* — εἰ βούλοιτο is elegantly added, says Stallb., to denote the arrogance and pretension of Gorgias, — if he chose to give himself the trouble.

D. ἔμαθε, sc. τις. Soph. § 157, N. 8; K. § 238, R. 3; Cr. § 546. This omission of the indefinite subject *τις* is common in this dialogue, as is also the transition from a singular verb to a plural, or the contrary, where the subject is an indefinite one. — εἰ ὄπλοις μάχεσθαι dicuntur qui veris armis certare discunt. Nam vulgo *juventus* non veris armis se exercebat sed rudibus, aut pilis præpilatis, quæ dicuntur Græcis ἐσφαιρωμένα ἀκόντια [i. e. with a ball covering the point]. Quæ sunt verba Casauboni ad Theophrast. Charact. p. 79, ed. Fischer. Stallb.

E. ἐκεῖνοι μὲν γὰρ, etc., *for they intrusted (them to their scholars) for the purpose of using them aright against their foes, and those who wrong them, in defending themselves, not in beginning an assault.* τούτοις refers to the means of defence used in the arts just named. The subject of χρῆσθαι is to be gathered from the context, viz. such persons as learn to box, and beat their friends. The forms of ὑπάρχειν, and those of ἀμύνομαι, are often contrasted, in the senses of acting on the offensive and *defensive.* — μετα-

στρέψαντες, turning round, i. e. *on the contrary*. Comp. μεταβαλών, 480, E.

A. ἐμβραχύ, *in short*, is taken with περὶ ὅτου ἄν βούληται, 457 to show that that phrase comprises all that can be said, or is used in its widest sense. Its force is like that of *omnino*.

B. καὶ τῇ δητορικῇ . . . ὥσπερ καὶ. For *καὶ*, in each member of the sentence, comp. the note on Electr. 1301, where it is said that *καὶ* often stands after words of comparison to show connection, without any force that can be given in English. See also 458, A, at the beginning. — *κατὰ*. Post participia, *καὶ εἰτα*, *καὶ ἔπειτα* inferuntur, ubi *εἰτα* et *ἔπειτα* expectes. Stallb. A frequent idiom.

C. δύνανται, sc. οἱ λέγοντες, implied in *τῶν λόγων*; or, more exactly, the subject is indefinite, and plural, because the action of conversing requires more than one. — *οὗτο* repeats and recalls the participles. Join διαλύεσθαι to δύνανται.

D. μὴ συφᾶς, i. e. μὴ φῆ (deny) τὸν ἔτερον συφᾶς λέγειν. — *καὶ κατὰ φθόνον*, etc., and they think that they are (i. e. each thinks that the other is) *speaking out of envy*, or with ill feelings *towards each other*, *having a contentious spirit, and not seeking after that which was proposed in the discussion*. For *ἴσαντῶν* = ἀλλήλων, Soph. § 145, N. 2; K. § 302. 7; Cr. § 507. 7. — *τελευτῶντες*, Cr. § 457. α; K. § 312, R. 3. — *οἵα καὶ*, etc., so that even the by-standers feel vexed for themselves, because they consented to be listeners to such people. The infinitive follows *οἵα* here, as it so often does *ώστε*.

E. διελέγχειν, *to go on, or through with a refutation of*. *διὰ* has the same force in διερωτάγην below. In the next words, the sense is, *Lest you should suppose that I speak with my zeal for debate not directed towards the subject, that it may become plain, but against you*. For *τοῦ γενέσθαι*, comp. Soph. § 187. 1; K. § 308. 2. (b); Cr. § 372.

With genitives in this relation of the motive, ἔνεκα is often found.

458 A. τῶν ἡδέως . . . ἀν ἐλεγχθέντων = τούτων οἵ ἡδέως ἀν ἐλεγχθεῖσιν. K. § 260. 2. (5); Cr. § 615. 2. Comp. Euthyphro 3, D, where Socrates says, that he converses, not only without taking pay for it, ἀλλὰ καὶ προστιθεὶς ἀν ἡδέως, sc. μισθόν, but even *with a willingness to give pay*, if any one is disposed to hear him. Here προστιθεὶς without ἀν would mean, that he *actually paid* his listeners. — Just below, for εἰ τι μὴ ἀληθὲς λέγω, we should expect εἰ τι . . . λέγοιεν, or, with the transition to the first person, λέγοιμι, parallel to the succeeding λέγοι. The reason for using λέγω seems to be that given by Stallb., which Ast opposes: that Socrates, in speaking of himself, denotes the *probability* of *his* being in an error by εἰ with an indicative; but only the *possibility* of error on the part of *another* by εἰ and an optative. — αὐτὸν ἀπαλλαγῆται. Comp. for αὐτὸν emphatic (the word with which it agrees being omitted), 447, C, οὐδὲν οἶον αὐτὸν ἔρωτάν.

B. ὕσον δόξα ψευδής. Græci in hujusmodi comparationibus modo casus præcedenti nomini accommodant, modo nominativum ponunt, intellecto verbo superiore. Stallb. Comp. Repub. 334, B, τοῦτο μέντοι ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ ἔτι, ὥφελεῖν μὲν τοὺς φίλους η δικαιοσύνη, where τὴν δικαιοσύνην would have been more common. See Cr. § 655. 4. — τὸ τῶν παρόντων, *the interests or feelings of the present company*. And so τὸ τούτων, just below; τὸ σὸν σπεύδοντα' ἄμα, καὶ τούτῳ αὐτῆς, Soph. Electr. 251. Such formulæ are sometimes little more than circumlocutions for the pronoun. Comp. τό γ' ἐμόν, 458, D. — The Schol. thinks that Gorgias is here finding an excuse to break off. But probably nothing more than polite attention to the wishes of the auditors is intended. Gorgias is uniformly polite to Socrates, and willing to continue the discourse. Comp. 497, B, 506, A.

C. πόρρω ἀποτενοῦμεν, *we shall extend too far, be too prolix.* The verb is here used without an object, or, if any thing is understood, it is ἡμᾶς αὐτούς, rather than τὸν λόγον. — εἰμοὶ δ' οὖν, etc., *and as for that (οὖν), may I myself also never have so much business, that leaving a conversation such as this, and so carried on (i. e. on a subject of such importance, and so interesting), it may be of more importance for me to do any thing else.*

D. τὸ ἐμὸν is the subject of χωλύει. — τὸ λοιπόν, *after this*, i. e. since all the others wish that the debate should continue. — καὶ ταῦτα, etc., *and that too (i. e. and especially) when I myself announced, that whatever questions any one wishes to put he may do so.*

A. ἔλεγές τοι νῦν δή, *you were saying certainly just now.* 459 I have written τοι νῦν δή for τοινυν δή, at Bekker's suggestion, on account of the sense. — τὸ ἐν ὅχλῳ τοῦτο, *this expression* ἐν ὅχλῳ. This is the subject of ἔστιν, and the remaining words the predicate. — ἐν τοῖς μὴ εἰδόσιν. Compare the negative μὴ here, and in ὁ μὴ λατρός, with οὐ in οὐκ εἰδώς, ἐν τοῖς οὐκ εἰδόσιν, just below. In the first two cases, the negation is general and indefinite: "before such as do not know, whoever they are," "he who is no physician, supposing such a person to exist." In the other two cases, the negation being made concerning something definite and particular (the orator and the crowd), οὐ is properly used.

B. ἐνταῦθα, i. e. in the case of the art of medicine.

C. ὁριστώνη, *saving of trouble, convenience.* — εἴγε τι ἡμῖν πρὸς λόγου ἦ, *if it come at all within the scope of our discourse.* πρὸς, (literally,) on the side of, in favor of, to the advantage of.

D. οὐτως ἔχων. This clause is afterwards defined by αὐτὰ μὲν οὐκ εἰδώς.

A. ᾠσπερ ἄρτι εἶπες. See 455, D. — οἷμαι is paren- 460

thetical: hence *μαθήσεται* follows, and not *μαθήσεσθαι*. — *ἴχε δὴ*, as Ast says, is a formula of exhorting, like *ἄγε δὴ*; as Heindorf, a “formula subsistendi et inhibendi,” = *ἴχε σεαυτόν*; as Stallb., after Hermann, one of admonishing another to remember something, and perceive its results, = *ἴχε τοῦτο*. Its use, here, at least, consists in drawing attention, in causing one to *stop* and consider something, especially some objection derived from what had been said.

B. *τὰλλα οὖτω*, sc. *ἴχει*. — *κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον*, after the same form of speech, after the same analogy. The next words, being explicative of this clause, are without a connecting particle.

C. The words here inclosed in brackets are so injurious to the sense, that there can be little doubt, I think, of their being interpolations. The reasoning is this: He who has learned justice is just. The just does justly. Therefore he wills or prefers to do justly. Therefore he never will prefer to do unjustly. The orator, if taught justice by Gorgias, is just, and therefore will never will or prefer to do unjustly. For this passage, consult the Introduction. — *ἐν τῷ λόγῳ*, from what has been said; as follows from the argument. These words show that Socrates begins here to apply what has been conceded to the case of the rhetorician, which is proof that the words in brackets are indecentable.

D. *ἔνβάλλειν*, sc. *αὐτούς*, and so with *ἴξελαύνειν*, just below. When the same noun follows two verbs, or a participle and a verb, in different cases, the Greeks content themselves usually with expressing it once. Comp. Mt. § 428. 2. — *ώσαύτως οὖτω*, in the selfsame way. These adverbs answer, as Coray observes, to *ὁ αὐτὸς οὗτος*.

E. *φαινεται . . . οὐκ ἄν ποτε ἀδικήσας*, appears incapable of ever doing injustice, = *φαινεται ὅτι οὐκ ἄν ποτε ἀδικήσειε*. F. A. Wolf, on Demosth. c. Leptin. (p. 468, ed. Reiske),

lays down the rule, that *φαίνουμαι* with an infin. — *videor*, but with a particip. *palam sum*. — — ὁ γ' . . . ποιεῖται, since it is always discoursing. For the use of the relative, comp. note on 488, D. Here ὁ, which refers to ἡ ἀγητορική, is put in the gender of the predicate *πρᾶγμα*, by attraction. Comp. 463, E.

A. εἴποι . . . ὅτι . . . ἄξιον εἰη. Here ἀν is not used, because the sense is, *I said that it was worth while*. With ἀν the sense would be, *I said that it would be worth while*. The first is a direct assertion, in *oratio obliqua*; the second a hypothetical one, in the same form. And so just above, 460, E, ἐλέγετο ὅτι ἡ ἀγητορική . . . εἰη, *that rhetoric was*, but ἔπειλαβον ὡς οὐδέποτ' ἀν εἰη, *that it never could be*.

B. μὰ τὸν κύνα. A very common oath in the mouth of Socrates, concerning which much has been written. In 482, B, we have μὰ τὸν κύνα, τὸν Αἰγυπτίων θεόν, i. e. "latterator Anubis," which is either a comic addition to the original formula, μὰ τὸν κύνα, or else shows the oath to be of Egyptian origin. Mr. Mitchell (Aristoph. Wasps, Appendix, Note D) is of the latter opinion. We refer those who wish to pursue this point further to the Commentt. and the Scholl. on that play, v. 83, Solanus on Lucian's Vit. Auct. (Vol. III. p. 520, ed. Lehm.), and Coray on this place. The ancients thought that such oaths were introduced by Rhadamanthus, to avoid swearing by a divinity on a common occasion. Zeno, the Stoic, in imitation of Socrates, swore by the caper-bush. — — οὐκ ὀλγῆς συνουσίας, haud exigui est sermonis. — — καὶ . . . δοξάζεις. According to Ast, καὶ affects δοξάζεις, being a little out of its place. Do you even or really think? — — ἢ οἶει . . . ἐρωτήματα. A passage of considerable difficulty, which seems to be best explained by regarding the sentence, with Schleierm., as a broken one; which is indicated in this edition by a dash after διδάξειν. Polus is so eager, that he cannot end his

sentence grammatically, but must make a rhetorical exhibition of his feelings. The sense is, *Or do you think, because Gorgias was ashamed not to admit, both that the orator must understand the just, beautiful, and good; and that he himself would give instruction in these subjects, if one should come to him (to study oratory) ignorant of them;* — then, perhaps, from this admission, an inconsistency arose in the discussion, to wit ($\delta\eta$) the very thing which you take satisfaction in, though you yourself led the way to such questions (i. e. though you alone, by your artful questions, are to blame for the inconsistency). For the first sentence, Schleierm. supplies a close from $\tauο\tilde{v}\theta'$ $\delta\delta\eta\alpha\gammaαn\tilde{a}\zeta$, as if Polus had at first meant to say, “or do you think, because Gorgias,” etc. . . . “to find your pleasure therein.” But perhaps some other close of more emphasis may be gathered from the context, such as, (“do you think, because Gorgias, through shame, made certain admissions,) *that therefore his inconsistency is to be charged to rhetoric.*” The other attempts to explain this sentence which I have seen are, — 1. Ast’s, who gives to $o\tilde{e}t\iota$ the sense of $\nuο\mu\tilde{i}\zeta\epsilon\iota\zeta$, and supplies $o\tilde{u}r\omega$. *Or do you think so because,* etc. 2. Stallb., in his first ed., translates thus : *an putas Gorgiam præ pudore negasse,* etc. But this perverts the sense. Comp. 482, C, D, where the passage is alluded to and in part explained. He also ends the sentence beginning with $\eta\ o\tilde{e}t\iota$ at $\epsilon\pi\epsilon\tau\alpha$, — a strange and flat close to the period. 3. In his second edition, where he blames Ast for his “mira commenta,” deserting his former view, he continues the sense in an unbroken period, and treats $o\tilde{e}t\iota$ as though it did not affect the structure. The sense then becomes, *because Gorgias was ashamed to deny,* etc. . . . *did therefore, do you suppose, from this admission an inconsistency arise,* etc.? But an inconsistency did arise, for the very reason contained in the words $\tilde{o}u\ \Gammaο\gamma\iota\zeta\zeta$, etc. This is evident from

482, D. The words of Polus then become unmeaning. — *μὴ προσομολογῆσαι . . . μὴ οὐχι.* *μὴ οὐ* sometimes, as here, follows a simply negative expression, = *quin* before a subjunctive. But more usually it follows a verb of negative import, when *οὐ* precedes such a verb. Thus *ἀπαρνῦμαι μὴ ἐπίστασθαι*, *I deny that I know*, but *οὐκ ἀπαρνῦμαι μὴ οὐκ ἐπίστασθαι*, *I do not deny that I know*. An analogous formula to this latter is found just below, 461, C, — *τίνα οἴει ἀπαρηγήσεσθαι μὴ οὐχὶ καὶ αὐτὸν ἐπίστασθαι*, — where the interrog. implies a negative.

D. *ἐπανορθοῖτε.* Most of the MSS. have the opt. here in lieu of the subj. after a present in the principal clause. The reasons given for the opt. in the present case by Stallb. and Ast are scarcely sufficient. — *δίκαιος δ' εἰ,* *and it is right for you so to do.* For *δίκαιος*, see Mt. § 297; K. § 307, R. 6; Cr. § 551. It is for *δίκαιόν ἔστι σε*, etc., owing to the cause explained in the note on 448, D. — *ἀναθέσθαι*, *to retract*, properly, to put a piece over again, to change a move in playing draughts. Comp. Xen. Memorab. 2. 4. 4. Cicero, in a frag. of his Hortensius, says, — “Itaque tibi concedo, quod in duodecim scriptis solemus, ut calculum reducas, si te alicujus dicti pœnitet,” borrowing his figure perhaps from Plato. The subject of *ἀναθέσθαι* Ast takes to be *σε* understood. “Quod fieri non posse manifestum est,” says Stallb. But such cases are possible, and we believe Ast to be right. Here, *σοι δοκεῖ*, just before, and *ὅ τι ἀν σὺ βούλῃ*, just after, almost forbid us to supply *με*. A stronger case occurs Theætet. 151, C: “For many feel so towards me, as positively to be ready to bite me, when I strip them of some folly of theirs,” — *καὶ οὖν οἴονται εὑροιάς τοῦτο ποιῶν*, i. e. that *I do this*. (Such is the MS. reading.) — *φυλάττης*, if you will only *observe* one thing. The middle, if you will *guard against*, might stand here.

E. οὐ . . . λέγειν, where of all Greece there is the greatest liberty of speech, Ἑλλάδος being a genitive partitive. — ἀντίθεσ, put over against it, sc. this, viz. σοῦ μακρὰ λέγοντος, etc. For this latter passage, compare Aristoph. Acharn. 303, σοῦ δ' ἐγὼ λόγους λέγοντος οὐκ ἀκούσομαι μακρούς. — *to*, though.

462 B. νῦν δή, nunc igitur. — ἐν τῷ συγγράμματι. Aristotle (Metaphys. init.) refers to this treatise, or to the words of Polus of like import on 448, C, and approves of his opinion making experience the foundation of art.

C. οὐκοῦν καλὸν . . . ἀνθρώποις; does not rhetoric, then, namely, to have the faculty of giving pleasure to men, seem to you to be a good thing? The last clause of the sentence explains, and is in apposition with, ἡ φητορική. οἷόν τ' εἶναι = τίνα οἷόν τ' εἴναι.

D. βούλει οὖν, etc., are you willing, then, since you prize giving pleasure, to give me a little pleasure? For the play on χαρέζομαι (which itself playfully alludes to χάριτος τίνος καὶ ηδονῆς, just above), comp. 516, B. In this sentence, the present infinitive denotes the habit of Polus; χαρίσασθαι, that which Socrates wishes him to do in this instance.

E. τίνος λέγεις ταύτης; Comp. 449, E, note on ποιοὺς τούτους. — μὴ ἀγροικότερον ἦ, I fear that it may seem too rude. For δέδοικα omitted, comp. Soph. § 214, N. 4; Cr. § 602. 2. The comparative, which here denotes a lower degree of the quality than the positive, is usual in such apologies.

463 A. δοκεῖ τοίνυν μοι . . . ἀνθρώποις, it seems to me, then, to be a sort of study, that has not indeed the properties of an art, but which belongs to a mind dexterous in attaining its ends, and manly, and possessed of a natural talent to communicate with men.

B. ὡς δὲ ὁ ἔμὸς λόγος, etc., yet, as I maintain, is not an art but experience, or a routine and practice, i. e. has

nothing to do with absolute truth and reason, but proceeds from accidental discovery that a certain end is gained by certain means. —— κομικωτικὴ differt a κοσμητικῇ quā honestus ornatūs quæritur. Stallb.

C. τέτταρα . . . πράγμασιν, *four divisions these* (of flattery or the art of show) *relating to four matters or subjects*. These four subjects, according to Coray and Stallb., are words, food, the ornamenting of the body, and philosophical disquisitions. —— ἀποκεκριμένος. Comp. 453, D, note. —— πρὶν ἄρ . . . ἀποφίνωμαι. With πρὶν “subjunctivum non usurpant tragici, nisi in priore membro adsit negandi aut prohibendi significatio.” Elmsley on Medea, 215. In which case ἄρ accompanies πρὶν, with some exceptions almost confined to poetry, and the subjunctive aorist has the sense of the exact future of Latin; e. g. here *priusquam respondero*. For the reason why the subjunctive follows πρὶν, see Mt. § 522, C.; K. § 337. 9. b.

D. ἀποφίναμένον, sc. μον. Comp. 461, D, note. —— πολιτικῆς μορίον εἴδωλον, *a shadow or semblance of a division of the political art*, “civilitatis particulæ simulacrum,” as translated by Quintil. 2. 15. 25, where this passage is examined.

E. Πῶλος δὲ ὅδε. There is here, probably, an allusion to the meaning of the name *colt*, as Schleierm. remarks. For another pun on the name of Polus, comp. Aristot. Rhet. 2. 23: ὡς Κόρων Θρασύβουλον “Θρασύβουλον” ἐκάλει, καὶ Ἡρόδικος (of Selymbria, comp. 448, B, note) Θρασύμαχον, “αἰτεὶ Θρασύμαχος εῖ,” καὶ Πῶλον, “αἰτεὶ σὺ πῶλος εῖ,” καὶ Δράκοντα τὸν τομοθέτην, ὅτι οὐκ ἀνθρώπον οἱ τόμοι ἀλλὰ δράκοντος. —— In τυγχάνει ὁν τοῦτο, the predicate τοῦτο determines the gender of ὁν by attraction, instead of φητοφικὴ, to which it refers. Comp. 460, E.

A. οἵον τοιόνδε λέγω, *for instance I mean as follows, literally, “of which sort I mention such a thing as this, viz.”*

This, with or without the article before *τοιόνδε*, is a common formula in Plato, when examples are adduced. — *τὰ σώματα* is the accus. of specification.

B. *ἔχει δὲ οὐδὲν μᾶλλον*, i. e. *εὖ*. The subject of *ἔχει* is supplied by the preceding accusatives, *σῶμα* and *ψυχήν*. *But, or, while yet they (soul and body) are none the more in a good condition.* Another construction also is possible: *ὅτι ποιεῖ (τίνα) δοκεῖν μὲν εὐ ἔχειν (κατὰ) τὸ σῶμα . . . ἔχει δέ,* *while he is none the more in a good condition.* — *τὴν δὲ ἐπὶ σώματι*, etc., *but the art for the body I am not able to name to you off-hand by one name.* *σῶμα* and *ψυχή* freely take and lose the article (comp. 465, D). They lose it, perhaps, as approaching the nature of abstract nouns. In 463, E, they could not have it. *μιᾶν* is the predicate-accusative. *οὕτω, thus, in these present circumstances,* is often equivalent to *illoco.* Comp. 509, A. — *τῆς δὲ πολιτικῆς*, etc. Here *λέγω* is to be supplied in thought, and *τῆς πολιτικῆς* depends on *τὴν νομοθετικὴν*, its part. The sense is, *And of the political art I mention (one branch) the legislative as the counterpart to the gymnastic art, and (the other) justice as the counterpart to medicine.* The political art, or the general art of securing the public good, has two divisions, *first*, that which consists in securing the moral welfare by *law*, which prescribes what is right, and according to which the public health will be preserved; and, *secondly*, that which restores this health when once impaired, or *justice*, the judge's art. (See Introduction.) Analogous to these arts for the soul are, for the body, gymnastics, or the art of preserving, and medicine, or that of restoring health. Plato elsewhere insists on the analogy between the healing art and justice, e. g. in Repub. 444, C, — a fine passage, where, however, justice is taken in the higher sense of that controlling virtue, which brings all the parts of the soul, like those of a well-regulated state, into their due place and order.

C. πρὸς τὸ βελτιστόν, with a view to the greatest good. — οὐ γνῶσα λέγω ὅλλα στοχασαμένη. As αἰσθομένη is a general word denoting mental perceptions, whencesoever derived, it is explained by this clause, not guided by knowledge, I would have you understand, but by guess. Comp. 463, A. — ὑποδῆσα ὑπὸ ἔκαστον, having slipped under, or by stealth put on the garb of each of the four divisions.

D. Θηρεύεται τὴν ἄνοιαν, hunts for, seeks to captivate ignorance, or the unwary. — τῷ . . . ἀεὶ ἡδίστῳ, by that which is at the time the most agreeable.

A. τοῦτο γὰρ πρὸς σὲ λέγω alludes to 463, D, where Po- 465 lus puts the question concerning the quality of rhetoric. Comp. 448, C - E. — ὅτι οὐκ ἔχει λόγον οὐδένα ἢ προσφέρει, because it cannot explain what sort of things those are in their nature, which it makes use of. Here we see what Plato thought that a τέχνη must be. The MSS. give, almost unanimously, ὃ προσφέρει ἢ προσφέρει, and the editors, without MS. authority, ἢν προσφέρει. I have restored a part of the MS. reading, and have since observed that Stallb., in his second edition, has made the same change. — ὑποσχεῖν λόγον, to submit the reason, or rationale, to explain and defend a position.

B. ὑπόκειται, puts itself under, puts on the form or mask of, = ὑποδύνει above. — ὥστε ποιεῖν . . . ἀμελεῖν, so as to make men attach to themselves adventitious beauty, and neglect their own, obtained through the gymnastic art.

C. ὅπερ μέντοι λέγω. In the ensuing words, down to ὁψοποικῶν, the thoughts seem to be only half expressed, as if Socrates, anxious to avoid a long speech, were hastening to an end. Some editors suppose that the text has sustained an injury, but, as I think, without reason. Such, says Socrates, are these arts in their nature; but in practice the Sophists' art and rhetoric are confounded together;

and the like would be true of cookery and medicine, if the body judged of them without a presiding mind. The thoughts are not essential to the argument, and are only thrown out *en passant*. ὅπερ . . . λέγω refers to what has just preceded; *but as I say*, or *was just saying*. — διέστηκε. The subject of this verb, according to Buttmann in Heindorf's edition, is all the arts before mentioned, and ὄντων has the same subject, which is ταῦτα understood, referring to these arts. Stallb. restricts διέστηκε, with reason, I think, in his first edition, to σοφιστικὴ καὶ δητορική. ὄντων may be used instead of ὄντες, referring to σοφισταὶ καὶ δῆτορες, next following. A participle is sometimes found in the genitive absolute, when its subject is the same as that of the verb; the cause of which seems to be a desire of the writer to express the thought contained in the participle more distinctly. The grammatical construction is caused by Plato's passing in thought from the *arts* to those *who pursue them*. — ἂτε δ' ἐγγύς ὄντων, *but, inasmuch as they are conterminous arts, sophists and orators are (mixed together in the same place and about the same things, i. e. are) confounded together, and indiscriminately give themselves to the same pursuit, and they know not what to make of themselves, nor their fellow-men of them* (i. e. neither they nor others have any exact idea of their so-called arts). For the thought, comp. 520, A : ταῦτόν, ὃ μακάριε, ἐστὶ σοφιστής καὶ δήτωρ, ἡ ἐγγύς τι καὶ παραπλήσιον, ὥσπερ ἐγὼ ἔλεγον πρὸς Πᾶλον.

D. τὸ τοῦ Ἀναξαγόρου ἀν πολὺ ἦν, *what the well-known (τοῦ) Anaxagoras said (his tenet) would hold extensively (in regard to these arts).* For the uses of the article, see Soph. § 176, and § 139, N. 1; Cr. §§ 477. α, 479. Anaxagoras taught that all things were in a chaos at first; then came MIND, and arranged them. In other words, he ascribed to an intelligent author, not creation, nor motion and

quality, but only arrangement ; which was, however, a step beyond the earlier Ionic philosophers, who accounted for all phenomena by the physical properties of matter. — *σὺ γὰρ τούτων ἔμπειρος*. The Schol. of the Clarke MS. supposes these words to allude to the rhetorical figure called *παρίσωσις*, which takes place when similar words, as *φίλε Πῶλε* here, are brought together. Another Schol. explains them of the acquaintance of Polus with the philosophy of Anaxagoras, — to which sect, says he, Polus belonged, — a piece of information probably picked out of the text. Perhaps nothing more than ironical praise of Polus for great knowledge is intended. Comp. 462, A.

E. *ώς ἐκεῖνο ἐν σώματι*, sc. *ἀντίστροφόν* *ἐστι τῆς ὁγηορικῆς*. The clause might be removed without injury to the sense. *ἀντίστροφον* here governs a genitive, but a dative, 464, B. Some other compounds of *ἀντὶ* vary in the same way as to their regimen. *ἐκεῖνο*, referring to *ὁψοποιίας*, accommodates its gender to that of *ἀντίστροφον*.

A. Init. *If, therefore, I too, when you answer, shall not* 466 *know what to make (of it), do you likewise prolong your discourse; but if I shall, let me make use of it.* The dative, which should follow *χρήσωμαι*, is contained in *ἀποχρινομένον*.

B. *οὐδὲν ρομίζεσθαι, not even to be thought of*, i. e. to be held in no estimation at all. This verb, which just above has a predicate, *φαῦλοι*, is here used absolutely. Our verbs *to regard, to consider*, and others, are capable of the same twofold use.

C. The colon, which most editors put after *κύρα*, ought, as it seems to me, to be erased. Comp. *μὰ τὸν Δλα . . . ἀλλ'*, 463, D, *νὴ τοὺς Θεοὺς ἀλλ'*, 481, C, where the formula of swearing unites in one clause with what follows. Socrates does not answer Polus by the phrase *νὴ τὸν κύρα*, but only begins his answer in the next chapter.

E. οὐδέν γὰρ ποιεῖν, etc. Comp. Repub. 9. 577, E. “Is not the state that is enslaved and under a tyrant far from doing what it wishes? Very far. And the soul, accordingly, that is governed by a tyrant, will be very far from doing what it may wish (if we speak of the whole soul); and, drawn along forcibly by urgent lust, will be full of agitation and regret.” For ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν, qualifying οὐδέν, see 450, B. —— ἐγὼ οὐ φημι; *egone nego?* —— μὰ τόν. The Schol. on Aristoph. Frogs, 1421, thinks that the name of the divinity is omitted out of reverence. But the omission seems intended rather for comic effect, as though the right divinity did not readily occur to the mind. —— καὶ τίχνην τὴν δητορικήν. Supply οὐσαν. Comp. 495, C.

467 A. ἐμὲ ἔξελέγεται. The aorist participle, which Heindorf declares to be used for the present, has its own force. Polus could come to his conclusion, *when he had refuted*, or *by refuting*. The argument may be considered as *the preliminary* to the conclusion, or as the *means* of reaching it. In the first case, the aorist is needed; the present, if used, would have the second sense. —— οὐδέν ἀγαθὸν τοῦτο κεκτήσονται. By τοῦτο, he means τὸ ποιεῖν ἢ δοκεῖ αὐτοῖς. —— ἔξελεγχθῆ... ὅτι. The verb is here used *in sensu prægnanti*, unless Socrates *be refuted, and it be shown that*, thus answering nearly to our verb *convince*.

B. οὗτος ἀνήρ. An instance of aposiopesis or reticentia, a figure often caused by excited feelings, which cannot find the language to express themselves. “In hac formula recte omittitur articulus, quoniam dicitur δεικτικῶς de eo qui præsens est.” Stallb. οὗτος contains a shade of contempt sometimes like *iste*. Comp. 489, B, 505, C. —— καὶ γὰρ non est *etenim*, sed καὶ pertinet ad *vūr*. Stallb.; i. e. καὶ is also. —— ἵνα προσείπω σε κατὰ σέ, *that I may address you in your own style*. This refers to λῶστε Πῶλε, and the artificial juxtaposition of words of equal length, or of similar form or sound. Comp. 448, C, 465, D.

C. πίνοντες παρά, i. e. πίνοντες τὰ φάρμακα, λαβόντες αὐτὰ παρὰ τῶν ἴαστων, a *constructio prægnans*.

D. οἱ πλέοντες, i. e. who make voyages for commercial purposes. — ἀλλ' ἔκεινο . . . πλουτεῖν, when a demonstrative pronoun thus prepares the way for the infinitive, the latter often loses its article. Comp. τοῦτο . . . ἔξειναι, 469, C. But, just above, we have not only τοῦτο, πίνειν, but also ἔκεινο, τὸ ὑγιαίνειν. — ἀλλο τι . . . οὐτω. Supply ἔχει. *Is it not so, then, in all cases?*

E. πολλὴ ἀνάγκη. The preceding question of Socrates is equivalent to a negative proposition, which is here to be supplied; sc. that there is nothing which is not either good or bad, etc.

A. πράττονται, *on fait*, like λέγονται, *on dit*. The same 468 indefinite subject appears just before in the first person plural, βαδίζομεν, etc.

C. ἀπλῶς οὕτως, *thus in themselves considered*, without respect to something further.

E. ἐν τῇ πόλει ταύτῃ. Not in this city, Athens, as Heindorf understood it, but *in this just-mentioned city*, i. e. in the supposed city. If Athens had been intended, Socrates, living there, would have said, as Stallb. after Boeckh on Pindar (Not. Crit. in Olymp. 6. 102) observes, ἐν τῇδε τῇ πόλει. Comp. this formula so used, 469, D, fin.; Leges 932, A. ὅδε seems to be the strongest, and, so to speak, most objective of the demonstratives, and to point especially at that which has a close outward relation (as that of place) to the speaker. — ἔστιν . . . δύνασθαι. ἔστιν = *fieri potest*. — ὡς δή, as *forsooth*, *just as though*. Stallb. translates these words by *quasi vero*, Ast by *nam revera*.

A. περὶ ὃν . . . τῶν ἀνθρώπων. Comp. Soph. § 151. 3; 469 K. § 332. 8; Cr. § 522.

B. καὶ ἐλεεινόν γε πρός· præpositioni πρός absolute posi-

tæ (præterea) adjungi solet particula γε. Ast. = *yes, and pitiable besides.* — *πῶς, cur.* — *οὕτως, ὅς, for this reason that.* And so, in English, we say *how is this?* nearly in the sense of *why is this?* the reason of which is, that the manner in which a thing is done often involves the cause why it is done.

C. *ἔξειναι.* Supply *τινί*, to which *αὐτῷ* refers, in the next line.

D. *τῷ λόγῳ* is added to explain the sense in which *ἐπιλέψον* is used, *attack in your discourse, refute by argument.* *δῆ* seems to belong to the imperative, with the usual hortatory sense. — *ἐν ἀγορᾷ πλήθουσῃ*, *in the agora, when it is crowded,* which it was between early morning and mid-day. This phrase denotes place, — not time, as Stallb. says, to which *ἐν* is opposed. *περὶ ἀγορὰν πλήθουσαν* is a common phrase for time. *ἀγορά*, even when definitely used, is often without an article, like *πόλις*, *πατήρ*, and many other nouns. And this is particularly frequent after prepositions. Comp. 447, A. — *τεθνήσει*, *he shall be dead*, the meaning of *τεθνηκα* put into a future. This appears to be the received form in old Attic, and *τεθνήσεται* came into use afterwards. See Elmsl. on Aristoph. Acharn. 590.

— *τινα . . . τῆς κεφαλῆς αὐτῶν κατεαγέναι, that any of them shall have his head broken,* like *συντριβῆναι τῆς κεφαλῆς*, Aristoph. Peace, 71. But the accusative may also follow this verb, as in 515, E. Yet the accusative of *κεφαλὴ* was disallowed by the Atticists, although used by Lysias and others of the best writers.

E. *τριήρεις*, desidero articulum. Stallb. *ai*, which may have been absorbed by *καὶ* (*KAI* for *KAIAI*), is added by Coray. But the article is unnecessary, being implied or contained in *τοῦ*, as Ast observes. One article often suffices, even for two substantives of different genders, or for two words separated by disjunctive particles. Comp. Hermann on Eurip. Hec. 593 of his second edition.

A. *τὸ μέγα δύνασθαι*, etc. The construction is anacoluthous; *καὶ τοῦτο . . . ἐστὶ τὸ μέγα δύνασθαι* being, for the sake of greater emphasis, in the place of *καὶ εἴναι μέγα δύνασθαι*. The sense is, *To have great power appears to you to be a good, if success follows a man while he acts as seems best to him; and this (i. e. the use of great power when accompanied with success), as it seems, is to have great power; but otherwise to have great power is a bad thing, and is to have little power.* Socrates shows the absurdities into which Polus, on his own ground, falls.

B. *εἰπὲ τίνα ὅρον ὀρίζει.* *τις* is here used like *ὅστις* in indirect inquiry. See 447, C, 448, E, etc.

C. *χαλεπόν γέ σε ἔλεγξαι.* These words are obviously spoken in irony.

D. *ἄλλ' ἀκούω γε.* Routh and other editors since suppose that by this form of words Socrates conveys ridicule of *ὅρᾶς*, just above, which is used quite rhetorically. This may be so, but *ἀκούω* is often thus used for *ἀκήκοα*. Comp. 515, E; Cr. § 579, ζ; K. § 255. 1. R. — *οὐκ οἶδα.* The noble passage down to *ἄλλὰ μὲν δὴ* is freely translated by Cicero, Tusc. Quæst. 5. 12. — *αὐτόθεν, ex ipsa re.* Stallb., *from the nature of the case itself.*

E. *παιδίας ὅπως ἔχει.* See 451, C. — *τὸν . . . ἄνδρα καὶ γυναῖκα.* See 469, E, note.

A. Archelaus began his reign by the foul means mentioned in the text, in 413 B. C., and died by assassination in 399. He seems to have been an able prince, and he made, according to Thucyd. (2. 100) more internal improvements in Macedonia than all his predecessors. His desire of the society of men of letters is well known; besides Euripides, the poet Agathon and others resorted to his court. (Ælian. Var. Hist. 2. 21.) Socrates, also, is said to have been invited, and to have replied, *ὑβούιν εἴναι μὴ δύνασθαι ἀμύνασθαι ὁμοίως εὖ παθόντα ὠσπερ καὶ κακῶς.* (Aristot. Rhet. 2. 23.)

He said, also, that Archelaus had spent 400 minæ in getting his palace painted by Zeuxis, but had spent nothing on himself. (*Ælian. u. s. 14, 17.*) Athenæus, in a bitter passage, filled with aspersions of Plato (Lib. 11. sub fin.), says that the philosopher was, according to the testimony of his nephew, Speusippus, on very good terms with the man whom he here speaks so ill of. But as Plato was scarcely thirty when Archelaus died, and until that time a man of little distinction, the story is probably distorted and exaggerated. — *ἔδούλευεν ἄν.* Some few MSS. give *ἔδούλευσεν*. Heindorf condemns Routh for adopting *ἔδούλευεν*, saying that the latter, with *ἄν*, is *serviret*; the former, *servisset*. But this is not so. The imperfect indicative with *ἄν*, “plerumque refertur ad præsens. Sæpe vero etiam ad præteritum, ejusmodi quidem, quod diuturnitatem aliquam vel repetitionem facti continet.” Hermann de partic. *ἄν*, II. 10.

B. *Θαυμασίως ὡς ἄθλιος.* See 477, D, note. — *μεταπρηψάμενος*, etc. “Insignis est hic locus eo, quod plurima participia cumulantur, copula non intercedente.” Stallb. In this, the style of rhetoric seems to be imitated. The circumstances are compressed into one sentence, and vibrated, so to speak, one after another with rapidity, for the sake of the greater effect.

C. *ἐμβαλὼν τοῖς φρέαρ, according to Ast and Stallb., denotes the manner in which the action of *ἀποπνιξας* took place, having drowned him by throwing him into the well.* Perhaps it may suit the rhetorical style here better, if they are taken side by side, as if *καὶ* were in the text, *having thrown him into the well (and so) drowned him.* For *ἀποπνιξας*, comp. 512, A. — *ἀρξάμενος ἀπὸ σοῦ, tuque imprimis, seu interque eos tu primus.* Heindorf, who has adduced a number of examples of the phrase.

D. *τοῦ . . . ἡμεληνέαι.* This clause is brought, by a

negligent freedom of style, under the influence of *ōtū*, although Socrates of course did not praise Polus for ignorance of the art of conversation. *δὲ* has the force of *quam-quam*; *although you seem to have neglected the art of discussing.* — *πόθεν.* Comp. my note on Eurip. Alcest. 95.

A. *δοκούντων εἴναι τι.* Cr., § 450, regards *τι* as indeclinable, *eorum qui videntur esse aliquid*; not as *accus.*, *eorum qui se putant esse aliquid.* *Aliquis* and *aliquid* are both used by classical Roman writers in the same emphatic way. Cic. Tusc. Quæst. 5. 36. 104: *an quidquam stultius, quam quos singulos contemnas, eos esse aliquid putare universos.* And so *τις*, *τινες*, as in the noted line of Pindar, *τι δέ τις; τι δ' οὐ τις;* *σκηῆς ὄναρ ἀνθρωπος*, Pyth. 8. 95; and in Demosth. c. Mid. § 213, *πλούσιοι πολλοὶ . . . τὸ δοκεῖν τινὲς εἴναι δι' εὐπορίαν προσειληφότες*, which favors Crosby's view. — *ὅλιγον.* Soph. § 220 (223. 2); Cr. § 623. — *Nicias.* This well-known wealthy general perished in the Sicilian disaster, some seven years before the time when this dialogue is feigned to have been held. He is, however, without anachronism, selected as a witness, in the same way that the testimony of Homer might be appealed to. The men here named were not selected on account of their unjust actions, — for they were, perhaps, all of them, among the best Athenian public men, — but probably on account of their wealth, illustrious connections, and ancestry. Socrates means to say, that the spirit of all the great and opulent families in the city led them to prefer prosperous injustice before depressed goodness. — *οἱ τριποδες.* A favorite kind of votive offering. The tripods here spoken of were set up on the top of small temples in the inclosure of the temple of Bacchus, in commemoration of victories in which the dedicators were the *choragi* of their tribes. — *Ἀριστοκράτης*, son of Scellias. This man, one of the more moderate aristocrats, after helping, in 411

B. C., to overturn the Athenian constitution, soon again united with Theramenes to put down the more violent revolutionists. His dislike of democracy is punned upon in Aristoph. Birds, 125. We find probably the same person acting as general with Alcibiades, 407 B. C., and one of the commanders in the great sea-fight of Arginusæ, 406 B. C. With five colleagues, he perished, the victim of the popular frenzy which succeeded that event. It would not, then, seem very apposite to cite him the next year as a witness of the tenets of Polus, which his own experience so sadly belied. Either Plato forgot the date of this transaction, or with concealed irony selects the case of this man as really disproving what it is intended to prove. And he may have adduced the others with the same feeling.

B. *ἐν Πυθίον*, sc. *ἱερῷ*, *in the temple of Apollo Pythius* at Athens. So I have no hesitation in reading, with Coray, after one MS., for the common *Πυθοῖ*, *Delphi*. For *τοῦτο* points at a votive offering well known and familiar to Athenians, and this temple (i. e. its sacred precinct) was the place where those who conquered in the cyclic choruses at the Thargelia deposited their tripods. Comp. Boeckh's Inscript., no. 213, and Thucyd. 6. 54. — *τῶν ἐνθέρδε* is for *τῶν ἐνθάδε*, by attraction or accommodation to *ἐκλέξασθαι*, which contains the notion of taking *from*. — *ἐκβάλλειν* . . . *ἀληθοῖς*. In these words there is an elegant allusion to actions of ejectment. There is, also, according to Stallb., a play upon *οὐσία*, which means not only *substance*, *estate*, but *reality*, *truth*. *ἐκβάλλειν*, also, may allude to the tyrants before mentioned; as though Socrates had said, — “ You mean to act the part of one of these tyrants, whom you admire so much, and expel me from my only substance, the truth, by getting a multitude of opinions in your favor.”

C. ὅν ἐγώ αὐτὸν οἴμαι. Supply τρόπον ἐλέγχου εἶναι, and comp. 473, C, 508, B.

D. σὺ ἡγεῖς οἰόν τε εἶναι. *οἶον* is neuter, and *εἶναι* is to be taken with *μακάριον* ἄνδρα; another *εἶναι* being understood, unless we say that the one in the text by brachylogy performs a double part. Comp. Repub. 486, A: *οἶόν τε οἴει τούτῳ μέγα τι δοκεῖν εἶναι τὸν ἀνθρώπινον βίον*. —— ἄλλο τι . . . διανοώμεθα; shall we not suppose that you think so? For the genitive absolute with *ώς*, after a verb of knowing, comp. Soph. § 192, N. 2; Mt. § 569. 5; K. § 312, R. 12; Cr. § 640. —— *ἄρα* interrogative is sometimes found out of its usual place at the beginning of the sentence, like other words of the same class. It is, however, before the most important clause. Comp. 476, A.

A. ὑπὸ Θεῶν. *ὑπὸ* is used because *τυγχάνη δίκης* contains a passive idea = *κολάζηται*.

B. ἀληθῆ . . . ἴσως. Hoc *ἴσως* cum irrisione dictum de re certa ut Lat. *fortasse*. Stallb. —— *ἄλλ' εἴ τι τοῦτ' . . . χαλεπώτερον* alludes to 470, C, *χαλεπόν γέ σε ἐλέγξαι*, and is ironical.

C. ἔκτείμηται, *exsecetur*. Ast. —— *τοὺς αὗτοῦ ἐπιδῶν παιδας*. Supply *λωβηθέντας*. *ἐπιδεῖν* (to look upon, to live to see), “ponitur semper in rebus gravioribus, et ἐπὶ συμφορᾶς ut ait Thomas Magister, p. 335.” Wytttenbach on Plut. de sera num. vindict., p. 17, referred to by Heindorf and others. Not *semper*, but *sæpe*. We have, for instance, Eurip. Med. 1025, *πρὸν σφῷν ὄνασθαι κάπιδεῖν εὐδαιμονας*; Plut. Pelopid. § 34, *Διαγόραν ἐπιδόντα νιόν τε στεφανομένους Ὀλυμπίασιν*, and so several times in Plutarch’s lives. —— *καταπιττωθῆ*, *pice oblitus cremetur*. —— *οὗτος εὐδαιμονίστερος ἔσται*. The compar. here has far less authority in its favor than the superl.; and quite a number of MSS. have *εὐδαιμων*. Stallb. inclines to the superl., but no sure example has been adduced of this degree used for the compara-

tive and followed by *η*. — *καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ξένων, and by strangers besides, or and by the rest of men, viz. strangers.* This seemingly pleonastic use of *ἄλλος* is quite common. Comp. 480, D; Phædo, 110, E, *γῇ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ξώοις;* Leg. 7. 789, D, *κάλλος καὶ τὴν ἄλλην φώμην;* Xen. Cyrop. 7. 3, *βοῦς καὶ ἵππους . . . καὶ ἄλλα πρόθατα πολλά.*

D. *μορμολύττει αὖ, etc., you are this time bringing up bugbears, and not attempting a refutation; and just now you were bringing up witnesses.* Socrates is making game of the rhetorical substitutes for philosophical proof used by Polus. For *ἄρτι δὲ ἐμαρτύρουν*, comp. 470, D, 472, A, to which places there is a reference. — *δυοῖν γὰρ ἀθλιοι.* Supply *οὐδέτερος.*

E. *ἄλλο αὖ τοῦτο εῖδος ἐλέγχου.* This may allude to a rhetorical precept of Gorgias mentioned by Aristot. Rhet. 3. 18, that the “impression produced by the serious discourse of the adverse party must be destroyed by mirth; and that of his mirth by seriousness.” — *καὶ πέρσοι βουλεύειν λαχών . . . οὐκ ἡ πιστάμην ἐπιψηφίζειν.* Socrates, in his ironical way, attributes to ignorance a proceeding which sprang from a conscientious regard to law, and crowned him with the highest honor. It is narrated by Xenophon, in his Hellenics, 1. 7, and mentioned by him (Memorab. 1. 1. 18, and 4. 4. 2) and Plato (Apol. Socr. 32, A), and in the dialogue Axiochus, § 12. Socrates happened to be the Epistles or president of the Prytanes, and as such the presiding officer in the assembly, on the day when the generals who had conquered at Arginusæ (comp. 472, A, note) were brought before the people on a charge of having neglected to pick up the bodies of the citizens that were floating in the water. It was proposed, contrary to the laws, to try them all at once by a summary process. Some of the Prytanes, who declared that they would not put the vote contrary to the laws, were frightened from their pur-

pose by the rage of the people, “and all promised that they would put the vote, except Socrates, the son of Sophroniscus, who only said that he would do every thing according to the laws.” (Xen. Hellen. u. s.) Whether Socrates was overruled by his colleagues it does not appear. One is tempted to conjecture that they took the affair out of his hands, and pretended that his delay in allowing the assembly to vote proceeded from ignorance; and that to this he playfully alludes. His conduct, however, was viewed by all in its true light. There is some reason to believe, however, that for that day he stayed proceedings upon the proposition. “But on the next day, Theramenes and Callixenus, with their party, by suborning fraudulently chosen proedri, procured the condemnation of the generals without a trial.” (Axiochus, u. s.) This passage from a work ascribed to a disciple of Socrates, but commonly regarded as spurious, is important, not only for this item of information, but also for the statement, which may have some historical basis, that the foul plot against the generals was consummated by means of the *proedri non-contribules*, as they are called, who were drawn according to a pretended lot, on the day of the assembly, by the Epistles for the day, who was the successor of Socrates.

A. ὅπερ νῦν δὴ ἔγώ ἔλεγον is to be taken with *έμοι* . . . 474 παράδος, as I was saying just now, hand over the proof to me in my turn. He refers to 472, C.

B. τοῖς δὲ πολλοῖς οὐδὲ διαλέγομαι. These words with some bitterness silently contrast the philosopher with the orator, who aims to persuade the many. — διδόναι ἔλεγχον, to give an opportunity of refutation, to let (another) take up the argument. — πολλοῦ γε δεῖ. In this formula, καὶ is often added before δεῖ in the sense of even.

D. τι δὲ τόδε; intellige λέγεις. Stallb. — εἰς οὐδὲν ἀποβλέπων, etc. Do you call beautiful things in general

(τὰ καλὰ πάντα) beautiful in each instance without having reference to any thing further? i. e. do you consider beauty a fundamental quality, or resolve it into something else? — πρὸς ὁ ἄν. These words down to τοῦτο are epexegetical of the preceding clause.

E. καὶ μὴν τά γε . . . ἀμφότερα. In this sentence, Ast wishes to write καλὰ without the article, thus making it a predicate. τὰ καλὰ is added by way of explanation. τὰ κατὰ . . . νόμους = οἱ νόμοι. The sense is, *And, moreover, laws and studies — those that are beautiful, that is — are not removed from (are not without) these properties, viz. the useful or pleasant, or both.*

475 A. τὸ τῶν μαθημάτων κάλλος ὥσπερτως. Supply ἔχει. — καλῶς . . . ὁρίζει. This conveys a bitter satire of Polus, who by pleasure and the good meant the same thing. — οὐκοῦν τὸ αἰσχρὸν τῷ ἐναντίῳ, i. e. οὐκοῦν καλῶς ὁρίζουμαι, τῷ ἐναντίῳ ὁριζόμενος τὸ αἰσχρόν.

B. οὐ καὶ τοῦτο ἀνάγκη; frequens apud Plat. dictio pro quâ quis expectet οὐ καὶ τοῦτο ἀναγκαῖον; infra, p. 499, B, οὐ ταῦτα ἀνάγκη. Stallb.

C. οὐκοῦν τῷ ἑτέρῳ λείπεται, sc. ὑπερβάλλειν αὐτό.

D. ἀντὶ τοῦ ἡπτον, sc. κακοῦ καὶ αἰσχροῦ.

E. For παρέχων, see 456, B. — δὲ ἐλεγχος . . . οὐδὲν ἔστιν, *my mode of proof when put by the side of your mode of proof is quite unlike it.*

476 A. σκεψώμεθα, σκοπώμεθα. The present imperative, and the subjunctive used for it, seem sometimes to have a closer reference to the present time than the aorist; and therefore to be more urgent. Comp. *let us be going*, and *let us go*, in English. It has been remarked (first, I believe, by Elmsley), that in the present and imperfect the Attics say σκοπῶ, ἐσκόπουν, or σκοποῦμαι, ἐσκοπούμην, but not σκέπτομαι, ἐσκεπτόμην. There is only one instance of σκέπτομαι in Plato to very many of σκοπῶ. On the con-

trary, they never use *σκοπῶ* in the future, aorist, or perfect.

B. *διασκεψάμενος*, *after careful consideration*. — ἄρα *τοῦτο πάσχον*, sc. *ἐστι*, or better, *ἀνάγκη τοῦτο πάσχον εἶναι* (i. e. *πάσχειν*), *τοῦτο* being the object. The participle is used to continue the form of the preceding discourse.

C. The Attic form *κάω* is justly preferred by all modern editors to *καιώ*, having, as it does, the support of several MSS.

D. *τούτων δὴ ὁμολογουμένων*. The participle is properly in the present, as the clause may be resolved into *ἐπειδὴ ταῦθ' ὁμολογοῦμεν*.

A. ἄρα ἵνπερ ἐγὼ ὑπολαμβάνω τὴν ὥφελειαν; Supply 477 ὥφελεῖται, to be taken with its cognate noun, and for the place of *ἥφελειαν* in the sentence, comp. Soph. § 151, Rem. 7; K. § 332. 8; Cr. § 522.

B. *ἐν χρημάτων κατασκευῇ ἀνθρώπου*, *in the condition of a man's property*. So Schleierm. Comp. Repub. 544, E, αἱ τῶν ἴδιωτῶν κατασκευαὶ τῆς ψυχῆς, and 449, A, περὶ ἴδιωτῶν ψυχῆς τρόπου κατασκευήν. Ast, in his translation, joins *ἀνθρώπου* with *κακίαν*.

C. *ἄει τὸ αἰσχιστον*, etc. *In every case, that which is most ugly is most ugly, from what has been admitted before, either as occasioning pain in the greatest degree, or harm, or both.* The student will have observed that *καλός*, *αἰσχρός*, preserve the same sense throughout the discussion, and there seems to be no fit word except *ugly* by which to translate the latter of the two. And yet *ugly* will not bear to be used in as wide an extent as *αἰσχρός*. *ἄγαθός*, *κακός*, denote the relation of any thing to our well-being, especially to future and ultimate well-being as opposed to pleasure in the present time.

D. *οὐκοῦν ἡ ἀνιαρότατόν*, etc. *Therefore it is either most unpleasant, and the ugliest of them because it exceeds*

(them) in unpleasantness, or (it is so because it exceeds them) in hurtfulness, or in both. *τούτων* refers to the two *πονηρίαι* of soul and body. — *ὑπερφυεῖ τινι . . . ὡς μεγάλῃ βλάβῃ*, by some extraordinarily great harm. This may be explained as a *confusio duarum locutionum*, *ὑπερφυέσις ἐστιν ὡς μεγάλῃ βλάβῃ*, it is astonishing by how great a harm, and *ὑπερφυεῖ τινι βλάβῃ*, by some astonishing harm. The common formula *ὑπερφυῶς ὡς*, *θαυμαστῶς ὡς*, with an adjective, can be explained in the same way, or by an attraction by which the adjectives *ὑπερφυέσις*, *θαυμαστόν* (*ἐστιν*) are changed in their form by the relative adverb.

E. *ἀπαλλάττει*. This means no more than “has a tendency to free.” Some are beyond the reach of cure by punishment (525, C). Nor does Socrates teach here that the ultimate object of punishment is to free the bad man from his badness, as that of medicine is to cure the sick. The comparison is not to be pressed in all respects.

478 A. *εἰ μή οὕτως εὐπορεῖς*, if on this view of the subject you are not prepared to answer.

C. *ἀπαλλάττεται*. The subject is to be found in *οἱ ιατρενόμενοι*, such as are under cure, which, being indefinite, readily gives place to a singular. — *ιατρενόμενος* is added to explain *οὕτως*. — *ἄρχήν*, omnino, used chiefly with negatives. Comp. Soph. Antig. 92. — *τὴν ἄρχήν μηδὲ κτῆσις*, the not even possessing it at all.

D. *ιατρική γιγνεται πονηρίας ή δίκη*. Hoc dictum multorum imitatione celebratum esse docuit Wyttenbach. ad Plutarch. de sera numinis vindicta, p. 23. Stallb.

E. *οὗτος δ' ἦν*, but this was, i. e. this is, as we proved, he who, etc.

479 A. *διαποάξηται ὥστε*. This verb and *ἐκπράσσω* are often followed by *ὥστε* before an infinitive. Comp. Soph. Antig. 303. Eurip. Alcest. 298. — *ὥσπερ ἀν εἴ τις*. In phrases like this, an apodosis to which *ἄν* belongs is to be supplied :

here διαπράξαιτο is to be repeated. A little below ὁσπεραγεῖ παῖς = ὁσπερ φοβοῖτο ἀν εἰ παῖς εἴη.

B. τὸ ἀλγεινὸν αὐτοῦ καθορᾶν is added to explain τοιοῦτόν τι. αὐτοῦ refers to δίκην διδόναι, implied in δίκην, just above. — μὴ ὑγιοῦς σώματος stands, with a brevity which is not uncommon in comparisons, for τοῦ συνοικεῖν μὴ ὑγιεῖ σώματι, in order to prevent the repetition of συνοικεῖν. Comp. 455, E, note; Soph. Antig. 75; and Soph. § 186, N. 1; K. § 323, R. 6; Cr. § 461, R. 2.

C. παρασκευαζόμενοι. This verb can be followed by an accusative, and by a clause beginning with ὅπως. The two constructions are here united. — ὅπως ἀν ὕσιν, *the means whereby they may be.* — συμβαίνει μέγιστον κακόν. This verb may be united with the participle or infinitive of εἰμι, or with a simple predicate, as here. Comp. Soph. Electr. 261, note in my ed.

E. τὸν ἀδικοῦντα . . . διδόντα, *the one who, though he commits the greatest wrongs, suffers no punishment for them.* — φαίνεται, sc. ἀποδεῖχθαι.

A. αὐτὸν ἔαντον . . . φυλάττειν, etc. *For one needs to keep guard especially over himself, lest he act unjustly, on the ground that (if he so act) he will be possessed of a serious evil.* The subject of φυλάττειν is τινά, with which αὐτὸν is to be joined; and the same omission of the indefinite subject occurs a few lines below. — ὅπως μὴ ἀδικήσῃ. One MS. has ἀδικήσει, and one other ποιήσει, just below. The old doctrine of Dawes, that ὅπως μὴ cannot be followed by a first aorist subjunctive, but requires either a second aorist subjunctive or future indicative, is now exploded by all respectable scholars.

B. η̄ πῶς λέγομεν. λέγωμεν, which Bekker prefers, would be equally good here. Comp. τι φῶμεν, just below. The difference is, that πῶς λέγομεν = *what is our opinion?* πῶς λέγωμεν, *what shall we say?* what ought to be our opinion? what have we good reason to believe?

C. *εἰ μὴ εἰ.* “Sometimes a second *εἰ* follows *εἰ μὴ*, as in Latin *nisi si*.” Mt. § 617. d; K. § 340, R. 5; Cr. § 667. 2. Stallb., on Sympos. 205, E, says: “Alterum *εἰ* rem magis etiam reddit incertam, ut quod exceptioni conditionem adjiciat.” — *ἐπὶ τούραρτιον*. According to Stallb., *χρήσιμον εἶναι* is here to be supplied, and the clause *κατηγορεῖν δεῖν*, being explanatory of *τούραρτιον*, follows without a copula. But this view of the construction overlooks *δεῖν*. It may be explained by supplying *οὐ χρήσιμος ... ἵμιν* again in thought with *εἰ μή τις*, etc., or in other words, Plato, studious of brevity, proceeds as if he had forgotten all of the sentence preceding *οὐ χρήσιμος*. *For making a defence, etc., ... rhetoric is of no use at all to us* (nor is it of any use), unless one should suppose, on the contrary, that he ought to be an accuser first of all of himself, etc. — *ὅς ἂν ἀεί*. Here *ἀεί* = *at any time*. — *ἄλλὰ παρέχειν μύσαντα*, etc., *but to give himself up, with his eyes closed and manfully, as to a physician*, etc. *μύσαντα* expresses endurance of calamity with determination, the impressions concerning pain derived from the sense of sight, and their effects in weakening resolution, being thus prevented by the will of him who shuts his eyes. Comp. Soph. Antig. 421.

E. *σοι ὁμολογεῖται*. Heindorf and Coray would exclude *σοι* from the text. If it be the pleonastic dative, as it is called, the sense is *for you*, i. e. *I am willing to own to you that* they agree with what was said before. — *τούραρτιον*, etc. If, on the other hand, says Socrates, one would do evil to another, he must save him by the use of rhetoric from punishment. Thus the rhetoricians, who place the value of their art in doing good to a friend, and harming an enemy, do just the contrary; they harm their friends by saving them from justice, and do good to their enemies by the opposite. All this proceeds upon the principles with regard to justice and injustice which Polus has been com-

elled to admit. The parenthesis *εἰν μόνον . . . εὐλαβητέον*, as understood by Buttmann, amounts to this: that this method of doing evil to an enemy is only applicable in case the enemy wrongs a third person; for when the enemy wrongs the orator himself, to do evil to him thus, namely, to save him from justice, would be but exposing the orator to fresh injuries from him. By rhetoric, then, he cannot gain the point he desires, namely, to do evil to his adversary without injuring himself. — *μεταβαλόντα, mutata ratione, vicissim.* Comp. *μεταστρέψας*, 456, E. It agrees with the subject of *ποιεῖν*. The abundance of words to denote opposition is worthy of notice: *τούναντιον, αὐτόν*, and this participle. — *εἰν δὲ ἄλλον*, etc. *δὲ* often resumes the subject after a parenthesis. The sense of the first part of this sentence is as follows: — *But on the other hand, again, if, reversing the case, one has need to do harm to any person, whether enemy or any one whomsoever, — provided only one be not himself wronged by his enemy; for that must be guarded against, — if, I say, an enemy wrong another, he (that other) must procure in every way, by deed and word, that he (the enemy) suffer not punishment nor come before the judge.*

A. *ἀναλίσκηται.* This, according to Coray, is an isolated instance of the middle of *ἀναλίσκω* used as the active, and to be altered into *ἀναλίσκῃ*. This word and *ἀποδιδῶ* are in a different tense from the aorists preceding, as containing the signification of continuance, which, however, rather belongs to *μὴ ἀποδιδῶ* taken together than to the verb in itself.

C. *νή τοὺς θεοὺς ἄλλά.* Comp. 466, C, note. — *πότερόν σε φῶμεν . . . σπουδάζοντα.* For verbs meaning to speak construed with a participle, see Mt. § 555, Obs. 2. — *εἰ μή τι ἦν, etc.* *If men had not the same state of mind, some of them some one, and others some other* (i. e. if classes or portions of mankind did not agree in one or another state

of mind), but each of us had a peculiar state of mind different from what the rest of mankind had, it would not be easy to manifest your own state of mind to another.

D. *ἴδιον ἡ*. This construction with *ἡ*, which belongs to *ἄλλος*, *ἐναρτίος*, and similar words, is adopted here by *ἴδιος*, on account of the notion of *difference* implied in it. — *πεπονθότες*. Soph. § 137, N. 6; Cr. § 337. a; K. § 241, R. 8. Then follows *ἔρωντες*, because *δύο* renders the *duality* of the persons more striking. — *Ἀλκιβιάδον*. At the time when Plato would have us suppose this dialogue to be spoken, Alcibiades, then a man of forty and upwards, had retired for the last time from Athens, and long before that the intimacy between him and Socrates had ceased. That intimacy was of the purest kind on the part of Socrates. He saw in the young Alcibiades high natural endowments, and hoped to win him over to the love of wisdom and virtue. But political ambition and his passions were more attractive. — *τοῦ Πυριλάμπους*, *the son of Pyrilampes*, whose name was Demus. Pyrilampes was a wealthy Athenian, and a friend of Pericles. He reared peacocks (see Plutarch. Pericl. § 13; Athenæus, p. 397, C), as did his son Demus; and this being then a new bird in Greece, attracted visitors from so far off as Sparta and Thessaly. On the first day of the month, and at no other time, this living picture-gallery was open to all. Demus was as much admired for his beauty as one of his peacocks. Hence the parody in Aristoph. Wasps, 97 (acted seventeen years before the date of this dialogue): *καὶ νὴ Δί' ἦν ἴδη γέ που γεγραμένον | τὸν Πυριλάμπους ἐν θύρᾳ Δῆμον καλόν, | ἵων παρέγραψε πλησίον,* “*Κημὸς καλός*,” i. e. where he finds written *Δῆμος καλός*, “Demus is beautiful,” he writes close by it, “*Κημὸς*” — the top-piece of the judge’s ballot-box — “is beautiful.” Pyrilampes also was considered as handsome and as large a man as any in Asia, whither he went on embassies to the great king and

others. (Charmides, 158, A, if another person of the name be not meant.) We find Demus commanding a galley at Cyprus, before the battle of Cnidus, which happened in 394 B. C. (Lysias de Bonis Aristoph. § 25, Becker.) The object of Socrates here is to teach Callicles, in a playful way, that he feels constrained to follow his object of attachment, philosophy, wherever it leads him; just as Callicles obeys the whims of the people. I know not why Alcibiades is brought in, unless it be for the reason which Ast has given: that, though aside from his main object, it serves to put Socrates in contrast with the politicians and orators. "I love beauty of mind," he says, "in Alcibiades, truth and justice in philosophy; but you love external beauty in Demus, and an ignorant, unjust Athenian people." — *ὅτι . . . οὐ δυναμένον*. There is here a confusion of two expressions, *ὅτι . . . δύνασαι*, and *δυναμένον*, without *ὅτι*, construed with *σον*. *ὅτι* thus becomes idle.

A. *τῶν ἐτέρων παιδικῶν*. The latter word could have an 482 honest sense. — *ἐμπληκτος*, fickle. It has this sense in Lysis, 214, C (where it is joined to *ἀστάθμητος*), Soph. Ajax, 1358, and elsewhere.

B. *ἐκείνην ἔξελεγξον . . . ὡς*, refute her (philosophy) and show that. See 467, A.

C. *ὦ Σώκρατες*. The sense is, *O Socrates, you seem to take airs upon yourself in your discourses, being in very truth nothing but an haranguer; and in the present instance you make this harangue because the same thing has befallen Polus, which, he said, befell Gorgias in respect to you.* The first clause relates to the general habit of Socrates, which, as Callicles, judging him falsely, says, was that of bringing a man into perplexity by sophistical arguments, and then of crowing over him, as from a loftier moral ground. The second clause asserts this to be true in the instance of Polus. *δημηγόρος* (comp. *δημηγορικά*, 482, E)

means one who, like a popular speaker, gains his ends by sophistry and pretence of honesty. —— *ταῦτὸν παθόντος* furnishes the ground or else the occasion why Socrates indulged in this spirit.

D. ὅτι ἀγαπακτοῖεν ἄν, εἴ τις μὴ φαινῇ, because they would be displeased if any one were to refuse. Without ἄν the sense would be, they were displeased. With ἄν, the verb, if put into *oratio recta*, would be in the *optative*; without ἄν, in the *indicative*. Comp. 461, A.

E. οὐ γὰρ τῷ ὄντι, ὡς Σώκρατες, etc. For, O Socrates, while you profess to be in pursuit of the truth, you in reality turn (the conversation) to such vulgar and popular things as these, which are not beautiful by nature, but by law. For φορτικά, comp. Mitchell on Aristoph. Wasps, 66. It may be translated, also, disagreeable, disgusting. Schol. φορτικά ἔστι τὰ βάρος ἐμποιοῦντα, and so Ast, Stallb. It is joined with δικαϊκά, in the style of pleadings, in Plat. Apol. Socr. 32, A. δημηγορικά, Schol. τὰ πρὸς τὴν τῶν πολλῶν βλέποντα δόξαν, i. e. in the style of a δημηγόρος. —— ὡς τὰ πολλὰ δέ. δέ is rarely found after the third word of the clause. Here, however, ὡς τ. π. are in a manner one word. See Poppo's note on ἐν τοῖς πρῶτοι δέ, Thucyd. 1. 6.

483 A. τοῦτο τὸ σοφὸν is in apposition with its relative, being added to explain it. —— κακονοργεῖς ἐν τοῖς λόγοις, you deal unfairly in your discussions. —— ὑπερωτῶν, asking slyly. He says, that if a person speaks of any thing as according to law, Socrates changes the ground cunningly, and asks about it according to nature, and the contrary. —— Πόλου τὸ κατὰ νόμον αἰσχιον, etc., literally, when Polus spoke of that which was more ugly according to law, you followed up the law according to nature, i. e. in your argument you followed out law, as if it were nature. Ast, with some reason, wishes to erase τὸ κατὰ νόμον and κατὰ φύσιν, which last words are wanting in some books. The sense would then

be, When Polus spoke of that which was more ugly, you urged the law, i. e. you spoke of that which was by law more ugly. For the phrase, *διωκ.* κατὰ νόμον, comp. Repub. 5. 454, B, κατὰ τὸ ὄνομα διώκειν, *to pursue an inquiry according to the letter*, and not the idea. For ἐδιώκαθες (which Elmsley on Medea, 186, regards as an aorist, but which here seems to be an imperfect, and its infinitive, Euthyphron 15, D, a present), I beg leave to refer to my note on Antigone, 1096, second edition. — τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι. οἶον, though in no MS., is added before τὸ by several editors, and assists the sense; though without it ἀδικεῖσθαι (a part), may be regarded as added in apposition, to explain πᾶν (the general idea). Being pronounced by the scribes like the ending *ον* of κάκιον, οἶον might easily be absorbed by that word.

B. οἱ τιθέμενοι τοὺς νόμους. See 488, D.

C. ἐκφοβοῦντες. After this word, τε stands in a few MSS. It seems to have been added to do away with the asyndeton; which, however, is allowable here, as what follows is an illustration of the foregoing. — ὁγαπῶσι γάρ, etc. *For they are contented if they are put on an equality when they are inferior.* — ή . . . φύσις. Stallb. observes, that οἶμαι is sometimes interposed between a noun and its article or preposition.

D. δηλοῖ. Not φύσις δηλοῖ, but ταῦτα δηλοῖ, *these things show that they are so.* But Stallb. and Ast give the verb an intransitive sense here. *These things are evident that they are so, i. e. it is evident.*

E. κατὰ φύσιν τὴν τοῦ δικαιοῦ. The three last words, though in all the MSS., are looked on by several editors as interpolated. Ast retains them, translating φύσιν δικαιοῦ not *the nature of justice*, but *natural justice*. He remarks, that a noun governing a genitive may sometimes be resolved into an adjective qualifying that genitive; and cites,

in his support, Aristoph. Plut. 268, ὡς χρησὸν ἀγγεῖλας ἐπῶν, i. e. *golden words*; Phædrus, 275, Α, σοφίας . . . ἀλήθειαν πορίζεις, *true wisdom*. — ὃν ἡμεῖς οὐθέμεθα πλάττοντες, etc. The primary idea, as Heindorf observes, is expressed by the participle. The sense is, *Not however, perhaps, according to that law which we enact, (thereby) moulding those among us who have the best gifts and most strength; — taking them in their youth, by our incantations and juggleries, we tame them as we would lions*, etc. The asyndeton at *ἐκ νέων* is like a number already noticed: the clause is epexegetical of the foregoing. See 450, B. *ἴσως* is used sarcastically, the thing being regarded as certain by Callicles.

484 A. *ἄνηρ*, according to Stallb. and Ast, is here used unemphatically as *a man, a person*. If contempt were expressed, *ἄνθρωπος* would have been chosen, as in 518, C. — *ἀποστισάμενος* contains a figure drawn from a horse *throwing his rider*. — *γράμματα*, *written ordinances*. — *ἐπαναστὰς*, etc. *He rises upon us and turns out our master*, — *this slave* that was, i. e. this one whose spirit we had curbed by laws against nature. The aorists *ἀντιράνη*, *ἔξελαμψε*, denote an action wholly indefinite in regard to time, and thus answer to *ἔαν γένηται* in the protasis, instead of presents or futures. The aorist, in such cases, represents a general truth as a matter of experience; the present, as something oft occurring in the existing state of things; the future, as something sure to happen, as the effect of existing causes.

B. *νόμος ὁ πάντων βασιλεύς*. This fragment of an uncertain poem of Pindar's is often referred to, especially by Plato. It is treated of at large by Boeckh, Pind. Vol. III. 640. Boeckh makes it probable that the words *κατὰ φύσιν*, or something equivalent, belong to the passage; *φῆσιν*, having the same sound, and almost the same letters, as *φύσιν*,

may have caused that word to be omitted. *οὗτος δὲ δὴ* are interposed by Callicles. Something like this followed in Pindar : ἐπεὶ *Ιηρούρα* βόας *Κυκλωπίων* ἐπὶ προθύρων *Εὐρυσθέος ἀναιτήτας* (?) τε καὶ ἀπράτας ἥλασεν. Coray supposes that Callicles perverted the sense of Pindar, but the same turn is given to the words in *Leges*, 10. 890, A, and *Aristides* (2. 69, Dindorf) knows no other. The sense of ἄγει δικαιῶν τὸ βιαιότατον, according to Boeckh, is *affect vim maximam, justam eam efficiens*; i. e. *law* (the law of nature) *makes use of might, and calls it right*. ἄγει and δικαιῶν have the same object. Socrates interprets ἄγει, below (488, B), in the sense of *carrying off, plundering*, which is suited to the action of Hercules. Hence Ast derives his translation, *lex abigit s. rapit, ex suo jure agens, violentissime*; where τὸ β. is treated as an adverbial phrase. But Aristides, by using the opposite phrase, ἄγει τὰ δίκαια προσβεύων, shows that τὸ βιαιότατον is at least the object of δικαιῶν.

— τούτου refers forward to καὶ βοῦς . . . εῖναι.

C. The changes of number here are worthy of notice : τις . . . ἄψηται, . . . τῶν ἀνθρώπων, . . . εὐφυῆς ἦ, . . . γλυκονται. — ἡλικίᾳ de *estate juvenili* intelligendum. Itaque πόρρω τῆς ἡλικίας est *ultra juventutem*. Stallb. πόρρω can take a genitive in two relations. 1. That of the thing *from which* one is far off; as, *Phædrus*, 238, D, οὐκέτι πόρρω διθυράμβων φθέγγομαι, *my words are not far from the style of dithyrambs*. 2. That *in respect of which* one is far advanced; as *Symposium*, 217, D, διελεγόμην πόρρω τῶν νυκτῶν, *I conversed to a late hour of the night*; *infra 486, A*, πόρρω ἀεὶ τῆς φιλοσοφίας ἔλανοντας, *always pushing forwards in philosophy*; and in the text the sense can be, *to too late a period of his youth*.

D. καλὸς κἀγαθὸς ἀνήρ, in the mouth of Callicles, means quite another thing from what the same words would intend if used by Socrates. In earlier times the *optimates* were

so called, i. e. the name was given to men of a certain birth. By the standard of Callicles, it would belong to a man of the highest rank in public estimation. The moral character of the individual gave him a right to this title, in the estimation of Socrates. Comp. Welcker, *Præf. to Theognis*, p. 25. —— *ἐν τοῖς συμβολαιοῖς*, *in stipulations*, or *business transactions* in general. The word denotes both private and public contracts, and treaties of commerce. —— *ἢθῶν, characters.*

E. *τὸ τοῦ E.* See 465, D. The following lines are from the Antiope, and, as the Schol. says, from a speech of Zethus to Amphion. Valckenaer, in his Diatribe on the frag. of Eurip. (the seventh and eighth chapters of which are devoted to this play), gives these words to Amphion. —— *ἴν' αὐτὸς αὐτοῦ*, etc., *where*, i. e. in whatsoever, *he happens to do his best*, whereinsoever he most excels. One MS. only has *τυγχάνει*, a reading which the editors before Stallb. generally preferred. But it is now admitted on all hands, that in the poets relative words occasionally are joined to the subjunctive without *ἄν*. Cousin translates this line, “*afin de se surpasser lui-même.*” It is strange that he did not see that in the very next line Plato interprets the ancient and poetical *ἴνα*, *where* (which the Attic prose-writers did not entirely give up), by *ὅπου ἄν*. —— For *αὐτὸς αὐτοῦ*, see Soph. § 144, N. 4, and § 232; and for *βελτιστὸς αὐτοῦ*, § 177, N. 5; Cr. § 464. The comparative with the reflexive pronoun in the genitive denotes the having gone beyond a previous or usual state; the superlative with the same, the possession of the quality in the highest degree to which the person spoken of attains.

485 A. *εὐνοίᾳ τῇ ἑαυτοῦ*, *out of regard to himself, through self-love.* The genitive is objective, as is the possessive pronoun, 486, A, *εὐνοίᾳ τῇ σῇ*. —— *ὅσον παιδεῖας χάριν, just for the sake of education.* —— *ὅμοιότατον πάσχω, I feel very*

much the same thing. Το ὄμοιος, in the second clause, ὥσπερ succeeds, instead of ὥπερ or οἷον. Comp. Xen. Symposium, 4. 37, ὅμοιά μοι δοκοῦσι πάσχειν ὥσπερ εἴ τις πολλὰ ἔσθιων μηδέποτε ἐμπίπλαιτο, and 518, B.

D. ἔφη ὁ ποιητής, in Iliad, 9. 441.

E. *ἰκανόν*, *satisfactory*, answerable to his powers, or to the expectations formed of him. — μηδέποτε. Heusdius μηδὲν excidisse suspicabatur. Sed vere monuit Boeckhius (in Plat. Minoem et Leges Comment. p. 112) sæpius ita τι et μηδὲν omitti. Stallb. — ἐπιεικῶς ἔχω φιλικῶς, am quite friendly.

A. In the Antiope of Euripides, a dialogue between the 486 brothers Zethus and Amphion was contained, in which the former, who was a shepherd, exhorts the other to give up the art of music, to which he had devoted himself. The dialogue, as the remains show, involved a brilliant comparison between the life of the practical man and of one devoted to the arts. See Appendix, No. 3. — μειρακιώδει . . . μορφώματι, *you strive to ornament a soul so nobly endowed by a puerile form*, or outside. μορφώματι denotes external decoration; here, the musical and poetical pursuits of Amphion. — οὐτὶ' ἀν δικης, etc., *nor in the counsels of justice couldst thou put forth thy words, nor take hold of any thing probable and persuasive*; i. e. Zethus denies to his brother the power to defend himself in suits at law, and to use the arts of persuasion. — ἀπαγάγοι. The word points at the ἀπαγωγὴ of Attic law, a summary process by which the accused could be dragged before the proper magistrate, and locked in prison, without previous citation. One of the crimes to which this process was applicable was ἀσέβεια, the offence for which Socrates, though by another process, was actually tried. There is an allusion below, no doubt, to what actually happened; to the seeming helplessness and unskilfulness of Socrates at his trial; to his

accusers, who were men of little influence or repute; and especially to the leading one, Meletus, a bad poet and a bad man; as well as to the penalty of death, which they attached to their indictment. —— ἀδικεῖν, says Stallb., accipiendum pro ἡδικηκέναι. Heindorf on Protag. p. 310, D, makes the same remark, and brings a number of examples in proof of it. One is from Lysias, p. 678, Reiske : οἱ δ' ἡδικηκότες ἐκπραίμενοι τοὺς κατηγόρους οὐδὲν ἔδοξαν ἀδικεῖν. According to Ast, the present includes the past, = *to have done and to be still doing wrong*. This is often true, but it will not explain such a case as this from Lysias, p. 136, Reiske, cited by Heindorf : ἀξιῶ δέ, ὡς βουλή, εἰ μὲν ἀδικῶ, μηδεμιᾶς συγγράμης τυγχάνειν, where one crime some time before committed is spoken of. The true explanation is, perhaps, that ἀδικῶ properly means, *I am a wrongdoer*, as well as *I am doing wrong*. But he is a wrongdoer who has done wrong.

B. κατηγόρου . . . μοχθηροῦ, *a very common and paltry sort of accuser*; referring to the accuser's standing in general. —— θανάτου . . . τιμāσθαι, *to lay his damages against you at death*, which happily is an expression we do not use, because our law, unlike that of Athens, never places human life in the power of a vile or revengeful accuser, and of a throng of unrestricted judges. τιμāσθαι, *to make his own estimate, set his price*, is the usual word for the plaintiff's claim of satisfaction, whether pecuniary or penal. The court were said τιμᾶν. The defendant was said ἀντιτιμᾶσθαι, *to estimate in his turn what ought to be the verdict*, or ἵποτιμᾶσθαι, *to give his reduced estimate*, in case he had been voted guilty by the judges. And all this was allowed only in certain suits called ἀγῶνες τιμῆτοι, or those in which the laws had not settled the penalty, but left it to the judges. One of these was ἀσέβεια, for which Socrates was tried. On being found guilty, his ὑποτίμημα was called

for; and instead of naming some small mulct which might have saved his life, he named support in the Prytaneum. This led the judges, who usually chose between the accuser's estimate and that of the accused, to sentence him to death. — *περισυλλασθαι*, *ζῆν*. These infinitives, as Stallb. remarks, depend on *ἔθηκε*, which is followed at first by a participle, *δυνάμενον*, added as a paraphrase of the poet's *χείρονα*, and then by an infinitive. — *ἀτεχνῶς*. See 491, A.

C. *εἴ τι καὶ ἀγροκότερον*. See 509, A, note. — *ἐπὶ κέρδης τύπτειν*, *to strike a person upon the side of the head or temples*, is spoken only of blows *with the flat hand*, and was the highest insult at Athens. See 527, D. — *πραγμάτων . . . εὐμονοιαν*. This expression is from Eurip., and alludes to Amphion's pursuit. His brother says, No longer practise music, but musicalness of conduct, i. e. that which is in harmony with your nature and powers.

D. *ἀγαθά*. A. Gellius (10. 22) has quoted the passage from *φιλοσοφία γάρ*, 484, C, to this place, but misapprehends its import. — *τὴν ἀριστην* is in opposition to *τινα τῶν λιθων*. Just above we should expect *αἰς βασανίζοντι* for *ἢ*, referring to *τούτων τῶν λιθων*; but *ἢ* comes from Plato's having *τινα λιθον* in his mind. — *προσαγαγών*, *admovens*, is used with allusion to gold, which was brought to the touchstone to be rubbed upon it, that a judgment might be formed by the color. The order here is, *πρὸς ἦν προσαγαγὼν αὐτὴν, ἔμελλον εὖ εἰσεσθαι εἰ*. Comp. Herodot. 7. 10: “pure gold we do not distinguish by itself, but when we rub it (viz. on the touchstone) by the side of other gold, then we distinguish the better.”

E. *ἄν = ἄ ἄν*. — *αὐτὰ τὰληθῆ*, *true in themselves, or the very truth*.

A. *ψυχῆς πέρι . . . μή*, *as to the soul's living rightly and the opposite*.

B. μᾶλλον τοῦ δέοντος. μᾶλλον is often thus used with a comparative instead of a positive; and in the same way πέρα, just below, 487, D.

C. Andron is mentioned in Protag. 315, C. He was probably the father of Androtion, an orator and disciple of Isocrates, against whom an oration of Demosthenes was written. — επήκουσα. So Bekker, Ast, and others, with most MSS. Stallb. prefers ἵπήκουσα, *I overheard*. (This he retracts in his second edition.)

D. εὐλαβεῖσθαι . . . διαφθαρέντες. Strikingly like Ecclesiastes vii. 16: "Neither make thyself overwise. Why shouldest thou destroy thyself?"

E. δῆλον ὅτι are often interposed in the middle of a sentence, without having an effect on the construction. And so οἶσθ' ὅτι. — τέλος τῆς ἀληθείας, *de veritate perfecta et consummata accipio*. Heindorf. — τὸν ἄνδρα, i. e. mankind. The article is used because ἄνδρος has its widest generic sense, and thus forms a definite whole.

488 A. εὖ ἴσθι τοῦτο ὅτι. τοῦτο traxerim ad ἔξαμαστάνω. Nam Demostheni familiaris formula εὖ ἴσθι τοῦθ' ὅτι, Platonii, quod sciam, non item. Heindorf.

B. ὄγειν. See 484, B, note. If ὄγειν is there correctly explained by Boeckh, we must suppose that Socrates plays upon the word, without essentially injuring the sense of the passage from Pindar.

C. ἀκροασθαι, *obedire*, like ἀκούειν. — τότε, i. e. *antea*, quum de his rebus disputares. Sic τότε passim ponitur. Stallb. — τι ποτε λέγεις. The present embraces the whole time of the present discussion. Hence it is here for ἔλεγες.

D. οἱ δὴ καὶ, etc. *Since, indeed, they even make laws for the one*, i. e. to control the one. The relative, as often elsewhere, renders a reason; i. e. = the demonstrative with γάρ. τιθημαι νόμον is used of a people, or one empowered by them, making laws, the maker being one of the party

to be governed; *τιθημι νόμον*, of a sovereign or a divine lawgiver.

A. ὅπως μὴ ἀλώσει. See Soph. § 214, N. 3; Cr. § 602. 489 3; K. § 330, R. 4. — *αἰσχυνόμενος*. Socrates refers with admirable irony to 482, C, D. — *ἴνα . . . βεβαιώσωμαι*, etc., that *I may get confirmation (for it) from you, seeing that a man who is competent to decide has admitted it.*

B. *κινδυνεύεις οὐκ ἀληθῆ λέγειν*, *it seems that you were not speaking the truth*; for *λέγειν* is the infinitive of the imperfect. — *ἄ . . . πακονοργῶ*. He quotes what Callicles said, 483, A. — *ὄνοματα θηρείων, verba aucupans*. Comp. 490, A. The same metaphor is seen in our word *captious*. — *ὅματι ἀμαρτεῖν, to use a wrong expression*.

C. *ἢ οὖτι με λέγειν*, etc. *Or do you think my opinion to be, that if a rabble should be collected of slaves and of all sorts of men, of no account except by reason of their bodily strength, and these persons should say any thing, that these very things which they say ought to have the force of law.* Join *τῷ ισχυρίσασθαι* together. This verb can mean *pollere, contendere, fidere*. For the first meaning, which is less common but seems to belong to it here, comp. Dio Cass. 44, p. 406, Reimar: *χαλεπὸν ισχυριζόμενόν τι τῷ σώματι φρονιμάτατον ἐκβῆναι, difficile est corpore esse valido, et animo prudenti.* *φῶσιν* must be taken absolutely, without an object, in the sense of *decreeing, determining*, but with contemptuous disparagement; unless we read, with Heindorf, *ἄπτα* for *αὐτά*. And *αὐτὰ ταῦτα* refers to the edicts implied in *φῶσιν*.

D. *τοὺς δύο . . . τοῦ ἑνός*. As the numerals are opposed to one another, they have a certain definiteness. Hence the article. So *τὰ δύο μέρη*, sc. out of three, *two thirds*. Comp. Cr. § 483. — *τι ποτε λέγεις τοὺς βελτίους* is as legitimate an expression as *τίνας ποτε*, which Routh wished to put into its place.

E. προδίδασκε. Schol. περιπτεύει ἡ πρόθεσις Ἀττικῶς. I believe that in προδίδασκειν, προμανθάνειν (Aristoph. Clouds, 476, 966), πρὸ means *forwards*, and that it is prefixed without adding much to the meaning of the verbs, because the idea of *advance* is involved in learning and teaching. This word alludes to a school, as is shown by ἀποφοιτήσω.

— οὐ μὰ τὸν Ζῆθον. Comp. 485, E. Most MSS. want οὐ, which, however, is necessary here, for although μὰ is almost confined to oaths expressly or impliedly negative, it is in itself merely affirmative, being connected, perhaps, in origin with μήν, μέν. — ὡς σὺ χρώμενος, etc., *whose words you used of me just now with much raillery.* — ὄνόματα λέγεις, *you utter mere words.*

490 B. πολλοὶ ἀθρόοι, *multi simul.* Sæpenumero sic junguntur. Stallb.

C. ἡ οὖν τούτων τῶν σιτίων, etc. *Must he then have more of these provisions than we, because he is better; or ought he, in virtue of his authority, to distribute them all, etc.* — εἰ μὴ μέλλει ζημιοῦσθαι, *unless he intends to pay the penalty (by making himself ill).* — πάντων ἐλάχιστον τῷ βελιστῷ. Supply ἔκτείον.

D. ποῖων ἴματίων; sc. δεῖ αὐτὸν πλέον ἔχειν. ποῖος is often used in questions conveying wonder, indignation, or contempt. Aristoph. Clouds, 366, ‘Ο Ζεὺς . . . οὐ θεός ἐστιν; | ποῖος Ζεύς; οὐ μὴ ληρήσεις; οὐδὲν ἔστι Ζεύς. Just below we have ποῖα ὑποδήματα . . . ἔχων; *what shoes are you talking nonsense about?* ἔχων here takes an accusative, unless we write ποῖα ὑποδήματα; φλυαρεῖς ἔχων. Of this last phrase explanations, not quite satisfactory, are given by Hermann on Viger, note 228; Mt. § 567; Cr. § 632; K. § 668, R. 1 (largest Gr.). Comp. 497, A.

E. ἀλλὰ καὶ περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν. Comp. Xen. Mem. 4.4.6, ὃ δέ γε ταύτου δεινότερον, ἔφη, ὡς Ἰππία, οὐ μόνον ἀεὶ τὰ αὐτὰ λέγω, ἀλλὰ καὶ περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν σὺ δὲ λέσως, διὰ τὸ πολυμαθῆς εἶναι, περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν οὐδέποτε τὰ αὐτὰ λέγεις.

A. ἀτεχρῶς, *absolutely, positively*. You never stop talking always about cobblers and fullers and cooks, and positively nothing else. In the sense *without art*, the penult has the acute accent. — ἀς . . . λέγω . . . οὐδὲν παύει. ἀς is joined thus redundantly with οὐδὲν παύει again, 517, C, and in Leges, 2. 662, E. Socrates was often thus reproached or derided for drawing his illustrations from homely sources. He was led to it by love of simplicity, contempt for pretension, the desire to find a general truth by means of familiar instances, and frequent conversations with artisans. See a fine passage in *Sypos.* 221, E. — περὶ τίνων . . . πλέον ἔχων. Heind. remarks that περὶ τι, not περὶ τίνος, is the usual formula with πλέον ἔχειν. — τοὺς κρείττους οἵ εἰσιν, etc., *by the better, namely, by who they are I do not mean, etc.* οἵ εἰσιν dictum est cum abundantia quadam qualem Callicles in hac oratione sectatur passim. Poterat enim omitti. Stallb.

B. For *κατηγορεῖν* with the genitive of the person, see Soph. § 183. 2 (§ 194, N. 3).

D. *τι δέ*; . . . ἀρχομένους; The reading and pointing here are quite uncertain. The passage in brackets is omitted by Bekker, after one MS. It has the look of an explanation of *τι δέ*. Nor does Socrates afterwards do any thing with ἀρχομένους, while ἀρχοντας is easily supplied with αὐτῶν. The sense without this passage is, *But what? Does justice consist in this, that those who rule themselves should have more than others?* Stallbaum's reading in his second ed. is αὐτῶν . . . τι [ἢ τι] ἀρχοντας ἢ ἀρχομένους; where *τι* is *quatenus, qua in parte*. But how can ἀρχομένους be the subject of πλέον ἔχειν? or how could he say *quatenus sibimet ipsis imperantes* unless he had already spoken of governing one's self. — ἢ τοῦτο μὲν οὐδὲν δέ. δέ sometimes takes an accusative of the thing, when that is a pronoun.

E. ὡς ήδὺς εἰ answers nearly to the French *comme vous êtes plaisant!* how ridiculous or foolish you are! γλυκὺς is used in the same way. — τοὺς ἡλιθίους λέγεις τοὺς σώφρονας, *you mean those fools the temperate.* The one accusative is in apposition with the other; unless, with Stallb., we make τοὺς ἡλιθίους the predicate-accusative; in which case the sense is, *by the temperate you mean the silly.* The sophists struck a disastrous blow against morality by giving it this title. Comp. Repub. 348, D. “What!” says Socrates to the sophist Thrasymachus; “do you call justice (*κακίαν*) badness?” “No,” said he, “but (*πάνυ γενναιόν εὐήθειαν*) very noble folly.” — πάνυ γε σφόδρα, sc. τοῦτο λέγεις.

492 B. οἴς . . . ὑπῆρξεν . . . νίσσιν εἶναι η̄ αὐτοὺς . . . ίκανοὺς. *εἶναι* belongs to both clauses. For the transition from the dat. dependent on the verb to the accus. construed with the infinitive, comp. 510, E, fin., and Soph. Electra, 962. — τί . . . κάκιον εἴη, for τί ἀν . . . κάκιον εἴη. Comp. τις . . . κατάσχοι, Soph. Antig. 605; Mt. § 515, Obs. ἀν may have dropped out here, as τι itself is wanting in ten MSS., both being absorbed, so to speak, by the last two syllables of δυναστείαν. — οἴς ἔξօν, etc. A contracted expression for οἱ, ἔξօν αὐτοῖς . . . αὐτοὶ ἐπαγάγοιντο, which is much the same as εἰ, ἔξօν αὐτοῖς, etc., if, when they had it in their power, . . . they were themselves to introduce. Comp. Repub. 465, fin.: “Do you remember that some one reproved us, because we, in his opinion, made (*ποιοῦμεν*) our guards not happy, οἴς ἔξօν πάντα ἔχειν τὰ τῶν πολιτῶν οὐδὲν ἔχοιεν, who, when they could possess every thing belonging to the citizens, were to have nothing.”

C. τοῦτ' ἔστιν ἀρετή, etc. τοῦτο refers, not to the three nouns just preceding, but rather to ἐὰν ἐπικουρίαν ἔχῃ, — to the condition of things when τροφὴ, etc., are able to supply

their wants. —— *τὰ δὲ ἄλλα*. The predicate is *φλυαρία καὶ οὐδενὸς ἄξια*.

D. *ἄμοθεν γέ ποθεν*, *undecunque*, from obsol. *ἀμός*, Attic *ἀμός*, = *τις*, whence *μηδαμοῦ*. This is Bekker's emendation of *ἄλλοθέν ποθεν*, which is evidently a false reading. —— *ἔτοιμάζειν* is for *ἔτοιμαστέον*, which the construction of the first clause would require. With this infin. supply *δεῖν* involved in *κολαστέον*.

E. *ως γε σὺ λέγεις . . . ὁ βίος*, *such a life as you mention*. —— The lines here quoted are probably from the Polyidus of Eurip., and very similar to another fragment from his Phrixus. The second trimeter is completed by *κάτω νομίζεται*. The passage is parodied by Aristoph. in the Frogs, 1477.

A. The singular passage next following is introduced 493 by the way, and perhaps half in sport. At the beginning of an argument concerning the good and the pleasant, Socrates takes breath a moment, and changes reasoning for playful illustration. He first mentions an opinion concerning the true life, which was expressed by the Orphic and Pythagorean theologists; — that the body is the tomb of the soul, release from which will admit it into real existence. To this dogma Plato alludes in Cratylus, 400, C. He says (ironically throughout), upon the derivation of *σῶμα*, that it may come from *σῆμα*, because some call the body the *σῆμα* of the soul, as being that in which in this present it is buried; or because the soul *σημαίνει* by means of the body its thoughts and wishes. But he thinks that the name is due to the followers of Orpheus especially, who taught that the soul was inclosed and kept (*σώζειν*) in it to atone for its crimes in an earlier state. This derivation, he says, would require no change of letter. The Pythagorean Philolaus (Boeckh's Philolaus 181, Clem. Alex. Strom. 3. 3, p. 518, Potter) says, that "the old theologers and diviners testify,

that the soul is joined to the body to suffer a certain penalty, and is buried in it *καθάπτει ἐν σύμπατη*." To this, and to the comparison of the body to a prison, there is frequent allusion. Socrates now passes on to an allegorical explanation of the fable of the Danaides, which illustrates the unsatisfactory nature of devotion to animal desire. It was the doctrine of some Mysteries (the Orphic or Bacchic especially) that the initiated fared better in the world below than the uninitiated, and use was made of this fable to show the difference in their condition. The fable was afterwards spiritualized, as we see in the text, and applied to the soul and its parts. It may be doubted who is the author of this punning allegory. Boeckh contends that it was Philolaus, who was a native of Croton or Tarentum. But there is no evidence that this allegory, and the dogma first spoken of, are to be attributed to the same person. The Schol. refers it to Empedocles, and Olympiod. (apud Stallb.) does the same. But their assertions may be mere guesses. As regards it as Plato's own invention, playfully ascribed to an Italian or Sicilian, for the purpose of laughing at the countrymen of Polus and Gorgias.—*τῆς δὲ ψυχῆς, etc.* *And that that part of the soul in which the desires lodge is capable of being persuaded, and of changing from one side to the other.* There may be a side-thrust at rhetoric, the object of which is *πειθεῖν*, when it is said that the part of the soul which contains the desires is moved this way and that by persuasion. —— *μυθολογῶν, expressing in the form of a fable.* —— The ensuing words, as Buttmann, in Heindorf's ed., observes, seem to be taken from a song of Timocreon of Rhodes, a lyric poet contemporary with the Persian war; of which song a few words in Ionic a minore dimeters preserved by Hephaestion (p. 71, Gaisford) are as follows: *Σικελὸς κομψὸς ἀνὴρ ποτὶ τὰν ματέρ' ἔφα.* —— *κομψός.* On this word, Ruhnken (Timaeus s. v.) says: *κομψὸν dicitur*

quicquid scitum et venustum est. Plerisque autem locis, apud Platonem vox habet aliquid ironiae Socraticæ, ut non tam *de vera et naturali*, quam *de nimia et adscititia venustate* capienda videtur. Gorg. 521, E. Pro *splendidis nugis* sumendum est Gorg. 486, C. Neque tamen desunt loci ubi simpliciter et sine ironia ad laudem referatur: which he considers to be the case here. It answers to nice, fine, refined, and witty. I cannot help thinking that it here contains something of irony. — *παράγων τῷ ὄνόματι, making a change in the word*, altering its sound a little.

B. *τῶν δ' ἀμνήτων*, etc., and that that part of the soul of the uninitiated, where the desires reside,—its incontinent and irretentive part,—he said that this was a cask with holes in it; making the comparison on account of its ἀπληστία. *ἀμνήτους*, besides its similarity to *ἀνοήτους*, seems to have a double sense, uninitiated (*ἀ, μνεῖν*) and *not closing*, unable to contain, as if from *ἀ, μύειν*. The construction is completed by supplying *ἔφη*, suggested by *ἀνόμασε*. *αὐτοῦ* seems to refer to *ψυχῆς*, although no reason appears why the neuter should here be chosen. Heindorf wished to read *διὰ τὸ ἀκόλαστον*, in which case *αὐτοῦ* would refer to *τοῦτο τῆς ψυχῆς*. — *τοὐταντον* and *σοὶ* are to be joined, the opposite of what you have expressed. — *τὸ ἀειδές δὴ λέγων*, meaning of course the invisible, i. e. the intellectual, as opposed to the material. Comp. Phædo 80, D, ἡ δὲ ψυχὴ ἄρα, *τὸ ἀειδές, τὸ εἰς τοιοῦτον ἔτερον τόπον οἰχόμενον*. — *οὗτοι . . . κοσκίνῳ*, that these uninitiated persons are, as it would seem (*εἶναι ἄν*), the most wretched, and carry water into the cask with holes in a sieve likewise perforated. The early mysteries seem to have consisted of purifications, the effect of which was to remove guilt. Hence the initiated escaped the punishment in the future world which was to fall on others. This was denoted by making use of certain fables of the poets, which exhibited the popular view of the punishment of great offenders, and applying them to the uninitiated.

C. ἄτε οὐ δυναμένη, etc., *on account, namely, of its inability to retain, through unbelief and forgetfulness.* ἀπιστία alludes to πιθον. —— ἐπιεικῶς. Non explicuerim cum Heindorfio satis, admodum, sed habet vim affirmandi atque concedendi, ut Latinorum *utique, sane quidem.* Stallb. *Ut candide loquar.* Routh. —— ὑπό τι, aliquatenus, quodammodo. Stallb. —— δῆλοι μὴν, etc. *Yet they make that clear, by the exhibition of which I wish to persuade you — if in any wise I can — to change your mind.* —— μεταθέσθαι, sc. γνώμην or ψῆφον. The next words explain μεταθέσθαι, and therefore have no need of καὶ, which is in some editions. Just below, μετατιθεσαι is used in what is called the *constructio prægnans* like ἔξελέγχω, p. 482, B. The sense is, *And do you change your opinion, and say that, etc.*

D. ἐξ τοῦ αὐτοῦ γνωμασίου τῇ νῦν, *from the same school with that just now,* from some allegorizing sophist. For ὁ αὐτός followed by the dative, in brief phrases, see Soph. § 195, N. 3. —— After οἶον supply λέγοις ἄν.

E. νάματα . . . ἐκάστου τούτων, *liquors belonging to, or put into, each of these tubs.*

494 B. χαραδριοῦ. A bird, so called from the ravines and beds of torrents where it lives, of a yellowish color, and very voracious. ἄμα τῷ ἐσθίειν ἐκκρίνει, says the Schol. The Schol. on this place and many others mention that these birds were reputed to cure the jaundice by being looked at; whence those who brought them into town for sale kept them covered, lest they should effect a cure for nothing. More about the bird will be found in Schneider on Aristot. Hist. Animal., Vol. IV. 80, seq. He thinks it to be the charadrius oedicnemus or c. hiaticula of Linnæus. —— τὸ τοιόνδε λέγεις, οἶον, *do you allow that there is such a thing as.*

C. λέγω, καὶ, etc. λέγω, to be repeated after καὶ in the

sense of *speaking of*, takes a personal object with which the participles agree. The sense is, *Yes, and I speak of (allow that there is such a thing as) a man having all the other desires, and able to live happily by taking pleasure in feeding them.* —— ὅπως μή, i. e. σκόπει ὅπως μή, as usual. ἀπαισχυνεῖ is used with allusion to what Callicles has said of the modesty of Gorgias and Polus, as in 489, A. —— πνούμενον διατελοῦντα τὸν βίον explains the preceding clause. Hence the asyndeton. —— δημηγόρος, *coarse, vulgar.*

D. ἀνδρεῖος γὰρ εἰ. This alludes ironically to his definition of the βέλτιστοι as being the ἀνδρεῖοι (491, C).

E. τὸ . . . κεφάλαιον, *id quod rerum hujus generis* (i. e. turpissimarum) *caput est.* Ast. κεφάλαιον is in apposition with ὁ βίος. —— ἀνέδην, *freely or openly.*

A. ἀνομολογούμενος, *inconsistent, disagreeing*; from ὁμο- 495 λογούμενος, used as an adjective, and ἀ priv. —— διαφθείρεις . . . λόγους, *you make what we have said before good for nothing.*

B. καὶ γὰρ σύ. *Well, what of that? For you do too,* i. e. παρὰ τὰ δοκοῦντα σαντῷ λέγεις.

C. διελοῦ τιάδε, etc. *Explain the following. You mean something probably by ἐπιστήμη (certain knowledge), do you not?* —— ὃλλο τι οὖν, etc. *Did you not accordingly, on the ground that knowledge was a different thing from manliness, speak of these as two?* The allusion in this and the prior question is to 491, A, B. With τὴν ἀνδρεῖαν, οὗσαν is to be supplied. The accus. absol. is often found without the participle of εἰμί expressed. Bekker, without MS. authority, adds ὅν after ἔτερον, which is a very probable conjecture, as ὅν may easily have been swallowed up by ἔτερον. The participle ὅν would be attracted in gender to the predicate.

D. ὁ Ἀχαρεὺς. Socrates playfully but severely imitates the solemn style of covenants, in which the *demus* of the

parties was mentioned. Some of the *demi*, as that to which Socrates belonged, had no corresponding adjective forms. The want was in most cases supplied by an adverb in θεν taken with the article.

496 A. περὶ ὅτου . . . ἀπολαβών, *look at this with regard to any part of the body you please, taking it by itself, or separately.* — φῶ, *which disease, refers to νοσεῖν implied in νοσεῖ.*

C. ὑπερφυῶς ὡς. Comp. 447, D.

D. οὐκοῦν τούτου οὐ λέγεις, etc. *In that of which you are speaking, the one part, viz. διψῶντα, being thirsty, is then feeling pain, is it not?* He was speaking of διψῶντα πίνειν.

E. κατὰ τὸ πίνειν χαιρεῖν λέγεις; *do you speak of taking pleasure so far forth as the act of drinking is concerned?* i.e. does the pleasure go with the drinking? — λυπούμενον; *at the same time that the person feels pain?* — εἴτε ψυχῆς εἴτε σώματος. Stallb. would read ψυχῆς πέρι. But there can be no objection to taking τόπον with the genitives; and χρόνον is excused by being in its company.

497 A. γιγνεται. See 525, E, note. — ἀκκίζει. Olymp. apud Stallb. προσποιῆ μωρίαν καὶ τὸ μὴ εἰδέναι. Mœris defines ἀκκισμός as the Attic expression for προσποίησις. From examples of the use of the word, its meaning evidently is, *to pretend that you do not, particularly to decline taking a thing (as food at table) when you want it.* Comp. Coray on Heliodor. 2. 64. Θρύπτομαι has sometimes much the same sense, e. g. in Plut. Anton. § 12, where it is used of the feigned reluctance of Cæsar to wear the crown. — ὅτι ἔχων ληρεῖς. Comp. 490, E, note. Stallb. (first ed.) and Ast suppose this to be a gloss. Stallb. (second ed.), after Winckelmann on Euthydem. 295, C (quite a parallel passage, οὐκ ἀποχρένει, ἔφη, πρὸς ἄν ὑπολαμβάνης, ὅτι ἔχων φλυαρεῖς καὶ ἀρχαιότερος εἰ τοῦ δέοντος), gives καὶ προϊσθι γε . . .

νονθετεῖς to Callicles, and *οὐχ ἄμα . . . πίνειν* to Socrates. On this passage we may remark,—1. That *ὅτι ἔχων ληρεῖς*, a choice Attic expression, has not the look of a gloss, and it is not easy to say what it is a gloss upon. 2. The phrase is not in dramatic keeping with the politeness of the Platonic Socrates. But then, 3. As Callicles wishes to break off the discourse, *πρόσθι τι εἰς τοῦμπροσθεῖν* is not what *he* would say. 4. *νονθετεῖς* can only point at the advice given by Callicles to Socrates, on pp. 484—486, and not to any thing said by Socrates. Comp. 488, A, *ῶσπερ ἦρξω νονθετεῖν με*, referring to Callicles. 5. There is no mark of a change of person at *οὐχ ἄμα*, and little at *καὶ πρόσθι*. These last considerations induce me to reject Winckelmann's view, and to regard it even more probable that *ὅτι ἔχων ληρεῖς* are words spoken by Socrates. But I can arrive at no sure affirmative conclusion respecting the passage.

B. *οὐ σή αὖτη ἡ τιμή*, *this damage or cost is not yours*, i. e. this does you no harm.

C. *ὅτι τὰ μεγάλα μεμύησαι*. There is an elegant allusion to the mysteries of Ceres; which were divided into the small, held in the city, and the great, held chiefly at Eleusis. The latter could not be witnessed until a year or more after initiation into the other. The sentiment is something like that in Artegall's words to the Giant :—

“For how canst thou those greater secrets know,
That dost not know the least thing of them all?
Ill can he rule the great, that cannot reach the small.”

— *ὅθεν ἀπέλιπες ἀποχόιον*, *answer beginning where you left off*. The usual construction of *ἀρχω* with an adverb of motion is here adopted by *ἀποχόιομαι*. — *πεινῶν* is a participle; *παίεται* here adopts two constructions.

D. *ὁμολογεῖσθαι* seems to mean *to agree with itself*; *σοι* being the ethical dative, and *τὸν λόγον* or *ταῦτα* understood the subject. But *ὁμολ. σοι* may also denote *to be consistent with your previous admissions*. Comp. 487, D.

E. τοὺς οἵς ἀν μάλλος παρῆ. Supply καλοὺς καλεῖς. The article is here used as a demonstrative, — a usage not uncommon before a relative sentence introduced by ὅς, ὅσος, or οἵος.

498 A. ἀμφότεροι ἔμοιγε μᾶλλον, i. e. χαιρεῖν δοκοῦσι. This is said in contempt, as if Socrates were not deserving of a sensible answer.

C. η καὶ ἔτι μᾶλλον, etc. If cowards, who, according to Callicles, are the bad, feel more pleasure and pain than brave men when enemies retire and advance, and if pleasure and pain are the same as good and evil, then the bad are both bad and good in a higher degree than the good, which is absurd. After μᾶλλον ἀγαθοί, the MSS. have οἱ ἀγαθοί, which Routh and succeeding editors have justly left out, as wholly perverting the sense.

E. δἰς γάρ τοι, etc. A proverb, imputed by the Schol. to Empedocles, a part of one of whose hexameters (v. 164 in Sturz's Emped.) is καὶ δἰς γάρ ὁ δεῖ καλόν ἔστιν ἐνοπεῖν. τοι, you know, is often used in making familiar remarks or citing well-known passages. A little below, in 499, B, πάλαι τοι, it has, according to Stallb., "vim confirmandi cum quadam admiratione vel indignatione," = really, or don't you know.

499 B. ὡς δὴ, see 468, E. — *ἰοὺ* sometimes expresses grief, sometimes joy, or, as here, wonder. It is oxytoned by all the editors of Plato. Others would write *ἰοῦ*, either always, or when it does not denote grief.

C. αὖ, again, refers to 491, C. He is again inconsistent with himself. — ἐκόντος εἶναι, if you could help it, if you had your way about it. See Soph. § 221, N. 3; Cr. § 623, N.; K. § 306, R. 8. According to Hermann (Append. to Viger, de pleonasmo), it is not simply *sponte*, but *quantum quis sponte quid faciat*, and is used "de eo potissimum quod quis facere detrectat." Dr. Arnold (on Thu-

cyd. 2. 89), after Hermann, says that *ἐκὼν εἰναι* "is used generally in negative sentences where the speaker wishes to qualify his denial or refusal, by saying that he will not do it if he can help it, but that very possibly he may not be able to help it." He adds, that in Prometheus, 266 (*ἐκὼν ἐκὼν ἡμαρτον*), *ἐκὼν εἰναι* would make nonsense. — *τὸ παρὸν εὐ ποιεῖν*, *to do well what is in one's power, to make the best of what you have.* This proverb again occurs in Leges, 12. 959, C. — *ἡδοναι τινές . . . αἱ μὲν . . . αἱ δέ.* The constant use of *οἱ μὲν*, *οἱ δέ*, in antitheses, seems to be the reason why (by a kind of apposition, perhaps,) they follow *τινες* here. Instead of *τινες μὲν . . . ἄλλαι δέ*, *some, . . . others*, we have, as if the contrast needed to be made stronger, *some, these I say . . . those.* Comp. Eurip. Hec. 1185, *πολλαὶ γὰρ ἡμῶν, αἱ μὲν εἰσ' ἐπιφθονοι | αἱ δ',* etc. In Æschin. c. Ctes. (§ 11, Bekk.), *οἱ μὲν* follows *τινες*, and the second *οἱ μὲν* is suppressed, as is often the case with *οἱ μὲν*, *οἱ δέ* alone. The formula often occurs as in Plat. Repub. 8. 560, A.

D. *εἰ ἄρα τούτων.* Græci frequenter relativam orationis structuram permutant cum conditionali. Stallb. The relative structure would be *αἱ μὲν ἄρα τούτων*, etc.

E. *τέλος*, etc. Comp. Cic. de Fin. 2.2.5: *Hunc ipsum sive finem sive extremum sive ultimum definiebas, id esse, quo omnia, quæ recte fierent, referrentur, neque id ipsum usquam referretur.*

A. *ἐκ τρίτων*, and *ἐκ τρίτου*, *in the third place, third.* 500 Eurip. Orest. 1173, *σωτηρίαν σοι, τῷδε τ', ἐκ τρίτου τ' ἔμοι.* Sympos. 213, B, *ὑπολύνετε Ἀλκιβιάδην, ἵνα ἐκ τρίτων κατακένται.* — Cap. 55. *ἄν* for *αὐ* *ἄν*. *αὐ* is out of its clause for the sake of rhythm.

B. See 464, B, seq. — *παρασκευαῖ*, the Schol. observes, is a middle term, standing for *τίχραι* and *ἔμπειραι* both, like *ἐπιτηδεύσεις*. — *μέχρι ηδονῆς*, *terminating in pleasure.* This is explained by the next words, where

αὐτὸς τοῦτο refers to *ἡδονὴν*, i. e. *τὸ ἡδύ*. — *καὶ ἐπιθην*, etc., and among those pursuits which relate to the pleasures, I set down cookery as a knack, and not an art; but of those which have to do with good (I set down) medicine as an art. — *πρὸς φιλίου*, supply *Διός*. — *μήτε αὐτὸς οἶου*, etc. In this sentence, the two main clauses begin with *μήτε*; and the clause beginning with *μηδὲ* is the second part of the first clause. Comp. K. largest Gr. § 743, R. 4. — *μηδέ ὁ τι ἀν τύχης*, etc., and do not, contrary to your opinion, answer whatever comes into your head, nor take what I say as though I were in sport.

C. *οὐ τι ἀν μᾶλλον . . . ἢ τοῦτο*. The last words are added to recall *οὐ* to mind, and *τοῦτο* takes the construction of *τι* rather than of *περὶ τούτου οὐ*. It often happens that *ἢ* and *quam* are so inserted after a genitive depending on a comparative. — *ἐπὶ ὅν*, i. e. *τοῦτον ἐφ' ὅν*. — *τὰ τοῦ ἀνδρὸς δὴ ταῦτα πράττοντα*, whether I ought to spend my life in doing those deeds of the real man, forsooth, that you spoke of. The reference is to 485, A - D. *δῆ* is ironical. — *ἢ ἐπὶ τόρδε τὸν βίον*. We should expect *τόρδε τὸν βίον*, sc. *ζῆν*; but Plato forms this clause as though he had written *πότερον ἔμε παρακαλεῖς ἐπὶ τοῦτο*, etc.

D. *εἰ ἔστι . . . τῷ βίῳ*. A rare instance of a dual agreeing with a singular verb. As is usual in similar examples in Attic writers, where plurals not neuter are joined with a singular verb, the verb is *ἔστι*, and it precedes the noun.

E. Socrates breaks off in the middle of the sentence, to know whether Callicles is so far of the same opinion.

501 A. *ἥ δ' ἴατρική*, i. e. *δοκεῖ μοι τέχνη εἶναι*. Just below, *ἥ ἴατρική* is added to explain *ἥ μέν*. Comp. *ὅ μὲν . . . ὁ κολαζόμενος*, 476, E. — *ἥ δ' ἐπέρα τῆς ἡδονῆς . . . ἐπ' αὐτὴν ἔρχεται*. There is a striking change of construction here. The sentence begins with *ἡδονῆς*, as if Plato had in his mind the form of the preceding sentence, and were going

to say, *τῆς ἡδονῆς οὔτε τὴν φύσιν ἔσκεπται οὔτε τὴν αἰτίαν*. But this thought, which afterwards appears in the participial form, is postponed, and the intervening clause, *πρὸς ἣν ἡ θεραπεία . . . ἀπάσσα*, determined him to say, *ἐπ' αὐτὴν ἔρχεται*, accommodated to *πρὸς ἣν*, and to leave *ἡδονῆς* in the lurch, so to speak. It may be asked, why, when he read it over, he did not dismiss *ἡδονῆς* from its irregular position. The answer is, that the Greeks were governed in their style by nature, — a higher rule than grammar, and did not object to such irregularities of structure as arise from the nature of the mind, and are heard in good conversation. — *ἀτέχνως*, and not *ἀτεχνῶς*. Comp. 491, A. — *ἄλογως τε παντάπασιν*, *in a manner altogether irrational, making, I may say* (i. e. almost), *no estimates (or discriminations), a mere practice and experience.*

B. *ῳδὴ καὶ πορίζεται*. *ῳδή* refers to *τῷ μνήμην σώζεσθαι τοῦ εἰωθότος γίγνεσθαι*. — *καὶ εἴναι τινες*, i. e. *καὶ εἰ δοκοῦντι σοι εἴναι τινες*. It might have been said equally well, *εἴναι τινας*, etc. — *ῶσπερ ἐκεῖ*, i. e. as in the case of the body. — *οὐτε μέλον αὐταῖς*, etc., *nor having any concern about aught else but gratification merely, no matter whether it be for the better or the worse*. Here the structure changes to the impersonal participle, and the subject of the prior clause becomes *αὐταῖς*.

C. *ἔμοὶ . . . δοκοῦσι εἴναι*, *it seems to me that there are such, or they seem to me to exist*. The words refer to *εἴναι τινες πραγματεῖσαι*, etc. It is strange that Stallb. and Ast, overlooking this plain sense, understand *κολακεῖα* as the predicate. — *συγκατατίθεσαι*. The word means, properly, *to drop one's vote in the same vessel with another person*, as a judge in the court. *ἥμην* is ironical, as he had compelled Gorgias and Polus to agree with him.

D. *οὐκ, ἄλλὰ καὶ*. *οὐκ* denies the previous sentence taken as a whole. — *χαριζεσθαι ἔστι*, i. e. *ἔξεστι*.

E. τοιαύτη τις . . . διώκειν. The infinitive explains the demonstrative, and depends on δοκεῖ repeated. — ἄλλο οὐδὲν φροντίζειν. This verb, in the sense of *caring about*, usually takes a genitive, or a genitive with περὶ, but sometimes a neuter accusative. Soph. § 182, N. 1. — ἡ κιθαριστικὴ ἡ ἐν τοῖς ἀγῶσι. Plato condemned all music on the flute, as tending to render the young unmanly and fond of pleasure. He was, however, for retaining the lyre and harp in education, but disapproved of some of the occasions where they were used, such as the public contests of choruses, dramatic or dithyrambic, thinking that pleasure and not good was their object, and that they tended to agitate and not to calm the soul. Comp. Repub. 3. 398–403. — ἡ τῶν χορῶν διδασκαλία, *the exhibition of choruses*, so called because the *instruction* of the chorus was the principal preparative. The chorus in dithyrambic poetry is especially intended. — Κινησίας of Thebes, so called, it is said, because ἐν τοῖς χοροῖς ἔχοντο πολλῆς κινήσει. He was much laughed at for his poetry by the comedians (Aristoph. Birds, 1377, and Schol.), and attacked by the orators on account of his character (Lysias in Athenaeus, 551, 552).

502 A. τι δὲ . . . Μέλης; i. e. ἐδόκει σοι, as above τι ἡ διδασκαλία καὶ ποίησις; i. e. καταφαινεται σοι. A little below, τι δὲ δὴ ἡ σεμνὴ, etc., the construction is different, namely, τι δὲ δὴ ἔστι τοῦτο ἐφ' ὃ ἐσπούδακε ἡ σεμνὴ, etc. What is said here is a mere passing fling at Meles on account of the badness of his odes.

B. ἡ . . . θαυμαστὴ ἡ τῆς τραγῳδίας ποίησις. The ordinary collocation, as Stallb. remarks, would be ἡ θαυμαστὴ ποίησις, ἡ τῆς τραγῳδίας. He cites Herodot. 7. 196, ὁ ταυτικὸς ὁ τῶν βαρβάρων στρατὸς; Repub. 565, D, τὸ ἐν Ἀρκαδίᾳ τὸ τοῦ Διὸς τοῦ Αυκαίου ἴερόν, and other examples. — διαμάχεσθαι . . . ὅπως μὴ ἐρεῖ. Is its aim . . . to insist upon it

... that it will not say, etc. — *εἰ δέ τι τυγχάνει ἀηδές.* For *οὐ* omitted, comp. Soph. Electr. 313. — *ποτέρως ... παρευκενάσθαι, utro modo tibi videtur comparata esse.* For Plato's view of tragedy, comp. Repub. 8. 568, C, 2. 378, seq., and a noble passage, Leges, 7. 817. Another admirable passage treats of the corruption of tragedy by popular influence. Leges, 2. 659.

C. *εἰ τις περιέλοιτο.* Aristides, in opposing this passage, and the Schol., have *περιέλοι*, which Coray and Stallb. prefer. Ast, in defending the text, says that *εἰ περιέλοι* denotes *if one were to strip off*, *εἰ περιέλοιτο, if one were to strip off for himself*, i. e. in his own mind to conceive of it as stripped off. — *μέλος, musical accompaniment*; *φυθμόν, definite succession of arses and theses*; *μέτρον, definite succession of long and short syllables.* — *ἄλλο τι ἢ λόγοι γνωριται.* The verb is attracted in number to the predicate *λόγοι*.

D. *οὐκοῦν ... ἀν εἰη, It (tragedy) would be then a rhetorical species of popular speaking.* — *δῆμον τοιοῦτον, οἷον παιδῶν*, i. e. to a people (or audience) composed of boys, etc. The grammatical construction, which would be *οἷος ἔστι (δῆμος) παιδῶν*, is forsaken through a singular kind of attraction, by which *οἷος, ὅσος, ἡλίκος*, with the noun or adjective they accompany, adopt the case of the antecedent. It has been inferred from this, and a few other passages of Plato, that women attended the theatre at Athens, at least in tragic exhibitions. Comp. Leges, 2. 658, D, 7. 817, C, and Becker's Charicles, excursus to Scene 10.

A. *οὐχ ἀπλοῦν, etc. = τοῦτο ὁ ἐρωτᾶς οὐκέτι ἔστιν ἀπλοῦν, 503* i. e. does not admit of a simple answer. — *διαμάχεσθαι λέγοντα, to persist in saying, or steadily to say.*

B. *τι οὐχὶ ... αὐτὸν ἔφρασας.* Mt. § 503, c, says, “After *τι οὐ* an aorist often follows, where we should have looked for a present.” A degree of urgency is contained

in this mode of speaking. It may be explained by the practice of expressing a wish by means of an interrogative sentence. "Why did you not tell me?" = "I wish you had already told me," and by implication, "Tell me at once." — *αἰτίαν ἔχονσιν, have it ascribed to them,* is here used in a good sense.

C. *οὐκ ἀκούεις.* Præsens hujus verbi de durante fama, — *perpetuo ponitur.* Stallb.; i. e. it is used of something which is said and may be heard until now. Comp. the editor's note on Prometh. 683 (ed. sec.). — *νεωστὶ,* i. e. about twenty-three years before. — *οὐ καὶ ἀκήκοας.* See 455, E. For Plato's opinion of Pericles, see the Introduction. — *εἰ ἔστι γε . . . ήν σὺ ἔλεγες ἀρετὴν, ἀληθῆς.* Comp. for *ἀρετὴν*, Soph. § 151, Rem. 6. The apodosis of this sentence, which might be "they are good men," is omitted. "When a proposition with *εἰ μέν*, or *ἢν μέν*, has another with *εἰ δὲ* opposed to it, the apodosis is often suppressed in one of the two." Mt. § 617. In the ensuing clause, the predicate, *ἔστιν ἀληθές*, is left out, and *ὅτι* before the infinitive is redundant. Examples are given by Heindorf, on Phædo, 63, C. Comp. 453, B, above. *ὅτι* was used as though *δεῖ ἀποτελεῖν* was to follow; but when Plato came to that part of the sentence, he accommodated *ἀποτελεῖν* to *εἰ δὲ μὴ τοῦτο*: "if this, viz. *ἀπομιμλάται*, is not virtue, but this, viz. *ἀποτελεῖται*, etc., is so."

D. *τοῦτο δὲ τέχνη τις εἶναι.* The nominative here is used by anacoluthon, as if, instead of *ἡταγκάσθημεν ὁμολογεῖν*, Plato had written *ώμολογήθη*. — *οὐτωσὶν ἀτρέμα,* *quite calmly*, or *pretty calmly*. *οὕτως*, like *sic* in Latin, throws into the adverb before which it stands a certain modification of its meaning, which cannot be easily expressed. Comp. Eurip. Alcest. 680, for an analogous use of *οὕτως* with verbs.

E. *ώσπερ καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι, etc.* *ἄλλοι* is used here as in 473,

C. The verb *προσφέρει* leaves the number required by *δημιουργοί*, through the influence of *ἔκαστος*, added in apposition to that noun. Comp. Mt. § 302, Obs. — *οἶον εἰ βούλει ἵδειν*. In this sentence the apodosis is omitted. One can supply in thought *φρεδίως τοῦτο ὄψει*. But the true account of the sentence is, that the apodosis should have begun at *ώς εἰς τάξιν* (“if you wish to look at painters, etc., — you will see that, etc.”); but by a change of style the clause *ώς εἰς τάξιν* is made to depend on *ἵδειν*, and the apodosis loses its proper form under the impression that an imperative, *ἴδε εἰ βούλει*, instead of *εἰ βούλει ἵδειν*, had commenced the sentence.

B. *καὶ μὴν καὶ τὰ σώματά φαμεν*, i. e. *τάξεως τυχόντα χρη-* 504 *στὰ εἴραι*.

C. *εἰπεῖν ὥσπερ ἐκείνῳ τὸ ὄνομα*, *to mention the name for it, as you did for that*. In the MSS., *ἐκείνῳ* stands, which, if genuine, is put briefly for *ἐκείνου τὸ ὄνομα*.

E. *ἢ ἄλλ' ὅτιον*, etc., *or any thing else which sometimes will not be of more use to it (the body) than the contrary* (i. e. abstinence from such gratifications will be) *according to a right view of the case*; — *nay, even of less*. So this clause must be rendered as it stands. But I am persuaded, notwithstanding what Stallb. says, that *ἢ* ought to be inserted before *κατά*, as Heindorf proposes, or *γε* turned into *δε*. For since *γε* shows that the clause *κατὰ . . . λόγον* relates to the foregoing, *καὶ ἔλαττον* stands quite by itself; and the asyndeton (*καὶ* being *etiam*) is intolerable.

B. *οὐκοῦν . . . κολάζειν*; *ἀφ' ὧν ἐπιθυμεῖ* belongs to *εἰς-* 505 *γειν*. — *ώσπερ . . . ὡν* relates to *ἀκολαστα*. See Chap. 46, 48.

C. *οὗτος ἀνήρ*. See 467, B. — *κολαζόμενος* is obviously in apposition with *πάσχων*; but we might have also had *κολάζεσθαι* in apposition with *τοῦτο*. According to Aristotle on Rhet. 1. 10. 17, cited by Stallb., *κολάζειν* (to chastise,

correct, lit. to cut off, prune) differs from *τιμωρεῖσθαι* (to take satisfaction from, punish) in this; that the former takes place for the sake of the sufferer, the latter for that of the doer. —— *μεταξὺ τὸν λόγον καταλύομεν*; *are we ending the discourse in the middle?* Some inferior MSS. have *καταλύσομεν*, *are we going to end*, and some *καταλύωμεν*, which (or rather *καταλύσωμεν*, as the action is momentary) would be *shall we end*. The present denotes that they *are doing* that which is equivalent to stopping, that they *are beginning* to stop. —— *αὐτὸς γνώσει, you yourself must judge*, i. e. I wish to stop, but leave it to you.

D. *Θέμις*. This word, being here an accusative, must be indeclinable. Of this use few will doubt, after reading what Elmsley and Hermann (Soph. CEd. Col. 1191), and Buttmann (largest Gram. 1. § 58, and 2. p. 405) have written. The other examples occur in CEd. Col. u. s., Xen. ΟΕcon. 11. 11, and Aesch. Suppl. 331. In Aesch. Choeph. 632, it is a neuter nominative. No phrases are found besides *θέμις ἔστι*, *θέμις εἴναι*. This is a strange but not a solitary anomaly. Comp. *χρέων*, *δεῖται* sometimes indeclinable, *κράται* in Sophocles nominative and accusative. —— *περιή*, sc. δ *μῆθος*. The style changes from the plural to the singular. Comp. for the expression, Leges, 6. 752, A, *οὐκονν... ἀν μῆθον ἀκέφαλον καταλίποιμι, πλανώμενος γὰρ ἀν ἀπάντη τοιοῦτος ὥν ἄμορφος φαίνοιτο*.

E. *τὸ τοῦ Ἐπιχάρμου*. Athenaeus (7. 308, C, and 8. 362, D) gives his words in a trochaic tetrameter, *τὰ πρὸ τοῦ δύ' ἄνδρες ἐλεγον εἰς ἔγὼν ἀποχρέω*. —— *ἀναγκαιότατον εἴναι οὖτως*. Supplent *ποιεῦν* ellipsi inaudita. Evidem *οὖτως* interpretor: *in hoc rerum statu, quum tu nolis amplius tecum colloqui*. Stallb. *οὖτως* seems to me to be loosely used for *τοῦτο*. Comp. Soph. Antig. 706, *ὡς φῆς σὺ — τοῦτ' ὁρθῶς ἔχειν*, for δ *φῆς σὺ*.

506 A. *οὐδὲ γὰρ... εἰδὼς λέγω*. Socrates often places him-

self in the attitude of a searcher after truth, unable of himself to find it, and hoping that others know where it is.

B. ἔως . . . Ζήθον, till I had given him back the speech of Amphion for that of Zethus, i. e. until I had defended philosophy from his attack. See 485, E. ἔως with an imperfect or aorist indicative accompanies another clause containing the same tenses with ἦν, when a *res non facta* is spoken of.

C. ἀχθεσθήσομαι. This form is condemned by Mœris as un-Attic, but is found several times in Attic writers, where, however, it may have come from the scribes. ἀχθέσομαι is the approved form. — εὐεργέτης . . . ἀναγεγράψει. An allusion to the honorary votes recorded on marbles, in favor of foreigners who had rendered Athens a service. — λέγε αὐτός. αὐτός is *by yourself, without another speaker*, and so in σοῦ αὐτοῦ διύντος above.

D. οὐ τῷ εἰκῇ. An elegant and certain emendation of Stallb. (ed. sec.) for οὐχ οὔτος εἰκῇ. — καλλιστα παραγίγνεται. One would expect καλλιστη. Coray wishes to strike out the word; Heindorf, to read μάλιστα. The sense is, attends upon it, or is present most beautifully, i. e. is present in its greatest beauty, or highest perfection.

A. ἦν δὲ αὕτη, i. e. now this we found to be. ἦν points 507 to the time when such a soul was (subjectively to them, i. e. appeared to be) ἄφρων, etc. Comp. 478, E, note.

B. ἀ δεῖ . . . φεύγειν καὶ διώκειν. With the definition of the σώφρων ἀνὴρ here given, Routh compares Aristotle's in the Eth. Nicom. 3, sub fin.: ἐπιθυμεῖ ὁ σώφρων ὃν δεῖ καὶ ὡς δεῖ καὶ ὅτε.

C. τὸν δ' εὖ πράττοντα . . . εὐδαιμονα εἶναι. Plato passes in this same way from εὖ πράττειν to εὐδαιμονα εἶναι in Repub. 1. 353, E, Charmides 172, A, Alcibiad. 1. 116, B. As εὖ πράττειν has the two senses of *acting well*, and *being prosperous*, Plato may seem to have unfairly used this am-

biguity in his argument. So Heindorf and Stallb. view the passage. Routh, on the contrary, says, "Vult philosophus consequens esse necessario *ex antecedentibus* eum qui recte agit felicem esse. Vix enim potest credi ut Plato duplice sensu verborum $\epsilon\nu\pi\varphi\alpha\tau\tau\epsilon\nu$ ad argumentum probandum abutti vellet." Finally, Ast, after Schleierm., correctly, as I think, observes, that Plato "in his conclusionem non dicit ex ambiguo,—sed usum loquendi cogitandus est in rem suam convertere, eumque quodammodo corrigere voluisse, ex ea enim quam posuit ratione,— nisi bonum quod est, nihil est prosperum ac beatum." With this Stallb., in his second edition, agrees.

D. $\betaονλόμενον$ $\epsilon\nu\deltaαιμονα$ $\epsilon\nu\tauαι$. . . $\deltaιωκτέον$. The subject of the action of a verbal may be in the accusative or in the dative. — $\omega\varsigma \epsilon\chiει ποδῶν = \omega\varsigma \epsilon\chiει τάχους$, Thucyd. 2. 92, = $\omega\varsigma \tauάχιστα$. Comp. Soph. § 188, N.; Cr. § 363, B. — $\piαρασκευαστέον$ is the verbal of the middle voice here, = $\delta\varepsilon\pi \piαρασκευάσσθαι$. Mt. § 447. 2. — $\iota\deltaιώτης$ (when opposed to the state), an individual. — In the next sentence, $\epsilon\iota\varsigma \tauοῦτο$ refers to $\delta\piω\varsigma$. . . $\epsilon\piεσθαι$, and $o\upsilon\tauω \pi\varphi\alpha\tau\tau\epsilon\nu$ to $\sigmaυτείνοντα$ and what follows it.

E. $\dot{\alpha}rήρυτον$ $\kappaακόν$, an *endless* or *cureless evil*, is in apposition with the participial clause preceding it, and in the accusative. Soph. § 167, N. 4; Cr. § 334. 8; K. § 266, R. 2. — $\varphiασὶ \delta' o\iota \sigmaοφοί$, etc. The allusion is more particularly to Empedocles, who made $\varphiιλία$ and $\nuεῖκος$ fundamental causes in his world of phenomena; the former, or the attracting principle, the cause of union among things unlike, of organization and of motion when *one* is made out of *many*, and the latter or the dissolving principle the cause of separation. He is the Agrigentine who taught in verse, that "quæ in rerum natura constarent, quæque moverentur, ea contrahere amicitiam, dissipare discordiam." Cic. de Amicit. 7. His causes for the phenomena of the world were

physical; and Socrates here gives playfully a moral turn to his doctrine.

A. *τὸ ὄλον τοῦτο . . . κόσμον καλοῦσιν.* The universe owed 508 the name *κόσμος*, order, *system*, to Pythagoras. Comp. Xen. Mem. 1. 1. 11, *ὁ καλούμενος ὑπὸ τῶν σοφιστῶν κόσμος*, which shows that even then the appellation had not become very current. — *ἡ ισότης ἡ γεωμετρική.* Geometrical equality is that of *rations*, arithmetical, of *numbers*. It exists figuratively in morals and polities, when the receipts of one are to his claims as those of another to his, i. e. when justice prevails and assigns to each according to his due, and not according to his power of receiving. But *πλεονεξία* or selfishness disturbs and destroys this kind of equality. In the state, this equality takes power from the bad, i. e. from the unjust and ignorant, and gives it to the wise and virtuous, because it is right that only they should govern who can govern well. There is a noble passage on the two equalities in the Leges, 6. 757, B, cited by Routh.

B. *ἔξελεγκτέος . . . ὡς.* See 467, A, note. — *κακίας δὲ οἱ ἄθλιοι.* The predicate *ἄθλιοι* is omitted. See K. § 852. 2, largest Gr. This is the more natural, because the preceding words, *εὐδαιμονες οἱ εὐδαιμονες*, clearly indicate the construction. Stallb. has added *ἄθλιοι*, without authority or sufficient reason. — *τι τὰ συμβαίνοτα.* This use of *τι* in the predicate with a plural subject is not uncommon. Comp. Aeschin. c. Ctes., *ἀπόδειξιν ποιησαι τι ποτ' ἦν ἢ ἐπράξας, καὶ τι ποτ' ἦν ἢ λέγεται.* (§ 165, Bekker.) The same formula is repeated just below, *τι ποτ' ἔστιν ἢ . . . ὀνειδίζεται*.

D. *εἰμὶ δὲ ἐπὶ τῷ βουλομένῳ*, etc. *And that I am in the power of any one who has the will, as those punished by civil infamy are in any one's hand who wishes it* (lit. belong to any one). There were three kinds of civil infamy at Athens, and they are particularly described by Andocides (p. 35, Reiske). The lowest consisted in a deprivation of

certain particular rights, as that of bringing an action as a public accuser. The next involved the taking away of all civil rights; and to this the highest added confiscation. As in the two latter kinds, the person affected with ἀτιμία could not appear in court as a prosecutor or a witness, or complain of his wrongs before the people, he was plainly in the power of his enemies. — *νεαρικὸν* denotes *high-spirited*, or rather *overbearing*. The clause is in apposition with τύπτειν ἐπὶ κόρρης. Comp. 507, E. The same is true of τὸ ἔσχατον, as it respects ἀποκτεῖναι. Socrates refers to 486, A - C.

E. *τέμνεσθαι*, when taken with *σῶμα*, is *in frusta disseparari*.

509 A. *καὶ εἰ ἀγροικότερον . . . ἔστι*. These words are used to excuse the confidence and want of deference to others which Socrates here displays. Comp. 462, E, 486, C. In the latter passage, we have *εἰ καὶ ᾧ*, and here *καὶ εἰ ᾧ*. According to Herm. (on Viger, note 307), referred to by Stallb., *καὶ εἰ, etiam si*, is used concerning that which we only assume as true; *εἰ καὶ, quamquam*, concerning that which we declare to be true. Socrates, then, does not here admit that his expression is impolite; but in 486, C, Callicles acknowledges by *εἰ καὶ* his trespass against the rules of good-breeding. — *οὐτωσὶν ut Latinorum sic est primo aspectu. Ast.*

B. *τίνα ὥν βοήθειαν, etc.* *By his inability to afford what kind of aid to himself would a man be in truth ridiculous?* This alludes to 486, B, *μήτε αὐτὸν αὐτῷ δυνάμενον βοηθεῖν*. — *ταύτην εἶναι τὴν αἰσχίστην βοήθειαν, μὴ δύνασθαι βοηθεῖν* is for *αἴσχιστον εἶναι ταύτην τὴν βοήθειαν μὴ δύνασθαι βοηθεῖν, that it is most disgraceful not to be able to render this assistance, etc.* (viz. this assistance which will avert the greatest evil). With this very strange instance of attraction, if it be such, we may compare the expression in

our own language which Routh adduces, *this is the most shameful thing to be without, for it is most shameful to be without this thing.*

C. *τὴν τοῦ δευτέρου κακοῦ, sc. βοήθειαν, and that the aid given to prevent the evil next in magnitude is second* (second in shame if inadequate, and in honor if adequate ; for this latter is implied). *βοήθεια κακῶν* is like *ἀλκὴ κακῶν* in Euripides. — *καὶ τάλλα οὐτως, sc. ἔχειν, not ἔχει, which Stallb. supplies.*

D. *ἀδικήσεται.* See Soph. § 207, N. 6; Cr. § 554, α; K. § 251, R. 1. — *τι δὲ δὴ τοῦ ἀδικεῖν; well, but what about doing wrong?* This genitive without a preposition may be compared with that which accompanies verbs of speaking. Comp. Soph. Electr. 317.

E. *τι οὐκ . . . ἀπεκρίνω.* See 503, B, note. The imperfect *ἀπεκρίνονται* is in most MSS.; but in this formula that tense is not used. — *μηδένα βουλόμενον ἀδικεῖν.* See 468, C, and the Introduction, p. xxiv.

A. *ὅπως μὴ ἀδικήσωμεν.* See 480, A, note.

510

B. *φίλος μοι δοκεῖ, etc.* Here *ὄντες* refers forward to *ὁ ὅμοιος*, and *ὡς οἶόν τε μάλιστα* is taken with *φίλος*. *οἱ παλαιοὶ τε καὶ σοφοὶ* alludes especially to Hom. Odys. 17. 218, *ὡς αἰεὶ τὸν ὅμοιον ἄγει θεός ὡς τὸν ὅμοιον.* The thought is found also in Sympos. 195, B, *ὁ γὰρ παλαιὸς λόγος εὐ ἔχει, ὡς ὅμοιος ὅμοιῷ ἀεὶ πελάζει*, and in Lysis, 214, where it is said that the bad, being unlike themselves, that is, variable and unstable, cannot be friends. Comp. also Leges, 716, C, *τῷ ὅμοιῷ τὸ ὅμοιον ὅντι μετριῷ φίλον ἄν εἴη, τὰ δ' ἄμετρα οὐτ' ἀλλήλοις οὔτε τοῖς ἐμμέτροις.*

C. *δύνατο φίλος γενέσθαι.* Repentina subjecti mutatio, says Stallb., i. e. *τούτῳ* refers to *ὁ τύραννος*, and the subject of *δύνατο* is *ὁ τοῦ τύραννου βελτίων*. This appears most probable, as Plato might easily return in his mind to the earlier subject of the clause, *εἴ τις . . . εἴη*; and as *οὐδὲ* *ἄν*

οὗτος shows that the same subject was still in his mind. It is not, however, necessary, because either this person or the tyrant might be called a friend to the other. — *ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ πόλει.* See 468, E, note.

D. *χαιρῶν*, *impune*, the opposite of *χλαίων*, *passim apud dramaticos*. And so *gaudens* is used in Latin. — *αὐτη̄, . . . ὁδός ἐστιν.* *αὐτη̄*, the subject of *ἐστιν*, refers to *ἔθιζεν*, but is attracted, as often happens, in gender, to the predicate *ὁδός*.

E. *ἔσται ἐπὶ τὸ οἷον τε εἶναι*, *will be in favor of*, or *will tend to his being able*. Here the construction of the dative with the infinitive is followed by that of the accusative. See 492, B.

511 B. *οὐκοῦν . . . ὀγανακτητόν*; *Well, then, is not this just the thing to rouse indignation?*

D. *προσεσταλμένη*, *simple*, properly spoken of garments, *drawn close to the body*, in contrast to a garment which spreads out with numerous folds and plaits. — *ἄλλὰ ταῦτα διαπραξαμένη*, etc. *But when it has effected the same things with the forensic art, it charges, I presume, but two obols if it has brought a man safe from Ægina hither; and if from Egypt or the Pontus, — at the highest rate (ἐὰν πάμπολν), when it has conveyed in safety what I just now spoke of, the man himself, and his children, and property, and women; having landed them in the port, it demands but two drachms.* Ast and Coray wish to change the order in this sentence. I see not why; for it is not more broken than often happens in earnest conversation. *ἐπράξατο* is the aorist of indefinite time. See 484, A. With *ἐὰν πάμπολν*, supply *πράττειται*.

512 A. *λογίζεται οὖν ὅτι οὐκ*, etc. Here *οὐκ* belongs to *βιωτέον* *ἐστὶν καὶ ὀνήσειεν*, which is the primary clause. But the sentence assumes an antithetical structure, the clauses *εἰ μέν τις, . . . εἰ δέ τις*, and *οὗτος μέν, τούτῳ δέ* being paired off

against one another. On this form of sentences, Mt. § 622. 4, remarks, that “ clauses are put in contrast with one another by means of *μή* and *δέ*, of which only the second clause suits the connection, while the first in other languages would be treated as a parenthesis.” Preserving the Greek order and form nearly, we may translate, “ *He reflects that it cannot be* (*οὐκ*), if a man afflicted with great and incurable diseases, whom he has saved from drowning, is miserable because he lost not his life, *that he on the other hand ought to live, who has many incurable maladies in* that which is more precious than the body, *the soul*, and that he (the person so reflecting) will do him good if he deliver him from the dangers of the sea, or the tribunal, or any other place. Nay, he knows,” etc. The use of the optative *ὄνήσειεν* is to me at least perplexing. Stallb. renders it, with its attendant words, *neque a se ullo modo juvari posse*, and then in defence of it refers to Mt. § 529, on the *oratio obliqua*. But if I am not deceived, such a form as *λογίζεται* (being a present not equivalent to a historical tense, and not reducible to the form of *oratio obliqua*, as cases like *λέγεται* *ὡς τινά τις δέξαιτο* are) *οὐ* *οὐκ* *ὄνήσειεν* would not be Greek, and if it were, must mean, not *can benefit*, but *probably benefits*. Heindorf conjectured *ὄνήσειεν ἄν*, *can (not) do him good*, which in some degree removes the difficulty. I beg leave to offer an opposite conjecture, *ὄνήσει*, on the supposition that the final syllable *εν* may owe its birth to *ἄν* wrongly repeated.

B. *οὐ νόμος ἔστι*, *it is not the custom*. — *μὴ ὅτι κυβερνήτου*, i. e. *μὴ εἴπης ὅτι*, *not to say, or to pass by the pilot*, who is not mentioned in order to select a stronger case, that of the general. Comp. *οὐχ ὅτι*, 450, E, note. — *ἔλαττω σώζειν* = *ἔλαττονα σωτηρίαν πορέζειν*, or *ἀπεργάζεσθαι*. — *μή σοι δοκεῖ κατὰ τὸν δικανικὸν εἶναι*; *does he seem to you to be on a level with (and not rather above) the forensic man?*

Comp. Repub. 466, B, *μή πη κατὰ τὸν τῶν σκυτοτόμων φαινεται βιον*; *does it seem to you to rank with the shoemaker's kind of life?*

C. *λέγων καὶ παρακαλῶν ἐπὶ τὸ δεῖν.* Briefly for *λέγων δεῖν*, *καὶ παρακαλῶν ἐπὶ τὸ δεῖν.* — *ώς οὐδὲν τὰλλά ἔστιν, on the ground that every thing else is of no value* (in comparison with engineering). — *ἀποκαλέσαις.* This compound of *καλέω*, as Stallb. remarks, is often used when a name is given in anger or contempt, = *to call by a nickname, to call contemptuously, or with a scornful air.* Examples may be found in Æschin. c. Ctes., and in Reiske's Index to Demosth. — *Ἐξ ὧν τὰ σαυτοῦ ἐπαινεῖς = ἐκ τῶν ἐπαινῶν οὓς τὴν σαυτοῦ τέχνην ἐπαινεῖς.*

D. *μὴ γὰρ τοῦτο . . . ἔατέον ἔστι.* *μὴ* denoting suspicion that something is true, or *mild expression of opinion*, may be joined with an indicative; and the like may be said of *ὅρα μὴ* also. Comp. Soph. Electr. 581, 584 (where *τιθῆς*, and not *τιθῆσ*, is supported by the MSS.); Alcibiad. 2. 139, D, *ἄλλ' ὅρα μὴ οὐχ οὕτω ταῦτα ἔχει.* *μὴ* may here be translated by *perhaps*, or *I suspect.* The sense is, *I suspect that a man deserving the name ought to throw away the idea of living as long as ever he can, and not love his life too well; and yielding the disposal of all such things to the Deity, as well as believing what the women say, that no one, whosoever he be, can escape his destiny, that he ought to consider thereupon how he can best live during the life which he is probably about to live*, etc. A fine parallel passage occurs in Leges, 2, 661, C. *ἐπιτρέπειν*, in the sense of committing or referring to, and of giving up to, takes a dative of a person, often with a genitive with *περὶ*. Æschin. c. Ctes. § 83, *εἰ ἐπιτρέπειν ἐθέλοι πόλει τινὶ ἵση καὶ ὁμοίᾳ περὶ τῶν ἐγκλημάτων, if he wished to refer the grounds of complaint to some impartial and disinterested state.* Alcibiad. 1. 117, D, *τῷ κυβερνήτῃ ἐπιτρέψας ἄν ἡσυχίαν ἔχοις; would you let the pilot have his*

own way, and be quiet? For οὐδὲ τίς, more emphatic than οὐδεῖς, comp. Eurip. Alcest. 671 (note in my ed.).

A. *καὶ νῦν δὲ ἄρα δεῖ* depends on *σκεπτέον ἄρα*. — *τὰς* 513 *τὴν σελήνην καθαιρούσας*. The Thessalian sorceresses, who drew down the moon by their incantations, drew down mischief also upon themselves. They lost, it was thought, their eyes or their children, to which last *τοῖς φιλτάτοις* alludes. Even an astrologer, in predicting an eclipse of the moon, which was akin, in the minds of the vulgar, to magical arts, was supposed to incur calamity. Hence *ἐπὶ συντῷ σελήνην καθαιρεῖς*, or *καθέλκεις*, is used proverbially of those who draw down calamities upon themselves by their conduct. The next words, *σὺν τοῖς φιλτάτοις*, must mean *with the loss of what we hold most dear*, i. e., as Socrates estimates things, *of virtue and truth*. *σὺν* here properly denotes the means, and it is only by inference from the connection that the phrase can imply *the loss of*. The preposition, as Stallb. observes, seems to be chosen with allusion to Iliad, 4. 161, *σύν τε μεγάλῳ ἀπέτισαν | σύν σφῆσιν κεφαλῇ-σι γυναιξὶ τε καὶ τεκέσσσι*.

B. *ἐν τῇ πόλει τῆδε*, i. e. in Athens. See 469, D, and 468, E, note. — *ἀνόμοιον . . . χεῖρον*, *so long as you are unlike the political institutions either on the better side or on the worse*, i. e. so long as you are not assimilated exactly to the democracy of Athens, but are either like the true philosopher, in favor of *better* institutions, under which knowledge and virtue, and not the popular will, shall govern, and resemble such institutions in your character; or, on the other hand, have the selfish spirit in the extreme, like the tyrant who first corrupts, and then destroys, popular liberty. Thus, I suppose, the politics of Plato, as set forth in the Republic and Laws, require us to understand these words. — *η γνήσιον ἀπεργάζεσθαι*, etc., *to effect any genuine or real result in regard to obtaining the friendship*

of the Athenian people, i. e. to be on terms of true friendship with Athens. δῆμος depends on φιλίαν. For τῷ Πυριλάμπους, see 481, D. — ὡς ἐπιθυμεῖς πολιτικός εἶναι. Ast, after one MS., omits πολιτικός, but Stallb. justly says of it, *iteratur non sine vi et gravitate*. There is, as it seems to me, even something of scorn in the emphatical repetition of the word. ὡς is *since, seeing that*; not *as, i. e. according to (your wishes)*.

D. πρὸς ἥδονήν ὁμιλεῖν, i. e. τό τινα πρὸς ἥδ. σώματι καὶ ψυχῇ ὁμιλεῖν. With the indefinite subject of the infinitive agree the two subsequent participles.

E. ή δέ γε ἔτερα, ὅπως. Supply ὁμιλεῖ, as ὁμιλοῦσα is understood just above with ή πρὸς ἥδονήν. — ἐπιχειρητέον . . . θεραπεύειν. The infinitive is added epexegetically, and the datives depend on the verbal. Comp. Soph. Electr. 543, 1277. For the construction of ποιοῦντας, see 492, B, note. It is without a copula as explaining οὐτως, and ὡς is taken with βεκτίστους only.

514 A. εὑρίσκομεν. The Atticists and MSS. vary in regard to the augment of verbs beginning with εν. The earlier practice seems to have been, to leave the diphthong unchanged. Mt. § 167. 6. Below, 514, E, two of the best MSS. give ηνύρισκομεν, and ηνδοκίμει, 515, E. — εὰν μὴ . . . ἡντιοῦν explains and defines ἀνεν τούτον. Comp. a similar apposition of a clause beginning with εὰν μὴ in Soph. Antig. 87. — δημοσίᾳ πράξαντες τῶν πολιτικῶν πραγμάτων, *after we had engaged in a public capacity in any transactions of the state*. The genitive is taken partitively. The words πολιτικῶν πραγμάτων denote any employment in the state's service, as that of an ἐργολάβος, or *contractor*, like Phidias, and of an ἀρχιτέκτων, like Ictinus, the builder of the Parthenon.

B. εἰ ἐπιστάμεθα, and a little below, εἰ ὠκοδομήκαμεν. After *would it be incumbent on us to examine*, we should add

in English, *whether we knew*, εἰ ἡπιστάμεθα, relative to ἔδει ᾧ, and not εἰ ἡπιστάμεθα, which is absolute: and so *whether we had builded* (in the pluperfect), not *whether we have builded*. But the Greeks, in many kinds of dependent clauses, preferred the absolute to the relative form, as here. The cause of this lay in that liveliness of mind which made the past present and the possible real, and often led them to the use of *oratio recta* for *oratio obliqua*.

C. *iδίᾳ . . . ήμῶν*. According to Ast, ήμῶν depends on *iδίᾳ*, which would alone express the idea, were not ήμῶν wanted for the contrast with μετὰ τῶν διδασκάλων. Those who would reject such an expression as *iδίᾳ ήμῶν*, which is destitute of the support of parallel examples, must read with Stallb., after one MS., *iδίᾳ ὥφ' ήμῶν*. —— οὗτοι μὲν δι-
ακειμένων, etc. *It would be the part of prudent men, if so situated, to engage in public works.* Here ḥν has ᾧ, but just below is without it. I think, with Ast, that although ḥν is often used without ᾧ, (see Mt. § 508, Obs. 2,) yet here the influence of ᾧ can extend to the second ḥν.

D. A very similar passage may be found in Laches, 186, B, C. In the first sentence, ᾧ belongs to ἐπεσκεψάμεθα, which verb is taken with πάντα . . . ἄλλα, as well as with εἰ παρεκαλοῦμεν. The aorist, with ᾧ following the imperfect, here denotes transitory action referable to present time (*if we were urging . . . we would examine*: see Hermann de partic. ᾧ, 1. 10), or possibly (since we have ἐσκόπουν just below), there may be an inaccuracy of style, like that of using our potential pluperfect for the imperfect, — *would have* for *would*. Comp. 447, D, for the opposite use of the imperfect (εἰ ἐτύγχανεν ὥν . . . ἀπεκρίνατο), in speaking of something continuing in past time. Some would read ἐπι-
σκεπτόμεθα here, but it is scarcely Attic. See 476, A, note.

E. ἀνθρώπους . . . ἐτύχομεν. The style passes freely from

the first person plural, as a representative of a general truth, to the third, and then back again. There is no reason why we should suspect ἀνθρώπους, or read ἔτυχον. ὥστε goes with ἐπιχειρεῖν. — ὅπως ἔτυχομεν, = *in an ordinary way, as we could, utcunque.* — τὸ λεγόμενον δὴ τοῦτο. See 447, A. δὴ is *just* or *even*. — ἐν τῷ πιθῷ, etc., *to try to learn the potter's art by beginning with the jar,* — the largest vessel, and therefore the hardest to make. This proverb occurs again in Laches, 187, B, in company with its opposite, ἐν τῷ Καρὶ ἡμῖν ὁ κινδυνός, i. e. *to risk what you value least, attempt what you can best afford to fail in;* which refers to the Carian mercenaries in war, whose blood was less precious than their employer's.

515 B. σὸν ἴδιωτεύοντος. Soph. § 174; Cr. § 454; K. § 266. 2.

D. For what is here said of “the four,” see the Introduction. — ἀγαθοὶ πολῖται here is much the same as ἀγαθοὶ τὰ πολιτικά, which is used as an equivalent, 516, C, 517, A.

E. ἀκούω. See 503, C. — εἰς μισθοφορίαν . . . παταστήσαντα, *by being the first to bring them into the practice of taking pay for performing their political duties.* Pericles introduced the practice of paying the judges. The pay was one obolus per diem at first, and then three. After the death of Pericles, the people also drew pay for attending in the assembly. All this is explained at large in that admirable book, Boeckh's Civil Economy of Athens, Book II. §§ 14, 15. — τῶν τὰ ὥτα κατεαγότων. See 469, D. This phrase is explained fully by Protag. 342, B. “The Lacedæmonians,” Socrates there says, “conceal their philosophy, and thus deceive those in other states who affect Spartan manners, and *who, in imitation of them, have their ears bruised by blows received in boxing, (ὥτα κατάγνυνται μιμούμενοι αὐτούς,)* and bind the cæstus round their

hands and study gymnastics, and wear short tunics, just as though the Lacedæmonians surpassed the rest of Greece by such means." The phrase, then, denotes the partisans of Sparta, those who admire Spartan institutions, and are ill-affected towards Athens.

A. *γεγόνεσσαν*. Comp. Soph. § 79 (91. 6, N. 4); Cr. 516 § 194. 1; K. § 120, R. 2. — *κλοπὴν αὐτοῦ κατεψηφίσαντο*. Thucyd. merely says (2. 65) *χρήμασιν ἐξημιλώσαν*. Plutarch mentions an accusation and a fine (Vit. Peric. § 35), as does Diodorus also (12. 45); but the charge was no doubt false: he was *χρημάτων διαφανῶς ἀδωρότατος* by the testimony of the most impartial of historians. See Appendix, No. II. — *θανάτου εἰμησσαν*. See 486, B, note: *δῆλον ὅτι*, 487, E, note. — *ὅντων ἐπιμελητής*. Comp. Xen. Memorab. 1. 2. 32, for a similar passage. — *ἀπέδειξε . . . ποιοῦντας*, if he had caused them to do. This verb and *ἀποφαίνω* are often used in the sense of causing something to appear, of effecting, rendering, and, like *φαίνω*, *δείκνυμι*, take their complement in the form of a participle.

B. *καὶ τόδε . . . χάρισαι*. There is a similar play upon *χαρίζομαι* in Repub. 1. 351, C, *σοὶ γάρ, ἔφη, χαρίζομαι*. *Ἐν γε σὺ ποιῶν· ἀλλὰ δὴ καὶ τόδε μοι χάρισαι καὶ λέγε*.

C. *ώς ἔφη Ὄμηρος*. Nusquam disertis verbis hoc dictum in eo quem hodie habemus Homero, nisi quis hic trahere velit quod Routhius fecit Odyss. 6. 120, 9. 175, *ἥ δ' οἴγ' ὑβρισταῖς τε καὶ ἄγροι, οὐδὲ δίκαιοι*. Heindorf. Plato puts the *ἄγροι* and *ἡμεροι* together, in Repub. 5. 470, E, and makes *τὸ ημερον* a part of the philosophic nature in Repub. 3. 410, E. — *ὅν ηκιστ' ἀν ἐβούλετο*, i. e. *εἰς ὅν*.

D. What is here said of Cimon and Themistocles is well known. What is said of Miltiades rests on the authority of Plato, and of the Scholiast on Aristides 3. 677, Dindorf, whom Valck. on Herodot. 6. 136 first cited from a MS. The Scholiast says *ὅτε ἐκρίνετο ἐπὶ τῇ Πάρῳ* (i. e.

on account of his fruitless attack upon the island of Paros soon after the battle of Marathon), ἡθέλησαν αὐτὸν κατακρημνῆσαι, ὁ δὲ πρύτανις εἰσελθὼν ἔξηγήσατο αὐτόν. Plato perhaps exaggerates a little in saying ἐψηφίσαντο. The Prytanis, being president of the assembly of the people which tried the case, was probably one of those friends of Miltiades of whose advocacy Herodot. speaks, and by his intercessions led the judges to lower the penalty from death to a heavy fine. But for that, death, by being thrown into the pit, would have been his portion. See Grote's Greece, Vol. IV. p. 491. — *tὸν ἐν Μαραθῶνι, him who was at Marathon,* the general there. *ἐν* is used because the action was "in Marathonio agro." See Soph. Electr. 1. Thucyd. 2. 85, *τῆς ἐν Στράτῳ μάχης, at, near Stratus.* — *τὸ βάραθρον* is defined by Timæus (Lex. Platon. s. v.), "a place like a well, where the condemned were thrown," and in Bekker's Anecdot. 1. 219, is said to be "an excavation in Keiriadæ, a demus of the Æneid tribe, where they threw down the capitally condemned, as the Lacedæmonians did into Kæadas." Herodot. 7. 133, says that the heralds of Darius were thrown by the Athenians into this place. Comp. Aristoph. Clouds, 1450, and the Schol. on Aristoph. Plut. 431.

E. *εἰ μὴ διά, but for.* This not unfrequent formula has always the same sense as if some part of *κωλύω* were understood. The origin of the phrase is not clear. Ast accounts for it as a confusion or union of two forms of speaking; e. g., in this case, *εἰ μὴ ὁ Πρύτανις εἴη*, if the Prytanis had not existed, . . . *ἐνέπεσεν ἄν*, and *διὰ τὸν Π. . . οὐκ ἐνέπεσεν*. — *οὐχοντες οἱ γε ἀγαθοὶ ἱνιόχοι, etc.* This sentence is formed like that explained in the note on 512, A. The sense is, *It is not true that good drivers are not at first thrown from their chariots, but when they have improved their horses by care, and have become better drivers themselves, that they are then thrown out.* *Ζεῦγος* is often used of the vehicle, as well as of the yoke or pair of animals drawing it.

A. *τῶν μέντοι ἐμπροσθετῶν.* Here, by a kind of zeugma, *ἄλτ-* 517 *γες*, readily suggested by *ώμολόγεις*, is to be supplied, together with *τινάς*, which is contained in *οὐδένα*. Comp. Soph. Antig. 29. — *οὐ γὰρ ἀν ἔξεπεσον.* The metaphor is borrowed from charioteers, and is the more natural, as persons who lost their rank or authority were said *ἔκπεστιν*. Comp. Soph. Antig. 679. — *οὐτε τῇ κολακικῇ.* If they had used the true art of rhetoric, that is, had been good politicians, they would have made the people better, and not have had to rue its ingratitude: if the flattering art of rhetoric, they would have escaped from dangers, because that art, according to the Sophists, *σώζει ἐκ τῶν μεγίστων κινδύνων μάλιστα μὲν ἑαυτόν.* Aristides triumphs in a supposed inconsistency of Plato, who had before called “the four” *κόλακας*, and now says that they did not use *τῇ κολακικῇ φητορικῇ*. But he does not see into the meaning. The words contain a sneer at the rhetoricians. They were *κόλακες*, inasmuch as they studied to gratify, not to benefit; and carrying such a motive into their public addresses, they imbued all their words with it. But if the false art of rhetoric can rescue from dangers, and makes that its first aim, they fell short of it. In other words, the art cannot gain its own dearest ends. They had the principles of the false rhetoric, but could not gain that for which the art was esteemed.

B. *πολλοῦ γε δεῖ . . . μὴ . . . ἐργάσηται.* *πολλοῦ δεῖ* is usually followed by an infinitive, and Stallb. says that he knows of no example like this. The reason for the construction seems to be, that *πολλοῦ δεῖ*, being in sense a negative, adopts the construction appropriate to *οὐ*. *οὐ μὴ ἐργάσηται* would be a familiar formula. — *ὅς βούλει*, a singular expression for (*τις*) *οὐ βούλει*, to be referred to the rule of attraction of the relative. Comp. Cr. § 526. γ. The verb must be regarded as coalescing with *ὅς* to form one notion, like *quisvis* in Latin. — *ὦς γε διακόνους εἶναι πόλεως, as to*

their being servants of the state, or considering them merely as (ὡς γε) being servants of the state. Stallb. thinks that the phrase arises, by a *confusio duarum locutionum*, out of ὡς . . . διακόνους, and διακόνους εἶναι. But the infinitive with ὡς can be used in this relation to the main verb, as well as in others. — καὶ μὴ ἐπιτρέπειν, and in regard to not letting them have their own way. The infinitives limit διέφερον. — τούτων, politicians of the present day.

C. οὐδὲν πανόμεθα . . . ἀτί. Comp. 491, A. — ἀγνοοῦντες ἀλλήλων ὃ τι λέγομεν. ἀγνοέω takes a genitive, like μανθάνω and other verbs of learning or understanding. Soph. § 182; Cr. § 375. β; K. § 273. 5, f.

D. ἢ δυνατὸν εἶναι is for ἢ δ. ἔστι, by a change of style from direct to suspended discourse. Supply ὁμολογήκαμεν. — φίγῳ is for φίγοι, subjunctive of φίγόω; and so φίγῶν for φίγον infinitive, in Aristoph. Clouds, 442. This is quite analogous to the contraction of πεινάω, and a few others in αώ, by η instead of α, but is usual with no other verb except ἴδροω. Buttmann (largest Gr. 1. 506, and note in Heindorf) thinks that both contractions are relics of a general method prevailing in old Ionic. — τούτων γὰρ πορειστικὸν εἶναι, etc. This sentence changes its structure, and proceeds as if ὄντα, and not εἶναι, had stood here. The anacoluthon is caused by the explanatory clause ἢ κάπηλον ὄντα . . . σκυτοδεψόν, and by the difficulty of carrying out the original construction.

518 A. διὸ δὴ καὶ ταύτας . . . εἶναι. The construction changes from ὄντι and a finite verb, εἰδότι ὄντι ἔστι τις, etc., to an infinitive with its subject accus. — ταύτα ὅν ταύτα, etc. Now at one time you seem to be aware that I say that the selfsame thing holds good of the soul also, and you agree to it, as if understanding what I mean. τοτὲ μὲν answers to ὀλίγον δὲ υστερον, and δὲ is, in a sense, out of its place.

B. προτεινέσθαι, to hold forward as a sample of what

one has got, hence to take, or select as a specimen. — ὁμοιοτάτους . . . ἀσπερ. See 485, A. — Θεαρίων must have been the fashionable baker at Athens. He is thus spoken of in a fragment of the Gerytades of Aristophanes (*Athenaeus*, 3. 112, E): ἦκω Θεαρίωνος ἀρτοπάλιον | λιπών, ἵν' ἐστὶ κριβάνων ἐδώδια, — which is a parody of the beginning of the *Hecuba*. And a longer fragment from the *Omphale* of Antiphanes, preserved in the same place, asks, (by way of parody on Soph. *Electr.* 257, perhaps,) how a man of noble birth could ever go out of the house where he saw the white loaves of bread . . . οὐς δημόταις | Θεαρίων ἐδειξεν. — ἀρτοκόπος. In a number of MSS., ἀρτοποῖος appears. Still another word for the same thing is ἀρτοπόπος, which has most commendation from the Atticists, and which has probably been without reason thrust out of its place by the other words in a number of instances. See Lobeck on *Phrynicus*, 222. — *Mithaikos*, etc. *Mithæcus, who wrote the treatise called “La Cuisine Sicilienne.”* The Sicilians were in the gastronomic art to the Greeks what the French are now to the world, and *Mithæcus* was a Syracusan cook. *Repub.* 3. 404, D, Συρακουσίων τράπεζην καὶ Σικελικὴν ποικιλίαν ὅψαν, ὡς ἔοικας, οὐκ αἰνεῖς. *Athenaeus*, 12. 518, C, διαβόητοι εἰσιν ἐπὶ τρυφῇ καὶ αἱ Σικελῶν τράπεζαι. Comp. also Cicero de Fin. 2. 28. According to Maximus Tyrius (23. 1), cited by Routh, *Mithæcus* went to Sparta, but they, thinking that too many cooks would spoil their broth, drove him away. — To Sarambus (or Sarabus, as Meineke, Com. Græc. frag. 4. 525, would write the name) many later writers allude, but they seem to have derived their knowledge of him from this passage. See the commentators on *Suidas*, *sub voce*.

C. παρουσκεναστὰς ἀνθρώπους. ἀνθρώπος is often added in contempt, having something of the force of our *fellow*. ἀνὴρ is used on the contrary with an honorable sense. This

is shown at large in Valckenaer's Opusc. 2. 243, ed. Lips. — *οἵ, ἀν οὐτι τύχωσιν*, etc. *Who, it may be, after they have filled and fattened the bodies of the men, and while they are praised by them, will cause the loss (not only of this increase of flesh, but) of their old flesh besides.*

D. *ὅταν δὴ αὐτοῖς ἥξῃ*, *when now their former repletion shall have brought on disease a good while afterwards.* *ἥξω φέρων* is often nearly the same as *φέρω*, and can only be figuratively explained here of the repletion acting as a cause bringing in its train disease as the effect.

E. Nothing is truer than these remarks. The seeds of present national evil are sown in the past, and yet we blame the men of the present for what we suffer, and praise the men of the past, who are the true source of our calamities. It is thus that some, who look with alarm on the turn our affairs are taking, worship Jefferson as a political saint. — *καὶ φασὶ . . . αὐτοῖς* is for *καὶ οὓς φασι*, by a change of style from the relative to the demonstrative.

519 A. *καταβολή*. *περιοδικὴ λῆψις πυρετοῦ*, interprete Timæo Lex. p. 154 ubi v. Ruhnken. Heindorf. — *Ἀκιβιάδον*. As he had some time before left Athens for the last time, Plato is here forgetful of dates. See 481, D, note, and Appendix, No. I.

B. *ἀγανακτούντων*, sc. *αὐτῶν*, these politicians.

C. Comp. 460, C, and Xen. Memorab. 1. 2. 7. — *κινδυνεύει ταῦτὸν εἶναι, (τούτοις,) ὅσοι*, *the same thing seems to hold good of those who*, etc. But Mt. § 632, has a different explanation of the form of the sentence.

D. *καὶ τούτον τοῦ λόγου*. For *καὶ*, Heindorf, without authority, writes *καίτοι*. But *καὶ*, in the beginning of imperative and interrogative sentences, marks liveliness of transition (Mt. § 620), like our *and* in animated questions, particularly in those where objections are refuted. — *δημηγορεῖν με ἡνάγκασας*. See 482, C, 494, D.

E. *συχροὺς τείνω τῶν λόγων.* The construction seems to be *τινας τῶν λόγων συχροὺς τείνω*, i. e. ὡστε συχροὺς εῖναι, *some things which I have to say I dwell largely upon.* But if *λόγων* depends on *συχροὺς*, as it well can (comp. Soph. § 177. 1), the sense must be, I think, *a good many of my discourses I extend in length.* — πρὸς φιλίου. See 500, B.

A. *ὅταν τύχωσιν.* Comp. 514, E, 518, C. — What is 520 said here refers to Protagoras, Prodicus, and other professed teachers of virtue, as Heindorf remarks ; and it is amusing to see the contempt felt by the friend of Gorgias, a mere teacher of words (*λέγειν οἴεται δεῖν ποιεῖν δεινούς*, Meno, 95, C), for the Sophists, whose pretensions were as much higher as wisdom is higher than eloquence.

B. *ἢ . . . ἀμα καὶ ξαντῶν κατηγορεῖν.* Here supply *δεῖν* or *ἀνάγκην εῖναι*, which is readily suggested by *ἐγχωρεῖν*. Comp. 517, A.

C. *προεσθαι, to bestow freely, and in the first instance, without knowing what return the party receiving the favor will make.* Comp. Thucyd. 2. 43, *κάλλιστον ἔργον αὐτῇ προείμενοι, bestowing upon their country a most precious contribution.* So *προεμένους εὐεργεστατῶν*, Xen. Anab. 7. 7. 47, where Schneider adverts to this sense. — *ἄνευ μισθοῦ.* Protagoras, who first openly called himself a Sophist and took pay (Protag. 349, A), says (328, B) that he had a price, which his student might give if he pleased ; but if not, that the student went to a temple, and paid so much as he (the student) pronounced on oath the instructions to be worth. For the opinions of Socrates on this point, see, among the rest, Xen. Memorab. 1. 6. 13. — *ἐνεχώρει.* The absolute form without *ἄν* is here used for the hypothetical with it. See Mt. § 508, Obs. 2 ; K. § 260, R. 3. — *τὴν χάριν, the favor due, the compensation, as a mark of a grateful mind.* — *καὶ μὴ συνθέμενος . . . τὸ ἀργύριον, and should not take the money in consequence of a bargain made*

with him (i. e. should not take it as the payment which was stipulated) *at the very time when he was imparting to him the power of swiftness.* ὅτι μάλιστα is joined with ὥμα to increase its precision.

E. έὰν μή τις αὐτῷ διδῷ. αὐτῷ refers to the indefinite subject of φέρει. — ἀντ' εὖ ποιεῖν. There can be little doubt that Stallb. is right in separating these words, in opposition to Buttman (2. 361, largest Gr.), who writes in one word ἀντευποιεῖν. εὖ and δυς are united only to derivative forms, except in the instance of the strange word δυσθηίσαν, used by Euripides. — εἰ εὖ ποιήσας. Heindorf writes ὁ εὖ ποιήσας, “sed fallitur, loco qui repudiat articulum non recte explicato.” Hermann on Eurip. Hecuba, 485, 2d ed. The indefinite subject is understood, and εὖ ποιήσας denotes *after conferring a favor.*

521 A. ὡς διακονόσοντα καὶ ὄμιλόσοντα. Instead of writing τὴν τοῦ διακονεῖν καὶ ὄμιλεῖν, Plato deserts the construction of the nearest words, through the influence of ὡς ἵτρόν, and accommodates the participles to παρακαλεῖς. See Mt. § 555, Obs. 2. Just below, Heindorf, Coray, and Stallb. think that ὡς has fallen out before κολακεύσοντα.

B. εἰ σοι Μυσόν γε ἥδιον καλεῖν. The sense of this vexed passage seems to be that which Stallb. and Olympiod., whom he cites from the MSS., give to it, *if you like better to call* (such a man) *a Mysian*, call him so; i.e. “You may give the political man the most contemptible name that you can find. Do as you like about that, since if you will not act so as to gratify the Athenians (εἰ μὴ . . . ποιήσεις) you will —.” The apodosis to εἰ . . . καλεῖν is omitted, being readily suggested by the sense of the passage. It is οὕτως κάλει, or οὐδέτερ καλένει, or something equivalent. The apodosis which εἰ μὴ . . . ποιήσεις would have had, if Socrates had not cut the sentence short, is to be found in his words. With καλεῖν must be understood τοῦ-

τον, this political man, whom in fact, though not in so many words, Socrates calls a *κόλακα*. But the connection with the foregoing must be owned to be rather loose. The Mysians stood low among the people of Asia Minor. *Μυσῶν ἔσχατος* (Theætet. 209, B) is a proverb for the vilest of the vile. Cicero, in his *Or. pro Flacco*, § 27, says, “*Quid porro in Græco sermone, tam tritum atque celebratum est, quam, si quis despiciatui dicitur, ut Mysorum ultimus esse dicatur?*”

C. *οὐχ ἔξει ὅ τι χρήσεται αὐτοῖς.* *αὐτοῖς* is *his property*, before spoken of in *ἴαν τι ἔχω*. In 465, C, the indicative, but in many places the subjunctive, follows *ἔχω* in this formula. The distinction seems to be, that with the future the action is viewed as simply future; with the subjunctive, as connected with and dependent on some contemplated cause and ground of action. Thus, in *οὐκ ἔχει ὅ τι χρήσεται*, the subject is in doubt about his future action; in *οὐκ ἔ. ὅ. χρήσωμαι*, about his rational future action. — *ἄς μοι δοκεῖς.* *ἄς* is exclamatory. — *ἄς οἰκῶν . . . καὶ οὐκ ἄν εἰσαχθεῖς*, as though you were living aloof, and could not be brought (on trial) into court. For *εἰσαχθεῖς ἄν* comp. 458, A, note.

D. *ὅ τι τύχοι.* Mireris Heindorfium *ὅ τι ἄν τύχοι* corrigentem. Nam optativus post relativa in obliqua oratione haudquaque infrequens est. Addito *ἄν* hoc loco scribendum erat *τύχη*. Stallb. — The dissatisfaction with the political institutions of Athens, which is here clearly implied, was felt by Socrates to some degree, but far more by Plato, whose ideal turn of mind was not fitted to find satisfaction in the present under any system, particularly under one where demagogues reigned, and philosophers had to drink poison. — *πονηρός*. An allusion, no doubt, to the actual accusers. — *οὐδέν γε ἀτοπον*, sc. *εἶη*.

E. *τὰ κομψὰ ταῦτα.* An allusion to what Callicles says, 486, C. — *ὅδε εἰργασται ἀνήρ.* *ὅδε*, like *οὗτος*, 489, B,

used of a person who is present and pointed at, has no article. — *καὶ αὐτοὺς, καὶ τοὺς νεωτάτους.* *αὐτοὺς* is taken with *ὑμᾶς εἰσγαστρί*, and serves to contrast the whole *ὑμᾶς* with the part *νεωτάτους*. *καὶ* = *and especially.* — *νεωτάτους διαφθείρει.* An allusion to the actual charge against Socrates. Comp. 522, B.

522 A. For *εὐωχεῖν* governing two accusatives, see Mt. § 421, Obs. 1; Cr. § 430. This construction (which *γεύω* also sometimes takes) seems to be owing to this; that the verb means substantially *to make to eat*, and needs an object for each of these notions. — The sentiment conveyed by this comparison of the cook and the physician is expressed in another way by Crates of Thebes, a Cynic philosopher who flourished at Athens in Alexander's time (Diog. Laert. 6. 86) : *τιθει μαγείρῳ μνᾶς δέκ', ιατρῷ δραχμήν· | κόλακι τάλαντα πέντε, συμβούλῳ καπνόν· | πόρη τάλαντον, φιλοσόφῳ τριώβολον.*

B. *οὐτε γάρ ήδονάς.* To *οὐτε*, *έάν τε* answers. An affirmative and a negative proposition are often thus bound together by *οὐτε* and *τε*; but *οὐτε* must come first. *αὐτοῖς* the judges implied in *δικαιοτήριον*. — *οὐτε οἷς πορίζεται*, i. e. *οὐτε τούτους, οἷς ταῦτα* (referring to *ήδοναι*) *πορίζεται*. — *ἀπορεῖν ποιοῦντα.* This was a frequent charge against Socrates. The doubt he threw upon their former opinions, and the unsettled state of mind which he produced, may have been unwelcome to a few, and regarded as dangerous by a few more; but probably nothing made him more unpopular than his provoking way of bringing men who argued with him to a stand, so that they did not know what to say. Meno says (79, D, cited by Heindorf), “O Socrates, I used to hear it said of you, before I became acquainted with you, that you do nothing else except *αὐτός τε ἀπορεῖς, καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ποιεῖς ἀπορεῖν.*”

C. *πράττω τὸ ὑμέτερον δὴ τοῦτο, and herein I am doing*

just (*δῆ*) *what is for your interest.* Ast takes *πάντα ταῦτα* with *πράττω*, as well as with *λέγω*, and *ὑμέτερον . . . τοῦτο* as added in apposition. — *οὗτος διακείμενος* (not *οὗτω*). · Videlatur *οὗτος*, etiam sequente consona litera, usurpatum esse ubi *vi* et pondere suo pollet plurimum. Stallb. — *ἐν αὐτῷ ὑπάρχοι.* Heindorf wishes to erase *ἐν*, or write *ξ*, with some reason, as *ὑπάρχω* takes with it a simple dative.

D. *βοήθεια ἔσαντῷ.* This noun with the dative denotes *help afforded to*; with the genitive, *against* (comp. *βοήθεια κακοῦ*, 509, C, *βαρβάρων*, Plat. Epist. 7. 332, E), or *to* any one. — There is an allusion here to 486, B.

E. *αὐτὸ τὸ ἀποθρήσκειν.* Comp. for the sentiment Plato's Apol. 28, B, et seq. — *φοβεῖται*, sc. *πᾶς τις*, by brachylogy supplied from *οὐδεὶς*, just above. See my note on Soph. Antig. 29. — *ώς τοῦτο οὗτος ἔχει* depends on *λόγον λέξαι*, as if it were *λόγῳ δεῖξαι* *ώς . . . ἔχει*.

A. *φασι*, i. e. *as story-tellers say, when they begin a story.* — *λόγος* opposed to *μῦθος* is *a historical narrative, a true story*, as opposed to *a fictitious narrative.* — "Ομηρος λέγει. Iliad. 15. 187. — καὶ ἀεὶ καὶ νῦν ἔτι, et semper et nunc etiam. Ast. *ἔστιν* includes a past tense.

B. *νεωστὶ*, *in modern times*, used relatively to the days of Saturn. — *οἱ ἐκ . . . νήσων.* The preposition is accommodated to *ἰόντες* (see Soph. Electr. 137), because the officers set over the blessed islands came *from thence*. Comp. Cr. § 659; K. § 300. 4; and 472, B, note.

C. *ἐκατέρωσε*, *in each direction*, to the blessed islands, and to the prison of punishment.

D. *προκεκαλυμμένοι* = *ἔχοντες προκεκαλυμμένον.* See Aesch. Prometh. 362; Soph. Electr. 54. The sense is, *having eyes and ears, and the whole body, spread as a veil before the soul.* — *αὐτοῖς . . . ἐπιπροσθετιν γίγνεται*, *are in their way.* — *τοῦτ' αὐτῶν, this property of theirs, this in them.*

E. ἐξαιφρης ἀποθανόντος = εὐθὺς ἀποθανόντος, *the moment he is dead.* Soph. § 222, N. 4. — By a constructio ad sensum, ἔσημον . . . καταλιπόντα are in the masculine, because τὴν ψυχὴν ἔκάστου is the same as *each person.* — δύο ἐκ τῆς Ασίας. Routh explains this by their being born of Europa, a Phœnician, and adds, that Minos was regarded by some as a stranger in Crete. “Sed Cretam insulam Asiæ assignasse videntur veteres sicut Libyam modo Europæ modo Asiæ contribuerunt; ut duas orbis terrarum partes posuerint, Asiam et Europam.” Ast. But no proof has been found elsewhere, that Crete was assigned to Asia.

524 A. ἐν τῷ λειμῶνι, etc. Virgil, Aeneid, 6. 540 :—

“ Hic locus est, partes ubi se via findit in ambas:
Dextera, quæ Ditis magni sub mœnia tendit,
Hac iter Elysium nobis: at lœva malorum
Exercet pœnas, et ad impia Tartara mittit.”

B. οὐ πολὺ ἡττον . . . ἥνπερ καὶ ὅτε ἔζη. A free and rather irregular construction, instead of οὐ πολὺ ἡττον . . . ἥ ὅτε ἔζη. ἥνπερ is brought in through the influence of τὴν ἔξιν τὴν αὐτοῦ, and alters the ensuing words to suit itself.

D. οἷος εἶναι παρεσκεύαστο, etc., *such as he had prepared himself to be while living in regard to his body*, i. e. such as were his ways of using his body. Just below, ἔρδηλα ταῦτα refer to the qualities of body implied in οἷος εἶναι παρεσκεύαστο, as if οἷα ἔσχεν ἐν τῷ σώματι had been written.

E. κατεῖδεν . . . ψυχῆς. The aorist marks indefinite time (484, A, note): ψυχῆς depends on οὐδέν; *nothing belonging to, or in, the soul.* Comp. Repub. 376, A, ὁ καὶ ὄξιον θαύμασαι τοῦ θηρίου. — ὀλλὰ διαμεμαστιγωμένην, etc. Tacit. Annal. 6. 6, “ Neque frustra præstantissimus sapientiæ firmare solitus est, si recludantur tyrannorum mentes, posse adspici laniatus et ictus; quando, ut corpora verbibus, ita sævitia, libidine, malis consultis animus dilaceretur.”

B. οἱ ὡφελούμενοι . . . καὶ διδόντες, i.e. those who, while 525 they suffer, are made better . . . are such as, etc.

C. τοῖς ἀετ. See 464, D; Prometh. 937.

D. τοὺς πολλοὺς . . . παραδειγμάτων. By a *constructio ad sensum*, παραδειγμάτων used of the persons who serve as examples, is joined to πολλούς, as if it were masculine. — "Οὐηρος. Odys. 11. 575, seq.

E. οὐ γὰρ ἐξῆν αὐτῷ, sc. συνέχεσθαι. — ἐκ τῶν . . . ἀρθρωποι, the men who prove to be even very wicked are of the class of the powerful. Here, 497, A, 526, B, and elsewhere, γίγνεσθαι means to become subjectively, i.e. to become in the view of the mind, to be found out to be.

C. ἐπισημηνάμενος, εἴν τε, etc., putting his mark upon him to show whether he thinks him curable or not. Comp. Repub. 10. 614, which I will give in English. "When, therefore, his soul went out of his body, he began a journey, with a number of others, and they came to a wonderful place, where there were two openings in the ground close by one another, and others opposite to them above in the sky. Between these judges sat, who, whenever they finished judging, bade the just take the road on the right and upwards through the sky, having first attached certificates (*σημεῖα*) to those who had been judged, in front; and ordered the unjust to take the road to the left and leading downward, with marks behind indicating all their conduct." — οὐ πολυπραγμονήσαντος, who has not been "a busybody in other men's matters," who has not gone out of his own sphere of duties, to perform a part belonging to another. In Repub. 4. 433, A, it is made a definition of justice, that a man τὰ αὐτοῦ πράττει καὶ οὐ πολυπραγμονεῖ. Here the words especially point at taking an active part in politics, which, for a man who is not yet qualified for political life, is undertaking another's duty to the neglect of his own.

C, D. ἐκάτερος . . . νέκυσσαιν. This passage is considered to be spurious by Heindorf and Ast, for reasons which, as far as I can see, are altogether insufficient. The passage from Homer is in Odys. 11. 568.

E. ἀντιπαραγωγαλῶ. ἀντὶ denotes *in my turn*, in reply to the exhortations which you gave me to engage in politics. Just below, ἀντὶ . . . ὀγώνων denotes *worth all the trials here*, i. e. to be set against, or equal in importance to all the trials before human tribunals, where rhetoric, as its advocates alleged, would save a man from condemnation. ζεθάδε, ἔκει, and ἔκεισε are often used of *this life*, and of *death or a future state*; the context of course suggesting the explanation. Comp. Soph. Antig. 76; Electr. 356; Eurip. Alcest. 363.

527 A. τὸν τῆς Αἰγίνης νιόν. Æacus (son of Jupiter and Ægina), as being the judge for all from Europe. Olympiod. apud Stallb. says, "He adds Ægina because Callicles was from Ægina." But as that Platonic Scholiast can have known nothing about Callicles, I suspect that the last word, Αἰγίνης, is an error in transcribing for Εὐρώπης, occasioned by the similar word preceding it. — χασμήσει, etc. This noble passage alludes to 486, B. — τυπτήσει. The Attic form of the future of τύπτω, according to Thomas Magister and Mœris sub voce. Comp. Aristoph. Clouds, 1379, 1443. The later writers used all the forms from τυπτέω, unless it be the present and imperfect.

B. ἔκεισε . . . συμφέρων, *advantageous there*. See 526, E. The adverb of motion is used, because the journey from this world is thought of. It is the same as *when we go thither*. Comp. the opposite in Æschin. c. Ctes. § 97, Bekker: "He said that he wished to report to you τὴν ἐν Πελοποννήσου πρεσβείαν ἦν ἐπρέσβευσε, his embassy into Peloponnesus, strictly *the embassy into P. from which he had returned*. — ἥρεμεῖ, *remains quiet, unshaken*, i. e. *unre-*

futed. —— οὐ τὸ δοκεῖν εἶναι ἀγαθόν, ἀλλὰ τὸ εἶναι. Comp. the noble words in Repub. 2. 361, A, ἐσχάτη ἀδικία δοκεῖν δίκαιον εἶναι, μή ὄντα. Æschylus was the source of the expression, Sept. c. Theb. 574, οὐ γάρ δοκεῖν ἄριστος ἀλλ' εἶναι θέλει, upon which words all the theatre turned and looked at Aristides, according to Plutarch in his life.

C. οὗτω χρηστέον. οὗτω is immediately explained by ἐπὶ τὸ δίκαιον ἀεί. —— ἐνταῦθα, *to that kind of life.* ἐνταῦθα came perhaps to be used with a verb of motion, because with the motion its end, rest in the place, is often thought of. —— ὡς ὁ λόγος σημαίνει, *as the discourse shows.* Stallb. gives ὡς ὁ σὸς λόγος, with the best of the MSS., to which Ast very justly objects. The same false reading appears 511, B, 460, C, and Socrates could not call the argument, so far as it proved this point, the argument of Callicles, to whom he here speaks.

D. πατάξαι. The interpreters are divided between πατάξαι, with which ξεσόν τινα and σε, from σον, just above, are to be supplied, and πάταξαι sine te verberari. Buttmann even denies that the middle can have this sense, and, I incline to think, with reason. It may denote *strike yourself*, or *get yourself struck* (i. e. do something which shall cause the action of striking to come back upon yourself), but not *allow yourself to be struck*, i. e., in this place, “bear such an infliction without thinking it the greatest evil in the world.” Stallb., in defence of the middle so used, cites from Aristoph. Clouds, 494, φέρ' ἵδω τι δράς, ἢν τις σε τύπτῃ; where Strepsiades replies, τύπτομαι: this word Stallb. takes in the sense of ἔω ἐμαυτὸν τύπτεσθαι. I apprehend that τύπτομαι is in the passive. “What do you do,” says Socrates, “if a person beats you?” “I am beaten,” is the reply; i. e. I do nothing but suffer, I get beaten. We need not be troubled by σύ γε θαρρών; for σὺ is occasionally repeated with γε in the second clause, with a certain increase of

force in the exhortation. Comp. Herodot. 7. 10, “I shall hear of you as being torn to pieces by dogs and birds, $\eta\; \kappa\sigma\nu$ $\dot{\epsilon}\nu\; \gamma\eta\; \tau\eta\; \mathcal{A}\theta\eta\tauai\omega\eta\;$ $\eta\; \sigma\acute{\epsilon}\; \gamma\epsilon\; \dot{\epsilon}\nu\; \tau\eta\; \mathcal{A}\alpha\kappa\epsilon\deltaai\mu\omega\eta\omega\eta\;$;” Soph. ΟEd. Tyr. 1101, $\tau\acute{\iota}\zeta\; \sigma\acute{\epsilon}\dots\;\ddot{\epsilon}\tau\acute{\iota}\kappa\tau\acute{\epsilon}\dots\; \Pi\alpha\eta\acute{\iota}\sigma\dots\; \pi\varrho\sigma\sigma\pi\epsilon\lambda\alpha\sigma\theta\epsilon\eta\sigma\acute{\iota}\;$, $\eta\; \sigma\acute{\epsilon}\; \gamma\epsilon\; \dots\; \mathcal{A}\o\xi\mathfrak{lo}\mathfrak{v}$; The same is true of $\ddot{o}\; \gamma\epsilon$, and *tu* in Latin. Nor do I see how $\mathcal{O}\alpha\dot{\eta}\dot{\omega}\mathfrak{w}\nu$ opposes this construction any more than $\mathcal{O}\alpha\dot{\eta}\dot{\omega}\mathfrak{o}\mathfrak{u}\mathfrak{n}\mathfrak{t}\mathfrak{w}\mathfrak{s}$ would. The sense, then, is, *Yes, indeed, and do you calmly let him give you this dishonorable blow.* — Stallb., I find, has given up his defence of $\pi\acute{\alpha}\tau\alpha\xi\mathfrak{s}\mathfrak{u}\mathfrak{i}$, imperative middle, in his second edition.

E. $o\acute{\iota}\zeta\; o\mathfrak{u}\mathfrak{d}\mathfrak{e}\mathfrak{p}\mathfrak{o}\mathfrak{t}\mathfrak{e}\mathfrak{t}\; \tau\alpha\mathfrak{n}\mathfrak{t}\mathfrak{a}\; \delta\mathfrak{o}\mathfrak{x}\mathfrak{e}\mathfrak{i}\mathfrak{t}$. Comp. 491, B. He includes himself in the censure, to give it a milder form.

A P P E N D I X.

No. I.

Where and when does Plato represent this Dialogue to have taken place?

1. *Where?* In the house of Callicles, say all with whose opinion I am acquainted, except Schleiermacher. He decides in favor of some public place, such as the Lyceum, where other conversations of Socrates were held. His reasons, given in a note on his translation of Gorgias (Vol. III. 473, of his Plato), are principally these. 1. Socrates (447, B) seems to be going into the place where Gorgias is. He meets Callicles without, who says, “ Whenever you wish to come to my house, Gorgias will exhibit to you, for he lodges with me.” (See the note on that place.) The words, *whenever you wish to come*, must relate to some future time. What does Callicles do, then, if they are at his house, (Schl. leaves to be implied,) but shut the door in his visitors’ faces. To tell a stranger just entering your house to call at any time, without asking him in, is to turn him away.
2. Schl. finds it strange, and not consistent with Athenian politeness, that Callicles should have deserted his guests, and be going away from his own house. To these reasons of Schleiermacher’s may be added two others.
3. If Socrates and his friend were at the door of Callicles’s house to hear Gorgias display his rhetorical powers, and if Chærephon knew Gorgias well, why should they need the information that Gorgias lodged there?
4. Perhaps it may be

regarded as a slight argument, that Socrates says (506, A), *εἴμεν χαίρειν καὶ ἀπίωμεν*: to which Gorgias replies, “It does not seem to me that we ought yet *ἀπιέναι*.” For *ἀπιέναι* must have the same subject as the preceding *ἀπίωμεν*. Here, then, Socrates expects that the other parties to the conversation will go away from the place when the discourse is broken off; and Gorgias repeats what Socrates had said, including himself among those who would leave the place. But this could not be, if they were where Gorgias was staying.

No one within my knowledge has examined what Schleiermacher says on this point, or given reasons for choosing the house of Callicles as the scene of the Dialogue, except Cousin. His reasons, I must think, have little weight. 1. There would have been some allusion, direct or indirect, to the place, if a public one. The same might be said, with equal reason, I think, on the other side. 2. It was mainly in private houses, as Plato affirms in Hippias Major, that Gorgias spoke. Plato's expression is *ἰδιᾳ ἐπιδείξεις ποιούμενος*, and *ἰδιᾳ*, contrasted with *ἐν τῷ δῆμῳ* just preceding, means nothing more than *in other places besides the assembly*. 3. Of Callicles leaving his guests, and going out to talk with Socrates, he says, “Nothing is more natural than to go to meet persons who are visiting you, and whom you are to receive, at the entrance of your house.” If I mistake not, the porter would have admitted the strangers, and the master of the house have been in a distant part of the building. 4. To Schleiermacher's main remark, he replies, that, as Gorgias was fatigued, Callicles could not ask him to repeat his exhibition, and therefore begged the visitors to call at another time. But need they be turned away? Might they not be invited in, without the necessity of a new exhibition on the part of Gorgias?

2. *When?* The passage 473, E, which is treated of at

large in the note, has been usually supposed to determine the time. But several scholars, as Boeckh (which I learn from C. F. Hermann's work, 1. 634) and Foss, have ascribed an earlier date to the Dialogue, and one so early even as the first visit of Gorgias to Athens. The arguments, so far as I know them, with a single exception, are of little importance. They are,— 1. Pericles is spoken of as *νεωστὶ τετκευτηκώς*, 503, C. But *νεωστὶ* may be widely used. Comp. 523, B. “*Nuper, id est paucis ante saeculis.*” Cic. de Nat. Deor. 2. 50. It was twenty-four years before 405 B. C. And Pericles in this passage is contrasted tacitly with Themistocles, Cimon, and Miltiades, whose deaths were considerably earlier. 2. Archelaus is said to have committed the crimes by which he gained the throne “yesterday and the day before.” But this is very plainly a rhetorical contrast with the *παλαιοῖς πρόγυμασιν*, just before spoken of. See 470, D. 3. Demus, son of Pyrilampes, was a youth when the Wasps was written, seventeen years before 405 B. C. See 481, D. Suppose him thirty-two in 405, Plato, I imagine, if he had been aware, at the time of writing, of his exact age, would not have scrupled to say what he does. 4. The passage, 473, E, where Socrates speaks of his ignorance of the way to put the question when he was a presiding officer, is inconsistent with Apology 32, B, which refers to the famous occasion in 406 B. C. Socrates, therefore, must allude to something else. I can scarcely conceive how any one, used to the style of the Platonic Socrates, can take what he says 473, E, as sober earnest. 5. In 481, D, and 519, A, Alcibiades is spoken of as beloved by Socrates after their intimacy must long have ceased, and as likely to be punished by the Athenians, after his last departure from Athens, and a little before his death. This appears to me the most serious objection to the year 405. But I apprehend that this is by

no means the only instance in which Plato assigns the relations of one time to another, changing the more immaterial circumstances, as the tragic poets did those of the fables, to suit his design.

No. II.

On what is said of Pericles, 516, A, and on the Character given to him in this Dialogue.

AN eminent historian (Thirlwall, Hist. of Greece, Vol. III., chap. 18, and Appendix, 2) has examined the passage above quoted, and thinks that Plato's charge of peculation at this time arose out of a confusion of dates and circumstances. This may be so, but there are two things which ought to be said on behalf of Plato, before we fully condemn him for injustice towards his great countryman. The first is, that he expresses no opinion as to the justice of the charge. If it is admitted to be unjust, his argument is so much the stronger, for it turns upon the *ingratitude* of a people towards its public servants. Indeed, taken in connection with the charges against Themistocles, Cimon, and Miltiades, it wears the appearance of an unfounded accusation. The other is, that the fact may have been as Plato represents it: the people, in a sudden outburst of displeasure, may have at this time fined him, upon a charge of peculation so frivolous that Thucydides does not think it worthy of mention. The circumstances were these. Pericles was deposed from his office of general (Plut. Pericl. § 35, Diodor. 12. 45), — it may be at one of the *epicheirotoniæ*, or in consequence of a special process, an *eisangelia*. A suit was brought against him, — probably a *γραφή*, though Plutarch calls it a *δίκη*. Cleon, Simmias, or Lacratidas,

was his accuser, and he was fined in a sum variously estimated at fifteen, fifty (Plut.), and eighty (Diodor.) talents. The nature of the suit is not stated, but it certainly may have been κλοπὴ δημοσίων πραγμάτων, based upon some trifling circumstance, occurring at a time when moneys would be under his control, as commander of the forces. The general Timotheus, with no more reason, perhaps, was accused of treason, and then, at the rendering of his accounts (*euthynæ*), charged with bribery, and fined one hundred talents. To this it may be added, that Aristides, in his vindication of Pericles, nowhere, so far as I have observed, taxes Plato with inaccuracy, but follows his statement, as if he thought it true. And this he does in a work where he accuses Plato of anachronisms and misquotations. (Aristid. 2. 319, 327, de Quatuorv. ed. Dindorf. In the latter place the Sophist says:—“If one should ask Plato whether, supposing he had been one of Pericles’s judges when he was tried for peculation, he would have been one to condemn him, and would have given more weight to the words of Cleon than to those of Pericles, or,” etc.)

Plato, then, in this very serious and not at all ironical passage (see Thirlwall, III. 91), may have given no credit to the charge against Pericles, and, notwithstanding the silence of historians as to the nature of the suit, may be right in calling it one for peculation.

Upon another point, — Plato’s consistency in the character which he gives to Pericles, — I will say but a word. There are three passages which concern us here; Gorg. 515, C – 517; Meno, 99, B – 100, B, compared with 94, B; and Phædrus, 269, A – 270, B. In Meno, εὐδοξία, or correct opinion, is ascribed to Pericles, without wisdom, and in Phædrus he has the credit of possessing consummate eloquence, derived from the discipline of Anaxagoras. In

Gorgias, he is denied to be a true orator, but in Phædrus is declared to be πάντων τελεώτατος εἰς τὴν ὁγηογικήν. The seeming inconsistency can be explained by taking into consideration, that Plato judges of the orator in Gorgias by a moral standard, and in Phædrus looks at him as capable of producing a work of art; and perhaps by this consideration also, that while he would grant to Pericles all that knowledge of the mind which the physical instructions of Anaxagoras could furnish, he might still refuse to him the attributes of a truly philosophical artist.

No. III.

See 486, A, note.

THE verses yet extant of this dialogue between the brothers have been collected and emended by Valckenaer, Matthiæ, and others. We here add the passage adjacent to the lines cited or alluded to by Plato, according to Hartung's arrangement in his *Euripides Restitutus* (Hamburg, 1843). Zethus invites his brother Amphion to go a hunting, and, on his refusal, reproaches him with effeminity of mind, as giving himself up to the musical art and to indolence, while he neglects useful pursuits. To this scene Horace alludes (Epist. 1. 18. 39) :—

“ Nec tua laudabis studia, aut aliena reprêndes,
Nec, cum venari volet ille, poemata panges.
Gratia sic fratrum geminorum, Amphionis atque
Zethi, dissiluit, donec suspecta severo
Conticuit lyra; fraternalis cessisse putatur
Moribus Amphion.

Zethus first speaks :—

Ἄμφιον, ἀμελεῖς ὃν ἐπιμελεῖσθαι σε δεῖ·
ψυχῆς δὲ ... ἀδε γενναῖαν φύσιν

γυναικομίμῳ διαπρέπεις μορφώματι .
οὐτ' ἐν δίκης βουλαῖσιν δόθως ἄν λόγον
προθεῖο πιθανόν, οὔτ' ἂν ἀσπίδος κύτει
· · · · · διμιλήσεις, οὐτ' ἄλλων ὑπερ
νεανικὸν βουλευμα βουλεύσαιο. . . .
κακῶν κατάρχεις τῆνδε Μοῦσαν εἰσάγον
ἀσύμφορόν τιν' ἄτοπον
ἀργὸν φίλοιον χρημάτων ἀτημελῆ.

πολλοὶ δὲ θνητῶν τοῦτο πάσχουσιν κακόν.
γνώμῃ φρονοῦντες οὐ θέλουσ' ὑπηρετεῖν
ψυχῇ, τὰ πολλὰ πρὸς φίλων νικώμενοι.

ἀνὴρ γάρ ὅστις εὖ βίον κεκτημένος
τὰ μὲν κατ' οἶκους ἀμελίᾳ παρεῖς ἔσται,
μολπαῖσι δ' ἡσθεῖς τοῦτ' ἀεὶ θηρεύεται,
ἀργὸς μὲν οἴκοις καὶ πόλει γενήσεται,
φίλοισι δ' οὐδεὶς ἡ φύσις γάρ οἰχεται
ὅταν γλυκείας ἡδονῆς ἥσσων τις ἔη.
καὶ πῶς σοφὸν τοῦτ' ἔστιν, εἴ τις εὐφυῆ
λαβοῦσα τέχη φῶτ' ἔθηκε χείρονα
μήτ' αὐτὸν αὐτῷ δυνάμενον προσάρκεσαι ;

· · · · · μισῶ · · ·
σοφὸν λόγοισι, ἐς δ' ὄνησιν οὐ σοφόν.
· · · · · ἄλλ' ἐμοὶ πιθοῦ,
παῦσαι δ' ἀοιδῶν, πολεμίων δ' εὐμουσίαν
ἀσκει, τοιαῦτ' ἀειδ' ἀφ' ᾧν δόξεις φρονεῖν,
σκάπτων, ἀρῶν γῆν, ποιμνίοις ἐπιστατῶν,
ἄλλοις τὰ κομψὰ ταῦτ' ἀφείς σοφίσματα
ἔξ ὧν πενοῖσιν ἐγκατοικήσεις δόμοις.

ΑΜΦΙΩΝ.

ἐκ παντὸς ἄγ τις πράγματος δισσῶν λόγων

ιγῶνα θεῖτ' ἄν, εἰ λέγειν εἴη σοφός
 ὅς δ' εὐγλωσσία
 νικᾶ, σοφὸς μέν, ἀλλά τοι τὰ πράγματα
 κρείσσω νομίζω τῶν λόγων ἀεὶ ποτε.

λαμπρὸς δ' ἔκαστος κάπι τοῦτ' ἐπείγεται,
 νέμων τὸ πλεῖστον ἡμέρας τούτῳ μέρος
 ἵν' αὐτὸς αὗτοῦ τυγχάνῃ κράτιστος ὢν.

κ. τ. λ.

THE END.

E R R A T A.

Page 131, line 20, for *ἄν* read *ἀν*

- 132, " 34, " *ἐστι* " *ἐστιν*
139, " 20, " *ἐπ'* " *ἐπ'*
163, " 7, " whem " whom
164, " 12, " *τίνες* " *τινές*
164, " 13, " *σκιᾶς* " *σκιᾶς*
171, " 16, add a period at the end of the line.
189, " 14, for *ἰκανοὺς* read *ἰκανούς*
193, " 18, " *αὐτός* " *αὐτὸς*
194, " 28, " *εἰμί* " *εἰμὶ*
199, " 19, " *δή* " *δὴ*
201, " 4, " *περὶ* " *περί*
201, " 32, " *στρατὸς* " *στρατός*
201, " 33, " *ἱερὸν* " *ἱερόν*
219, " 27, " *εἴη* " *ἡν*
226, " 17, " *χρήσωμαι* " *χρήσηται*

BINDING SECT. JUL 3 - 1968

PLEASE DO NOT REMOVE
CARDS OR SLIPS FROM THIS POCKET

UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO LIBRARY
